

THE
BOURBON
RESTORATION

MAJOR JOHN R. HALL

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
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THE BOURBON RESTORATION

CHAPTER I

LOUIS LE DESIRÉ

ON March 30th, 1814, the campaign of France terminated with the Battle of Paris. The last fractions of the Imperial army which interposed between the capital and the Allies were hurled back on the city. Joseph Bonaparte, the ex-King of Spain, the Emperor's Lieutenant-General, witnessed the scene from the heights of Montmartre. When he saw that Marmont and Mortier's attenuated battalions were enveloped and overborne, he sent word to the Marshals to make the best terms they could with the enemy, and himself fled to rejoin the Empress Marie Louise at Blois. After continuing the struggle for about three hours longer, Marmont asked for and obtained a suspension of hostilities.¹ In the evening a convention was drawn up, under the terms of which the Russian and Prussian armies, the next day, made their entry into Paris.²

Napoleon himself was at Fontainebleau gathering round him the remnants of his army. Though he was a factor, which in all military calculations could never be overlooked, the situation seemed beyond the power even of his genius to retrieve.³ In Paris all eyes were turned towards the Tsar, whom circumstances had made the arbiter of the destinies of France. But Alexander had not yet decided, to his own satisfaction, the form which the future government was to assume. If he was determined to depose Napoleon, he had not yet settled the question as to who should be his successor. The plan of enthroning the Duc d'Orléans or Bernadotte had much to commend it. In some quarters he was

¹ H. Houssaye, 1814, pp. 496-505.

Marmont, *Mémoires*, VI. pp. 244-247.

² H. Houssaye, 1814, p. 537.

³ Madame de Staël, *Considérations sur la Révolution* (Vol. III. 2me édition), Chapitre VI.

Pasquier, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 240-259.

urged to allow the infant King of Rome to be proclaimed Emperor, with Marie Louise or Eugène de Beauharnais as Regent. In others, it was suggested that the establishment of a Republic might prove to be the best solution of the problem. A Bourbon Restoration presented the drawback that it would entail the return to France of a crowd of *émigrés* thirsting for revenge. During the campaign in the eastern provinces the Tsar had seen nothing to make him believe that the exiled House counted many adherents. In the south, on the other hand, Bordeaux had hoisted the white flag, and had received the Duc d'Angoulême with open arms. Vitrolles and the Royalist agents, moreover, assured him that in Paris public opinion was favourable to the Bourbons. But, as he rode along at the head of his troops, it was not till the Boulevard des Italiens was reached, that Alexander perceived anything to confirm their statements. At this point, in contrast to the silence which had been hitherto observed, a crowd of young nobles wearing the white cockade, greeted the invaders with loud cries of "Long live the Allies!" "Long live the Bourbons!"¹

During his stay in Paris the Tsar was the guest of Talleyrand in the Rue Saint-Florentin. In these days he still attached great weight to his host's opinions. "The Bourbons," Talleyrand now impressed upon him, "represented a principle, the principle of Legitimate Sovereignty." Alexander had grave doubts whether this doctrine would find much favour with the French people.² Both Talleyrand and Dalberg, however, assured him that, if the Powers were to pledge themselves not to treat with Napoleon or any of his family, the Legislative Assembly would itself call in the Bourbons.³ After consulting with the King of Prussia and with Schwarzenberg, Alexander issued a proclamation in the desired terms. A Provisional Government was, thereupon, appointed, and the next day, April 2nd, the Senate formally decreed the deposition of the Emperor.

In the meantime Napoleon was preparing to assume the offensive. Marmont and Mortier had rejoined him, and his army numbered between fifty and sixty thousand men.⁴ The conduct of the Senate only became known at Fontainebleau on April 4th. On receipt of the news the Marshals, whose allegiance to the Emperor was already sorely shaken, determined to intervene

¹ Pasquier, II. pp. 255-256.

Beugnot, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 88-92.

Mme. de Staël, *Considérations*, III. (2me édition), p. 43.

Houssaye, 1814, pp. 365, 366.

² Pasquier, II. p. 259.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 270, 278.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 285-295.

at once. Led by Ney, they sought his presence, and insisted on his abdication.¹ Finding that arguments were of no avail, and that the confidence, which he expressed in victory, left them unmoved, Napoleon personally drew up the Act by which he abdicated in favour of his son. Ney, Caulaincourt, and Macdonald, whom he himself selected for the mission, carried the document to the Tsar, and, as they passed through Essonnes, where his corps lay, they induced Marmont to go with them.

In spite of his official announcement that he would never treat with any member of the Bonaparte family, Alexander still clung to the idea that a Regency might prove to be the only alternative which the army would be prepared to accept. In order, thoroughly, to disabuse his mind of this notion, Talleyrand had been scheming to bring about the defection of a large body of troops.² Marmont, Duc de Raguse, owed everything to the Emperor. Nevertheless, as he confessed to Ney and his colleagues, he was, already, in secret communication with Schwarzenberg and the Provisional Government. During the negotiations which had taken place, after the cessation of hostilities on March 30th, Talleyrand had had a long conversation with him at his house in the Rue Paradis. He had seen the Marshal, "smoke begrimed and mudstained, the very incarnation of the battle," surrounded and eagerly listened to by all the men of light and leading in Paris. He had read his character like a book, and had realized how thoroughly the situation was to his taste.³ He felt certain that he would grasp any opportunity of again acting the chief part in a great event. An emissary was, accordingly, despatched to him, to insinuate that, were he to disassociate himself openly from the fortunes of the deposed Emperor, he would deserve the eternal gratitude of his countrymen. At the same time, the tempting prospect of playing the rôle of a second General Monk was adroitly dangled before his eyes. Marmont yielded, and undertook to march his *corps d'armée* to Versailles, within the Austrian lines, and to place his troops at the disposal of the Provisional Government. Before the unexpected arrival of Ney and the other envoys he had confidentially communicated this plan to the Divisional Generals under his command, and had apprised Schwarzenberg

¹ Pasquier, II. pp. 298-301.

Marmont, *Mémoires*, VI. pp. 260, 261.
H. Houssaye, 1814.

² Pasquier, II. pp. 289-292.

Marmont, *Mémoires*, VI. pp. 249-250.

³ Marmont, *Mémoires*, VI. pp. 269-286.
H. Houssaye, 1814, pp. 532-536.

Rovigo, *Mémoires*, VII. pp. 99-107.

that his intended movement would take place during the night of April 4th-5th.¹

The terms of Napoleon's abdication, and the representative character of the envoys who laid them before him, confirmed Alexander in the opinion that the French army would never consent to see the Imperial dynasty placed on one side. To the dismay of the Provisional Government he was visibly inclining to the idea of a Regency. The deliberations at Talleyrand's house were prolonged far into the night. At about 2 a.m. the Tsar retired to rest without having arrived at any definite conclusion. But when he rose again, a few hours later, his mind was made up.² The situation had in the meantime undergone a complete change. General Souham, commanding the 6th Corps, in Marmont's absence, had marched his troops into the Allied lines, at Versailles. To Alexander, the mystic, the event appeared in the light of a direct interposition of Providence to guide him through his difficulties. The army itself was declaring against Napoleon. His doubts and hesitations vanished. Ney and his companions were informed that the Emperor's abdication must include his whole family.³

Anxious as Talleyrand and his fellow-members of the Provisional Government were to recall the Bourbons, they proposed to set up a limited, not an absolute and unconditional Monarchy of the old type. They had, in consequence, drawn up a document which was adopted by the Senate on April 6th. Talleyrand named it the Constitutional Charter. By its terms "Louis-Stanislas-Xavier of France, brother to the late King, was summoned to the throne," but it was also provided that the Charter itself was to be submitted to a *plébiscite*, and Louis was only to be proclaimed King after he had sworn to adhere to its articles.⁴

Louis was in England, ill with the gout; but Vitrolles induced the Provisional Government to allow the Comte d'Artois⁵ to enter Paris as his brother's representative. The ceremony, which took place on April 12th, proved a brilliant success. Dressed in the uniform of the National Guard, Monsieur (the Comte d'Artois) rode through the streets, amidst a scene of general enthusiasm. His charming manners, which retained all the grace of the old Court, won the hearts of the Parisians. The saying, invented for him by Beugnot the next day, that

¹ Marmont, *Mémoires*, VI. pp. 255-260.

² Pasquier, II. 303-309.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 311.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 319.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 340-347.

Beugnot, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 107, 108.

"nothing is changed save that there is one Frenchman the more," was repeated from mouth to mouth.¹

France had now definitely passed under the Bourbon rule. The white flag became the national colour and, with the cockade, was imposed upon the army without encountering much resistance. Napoleon on April 6th, yielding a second time to the pressure of the Marshals, abdicated unconditionally. No sooner was it known that he had affixed his signature to the Act than the Palace was deserted. On some pretext or another the Marshals, Generals, and other great dignitaries of the Empire hastened away to Paris, to tender their services to the Provisional Government.² For the next week the *Moniteur* was full of the declarations of Berthier, Lefebvre, Kellermann, Oudinot, and many others. Even Hulin, so long the Military Governor of Paris and the President of the Prince d'Enghien's Court Martial, publicly announced his adhesion to the new order of affairs.³ On April 13th, after many hesitations, the ex-Emperor ratified the Treaty of Fontainebleau, which banished him to the Island of Elba. A week later he took leave of his Guards, embraced the eagle, and set out on the road to exile.

Neither promises nor conditions had been exacted from Monsieur, prior to his public entry into the capital.⁴ The negotiations, which ensued to define his constitutional position, disclosed the real aims of the Royalists and the interested motives which actuated some of the members of the Senate and the Provisional Government. On the one side, the Comte d'Artois was urged by his followers to assume the title of Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom; on the other, Talleyrand and his colleagues contended that, inasmuch as Louis had not yet subscribed to the conditions of the Charter, he had no power to delegate authority to anyone. The argument was unanswerable, and had it been persisted in, Monsieur would probably have acceded to whatever terms they might have seen fit to impose. But it was not the intention of Talleyrand, and still less of Fouché, who, since his arrival in Paris, on April 8th, had taken a prominent part in the negotiations, to drive too hard a bargain. As a regicide, Fouché's position under a Bourbon Monarchy must always be a delicate one. He had no desire to aggravate it by the display of an irreconcilable hostility to the

¹ Beugnot, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 110-114.

² Pasquier, II. p. 329.

³ *Ibid.*, 379.

H. Houssaye, 1814, p. 641.

⁴ Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, I. p. 296-299.

wishes of a Prince of the restored dynasty.¹ If at the conference held at the Pavillon de Marsan on April 14th his shrill voice had been raised in opposition to the Baron de Vitrolles, it was only that Monsieur's agent should be compelled to realize the importance of gaining the support of a man who could command a large following in the Senate. But having given proof of his strength, he was prepared with a solution to the difficulty. He undertook to arrange that Monsieur's claim to be recognized as Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom should be admitted, provided he would subscribe to the agreement which he forthwith wrote out. Monsieur was to declare that he was acquainted with the constitutional act which recalled his brother, and that, knowing his views and sentiments, he was prepared to accept, in his name, the fundamental conditions which it contained. On this basis a compromise was arrived at.

If in this result the conditional theory had been upheld at the expense of the legitimist principle, the gain was more apparent than real. The greed of the Senators in the matter of their endowments, the intrigues with Fouché, had revealed to Vitrolles the true state of the situation. Henceforward he had no hesitation in advising his Royal masters that the pretensions of the Senate to confer a crown, and to impose conditions on its wearer could be safely ignored. A fortnight later the experiment was tried with success.² On May 2nd, Louis XVIII, to give him the title by which he was now universally acknowledged, having arrived at Saint Ouen, outside the walls of Paris, issued his declaration in which he, merely, signified his general approval of the Charter, and announced that it would require to be modified in some particulars. His Majesty at the same time convened the Chambers for June 14th, when he promised that a Liberal Constitution should be submitted to them.

The next day, May 3rd, Louis XVIII made his formal entry into Paris. The weather was as fine as it had been on the day of Monsieur's reception, but the attitude of the people had undergone a marked change. The enthusiastic welcome which they had given to the Comte d'Artois they did not extend to the King. Already a sense of disillusion seemed to have come over them.³ His Majesty was seated in an open carriage, drawn by eight white horses, with his niece the Duchesse d'Angoulême

¹ Pasquier, II. pp. 350-359.

Madelin, *Fouché*, II. pp. 302-306.

² Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 1-6.

Beugnot, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 126-130.

³ Rovigo, *Mémoires*, VII. pp. 256, 257.

Beugnot, II. pp. 134, 135.

Marmont, *Mémoires*, VII. pp. 35-40.

(Madame) by his side, and with the old Prince de Condé and his son, the Duc de Bourbon, opposite to him. Monsieur was on horseback, surrounded by Marshals and Generals. Of all the members of the Royal Family, he alone appeared to be happy, genial, and perfectly at his ease. Madame, on the other hand, saw no reason, on this occasion, to relax the stern and unbending demeanour which was habitual to her. The Prince de Condé was almost in his dotage: neither he nor his son appeared to take much interest in what was going on. Of the occupants of the Royal carriage only the King displayed either graciousness or animation.¹ But the smiles and gestures, with which he pointed out objects of interest to his niece, seemed forced and theatrical and failed to win the approbation of the people. The general impression of gloom and constraint was heightened by the appearance of the ex-Imperial Guard. The stern, set faces of the veterans, who formed the Guard of Honour, froze the cheers on the lips of the spectators. In some places there were shouts of "Long live the old Guard!" but in others the silence was so complete that the measured tramp of the soldiers was the only sound which could be heard. To many present the scene conveyed the illusion that they were assisting at the funeral procession of the Emperor, not at the joyful entry of the restored King into his capital.

The news of Napoleon's downfall had reached Louis at Hartwell, the country house near Aylesbury, which he had hired from Sir George Dee, and where, under the title of the Comte de Lille, he had been living since 1809. In his Buckinghamshire home, on the allowance of £6000 a year made him by the English Government and a Russian subsidy, he had always contrived to keep up a certain state and to shelter about a hundred of his adherents.² At the time of his restoration he was a widower, his wife Marie Josephine de Savoie having died at Hartwell in 1810. Their forty-one years of married life had been childless and not particularly happy. Louis had commanding features and an agreeable voice, but though only fifty-nine years of age was already an infirm old man. His unwieldy bulk, and the frequent attacks of gout from which he suffered, rendered him almost incapable of moving without assistance. Yet in spite of these defects there was a stateliness in his bearing, which never failed to impress all those who were brought into contact

¹ Mme. de Boigne, *Mémoires*, I. pp. 388-390.

² Lipscomb, *History of Buckingham*, II. pp. 308, 326.

E. Daudet, *Histoire de l'émigration*, III. pp. 481, 482.

C. Greville's *Journals, Reigns of George IV and William IV* 1st edition, II. pp. 345, 346.

with him. Mentally, he was a man of superior intelligence, with a prodigious memory and with scholarly tastes, which he had cultivated through long days of exile, amidst the snows of Russia and Poland, and in the dull but peaceful years in England. From the time when the death of his nephew in the Temple had made him in his own eyes and in those of his followers King of France, he had never ceased to believe in the ultimate triumph of his cause. But before these hopes had come to be realized he had gone through days of direst poverty and had drunk the cup of humiliation to the dregs. The correspondence which M. Ernest Daudet has, recently, published bears witness to his imperturbable confidence and to his serene cheerfulness under misfortune. Some of his letters were written at the gloomiest period of his exile, when Western Europe was prostrate under the heel of Napoleon, and when no continental Sovereign dare consent to his remaining within his kingdom. Yet into the humblest of the appeals, which he was often compelled to make, he, invariably, contrived to infuse that sense of personal dignity which, under the most trying circumstances, never deserted him.¹

A constitutional indolence and an inability to do without an intimate friend and adviser, whom he could consult on all matters of daily life, were the two great defects of Louis' character. At the old Court, and during the first few years of exile, the post of favourite had been filled by a lady-in-waiting to his wife, the Comtesse de Balbi, by birth a Caumont La Force. Louis, who had himself a caustic tongue and a cynical turn of mind, delighted in her quick intelligence and pungent wit. For several years her influence over him was unbounded, and, though there was nothing in her character to make the suggestion probable, it seems to have been the general opinion of contemporaries that their connection was platonic. After Louis' quarrel with Madame de Balbi, the Comte d'Avaray, with whom he had made his escape from Paris in 1791, became his guide and the recipient of his most intimate thoughts. Their friendship remained unbroken till 1811, when d'Avaray died of consumption at Madeira.² His place in Louis' affections was then taken by the Comte de Blacas, whom d'Avaray, when he felt that his health was failing, had selected and trained for the duties of confidential friend to his beloved master.³

Few Sovereigns have been confronted with greater difficulties

¹ E. Daudet, *Histoire de l'émigration*, 3 vols., Hachette et Cie. Marmont, *Mémoires*, VII. pp. 48-52.

² Daudet, *Histoire de l'émigration*, I. p. 107.

³ *Ibid.*, III. pp. 453-455.

than Louis XVIII, at his restoration.¹ The spectacle of a gouty, elderly gentleman, weighing some eighteen stone, arriving at his capital in the wake of foreign armies and laboriously ascending the throne of the great Emperor, necessarily savoured of the ridiculous. Besides this inartistic opening to his reign, Louis suffered from the disadvantage of being completely unknown to the great mass of his new subjects.² It had been Napoleon's wish to surround the existence of the exiled Royal Family with silence. Occasionally, a sneering reference to the "King of Hartwell," or some allusion to Louis' unwieldy figure, might appear in the public press, but, generally speaking, it was the Emperor's policy to allow them to sink into oblivion. The very mention of the word "Royalist" aroused his wrath. Any agents of the Bourbons who fell into the hands of the police, under the Empire, were summarily dealt with, as spies or brigands, by a Military Commission. A line in the *Moniteur* would announce their fate, the next morning, to the public.³ The obscurity, however, which had surrounded Louis' name, his ignorance of the new men, and new institutions which had arisen in France during his absence, were only drawbacks which might soon have been overcome. The great majority of people were heartily sick of war, and were prepared to welcome any change which put an end to invasion and gave them peace. It was to be foreseen, however, that misgivings would arise when the first feeling of relief at the cessation of hostilities should have passed away. In the eyes of the peasant the white flag was associated with the old *régime*, tithes, seigniorial rights, and everything which he most detested. The purchaser of national property, as he looked up at the Royal Standard, was uncomfortably reminded that the noble whose forfeited estate he had bought belonged to the winning side, and was beginning to talk of restitution and compensation. It was a condition, essential to the stability of the restored Monarchy, that it should rest on a basis of national institutions, which owed their origin to the Revolution and which must be allowed to develop unchecked. As a first step in this direction Louis would have to forget many of the cherished traditions of his House, and set himself to allay the fears of those whose interests his restoration might appear to threaten. And in order that all classes of his subjects should be brought together to work for the common good, a reconciliation would have to be effected

¹ Cf. Beugnot, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 134, 135.

² E. Daudet, *Histoire de l'émigration*, III. pp. 450-452. Madelin, *Fouché*, I. p. 437.

³ Cf. G. Lenôtre, *Tournebut*, pp. 290-293.

between the old aristocracy, which had lost, and the new nobility and the *bourgeoisie* which had gained, by the Revolution. The happy solution of these problems would require patience and statesmanlike qualities. The difficulty of Louis' task was further enhanced by the fact that the majority of his chief supporters belonged to the class which had suffered most, and that he, himself, was identified with the policy of the emigration which had, deservedly, brought down upon the Bourbon Princes and the nobility the obloquy of their fellow-countrymen.

Taine has estimated that the *noblesse*, in the latter half of the eighteenth century, numbered about 140,000 members.¹ In pursuance of their absolutist system of government, the Bourbons had steadily set themselves to undermine the power of the nobility. Absenteeism on the part of the great nobles had been deliberately encouraged, and they had been taught to look to the King's favour as the object of their highest ambition. The conditions which reduced them to political nullity produced, in the course of years, an aristocracy which had lost all instinct of government. At the time of the Revolution the nobles were still a privileged, but they had long ceased to be a governing class.² In addition to loss of power, the *noblesse* during the eighteenth century had gradually been growing poorer. Marriages with heiresses outside their own class were expedients little in favour with the nobles of those days. The prejudices of their order debarred even the cadets of an aristocratic family from embarking on a lucrative calling. Under pain of loss of caste they had no option but to enter the Army, the Navy, or the Diplomatic service. The disunion which existed among them was a further source of weakness to their class. The "nobility of the Court" despised the provincial aristocracy, the "nobility of the sword" looked down upon the "nobility of the robe," as those families were termed of which the members, from father to son, filled the high places in the judicature. With the rest of their fellow-countrymen the nobles were highly unpopular.³ The middle classes were jealous of their privileges, and smarted under their insolence and pride of birth.⁴ The peasants had no liking for them. From the circumstances and habits of their lives they were, generally, in-

¹ H. Taine, *Origines de la France Contemporaine*, I. pp. 16, 17.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 42-56.

Tocqueville, *L'ancien Régime*, pp. 40-42.

Mme. de Staël, *Considérations sur la Révolution*, III. (2me édition), p. 15.

³ H. Taine, *Origines*, I. pp. 68-76.

⁴ Tocqueville, *L'ancien Régime*, pp. 43-45.

H. Taine, *Origines*, I. pp. 59-67.

different landlords. The majority of the great nobles had no thoughts beyond extracting as much money as they could from their estates, which they seldom visited except when in disgrace at Court. The members of the lesser aristocracy, who usually lived on their properties, were, as a rule, poor and narrow-minded men who did little either to ameliorate the conditions of the peasants or to improve the land.¹ Many, moreover, of the seigniorial rights, from which they chiefly derived their incomes, were serious obstacles in the way of a more enlightened system of agriculture.

In 1789 the nobility had become one of the institutions in an antiquated system which France was determined to abolish. Most of the members of the higher aristocracy themselves were, no doubt, dimly aware that changes had become necessary. But though some of them were strongly imbued with the philosophic spirit and had devoted attention to the study of social questions, the great crisis in their country's history was to find them singularly lacking in political intelligence and in constructive ability. That strange feature of the Revolution, known as the emigration,² began with the flight of the Comte d'Artois, the Prince de Condé, and the Polignac *clique* after the fall of the Bastille. This step was dictated far less by fear than by a desire for revenge. At the small Courts in Germany and in the other countries which they visited, the *émigrés* presented themselves, not as fugitives asking for shelter, but as a political party seeking allies. After the departure of these forerunners of the emigration the movement slackened.³ The march of the women to Versailles and the events of October 6th, 1789, gave it a fresh impulse. Henceforward the stream of voluntary exiles flowed, without interruption, across the northern and eastern frontiers. In the army the rapid spread of the revolutionary spirit had made the position of the officers difficult and, in some cases, dangerous. Under these circumstances they were ready to follow the example set them by the Princes and great nobles who had fled from their country.⁴ By August, 1791, so large a number of officers had deserted from their regiments, that the reorganization became necessary, which may be said to have converted the old Royal into the new revolutionary army.⁵

¹ H. Taine, *Origines*, I. 429-456.

² Tocqueville, *L'ancien Régime*, pp. 311-323.

A. Sorel, *Europe et Révolution*, II. pp. 6-9.

³ Daudet, *Histoire de l'émigration*, I. p. 20.

A. Sorel, *Europe et Révolution*, II. p. 5.

⁴ Daudet, *Histoire de l'émigration*, I. pp. 6, 7.

A. Sorel, *Europe et Révolution*, II. pp. 166, 167.

⁵ Thiers, *Révolution*, II. p. 147.

The Comte d'Artois was one of those men of limited intelligence naturally disposed to look with approval on small men and small measures. He had, to quote M. Sorel,¹ "all the qualities required for gaily losing a battle or for gracefully ruining a dynasty" and none of those needed for "managing a party or for reconquering a Kingdom." In M. de Calonne he found a congenial adviser. Seven years before Charles Alexandre de Calonne had been appointed Controller-General on account of his supposed financial ability. Even now, after dissipating with a supreme elegance his own fortune and terribly increasing the pecuniary embarrassments of France, he was still able to impress his friends with a belief in his profound knowledge of high politics.² The Comte d'Artois' plan for combating the Revolution was based on the supposition that it must be to the interests of all the Monarchical Powers to restore absolutism in France. Ludicrous as it sounds, he and M. de Calonne seriously imagined that they could use for the attainment of their own ends Marie Antoinette's brother, Leopold II, Emperor of Austria, the student of Machiavelli, diplomatist and statesman, Frederick William II, King of Prussia, the great Tsarina Catherine II, and William Pitt.³

At the beginning of 1790 a war, which threatened to involve all Europe, seemed on the point of breaking out.⁴ The alliance which the Tsarina had concluded with Joseph II, Emperor of Austria, in 1781, had been followed, two years later, by her annexation of the Crimea. In 1787 the Porte declared war on Russia, and Austria mobilized her Army to support her ally. The opening of hostilities with Turkey brought Gustavus III, King of Sweden, into the field with a view to recovering Finland. The second year of the war, however, proved infinitely more critical. Though the Allies obtained some notable successes over the Turks, which compensated for their reverses in the previous campaign, serious difficulties arose in other directions. In the autumn of 1789 a rebellion broke out in the Austrian Netherlands, and in Hungary the discontented Magyars seemed disposed to cast off their allegiance to the Emperor. The attitude of Prussia, which had for some time past been disquieting, now became openly hostile. On January 30th, 1790, Frederick William allied himself with the Porte, and a Prussian army was concentrated on the frontier of Bohemia. The great

¹ A. Sorel, *Europe et Révolution*, II. p. 173.

² Daudet, *Histoire de l'émigration*, I. pp. 17, 43, 81.

³ A. Sorel, *Europe et Révolution*, II. pp. 175, 176, 246-258.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 59-61.

Cambridge Modern History, VIII.: *The Eastern Question*.

conflagration which these events appeared to portend was only averted by the death of one man. On February 20th, 1790, Joseph died and was succeeded by Leopold II, his brother.

During the next ten months the European situation underwent a profound modification. Leopold lost no time in detaching himself from the Russian alliance as a necessary preliminary to the improved relations which he was determined to re-establish with Prussia. After negotiations which he conducted with consummate skill all fears of a general war were set at rest by the signature, on July 27th, 1790, of the Convention of Reichenbach. Formal peace between Austria and Turkey was not, however, concluded till August 30th of the following year, at Sistova.¹ But this was not the sum total of Leopold's achievements. The rebellion of his subjects in the Netherlands was completely suppressed before the end of the first year of his reign; while his Coronation as King of Hungary at Pressburg in November, 1790, and other prudent concessions to national susceptibilities, delighted the Magyars and removed the causes of their discontent.

So long as the Eastern Question was passing through its acute stage there was no disposition on the part of the Sovereigns to meddle with the affairs of France. The impotence to which the Revolution seemed to have condemned her, merely caused her to be eliminated from all potential combinations of the Powers.² To the solicitations of the *émigré* party Leopold turned a deaf ear, nor could the secret emissaries of Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette extract from him more than polite expressions of condolence and sympathy. If as a brother he was not insensible to his sister's peril, as a statesman he could see the affairs of a powerful neighbour fall into anarchy without compunction. His determination to stand aloof was strengthened by the fact that, in his opinion, no danger was to be apprehended from the spread of revolutionary doctrines among his own subjects. He could, besides, always reply with perfect reason that, so long as the King and Queen remained in Paris, armed intervention on their behalf must certainly bring on the very evils which he was now implored to interpose to avert. To his old Chancellor, Kaunitz, he accordingly expressed his fixed intention not to embark on any adventure against France, unless all the Powers were prepared to act in concert with him.³

¹ A. Sorel, *Europe et Révolution*, II. pp. 62-75.

² Daudet, *Histoire de l'émigration*, I. p. 42.

A Sorel, *Europe et Révolution*, II. 154-164, 175-178, 222-226.

³ Daudet, *Histoire de l'émigration*, I. p. 55.

A. Sorel, *Europe et Révolution*, II. pp. 72-75.

A question had, however, arisen between Austria and France which, though small in itself, involved treaty obligations and might, therefore, at any moment assume serious proportions. The action of the Constituent Assembly in abolishing feudalism throughout France had been extended to Alsace. The Princes and Knights of the Holy Roman Empire whom this decree threatened to deprive of their privileges had, in consequence, sent a protest to the French Government in February, 1790. The reply which they received took the form of an offer of pecuniary indemnity. As compensation of this kind was not to the taste of the majority of the Princes, they forthwith took steps to bring their cases before the Imperial Diet. However anxious Leopold may have been to avoid complications with France, this was a matter which he could not afford to ignore. He had, accordingly, in December, 1790, propounded his views, on the subject of the dispossessed Princes, in a despatch to the King of France.

But if the action of the Constituent Assembly in Alsace gave Leopold a good cause of complaint against France, the attitude of the *émigrés*, assembled on German territory, created a situation which the French Government was justified in resenting. At the time of the attempted flight of the King and Queen (June 20th, 1791) Monsieur, the Comte de Provence, afterwards Louis XVIII, more fortunate than the other members of his family, succeeded in escaping and in reaching Brussels.¹ When he heard that the King had been stopped at Varennes, Monsieur proceeded to arrogate to himself the title of Regent, on the plea that his brother had ceased to be a free agent. He was encouraged to adopt this course by Gustavus III, who, impelled by Catherine, had taken up the cause of the *émigrés* with enthusiasm. On July 5th, a Council of War was held, under the auspices of the King of Sweden at Aix-la-Chapelle, to concert measures for the coming campaign. In imagination Gustavus already saw an Austrian, a Swiss, a Sardinian, and a Spanish army marching on Paris; whilst he himself, at the head of 16,000 of his own men and a Russian contingent, was to land in Normandy and move on the French capital by the valley of the Seine. From Aix-la-Chapelle the King returned to Sweden to hurry on his military preparations, whilst Monsieur proceeded leisurely to Coblenz.

The defection of Austria had been a death-blow to Catherine's

¹ Daudet, *Histoire de l'émigration*, II. pp. 75, 77, 78.

A. Sorel, *Europe et Révolution*, II. 246, 247.

Cf. *Correspondence between Gustave III et le Comte de Fersen*, publié par Klinckowström.

schemes for driving the Turks out of Europe and for establishing a Greek Empire at Constantinople. The events in France however, and the solicitations made to her for assistance by the *émigrés* suggested the idea that compensation for her disappointment might be obtained in another direction. Notwithstanding her friendship for the philosophers, the Tsarina had not the smallest sympathy with the practical development of their principles which was in progress across the Rhine. From the position of her Empire and from the half-civilized condition of her subjects she knew that she had nothing to fear from the democratic propaganda. The Revolution, accordingly, appeared to her simply in the light of a fortunate occurrence by means of which Austria and Prussia might be entangled in a war with France¹; whilst she was left free to seek at the expense of Poland the territorial aggrandizement which Leopold's desertion had made impossible in the south. In pursuance of this new policy she had, on August 15th, 1790, made peace with Gustavus III at Werela, taking care, at the same time, to impress upon him that all the Monarchical Powers must join in a crusade to rescue the King of France from the humiliating thralldom in which he was held by his revolted subjects. Ever since the Convention of Reichenbach both England and Prussia had been bringing pressure to bear upon her to induce her to follow Leopold's example and come to terms with the Porte. The idea of yielding to anything in the nature of a mandate was singularly distasteful to her. The successful storming of Ismail, however, by Suwarov at the close of 1790 gave her the opportunity of bringing hostilities to an end in a blaze of triumph. After negotiations by which she obtained the cession of Ockzakoff on the Dniester, the preliminaries of peace between Russia and Turkey were signed at Galatz on August 11th, 1791.

The news that Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette had failed in their attempted escape reached Leopold at Padua. He at once despatched a circular note to the Powers proposing that they should confer with a view to adopting measures for the delivery of the King and Queen of France. He had small hopes, however, that the suggestion would lead to any practical results.² England, he knew, would refuse to intervene, and Russia might make promises which she would almost certainly fail to perform. With Prussia his relations had been steadily growing closer. Under the influence, accordingly, of the flight to Varennes and of their joint distrust of Russia, the prelimi-

¹ A. Sorel, *Europe et Révolution*, II. pp. 74, 75, 215-221.

² Daudet, *Histoire de l'émigration*, I. pp. 72, 73.

A. Sorel, *Europe et Révolution*, II. pp. 226-230.

naries of a defensive and offensive alliance between Austria and Prussia were signed on July 25th, 1791. A month later Leopold and Frederick William met at Pillnitz, a country seat of the King of Saxony, near Dresden.¹ A few days before his departure from Vienna, Leopold had granted an interview to the Comte d'Artois and M. de Calonne. For the *émigrés* he felt nothing but dislike and contempt, and it was with the greatest reluctance that he consented to receive them. Permission was nevertheless accorded to the Comte d'Artois to attend the conference at Pillnitz, but he was given clearly to understand that his presence would under no circumstances make the Emperor modify his resolution not to intervene in French affairs, except in concert with all the Great Powers.

The result of the conference was seen in the famous declaration of Pillnitz, wherein the two potentates announced that, inasmuch as the re-establishment of the monarchical power in France was a matter of universal interest, they would undertake to mobilize their armies to attain this object, provided the other Powers would give it their support.² Under the conditions which then prevailed in Europe, this circular was no more than a diplomatic³ comedy by which it was hoped to impose on the leaders of the extreme party in France and to afford them food for reflection. In the meanwhile Leopold continued to advise his sister, through her secret agents, that the wisest course for the King was to accept the Constitution, and, at the same time, he steadfastly refused to listen to the proposals of the *émigrés*, or to recognize Monsieur's assumption of the Regency, which, as he sensibly pointed out, must still further degrade Louis XVI in the eyes of his subjects.

At the Courts of the ecclesiastical Princes in the Rhine country the *émigrés* had met with a cordial welcome. Frederick von Erthal, Elector of Mainz, and Clement Wenceslas, Elector of Trier, vied with each other in extending a lavish hospitality to their noble guests.⁴ Ever since the summer of 1790 it had become very much the fashion in polite society to "emigrate." In the course of the next year many thousands of French nobles left their country and assembled chiefly on German territory, to await the moment when the Sovereigns should set in motion

¹ Daudet, *Histoire de l'émigration*, I. p. 80.

A. Sorel, *Europe et Révolution*, II. pp. 251, 252.

Comte de Fersen à Gustave III., 20 Août, 1791, publié par Klinckowström.

² Daudet, *Histoire de l'émigration*, I. pp. 89-90, 91.

³ A. Sorel, *Europe et Révolution*, II. pp. 261, 262.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 167.

Daudet, *Histoire de l'émigration*, I. p. 69.

the armies which were to sweep away the Revolution and to give them back their privileges. In the meantime they amused themselves as best they could, laughing immoderately at the dull Germans and the petty Princes whose dominions they honoured with their presence.¹ For Louis XVI, his weakness and concessions they expressed the most unbounded contempt,² and freely circulated the vilest calumnies about the unfortunate Marie Antoinette. To those of their order who remained behind in France they sent distaffs in derision; whilst as for a Constitutionalist noble, or a "*Monarchien*," as he was called, they considered him to be even more deserving of their hatred than a Jacobin.³ The German townspeople were, in the first instance, much pleased with the noisy brilliant throng of Frenchmen who suddenly descended upon them. The newcomers⁴ spent their money freely, so long as they had any. Few of them, unfortunately, had brought more than would last them for three months, by which time they calculated that they would be home again in triumph. Supplying fine gentlemen on credit, who only laughed in their faces when they presented their bills, was not at all to the German taste. Before long the tradesmen and innkeepers in the Rhine country began to think that perhaps, after all, the French people were not so much mistaken in deciding to make political changes. The insolence which they had to put up with, and the scenes which they daily saw enacted in their own towns during the emigration, brought home to them the real causes of the Revolution more forcibly than the most violent propagandism could ever have succeeded in doing.⁵

At the time of the meeting at Pillnitz and during the autumn which followed, Coblenz was one of the gayest towns in Europe.⁶ At the Palace of the Elector, Clement Wenceslas, the future Louis XVIII held his Court and transacted the business of his Regency, tempered by an exchange of witty epigrams with Madame de Balbi.⁷ M. de Calonne was Prime Minister, with charge of the departments of finance and of the police; Conzié, the free-thinking Bishop of Arras, filled the office of Chancellor; and Vaudreuil was Minister of War. Monsieur's government was represented at the chief European capitals by ambassadors

¹ Daudet, *Histoire de l'émigration*, I. pp. 37, 68.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 75, 76, 83, 105.

A. Sorel, *Europe et Révolution*, II. pp. 201-207.

³ E. Daudet, *Histoire de l'émigration*, I. pp. 28, 105, 150, 208.

Cf. Madame de Staël, *Considérations sur la Révolution*, Manifeste de Brunswick, II. p. 55.

⁴ Daudet, *Histoire de l'émigration*, I. pp. 5, 8.

⁵ A. Sorel, *Europe et Révolution*, II. p. 168.

⁶ Daudet, *Histoire de l'émigration*, I. p. 97.

⁷ *Ibid.*, II., p. 109.

whose numerous secretaries were not remarkable for diplomatic experience.¹ At Worms the military commander, the Prince de Condé, accompanied by Madame de Monaco, was lodged at the episcopal palace. In and about the town were collected some twelve thousand *émigrés*, who were to form the French contingent in the army of invasion. Though all were eager to begin the campaign, few had any notions of discipline. There was a plentiful supply of officers and a great deficiency of the rank and file. The majority had offered their services expecting to command, not to obey. The magazines were empty, stores, money, arms, everything was wanting.² In default of muskets, squads of noble recruits might be seen performing their exercises with walking-sticks, under the eyes of their Swedish drill-instructors.

The vague and contingent character of the Declaration of August 27th was a serious check to the warlike plans of the *émigrés*. They determined, however, to put a bold face on their disappointment. The Comte d'Artois and the brilliant suite which had been enjoying the King of Saxony's hospitality received, on their return to Coblenz, an enthusiastic welcome. Nothing was talked of but the assurance of treaties, alliances, and loans which had been given at Pillnitz. Unfortunately for the Royal cause they did not confine themselves to harmless rhodomontade of this description.³ The next step of the Princes was to publish in the French papers the declaration of Pillnitz, together with a manifesto from themselves, in the shape of a letter to the King, which completely distorted the character of the document which it accompanied. They announced that, in answer to their application for assistance, the Emperor and the King of Prussia had formally bound themselves to use their armed forces for the purpose. Similar views and intentions were entertained by all the Powers. Should the King, they went on to say, be constrained to give his assent to the Constitution, they would know that it had been wrung from him by force, and would consider it as null and void.⁴ Even were His Majesty to declare that he had accepted it freely, and were he to order them to respect it, they would still disregard his commands, well knowing that they could not possibly be the expression of his real sentiments. Such was the substance of

¹ Daudet, *Histoire de l'émigration*, I. p. 98.

² A. Sorel, *Europe et Révolution*, II. p. 285.

Daudet, *Histoire de l'émigration*, I. pp. 102, 103.

³ A. Sorel, *Europe et Révolution*, II. p. 258.

⁴ Daudet, *Histoire de l'émigration*, I. p. 93.

A. Sorel, *Europe et Révolution*, II. p. 262.

the proclamation which appeared in the *Moniteur* of September 23rd, 1791.

Nothing could be more untrue than this statement that the Powers were contemplating an armed intervention in French affairs.¹ Both in London and at Vienna the Regent's diplomatic representatives were coldly repulsed. Though in Berlin they were treated with more ceremony, the interviews between the Baron de Roll, a Swiss by birth and a Major-General in the French army, and Bischoffswerder, Frederick William's confidant, seem to have been chiefly concerned with the delicate question of an arrangement, whereby Prussia might gain some accession of territory towards the Rhine, at the expense of France. Gustavus III gave the cause of the French Monarchy his enthusiastic support, but he was in no position to embark on distant military operations unaided, and Catherine proved singularly elusive when pressed to conclude the alliance, which she had been dangling before his eyes for the past twelve months.² The Tsarina meanwhile recognized Monsieur's Regency and received Esterhazy, his envoy, at her Court. She even sent an ambassador to him at Coblenz with a present of two million *roubles* and the advice to read the *Henriade*³ and to steep himself in the genius of his ancestor of glorious memory. But further than this, neither persuasion nor all the flattery of which Monsieur was unsparing could induce her to go.

Though all the attempts of the *émigrés* to interest the Powers on their behalf proved ineffectual, their openly avowed designs against the liberties and national independence of the French people was to rouse a storm the strength of which their philosophy was incapable of estimating. There existed, moreover, in the Legislative Assembly, which had begun its sittings on October 1st, two parties which considered that their different ends could be best served by a foreign war and the interest of which it, therefore, became to play upon the feeling of indignation which the conduct of the Princes had excited throughout the country.⁴

Louis, Comte de Narbonne, the Minister of War, was a soldier thirty-six years of age. He had studied his profession and had

¹ E. Daudet, *Histoire de l'émigration*, I. p. 154.

A. Sorel, *Europe et Révolution*, II. p. 290.

Papiers de Fersen, publié par Klinckowström.

² *Gustave III. à Fersen*, 23 Août, 1791, publié par Klinckowström.

³ Daudet, *Histoire de l'émigration*, I. pp. 94, 115.

Gustave III. à Fersen, Sept. 8, 1791, publié par Klinckowström.

A. Sorel, *Europe et Révolution*, II. pp. 303, 304.

⁴ A. Sorel, *Europe et Révolution*, II. p. 262.

Baron de Taule à Fersen, 9 Septembre, 1791, publié par Klinckowström.

received a diplomatic training. In private life he passed for a witty and agreeable man, the accomplished type of the Eiberal noble of his time, and a friend of Madame de Staël. Narbonne, like the other members of the Government, belonged to the Constitutional Monarchist, or Feuillant party, so called after the Club founded in July, 1790. The dissolution of the existing assembly, a revision of the Constitution, and the strengthening of the Royal Prerogative figured among the aims of Ministers. With regard, however, to the means which should be adopted to rehabilitate the Monarchy, Narbonne differed from the majority of his colleagues. Whilst they wished to avoid war, he hoped, by a brilliant campaign, to restore the discipline of the army and the prestige of the Crown. The presence of bands of *émigrés* within his dominions could be always used as a pretext for an attack on Clement Wenceslas, Elector of Trier. This would, doubtless, involve war with Austria, but Narbonne and his friends counted on diplomacy for restraining Prussia from participating in the struggle. In view of the political rôle which it was proposed to impose on the army, when it should have emerged regenerated from a successful campaign, the selection of the commanding general was a matter of more than usual importance.¹ It is a curious illustration of the ideas of the time that, after mature reflection, they should have decided to invite Ferdinand, Duke of Brunswick, to place himself at the head of the French army of operations. Monstrous as such a plan would appear in the present day, it was nevertheless one which equally commended itself to the Constitutional Royalists and to the firebrands of the Revolution. Ferdinand was a Prince who had displayed a leaning to Eiberal doctrines, which did not, however, prevent him from holding the ignorant masses in the most profound contempt. Whilst admiring the principles of the Revolution he deplored its excesses. In his opinion the destruction of the nobility was a subject for regret. "It was a prejudice," he admitted, "but it was one which was entertained throughout Europe." In Narbonne's eyes the great merit of his scheme was that, by securing Ferdinand, Prussia would be deprived of her best General, which must go a long way towards ensuring her neutrality. In the early days of January, 1792, François de Custine, a promising young man of twenty-three well known in Berlin society, was sent with a letter from Louis XVI to the Duke, to sound him on the subject. Custine carried out his mission with tact and discretion, but to Ferdinand the enterprise appeared altogether too complicated and too

¹ A. Sorel, *Europe et Révolution*, II. pp. 323, 324.

Marie Antoinette à Fersen, Nov. 7, 1791, publié par Klinckowström.

hazardous. Wrapping up his refusal, accordingly, in the most complimentary language he declined the honour of commanding the French armies of the new *régime*. A different fate was in reserve for him.¹

Whilst Narbonne and his followers were planning a campaign which was to regenerate the army and make it the arbiter of the destinies of France, another, and an infinitely more formidable group, was striving to bring about an outbreak of hostilities with a widely different object in view. The Brissotins, a section of the Jacobin party led by Brissot, and soon to become famous under their better-known appellation of the Girondins, saw in a foreign war the surest way of overturning the Monarchy. Once fighting had begun, it would be a simple matter, they considered, to implicate the King in the anti-national policy of the Princes, the *émigrés*, and all enemies of the Revolution. The suspicion, which it would be their business to foster, that he was in league with the Monarchs whose armies were threatening the frontiers, must rouse the people to fury and seal the fate of the dynasty.²

By their ill-advised conduct Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette were making the game of these implacable opponents only too easy. Mirabeau had said once that "the Queen was the one man whom the King had about him." It was not a happy description of her. It may have been her charm, it was certainly her misfortune that, excepting courage, she had no virile qualities in her composition.³ The impulse was a feminine one which made her turn from the coarse and vulgar Mirabeau, the man who, perhaps, might have saved her, to Fersen, the Swedish noble, the friend of happier days. With his assistance she had embarked on a system of clandestine correspondence with her brother, the Emperor Leopold, through the intermediary of Mercy Argenteau, who was watching events from Brussels, and who had been, for many years, her adviser whilst ambassador in Paris.⁴ It was under the mistaken conviction that their best hope of safety lay in foreign intervention that Louis had appointed the Baron de Breteuil to act as the exponent of his real views and sentiments at Vienna and at the great European Courts. He was instructed to explain that no significance was to be attached to the King's public utterances or doings, nor was any heed to be paid to the communications of his official

¹ E. Daudet, *Histoire de l'émigration*, I. 178.

A. Sorel, *Europe et Révolution*, II. pp. 350, 351, 352.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 300-304.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 130-134.

⁴ *Le Comte de Fersen et la Cour de France*, publié par Klinckowström.

ambassadors.¹ Thus, when Louis on September 13th, 1791, accepted the Constitution he privately disavowed his act through Breteuil and his agents at the different capitals. But whilst the King and Queen were pursuing the equivocal policy of repudiating in secret what had been solemnly agreed to in public, they were perfectly sincere, both through their official and their private agents, in condemning the conduct of the *émigrés*. Monsieur's assumption of the Regency had deeply offended Louis and had evoked from him a strong and dignified protest. He had on several occasions remonstrated with his brothers, and had warned them of the grave dangers to which their provocative attitude was exposing both the Queen and himself.²

Though Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette believed foreign intervention to be the only solution to their difficulties, the form, which they suggested it should take, differed from the kind of action which the *émigrés* wished to see adopted.³ Nothing, perhaps, better illustrates the Queen's complete inability to grasp the national character of the Revolution than that she should have imagined that a European congress and a military demonstration would suffice to bring about its collapse. She would have the Powers mobilize their armies and, at the same time, proclaim to the people that they had no intention of interfering with the internal affairs of France. They must declare, however, that they could recognize no one but the King and would treat with no one but him. The announcement should be accompanied by threats of terrible reprisals against the rebel leaders. Language of this kind must, in the Queen's opinion, have such a terrifying effect on the people that they would turn to the King and implore him to save them from the horrors of war and of invasion.⁴

Whilst the Queen was deluding herself with vain hopes of this description, events in the Assembly⁵ were moving to their logical conclusion. The decree of November 9th, 1791, summoning the *émigrés* to return to France before January 1st, under pain of death and confiscation of property, was followed, on December 14th, by the despatch of an ultimatum to Clement

¹ Daudet, *Histoire de l'émigration*, I. pp. 51, 156.

A. Sorel, *Europe et Révolution*, II. pp. 108, 109, 124, 131.

² *Marie Antoinette à Fersen*, 26 Sept., 1791, publié par Klinckowström.

A. Sorel, *Europe et Révolution*, II. pp. 135-143, 270-277.

³ Daudet, *Histoire de l'émigration*, I. p. 113.

⁴ *Marie Antoinette à Fersen*, July 8, 1791.

Fersen et la Cour de France, pp. 147, 148.

Marie Antoinette à Fersen, Oct. 31, 1791, publié par Klinckowström.

Marie Antoinette à Fersen and Mémoire du roi, Nov. 25, 1791, publié par Klinckowström.

⁶ E. Daudet, *Histoire de l'émigration*, II. pp. 119, 124, 125.

Wenceslas, in which he was given until January 15th to disperse the armed bands assembled within his dominions. Thus threatened, the Elector of Trier appealed to both Austria and Prussia for protection. Frederick William at once promised support, and Leopold, more reluctantly, agreed to go to his assistance if attacked, on condition, however, that he should first take steps to expel the *émigrés* from his territory. Clement Wenceslas obeyed forthwith, and the Elector of Mainz deemed it prudent to follow his example. Within a few days Monsieur and the Comte d'Artois were the only Frenchmen remaining at Coblenz. The winter was at its height, many of the *émigrés* were penniless; the frontiers of Hesse, of Wurtemberg, and even of Prussia were closed against them. The populations they had been living among saw them depart without regret and, in many cases, pursued them with jeers and execrations. In the miserable plight to which they were suddenly reduced they tasted the first of the many humiliations which were to follow.¹

On December 21st Clement Wenceslas informed the French Government that its demands had been complied with, and Kaunitz wrote from Vienna to the same effect.² His despatch concluded with a reference to the European concert formed to maintain public peace and to watch over the safety of Crowned Heads. Nothing of the kind, in point of fact, existed, and the allusion made to it was merely an attempt on the Emperor's part to intimidate the firebrands of the Revolution in accordance with his sister's wishes.

Though the demands of the French Government had been complied with, too many forces were making for war to render it possible for peace to be preserved. On January 1st, 1792, the Princes and Calonne were decreed accused of High Treason, and on the 25th of the same month a peremptory note was sent to Vienna asking for an explanation of the Emperor's attitude.³ Leopold was in a difficult position. He knew that Catherine was anxious to see him embroiled in a quarrel with France, and he had little doubt that, with the armies which the conclusion of peace with Turkey had released, she contemplated the subjugation of Poland. The threatening tone of the French despatch, however, the violent speeches in the Assembly, the movements of troops towards the frontiers, were signs of imminent danger too ominous to be overlooked. As a first step he decided to conclude with Prussia the offensive and

¹ A. Sorel, *Europe et Révolution*, II. p. 344.

E. Daudet, *Histoire de l'émigration*, I. p. 122, 123.

² A. Sorel, *Europe et Révolution*, II. 345.

³ E. Daudet, *Histoire de l'émigration*, I. pp. 141, 142.

defensive alliance,¹ the preliminaries of which had been drawn up on July 25th of the previous year. The treaty was accordingly signed at Berlin, on February 7th, 1792, and certain military measures were, at the same time, concerted between the Allies. By a strange irony of fate Ferdinand of Brunswick, whom public opinion both in Austria and in Prussia had designated for the post, was appointed Generalissimo, in the event of an outbreak of hostilities. Only three weeks later², on March 1st, 1792, Leopold died suddenly, and the hopes of the military party at Vienna rose high. His son Francis II was twenty-four years of age, and was supposed to have disapproved of his father's temporizing policy.³ The Austrian communications to the French Government henceforward assumed a more warlike tone.⁴

As the excitement in Paris increased, the situation of Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette became daily more perilous. Fersen urged them to fly before it should be too late.⁵ A plan by which they were to escape concealed in Madame de Staël's carriage was suggested, but the Queen would not consent to attempt it.⁶ On March 9th the King dismissed Narbonne, and the next day the Feuillants succumbed to the attacks of Vergniaud and the Brissotins. Louis appointed their successors from the ranks of the victorious Girondins, and Charles François Dumouriez thus became Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the most important member of the new government. Dumouriez was fifty-three years of age. As a youth he had served in the Seven Years' War and had, later on, been employed in Louis XV's secret service. He had in this way acquired a vast knowledge of the lower channels of diplomacy, and, at the same time, had seriously studied strategical questions. A political intrigue in Poland had been the cause of his spending two years of his life in the Bastille. He was, in short, a clever adventurer who saw in the outbreak of the Revolution the opportunity for making a career for himself.⁷

Dumouriez took up office with his plans already matured. The idea of uniting Belgium to France was a scheme which he

¹ *Journal de Fersen*, 9 *Fevrier*, 1791.

A. Sorel, *Europe et Révolution*, II. 360-371.

² E. Daudet, *Histoire de l'émigration*, I. p. 179.

³ *Journal de Fersen*, 8 *Mars*, 1792; 10 *Mars*, 1792.

⁴ A. Sorel, *Europe et Révolution*, II. p. 375.

Fersen à Marie Antoinette, 9 *Mars*, 1792.

⁵ *Journal de Fersen*, Feb. 14, 1792, publié par Klinckowström.

Fersen et Marie Antoinette, 6 *Fevrier*, 1792.

⁶ *Journal de Fersen*, 13 *Mars*, 1792.

A. Sorel, *Europe et Révolution*, II. p. 398.

⁷ A. Sorel, *Europe et Révolution*, II. pp. 403-408.

had for some time past been studying. Hitherto the question of the dispossessed Princes in Alsace and the gatherings of the *émigrés* on the Rhine had been the points in dispute. He decided to ignore them. Kaunitz had threatened France with a concert of the Powers; an attack on the Austrians in the Netherlands, Dumouriez resolved, should be his reply. The assassination of Gustavus III, March 16th, 1792, had removed one enemy from his path¹; he proposed to neutralize another by inciting the Turks to resume hostilities with Russia. It would not even, he conceived, prove to be beyond the resources of his diplomacy to bring over England and Prussia to the side of France and thus isolate the Empire.

Having decided to take the offensive in Belgium, and considering that from a military point of view nothing was to be gained by delay, Dumouriez, on March 27th, despatched his ultimatum to Vienna. A complete satisfaction to be given before April 15th on all the points raised in previous communications was now demanded, and, in the meanwhile, any further armaments on the part of Austria were to be considered as amounting to a declaration of war. Kaunitz would have at once broken off diplomatic relations had his military preparations been in a more forward condition. Little opportunity was, however, accorded the Austrians of completing them. On April 20th the members of the Assembly, with the words of Merlin of Thionville, "war with the Kings, peace with the nations," ringing in their ears, voted, amidst a scene of tremendous enthusiasm, an appeal to arms.²

The Queen received the news that war had been declared with a feeling of relief. This crowning act of insolence on the part of the Assembly must open the eyes of the Monarchical Powers and rouse them to action.³ In her hatred for Ministers and for the popular leaders, generally, she had no scruples about betraying to Mercy Dumouriez's plan of operations and of suggesting means whereby his diplomatic combinations might be thwarted. But now that war had been declared both she and the King were as anxious as ever to disassociate themselves from the policy of the *émigrés*. Her secret correspondence with Vienna in the days which followed the rupture with Austria always kept this object in view. The inability of the Allies to begin the campaign at once was a disappointing and an alarm-

¹ A. Sorel, *Europe et Révolution*, II. pp. 409-424.

² E. Daudet, *Histoire de l'émigration*, I. p. 183.

A. Sorel, *Europe et Révolution*, II. pp. 425-436.

³ *Marie Antoinette à Fersen*, 30 Mars, 1792; 19 Avril, 1792.

A. Sorel, *Europe et Révolution*, II. pp. 436, 437.

Marie Antoinette à Fersen, 23 Juin, 1792.

ing circumstance. It materially added, they both felt, to the dangers of their situation. It was under these conditions that, on May 21st, the able Genevese publicist, Mallet du Pan, was secretly despatched to Germany to try and bring about a clear understanding between the King of France and the Allied Sovereigns who were about to invade his Kingdom. He was to impress upon them the necessity of preventing the *émigrés* from taking a prominent part in the coming operations, and, at the same time, to suggest the advisability of drawing up a Proclamation in terms calculated to reassure the French nation as a whole, whilst it threatened with the severest penalties the Jacobin leaders.¹

Directly France issued her Declaration of War on Austria, Prussia took steps to support her ally. The backward state, however, of the mobilization of both armies and other reasons imposed delay. The invasion of the Low Countries, which Dumouriez had planned, had ignominiously collapsed. At the first contact with the trained troops of Austria the new French armies gave way and fled in the wildest disorder. It was, in consequence, erroneously concluded in the councils of the Allies that there was no need for hurry, and that the march on Paris could be carried out, at any time, with the greatest possible ease. Moreover, the situation had become curiously complicated. At the moment when the combined armies of Austria and Prussia were about to invade France, with the avowed object of restoring the Monarchical Power, 100,000 Russian troops had crossed into Poland (May 19th, 1792) to wrest from King Stanislas the greater part of his dominions and, as events were to prove, to drive him from the throne. This development led to an interchange of views between Austria, Prussia, and Russia, the feature of which was a cynical disregard for national rights, pledges, treaties, and all those things which civilised countries are supposed to hold sacred. Prussia, having as a preliminary repudiated her treaty of March 29th, 1790, with Poland, proceeded to come to an agreement with Russia to share in the spoils of the ally she had solemnly bound herself to protect from aggression. This settlement, which satisfied Prussia, left Austria unprovided for. It was, however, suggested that she should exchange her possessions in the Low Countries for Bavaria, or, if she preferred it, she might indemnify herself at the expense of France in Alsace and Lorraine.²

¹ A Sorel, *Europe et Révolution*, II. 476, 477.

Cf. *Journal de Fersen*, 9 Juillet, 1792; 23 Juillet, 1792.

Marie Antoinette à Fersen, 24 Juillet, 1792.

² A. Sorel, *Europe et Révolution*, II. pp. 457-469.

In the midst of these negotiations the perils of Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette were almost forgotten. On July 5th Francis II was elected Emperor, and, on the 8th, made his state entry into Frankfort. Frederick William and the new Emperor met at Mainz, on July 19th, as the guests of the Elector, who entertained them with a sumptuous hospitality. Whilst the Sovereigns were exchanging compliments, attending banquets, and holding reviews, their Ministers were engaged on the more serious business of dividing the plunder which they expected to gather in the coming campaign.¹ Under these circumstances the arrival of Louis' envoy, Mallet du Pan, excited little attention. He was not admitted to an interview with the Emperor, but had several conversations with the statesmen of the coalition. Cobenzl and Haugwitz both assured him that the views of their respective Sovereigns were in complete accordance with those of the King of France. They promised him that the *émigrés* should be kept in the background, and declared that the war had been entered upon without a thought of territorial aggrandisement or of personal interests.²

The Declaration of War had brought back the *émigrés* into the ecclesiastical dominions,³ where they again established their camps and boasted and talked with the same confidence as before their expulsion. At Coblenz, Mallet was coldly received. As a "*Monarchien*" and as a man who was supposed to favour a bicameral constitution he excited suspicion. The King's views on the situation, and the attitude of inaction which he wished them to adopt, were most distasteful to the Princes and the *émigrés*. The idea of a proclamation was, however, more acceptable. Though they held it to be quite superfluous to reassure the French people, they thoroughly enjoyed the notion of terrifying the revolutionary leaders. Brunswick's manifesto was to be the only result of Mallet's mission. The document was drawn up in the councils of the Princes; it was submitted to and approved of by the Allied Sovereigns and signed by Ferdinand of Brunswick, who, however, is said to have done so with reluctance and to have regretted it ever afterwards.⁴

The celebrated manifesto bears the date of July 25th, 1792.

¹ A. Sorel, *Europe et Révolution*, II. 492-500.

² E. Daudet, *Histoire de l'émigration*, I. pp. 194, 195, 198.

A. Sorel, *Europe et Révolution*, II. p. 509.

Journal de Fersen, 31 Juillet, 1792.

³ E. Daudet, *Histoire de l'émigration*, I. pp. 184, 187.

⁴ E. Daudet, *Histoire de l'émigration*, I. p. 199.

Journal de Fersen, 28 Juillet, 1792.

Fersen à Marie Antoinette, 26 Juillet, 1792; 28 Juillet, 1792.

A. Sorel, *Europe et Révolution*, II. 503-515.

After stating the reasons which had induced the Allied Powers to invade France and exposing the disinterested character of their action, any inhabitants who dared to defend themselves were warned that they would be punished according to the usages of war. The National Guards, if they presumed to offer any resistance, would be treated as rebels. The inhabitants of Paris were enjoined to make their submission to the King. The members of the Assembly and all civil authorities were to be held responsible, in their lives and properties, for any outrages committed. If the Tuileries should be invaded, or if any insults should be offered to the Royal Family, the town of Paris would be handed over to the vengeance of the troops, and all rebels would be summarily executed. The Allied Sovereigns could only treat with the King, who was recommended to proceed to a frontier fortress for the purpose.

The terms of the Brunswick manifesto were known in Paris on July 28th. The threats which it breathed effectually dispelled any illusions which the revolutionary leaders may have entertained as to the fate which awaited them should the Allies and the *émigrés* enter the capital. It seemed to these men that their only chance of safety lay in seizing the King and in holding him as a hostage. The excitement in the town was already intense. Under the influence of Danton the sections, on August 3rd, voted the deposition of the King, and on the 10th the popular rising, which had been deliberately organized, broke out. The mob forced its way into the Tuileries, and the Royal Family fled for safety to the Assembly. The Deputies thereupon decreed the King's suspension and confinement. They, in addition, passed a resolution for the election of a National Convention.¹

Whilst in Paris the Monarchy was in its death throes, an army of 4500 *émigrés*, commanded by the Prince de Condé and officered by the flower of the French nobility, was entering France in the wake of the invading hosts of Austria and Prussia. The allied advance was slow. A month was consumed in traversing the country between the Rhine and the Meuse. The forward movement came to an end at Saint-Menehould. In the neighbourhood of that town, on September 20th, Dumouriez, who had been appointed to command the Army of the North, checked the Allies at Valmy, and Brunswick ordered a general retreat. By the middle of October the frontier had been recrossed, and Prussia and Austria had abandoned all idea of restoring the Monarchy in France.²

¹ A. Sorel, *Europe et Révolution*, II. pp. 513-514.
Journal de Fersen, 11 Octobre, 1792.

² A. Sorel, *Europe et Révolution*, III. p. 130.

The *émigrés* had to bear the brunt of the displeasure which this unexpected result provoked among the Allies. All the reverses were ascribed to their misleading statements and to their ridiculous stories that revolutionary France would be incapable of putting an army into the field. During the two months' campaign they had not won the respect of their German brothers-in-arms. Its brief duration had afforded few opportunities for the display of their one military virtue, courage.¹ But on many occasions their lack of discipline, their boasting, and their ignorance had been unfavourably commented upon. All pretence of prosecuting the campaign in order to rescue Louis XVI having been given up, Austria only continued the war in order to protect her possessions in the Low Countries; whilst Prussia turned her attention to the more congenial task of despoiling Poland.² Under these conditions the belligerent Powers had no desire to be at the expense of maintaining a contingent of which the military value was rated very low. Though the army of Condé continued its inglorious existence for several years longer, and was only finally disbanded on the eve of the Peace of Amiens, most of the *émigrés* were unceremoniously sent about their business. A few made their way back to France, some even took service in the national armies, but for the majority a period of extreme misery set in. Outlawed in their own country, they found themselves, as the years went by and as the tide of Republican victories rolled on, expelled from State after State.³ Whilst they wandered over Europe soliciting employment in the armies of their country's enemies they saw "a warlike and a conquering generation arise from their native soil, to take up, and to adapt to modern conditions, the glorious traditions of their ancestors." They lost, indeed, more than their privileges. The reasons which had been the only justification for them ceased to have any existence. Those duties, which it had been once their exclusive right to perform, were assumed and splendidly carried out by men sprung from a class which they despised.⁴

The war which began in 1792 and which was to last, with little intermission, for twenty-three years was precipitated but not caused by the *émigrés*. Under any circumstances the strong

¹ Daudet, *Histoire de l'émigration*, I. pp. 191, 206, 210.

A. Sorel, *Europe et Révolution*, III. pp. 95-97.

² *Journal de Fersen*, 27 Septembre, 1792; 13 Octobre, 1792; 14 Octobre, 1792; 18 Octobre, 1792.

³ E. Daudet, *Histoire de l'émigration*, I. pp. 136, 202, 210, 211, 212.

Fersen à Baron de Taule, 19 Novembre, 1792.

⁴ A. Sorel, *Europe et Révolution*, III. p. 132.

Mme. de Staël, *Considérations l'émigration*, II. pp. 5, 6, 7, 8.

national spirit and the new ideas which the Revolution gave birth to, antagonistic as they were to the principles which obtained among the Monarchical Powers of the Continent, must have led, eventually, to war. But on the course of the Revolution and on the fate of the Monarchy the influence of the emigration was decisive. It has been shown that that policy was based on a total misconception both of the views of the Powers and of the feelings of their own countrymen. An intense hatred of the old *régime* and a determination never to submit to its revival was the spirit which animated the majority of Frenchmen. This the Royal Family and the *émigrés* completely failed to realize. The nobles as a class had been unpopular before the Revolution; they became odious during the course of it. They had shown plainly that they were determined to set up again conditions which were detestable to the great mass of the people, and that, to attain their ends, they were prepared to subject their country to invasion and to the risk of dismemberment. Under the influence of the indignation which this conduct evoked terrible atrocities were committed. The nobles as a class were proscribed and, as was inevitable, many innocent persons suffered for the guilty.¹ The *émigrés* themselves should be divided into two classes: those who had voluntarily left their country to return in the ranks of the foreign invaders, and a not inconsiderable minority of harmless individuals who had been driven abroad on account of the persecutions which they had been subjected to at home.² The attitude of the aristocracy, moreover, must be judged by the standards and the ideas of the time. There was little in the conditions under which continental nobles lived to develop their instinct of nationality. Whilst it would be unjust to say that they had no love of country, their attachment may be fairly described as dynastic rather than patriotic. French was the almost universal language of polite society in the eighteenth century. It was a common practice for young men to wander over Europe attaching themselves to any Court or taking service in any army which appeared to offer prospects of advancement. It had not detracted from the glory of Fontenoy that, on that occasion, the French Army had been commanded by Marshal Saxe and that Loevendal had been his chief lieutenant. It has been related how, in 1791, even the popular party proposed to bestow the leadership of the national armies on Ferdinand of Brunswick. This idea, however, of seeking the assistance of a foreign general would have been wholly unacceptable if suggested a little later.

¹ A. Sorel, *Europe et Révolution*, III. pp. 184-186.

² Mme de Staël, *Considérations l'émigration*, II. pp. 1, 2.

Among the French aristocracy there, undoubtedly, appears to have existed a feeling that, when the interests of their class were in question, the nobles of all countries must stand together irrespective of frontiers.¹

The victories of the Republican Armies and the consequent dissolution of the coalition caused the decrees against the *émigrés* to be enforced with less vigour. It was the policy of Bonaparte to consolidate the nation by uniting all classes. After Brumaire those who applied to have their names removed from the list of proscribed persons, that is asked for their "*radiation*," to quote the official term, found that in most cases their request was complied with. In the course of the next few years a large proportion of the *émigrés* found their way back to France. If their forfeited properties had not been sold, they were restored to them after they had taken the oath of fidelity and fulfilled the prescribed formalities. The owners of houses in the Faubourg-Saint-Germain returned to them, and society soon resumed its accustomed course. Under the Consulate, and still more so under the Empire, many young men from among the returned *émigrés* entered the army. At the time of the shooting of the Prince d'Enghien they were few, who had accepted employment of any kind, who followed Chateaubriand's example and resigned their appointments. The cause of the Bourbons was generally looked upon as hopelessly lost.² Owing to the war, communication with England was difficult and dangerous. Gradually all interest in the fallen dynasty faded away. Painful as was the deprivation to men who for generations had been courtiers, the noble Faubourg generally avoided the Imperial Court.³ But when Napoleon's marriage with a Hapsburg was announced, it was universally agreed that the circumstances no longer required the exercise of further self-denial. Applications poured in for posts at Court. Napoleon was only too delighted to grant demands coming from such a quarter. It flattered his vanity to see the duties of his Court fulfilled by the bearers of historic names. It was decidedly, he once remarked, the best field for the exercise of their abilities. In the latter days of the Empire he was even begin-

¹ Madame de Staël, *Considérations l'émigration*, II. p. 4; III. p. 120 (2me edition); and Mme. de Boigne, I. p. 344.

E. Daudet, *Histoire de l'émigration*, I. 29, 30.

² Madame de Staël, *Considérations sur la Révolution*, III. (2me edition), pp. 18-21.

Madelin, *Fouché*, I. pp. 399, 392, 400.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 432; II. pp. 151, 152.

F. Masson, *Impératrice, Marie Louise*, pp. 132-136.

B. Constant, *Mémoires sur les cent jours*, II. p. 113.

ning to put into practice a favourite scheme, a fusion of the old and new nobility by means of carefully selected marriages, the "Conscription of the daughters," as it was humorously called.¹

The provincial aristocracy proved infinitely more irreconcilable. In country society the "heretofore nobles" kept to themselves as much as possible, and, so far as they dared, declined all advances from the Imperial authorities. This attitude on their part not unfrequently brought down the vials of Napoleon's wrath upon them.² He was always very ready to resent any disrespect shown to his officials. It was not until the autumn of 1813, when the Empire was tottering to its fall, that the inhabitants of the Faubourg-Saint-Germain remembered that they were Royalists and began to conspire. But, as in revolutionary times, they had been unable to save the Monarchy, had, in fact, by their folly largely contributed to its downfall, so in 1814 they achieved nothing for its restoration. Before the entry of the Allies into Paris their conduct was puerile; it became offensive afterwards. Sosthènes de La Rochefoucauld has left on record the part played by himself and his friends. He relates how a noble lady of his acquaintance would thrust, in the dead of night, Royalist proclamations under doors or into the shutters of shop windows. He describes how he and his followers boldly assumed the white cockade on the morning of the entry of the Russians and the Prussians into the capital, and of the tremendous welcome which they gave to the victorious foreign troops. He gives the story of how Madame Edmond de Perigord, in order to obtain a better view, sat on a Cossack pony clasping the rider round the waist, and how he himself headed a band of young enthusiasts who attempted to pull Napoleon's statue from off its column in the Place Vendôme.³

A considerable number of the *émigrés* had constantly remained in exile. Many of the nobles of the highest rank followed in their wanderings the Comte d'Artois and Monsieur, Louis XVIII, as he claimed to be after the death of his nephew on June 10th, 1795. Others besides for various reasons did not return to France. The majority of these persons, from the Princes downwards, eventually found their way to England. Here, as in the other countries which they had visited, many were compelled to adopt menial occupations in order to obtain

¹ Madelin, *Fouché*, I. p. 438.

² *Ibid.*, p. 421.

Cf. on this subject Napoleon to Fouché, 7 September, 1807; *Collection Lecestre*, I. p. 109.

³ *Mémoires du Vicomte de La Rochefoucauld*, I. pp. 25-28; Paris, 1837. H. Houssaye, 1814, pp. 16-25, 554-564.

a livelihood. The guerilla bands which, from time to time, disturbed Normandy and Brittany by exploits, closely resembling those of common brigands, were chiefly recruited and subsidized from England. It was from London that Georges Cadoudal and Armand and Jules de Polignac started on their expedition, in 1804, against the First Consul which was to bring the intrepid Chouan leader to the scaffold and to cause the two brothers to be detained as State prisoners for the whole duration of the Empire. England, also, found employment of a less questionable character for the *émigrés* in the many foreign corps which she was compelled to raise in the course of the long war.¹

The well-known saying that "the Bourbons had learnt nothing and forgotten nothing" applied with infinitely more force to the Comte d'Artois and the *émigrés* than to Louis XVIII himself. Notwithstanding the vicissitudes and the hardships which they had gone through, the nobles who came back to France with the Royal Family, or who welcomed them on their arrival, were men whose political ideas had not progressed since the days of the first emigration. The joy at the cessation of hostilities was, no doubt, universal, but the majority of people sincerely deplored the national humiliation which had given them peace. The *émigrés* made it clear they had little share in these patriotic regrets. It was an inevitable consequence of the emigration that the participators in such a policy should stand apart from the rest of their countrymen. Those of their number who had returned to France, and those especially who had accepted employment under the Empire, had not been insensible to the military glory and the proud position which their country had achieved. This feeling had, however, little in common with the impulse which, in revolutionary days, had driven the nation to take up arms to defend its liberties and to resist the imposition of a hateful *régime*. In 1814 this spirit was not dead. As men saw the former *émigrés* fraternizing with the invader and talking loudly of the privileges which the King's Restoration was to give them back, they remembered Coblenz.

The Louis XVIII who landed from an English frigate at Calais on April 25th, 1814, had changed in many ways since the days when as Monsieur he had trifled with Calonne and Madame de Balbi in the episcopal palace of the Elector Clement Wenceslas. Under the influence of disappointment and misfortune his judgment had ripened. Verona, Blankenburg, Warsaw, Mittau had been humiliating stages in the weary

¹ E. Daudet, *Histoire de l'émigration*, I. pp. 131, 132, 133.
Napoleon, by Holland Rose (new edition), I. pp. 450-455.
Army Lists, 1804-1814.

wanderings which were to end in 1807 at Great Yarmouth.¹ At Gosfield first, and then at Hartwell, he could feel secure from a peremptory order to move on ; but he was to find the English Government as coldly indifferent to the interests of his dynasty as the Sovereigns and statesmen of continental Europe.

On his journey from Calais to Paris Louis made a short stay at Compiègne, where he received deputations from various political bodies.² The Marshals also were introduced into his presence by Berthier. The King's reception of these officers passed off extremely well. He spoke to them individually and showed that he was intimately acquainted with the feats of arms which each of them had performed. At Compiègne he was the host of the Tsar, who drove out from Paris to visit him. Louis' extraordinary memory, which had served him to such good purpose in his interview with the Marshals, was less happily employed in his reception of Alexander. Following a precedent, which under the circumstances might have been forgotten with advantage, Louis walked into dinner in front of the astonished guest who had been so largely instrumental in effecting his restoration.

Both at Compiègne and at Saint-Ouen the declaration which was to herald the King's entry into Paris was anxiously discussed.³ It was characteristic of Louis that, though he could without much difficulty be brought to see that a Constitution was a necessity to which he must submit, he was greatly concerned with the form in which his acceptance of it was to be expressed. The conditional theory of Kingship, to which the constitutional Royalists attached so much importance, was intensely repugnant to him as a Bourbon. Provided the legitimist principle were upheld, that is to say, if he were called "King of France and Navarre," and if his reign were allowed to reckon from the date of his nephew's death, then he would be prepared to promise a Constitution drawn up in a very liberal spirit. But he insisted, and from this position nothing could move him, that it must be clearly laid down that he granted it to his subjects. The pretension of the Senate to drive a bargain with him was quite inadmissible. Not without difficulty Louis carried his point. In the Declaration of Saint-Ouen all those stipulations with which the Senate had surrounded the recall of "Louis Stanislas Xavier" were completely ignored.

¹ E. Daudet, *Histoire de l'émigration*, III. pp. 434-441.

² Rovigo, VII. p. 256.

Marmont, *Mémoires*, VII. p. 25.

³ Mme. de Boigne, *Mémoires*, I.

Cf. Marmont, *Mémoires*, VII. pp. 47, 48, 49.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, II. pp. 50-58.

Inasmuch as he thereby failed to comply with the conditions which the Comte d'Artois had agreed to in his name, the King may be justly accused of having inaugurated his reign by a breach of faith. Nevertheless, from the moment when he signed his Declaration, he set himself loyally to carry out the promises which it contained. Once it was promulgated, Louis' connection with the *émigré* party terminated, and his struggle with the reactionary tendencies of his brother and of the old companions of his exile began.¹

¹ E. Daudet, *Histoire de l'émigration*, I. p. 220.

CHAPTER II

PATERNAL ANARCHY

A VAST amount of important business awaited Louis at the Tuileries. In the first place, the terms of peace had to be drawn up. The treaty was signed on May 30th, by which France ceded nearly all her conquests and returned to her frontiers of 1792. The general readjustment of the map of Europe, which the fall of the Empire necessitated, was, however, only to be settled two months later at a Congress of the Powers, which was to assemble at Vienna. It was an unavoidable misfortune that Louis must thus begin his reign by submitting to an enormous loss of territory.¹ The formation of his first government was a more agreeable, but a very difficult task. It was not till May 15th that the names of Ministers were published. Talleyrand, to whose skilful diplomacy Louis was so much indebted, remained at the Foreign Office. General Dupont had been Minister of War under the Provisional Government of which the Abbé Montesquiou had been a member. He was now formally confirmed in his appointment, and to Montesquiou was assigned the Home Office. Dambray was Chancellor; Malouet, Minister of Marine; Baron Louis, Finance Minister; Ferrand, Postmaster; Beugnot was Director of Police; and Béranger of the Customs.² Almost every shade of opinion was represented in this list. Talleyrand, Beugnot, Dupont, and the Baron Louis were constitutional Royalists. Dupont, and to some extent Beugnot, however, tempered their views by a strong desire to propitiate the *émigrés* and the Court party. Dambray, the Chancellor, was a lawyer of the old *Parlement*, who prided himself on knowing nothing about the Revolution, "which so far as he was concerned might never have taken place." He, Ferrand, and Malouet represented the old *régime* and had no confidence in a constitutional form of government, merely regarding it as a stepping-stone to absolute Monarchy.

¹ Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, II. p. 62.

Bourrienne, *Mémoires*, X. pp. 244, 245, 258-263.

² Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, II. 227-230.

Houssaye, 1815, *Première Restauration*, pp. 41, 42.

Béranger, on the other hand, was practically a Republican who owed his place in the Ministry to his well-known hatred of Bonaparte. No Prime Minister had been appointed, but Talleyrand was the man to whom the King might have been expected to turn for advice. Though not officially nominated to the post, it might have been supposed that he would have been called upon to fill the position of President of the Council. Such was, unfortunately, not the case.¹ It is true that among Talleyrand's great gifts debating power was not included. He was, however, well acquainted with the leading men and the institutions of the day, and though he had no practical experience of constitutional government, in theoretical knowledge he certainly equalled, if he did not surpass, Beugnot and the Baron Louis, the only two of his colleagues who had given the subject their attention. But the King had an unconquerable aversion to him and placed his confidence in the Comte de Blacas, who had succeeded d'Avary in his affections. Blacas had been appointed Minister of the King's Household, and, inasmuch as he was the only member of the Council who could, on all occasions, obtain access to the King, he became the preponderating influence.

In most countries, and in France especially, the acknowledged favourite of the Sovereign has seldom been a popular person. By his many enemies Blacas has been accused of venality. No trustworthy evidence appears to support the charge. Owing, however, to his ignorance of men and of affairs, due to his long absence from the country, he was necessarily a dangerous adviser to Louis, who suffered from the same disadvantages. Moreover, in his intense anxiety to spare the King all trouble, he did much to encourage his natural indolence. This seems to have been his chief fault. Blacas and Montesquiou to some extent represented the *émigré* party in the Council. But both of them were sensible enough to see that large concessions must be made to the new ideas.² Though in politics they had much in common, there was little friendship between them. Montesquiou disapproved of the other's exceptional position with the

¹ Pasquier, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 416, 417.

Bourrienne, *Mémoires*, X. p. 253.

Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. pp. 36-42.

² Pasquier, III. p. 13.

Vaulabelle, II. pp. 130, 131.

Marmont, *Mémoires*, VII. p. 71.

Jaucourt à Talleyrand, 27 Mars, 1815.

Bourrienne, *Mémoires*, X. pp. 353-355.

Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. p. 87.

J. C. Hobhouse, *Letters*, I. p. 174.

Viel Castel, *Histoire de la Restauration*, I. pp. 470-472.

King, and had gone so far as to warn Louis that "his people could forgive a mistress, but that they had never tolerated a favourite."

"There were Ministers, but no Ministry," as Wellington wrote to Castlereagh. In effect a Cabinet Council, in the ordinary sense of the word, was rarely, if ever, held. Ministers might meet, from time to time in Blacas' apartments, waiting till he could usher them into the King's presence, but, generally speaking, every one carried on the business of his department as he thought fit.¹ A collective responsibility of the Cabinet had, in short, no existence. In their public utterances men like Ferrand and Dambray were fond of alluding to the King's paternal affection for his subjects. "Paternal anarchy" became a term which the wits were soon to apply to the Government.²

When the news of his recall was brought to Hartwell, Louis is reported to have said to the Duc de Duras that the future of the Monarchy would now depend on whether he survived his brother.³ If he used these words, they are but another instance of the remarkable prescience which he often displayed. Monsieur, the Comte d'Artois, was at this time fifty-seven years of age, and was still a good-looking man with agreeable manners and a courtly grace for which he had always been celebrated. To questions of etiquette he attached an overwhelming importance. In this peculiarity he closely resembled his brother, without, however, sharing in his learning, his sagacity, or his intellectual advantages. In politics Monsieur was, and was destined always to remain, an *émigré*. In one respect he had changed greatly. The *roué* of the old days at Versailles and Bagatelle was now a religious bigot. At Brompton Grove, in 1804, he had left the bedside of the dying Comtesse de Polastron to fall under the influence of the priest who had attended her. The ascendancy, which from that day the Abbé de Latil obtained over him, was never lost. Monsieur had spent nearly the whole period of his exile in England surrounded, both at Holyrood and in London, by a select circle of followers.⁴ Between the members of his *coterie* and the *émigrés* who had

¹ Pasquier, III. pp. 14, 15.

Vaulabelle, II. p. 134.

Beugnot, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 138-142.

Pozzo à Nesselrode, 13 Juin, 1814 ; 6 Juillet, 1814.

Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 215-216.

² Jaucourt à Talleyrand, 20 Septembre, 1814 ; 10 Decembre, 1814.

Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, III. p. 220.

³ Daudet, *Emigration*, III. p. 334.

Viel Castel, *Histoire de la Restauration*, I. pp. 378-381.

⁴ Mme. de Gontaut, *Mémoires*, pp. 98, 99.

Comtesse de Polastron, par le Vicomte de Reiset, pp. 280-281.

attached themselves to Louis there had been a great deal of jealousy. These intrigues continued after their return to Paris, and were certainly not discouraged by Monsieur. It was well known that he had no sympathy with the King's more liberal views, and that he was no friend to constitutional government.¹ By the pure Royalists, who wished to see the old *régime* restored, he was in consequence worshipped,² and the Pavillon de Marsan, his lodgings in the Tuileries, became the centre of an organized opposition which contributed materially to the embarrassments of Louis' Government.

The Duc d'Angoulême, Monsieur's eldest son, was thirty-nine years of age. He had neither his father's handsome exterior nor his charm of manner. On the contrary, he was shy and awkward, and was in the habit of indulging in certain facial tricks and peculiarities of gait which gave him a grotesque appearance. Like Monsieur he was religious, but, unlike him, he was not priest-ridden. He had no intellectual gifts and his education had been neglected. On the whole, he was a well-meaning, honourable man, subject, however, to fits of ungovernable passion.³ On June 10th, 1799, he had married at Mitau his first cousin, Madame Thérèse, the daughter of Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette. The terrible tragedy of her childhood has invested the Duchesse d'Angoulême with a halo of romance. Stripped, however, of the sentiment which sympathy for her misfortunes must inspire, there was little which was attractive about her. She had inherited her father's uncouth manners and her mother's pride, unredeemed by her powers of fascination and feminine charm.⁴ Though she was good and charitable, the sternness of her nature deprived these qualities of all grace. In her married life she had been happy, but no children had been born to her.

The Duc de Berri was three years his brother's junior and was as yet unmarried. He was short of stature and of somewhat vulgar appearance. He had served in the army of Condé, and was supposed by his family and the *émigrés* to possess military talents. Be this as it may, a sincere liking for the profession of arms was the only serious taste with which he can be credited. Roughness of manner and a violent temper were natural to him. To support, however, the character of the practical soldier to which he aspired, he thought it necessary

¹ E. Daudet, *Histoire de l'émigration*, III. p. 445.

² Beugnot, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 101, 102, 144, 145.

³ Viel Castel, *Histoire de la Restauration*, I. pp. 381, 384.

Mme. de Boigne, *Mémoires*, I. p. 397; II. p. 276.

⁴ *Ibid.*, I. pp. 390-392.

to accentuate these failings by an habitual use of coarse and brutal language. At inspections a paternal familiarity which he adopted towards the men engendered the suspicion that he was imitating Napoleon. This circumstance caused him to be looked upon with much contemptuous amusement, and certainly did not add to his popularity. In other relations of life he was simply a man of pleasure, about whom some stories of good-natured actions are recorded.¹

The Duc d'Orleans, who, sixteen years later, was to be enthroned as "Louis Philippe, King of the French," had been born in 1772.² He was a son of *Egalité* and had himself commanded with distinction a brigade in the National Army. Though he had deserted with Dumouriez, he had taken no part in the policy of the emigration, and had never borne arms against his own country. After a residence of some years in America he had settled quietly in England, and had made his peace with Louis XVIII. The Duc d'Orleans was a man of the world, of excellent abilities, whom a large section of Frenchmen would have been well pleased to have seen called to the throne in preference to Louis XVIII. This fact, which was within the King's knowledge, revived his slumbering distrust of him, and caused the Palais-Royal to become the object of a minute observation by the secret police. In so far as plotting or actively intriguing was concerned the suspicion was undeserved. The Duke was an astute and very prudent person, whose chief care at this time was to regain possession of his vast estates. Without doubt, however, he was quite alive to the opportunities which the future might have in store for him, and realized the full value of such assets as Valmy and Jemmappes.

The Prince de Condé and his son the Duc de Bourbon counted for very little. Old Condé was in his dotage, and the Duke devoted his attention entirely to sport and the formation of low and undesirable connections.³ From a family circle thus composed Louis could expect little assistance. He knew that his nearest relation, his brother, was intriguing against him, and for the Duc d'Orleans, the only intelligent member of it, he felt nothing but the greatest distrust.

Louis had been in no hurry to begin the work of framing the Constitution, which he had promised in his Declaration of Saint-Ouen. The Tsar, however, intimated in language, which

¹ Houssaye, 1815, *Première Restauration*, pp. 34, 35, 36.

Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 135-136.

Viel Castel, *Histoire de la Restauration*, I. p. 385.

² Houssaye, 1815, I. pp. 38, 39.

Viel Castel, *Histoire de la Restauration*, I. pp. 385-387.

³ Mme. de Boigne, I. pp. 147, 148.

could not be misunderstood, that he wished to leave Paris at the end of May, by which time he hoped that the Charter would have been drawn up. The framing of it was accordingly entrusted to a committee of eighteen members. Their work was necessarily hurried, but it was completed to Alexander's satisfaction.¹ The new Constitution was bi-cameral, an Upper Chamber, consisting of 154 Peers chosen by the King and nominated for life, and a Lower Chamber, composed of 258 Deputies, to be selected by the Electoral Colleges. The right of initiative and of legislation was given to the King, but the Chambers were to have the power to suggest the principles and the details of bills. Freedom of worship, the retention of the jury, and the independence of the judicial bench were among its chief provisions. Liberty was granted to the press, but it was laid down that laws would be introduced to correct its abuses. An article, specially intended to allay the fears of the purchasers of national property, guaranteed the revolutionary land settlement.² The King was empowered to make ordinances for the "execution of the laws and the safety of the State."

In the composition of his Upper Chamber Louis had exercised impartiality. According, indeed, to Lord Liverpool, the elevation to the Peerage of so many persons of obscure origin and of revolutionary antecedents constituted a danger. Eighty-four Senators of the Empire were now created Peers of France. In point of fact, only thirty members of the Imperial Senate were, by the King's act, excluded from his Upper Chamber. Those who were so debarred were, with few exceptions, regicides, and among them were comprised Fouché, Cambacérès, and Sièyes. Ten Marshals who had not been Senators were, however, raised to the Peerage, an honour which was also conferred on six Generals of the Empire, and six of the old *régime*. The remaining seats were assigned to the Dukes, and to those members of the old nobility, in whose families peerages were hereditary. It had been decided not to dissolve the existing Legislative Assembly, which was to continue its functions and to be known as the Chamber of Deputies.³ On June 2nd and 3rd the evacuation of Paris by the Allied Armies was carried out, and on the

¹ Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, II. pp. 66-72.
Pasquier, II. pp. 414, 439, 440.

² Beugnot, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 147-228.
Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 245-270.

Cambridge Modern History, X. chap. xviii.

³ Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, II. 84, 85.

4th Louis opened Parliament with all solemnity.¹ The ceremony took place at the Palais Bourbon, where the members of both Chambers were assembled to receive him. The King's speech, which he had himself composed, was well delivered. Its tone was dignified, and the allusions to past events were becomingly expressed. The reading of the Constitutional Charter followed the Speech from the Throne. It was listened to with general satisfaction and approval. Only the concluding words, which described the Act as "given in the 19th year of our reign," struck a discordant note.²

The session, which began on June 4th, 1814, and which lasted till December 30th, was a busy one. Far-reaching measures of administrative and financial reforms were successfully dealt with. The arrears of debt, which Napoleon's last campaigns had accumulated, gave to the framing of the budget an increased importance. Public interest was, however, centred round the debates in connection with two bills, the first to restrict the liberty of the press, and the second to restore to the *émigrés* such of their estates as had not been sold. The Government proposals for dealing with the press were introduced by the Abbé de Montesquiou.³ In drawing them up he had been assisted by his secretary, François Guizot, a young Protestant lawyer, and by Royer-Collard,⁴ who, under the name of Aubert during the Consulate, had been a trusted agent of the exiled King. The bill, which was of a stringent character, imposed a censorship on all newspapers and periodicals. It met with great opposition and was only passed with difficulty, after occupying the attention of the Chambers for a period of three months.⁵ The Government bill, however, for the restoration to their former owners of all forfeited estates which had not been sold, created still more excitement. The justice of the proposed step could not be questioned, and the measure would not have been opposed but for Ferrand's injudicious words in introducing it. He, unfortunately, thought the occasion a suitable one for delivering a speech, which was nothing less than an impassioned defence of the *émigrés* and the emigration. "They alone," he said, "have followed the right line." Not content, however, with laying down this formula which evoked indignant protests,

¹ Beugnot, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 231-234.

Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 275-278.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, II. pp. 81-83.

² J. C. Hobhouse, *Letters*, I. p. 69.

³ Pasquier, III. p. 24.

⁴ E. Daudet, *Emigration*, II. p. 373.

Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. p. 45, 46.

⁵ Pasquier, III. pp. 28, 29.

Ferrand proceeded to insinuate that the King hoped, before long, to repair more effectually the losses which his faithful followers had sustained. The alarm caused by these words spread throughout the country.¹ They were construed as an intimation that purchasers of confiscated estates would, in the future, be no longer secure from eviction. The elevation of Ferrand to the rank of count, a few days later, increased the agitation. A severe depreciation in the value of all property which bore the stigma of having been once "national" set in, and Bonaparte is said to have ascribed his unopposed march to Paris, six months later, to the alarm which Ferrand's utterances had engendered.² After eight stormy sittings the bill was, however, passed by a large majority.

Almost from the day of the King's return the existence of a general feeling of unrest and of discontent had become apparent.³ Clubs, in the English sense of the word, had not yet been established. Their place in the political and social life of the country was, to some extent, filled by the *salon*. The chief Bonapartist hostesses of the day were Madame de Souza, Madame Hamelin, and the Duchesse de Saint Leu, to give Hortense de Beauharnais, the ex-Queen of Holland and the mother of Napoleon III, the title which the King had conferred upon her, and by which she was now invariably addressed. In the drawing-rooms which these ladies presided over the discontented generals and the partisans of the Empire would meet nightly, to heap ridicule on the pretensions of the *émigrés* and to deplore the fallen greatness of France.⁴ At her house at Clichy, Madame de Staël was in the habit of entertaining at supper, three times a week, the leaders of the so-called Liberal party. At these gatherings Comte, the editor of the *Censeur*, Benjamin Constant, Lafayette, and Madame de Staël herself would dogmatize on constitutional questions and inveigh against the reactionary tendencies which they accused the Government of harbouring. The sudden change from a despotism, under which the press had been muzzled and the freedom of speech restrained to the benignant

¹ Pasquier, III. pp. 32-34.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, II. pp. 100-110.

Houssaye, 1815, I. pp. 71-73.

Fleury de Chaboulon, I. pp. 41-44.

B. Constant, *Mémoires sur les cent jours*, part i. p. 30.

Lavalette, *Mémoires*, II. p. 118.

Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. p. 55.

J. C. Hobhouse, *Letters*, I. pp. 94-95.

² B. Constant, *Mémoires sur les cent jours*, I. p. 126.

³ Bourrienne, *Mémoires*, X. p. 245.

⁴ Houssaye, 1815, I. p. 67.

Fleury de Chaboulon, I. p. 208.

rule of a limited Monarchy, brought political discussions into fashion. The liberty of writing and of talking freely, from which men had been debarred for so long, was greatly abused. People who are unaccustomed to hear the actions of the Government called into question are inclined to attach an undue importance to political criticisms. The Liberals and constitutional Royalists professed to be truer friends to the restored Monarchy than the *émigrés*. Nevertheless, by mercilessly exposing every mistake of Ministers and by circulating suspicions of their motives, they contrived to unsettle the public mind, and to prepare it for a change quite as effectually as the extreme Royalists by their reactionary views.¹

The newspapers of every shade of opinion contributed to the prevailing disquiet. The *Censeur*, the leading organ of the Liberal party, was a serious periodical chiefly read by politicians and lawyers. The *Nain Jaune*, a satirical and spiteful production, was more popular and had a more general circulation. It was inspired by the Duc de Bassano and belonged to a group of Bonapartists, who skilfully contrived to conceal their identity under the watchword of the King and the Charter. They were thus enabled to prosecute a vigorous campaign against Ministers, *émigrés*, and clergy, all of whom they contended were seeking to deprive the people of the liberties which the Charter had conceded to them. The doings and sayings of M. de La Jobardière, a fanciful character and an exquisitely satirical picture of an old *émigré*, were eagerly awaited by a large circle of readers.² Louis himself is supposed to have derived amusement from these trenchant attacks on the extreme Royalists. "It has taught me many things which a King is all the better for knowing," he said to his courtiers when they asked for the suppression of the paper.³ Among the numerous pamphlets which appeared during the autumn of 1814, notwithstanding the Press Laws, two especially attracted much attention.⁴ The first, by Carnot,⁵ though protesting its author's loyalty to the King,

¹ Jaucourt à Tallyrand, 1 Octobre, 1814.

Mme. de Staël, *Considérations*, III. pp. 95-100.

Chateaubriand, *Mémoires*, VI. p. 322.

² Pasquier, III. p. 59.

Houssaye, 1815, I. p. 58.

J. C. Hobhouse, *Letters*, I. pp. 166-167.

Viel Castel, *Histoire de la Restauration*, II. pp. 106-108.

³ Jaucourt à Tallyrand, 21 Janvier, 1815.

⁴ *Supplementary Despatches*, IX. ; Wellington to Bathurst, 2 October, 1814; Wellington to Castlereagh, 4 October, 1814.

⁵ *Mémoire au roi en Juillet*, 1814.

Bruxelles, 1814.

Fleury de Chaboulon, I. p. 21.

painted the state of feeling public in the gloomiest colours, and threw all the blame for the excesses of the Revolution on the *émigrés*. The other one, by Mehée,¹ an organizer of the September massacres, recalled the questionable part which the King, as Comte de Provence, was supposed to have played in the affair of the Marquis de Favras.

More real injury was, however, done to the cause of the Monarchy by the Royalist press. The denunciations of the men and the institutions of the Revolution, coupled with the contempt expressed for the Charter, and with the hints of retaliatory measures which were to be read in the columns of *La Quotidienne* and *Le Journal Royal*, created a profound feeling of alarm.² Whilst the Government was blamed by the Liberal papers for the reactionary schemes it was accused of entertaining, and by the Royalist papers for its revolutionary sympathies, the tone of fulsome adulation adopted by the official *Moniteur*, whenever the name of a Royal personage was mentioned, brought the whole *régime* into ridicule.³ A field-day having taken place on the outskirts of Paris, in which the two opposing forces were commanded by the Duc d'Angoulême and the Duc de Berri respectively, victory was adjudged to have rested with the elder brother. "But," so ran the report in the *Moniteur*, "the skilful dispositions of the Duc de Berri covered his retreat with glory." It is easy to imagine with what contempt such nonsense would be treated by a people accustomed to read the *bulletins* of the Grand Army.

The talk of the *salons*, the political pamphlets, and the indiscretions of the press were circumstances which only affected the educated classes. The working men and the shopkeepers had, however, grievances of their own. During their residence in England both the King and Monsieur were supposed to have been favourably impressed with the advantages to be derived from the strict observation of the Sabbath. It was due, no doubt, to this fact that in June, 1814, a police regulation had appeared which prohibited work of all description and public amusements on Sundays. The closing of taverns during the hours of divine worship was decreed at the same time. This order was supplemented, a week later, by another which prescribed the manner in which certain Holy Days were to be

¹ Denonciation au roi des procédés par lesquelles les ministres ont violé la constitution. Paris, 1814.

² B. Constant, *Mémoires sur les cent jours*, part i. pp. 30, 31.

³ Viel Castel, *Histoire de la Restauration*, II. pp. 91, 92.

observed.¹ These ordinances were deeply resented by the lower classes especially, and formed the subject of numerous petitions to the Chamber. Beugnot, the director of the police, having unwisely quoted, in defence of his enactments, some laws passed in 1702 and 1720, the affair was looked upon as a further proof of the Government's intention to reimpose the old *régime* in its "pristine purity."¹ So violent was the opposition to these regulations that all attempts to enforce them were soon abandoned.

The States which Napoleon had annexed had been administered by French officials. Their retrocession to their rightful owners necessarily deprived these persons of their employment, and sent them to swell the numbers of those who regretted the Imperial *régime*.² But it was in the army that lay the elements of the most serious danger. In 1814 the French army was a national and a democratic institution. Its history had begun at Valmy. All its victories had been won under the tricolour, and it had no traditions to connect it with the old Royal army. Though welcomed by the Marshals and the senior Generals whose ambitions were satisfied, the junior officers and the rank and file had resentfully submitted to the restoration of the monarchy.³ The wholesale desertion after Napoleon's abdication, which writers with Bonapartist sympathies have triumphantly adduced as a proof of the soldiers' hatred of the Bourbons, furnish, perhaps, better evidence of their utter weariness of military service and of a relaxed state of discipline. The police notes and the reports from the Generals commanding districts, which M. Houssaye has collected, point, however, to the existence of a certain amount of disaffection.⁴ They place it beyond dispute that the soldier assumed the white cockade with reluctance, whilst he secretly cherished the tricolour as a precious relic. The regret at relinquishing the colours which had been associated with so much glory was shared by all ranks of the army.⁵ The commissioned and the non-commissioned officers had, in addition, serious grievances of a more personal

¹ Pasquier, II. pp. 7, 8.

Pozzo à Nesselrode, 13 Juin, 1814.

Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. p. 55.

J. C. Hobhouse, *Letters*, I. pp. 78, 79.

² Lavalette, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 115, 116.

³ B. Constant, *Mémoires sur les cent jours*, I. pp. 76-78.

Supplementary Despatches, IX. ; Wellington to Castlereagh, 10 October, 1814.

Houssaye, 1815, I. p. 3.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 46, 50.

Hauterive à Tallyrand, 14 Novembre, 1814.

J. C. Hobhouse, *Letters*, I. p. 52.

⁵ Fleury de Chaboulon, I. 32-35.

character. The arrears of debt created by the last campaigns committed Louis to a policy of strict economy, making a large reduction of military establishments a matter of necessity. Hundreds of officers with brilliant records of service found themselves, in consequence, placed on a miserably insufficient half-pay. Such a state of affairs could hardly be avoided. But the choice of the Minister who was to carry out this policy was unfortunate. General Dupont, who at one time had been considered a good officer, had been responsible for the first serious reverse which the Imperial arms had sustained. A Court Martial had adjudged him guilty of having, without sufficient reason, concluded the capitulation of Baylen. He had been degraded from his rank, deprived of his honours, and imprisoned in a fortress, where he had remained till Napoleon's fall gave him his liberty. The appointment of this man to be Minister of War was looked upon as an insult to the whole army.¹ Dupont had been employed under the Provisional Government, and it was to this fact, principally, that he owed his position in the Ministry. It is probable, besides, that Louis and his advisers considered that an officer, who had been treated with such severity under the Empire, and who owed so much to the Restoration, would prove a willing instrument for the execution of the changes which they proposed to carry out.

The creation of a body of Household Troops, constituted on the same lines as in the most brilliant days of the old Monarchy, was a scheme which Louis had much at heart. The *émigrés* were fond of asserting that the Revolution could never have taken place had Louis XVI not disbanded his Mousquetaires and Cheveau-Legers. It would be unjust to Louis XVIII to suppose that he could subscribe to so ridiculous a notion. He was, however, fond of ceremony and was jealous of preserving old customs.² The formation of privileged corps was, moreover, a simple method of providing employment for a large number of Royalists, many of whom had returned to France in almost destitute circumstances. The old *Maison du Roi* consisted of the Gardes du Corps, which had been preserved till the Revolution, Cheveau-Legers, grey and black Mousquetaires, and the Gensdarmes. These four last were termed the *red companies*. They furnished the Royal escorts and did duty inside the Royal apartments, differing in that respect from the Gardes Suisses and the Gardes Françaises who guarded the exterior of the Palaces. The troopers in these select corps were either

¹ Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 205-206.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 185-187.

Viel Castel, *Histoire de la Restauration*, I. pp. 394-402.

poor nobles or the members of *bourgeois* families who "lived nobly," and all had the rank of officers. The *red companies* were each commanded by a Captain, who was either a General or a Marshal of France. The appointment was a purely honorary one, and partook rather of a court than a military duty.

By the King's desire Dupont at once set about forming the "*maison militaire*" strictly on the old model. No difficulty was experienced in finding the 6000 recruits required and the work was soon completed. The appearance of some of the middle-aged *émigrés* who had been incorporated, and the way in which they handled their arms, afforded a splendid field for satirical comment. The whole force was, indeed, an anachronism quite unsuited to modern military conditions.¹ The peculiar hardship which the creation of these corps constituted lay in the introduction of a large body of men with the position of officers into the army. Promotion from the non-commissioned to the commissioned ranks had been freely resorted to in the Republican and Imperial armies. The practice, which was in harmony with its democratic traditions, was popular and had stood the test of war. But this sudden creation of over 5000 sub-lieutenants, the more energetic of whom would expect to be transferred, before long, to regiments of the line, was a death-blow to the prospects of the non-commissioned officers of the regular army. Under any circumstances the raising of these privileged corps would have excited ridicule; taking place, however, at a time when wholesale reductions were being ruthlessly carried out, it engendered an intense resentment.² It is true that as a consolation to the army two additional *red companies* were formed, and the command of them was conferred on Berthier, Prince de Wagram, and on Marmont, Duc de Raguse, respectively. This was an honour which was, doubtless, much appreciated by the two Marshals concerned, but was cold comfort to a half-pay officer starving on a pittance of less than a pound a week. These two commands were officially known as the company of Wagram and the company of Raguse. Outside Court circles, however, the company of Peter and the company of Judas were the names which were invented for them.

The treatment of the old Imperial Guard was injudicious. One of two courses should have been adopted towards these fine troops. They should either have been disbanded, with the grant of generous bounties or pensions, or they should have been trusted unreservedly and converted into Royal Guards. Neither

¹ J. C. Hobhouse, *Letters*, I. p. 85.

² Houssaye, 1815, I. p. 60.

of these plans was resorted to. The regiments of the Guard were preserved intact, but they were sent into garrisons as far distant as possible from Paris.¹

Unlike the other great dignitaries of the Empire, the Marshals had been unfeignedly glad of a change of *régime*. All of them longed for the enjoyment of a few years of peace. They were mostly men of *bourgeois* origin, who had married in the class from which they had sprung. They were no strangers to the Tuileries, but they felt as they revisited the Palace, after Louis' restoration, that, at last, they were at a real Court.² There had been a feeling of unreality about the Imperial one. This enthusiasm of the Marshals for the new order of affairs was not destined to continue very long.³ Though the most ordinary prudence should have dictated the humouring and flattering of these officers, whose influence at a crisis might prove all important, such a policy did not always commend itself to the Royalists. The men were not the worst offenders.

The ladies of the Faubourg Saint-Germain were invariably polite towards their sisters of the new nobility ; they, nevertheless, contrived to make them feel profoundly uncomfortable. In this respect the Duchesse d'Angoulême set an unfortunate example. It was part of her system to ignore new titles as much as possible. To her the Princesse de La Moskowa was simply Madame Ney. Yet the wife of Marshal Ney was peculiarly deserving of her consideration. She was a Mlle. Auguié, the daughter of an old maid of Marie Antoinette who was said to have gone mad from grief at hearing of the Queen's execution. Madame had not forgotten this. Her conduct towards the Princesse de La Moskowa was, however, of a kind which might have been adopted with propriety towards the daughter of an old servant, but was not the treatment which the wife of a distinguished Marshal was entitled to expect.⁴ Madame Ney never came away from the Tuileries, where formerly she had held so exalted a position, without a burning sense of shame and of mortification. Ney, who was very fond of his wife, was proportionately indignant. It is said that six months later, when he was pacing the room at the inn at Bous-le-Saulnier in

¹ Viel Castel, *Histoire de la Restauration*, I. pp. 400-401.

² Houssaye, 1815, I. pp. 101, 102.

³ *Supplementary Despatches*, IX., Wellington to Castlereagh, 17 October, 1814.

⁴ Fleury de Chaboulon, I. p. 11.

Benjamin Constant, *Mémoires sur les cent jours*, part i. p. 39.

Houssaye, 1815, I. pp. 103, 104.

Lavalette, II. pp. 131-133.

J. C. Hobhouse, *Letters*, I. pp. 175-176.

an agony of doubt and indecision, the recollection of the slights which his wife had endured at Court came back to him, and finally dissolved the remaining shreds of his loyalty to the Bourbons.

The feelings which the Royal Family and the *émigré* party entertained, or were supposed to entertain, towards the Legion of Honour was another source of irritation to the soldiers. Under the Empire the Legion of Honour had been a highly prized distinction, rarely accorded to civilians. The King had been warned that, however repugnant this revolutionary decoration might be to his personal feelings, it would be highly impolitic to abolish it. It had been retained accordingly with certain modifications, such as the substitution of Henry IV's effigy for Napoleon's and the abolition of the eagles. But the profuse way in which it was now dispensed was justly felt to be an attempt to lower its value and to change its character.¹

The feeling of uneasiness² which was very apparent in the autumn of 1814 was augmented by the presence in Paris of a great number of half-pay officers. Driven to desperation by their poverty and the utter hopelessness of their prospects, they had become dangerous enemies to the Government. On November 30th Marmont, whose *company* was on duty at the Tuileries, excitedly informed the King of a plot, the existence of which had been brought to his knowledge. Louis that evening was to attend a gala performance at the Odéon, but Marmont now informed him that 150 half-pay officers intended to attack the Royal carriages at the Pont Neuf and to throw all their occupants into the river. He advised the King to postpone his visit to the theatre. "Not so," said Louis, who was quite unmoved; "it will be your business to protect me, my dear Marshal, whilst I go to the play to amuse myself." Marmont sent for the Governor of Paris, extraordinary precautions were taken, thousands of troops were placed on duty in the streets, Marmont himself rode by the King's carriage, and nothing happened. The affair, however, which caused a great sensation, was used as a pretext for dismissing Dupont from the War

¹ Bourrienne, *Mémoires*, X. pp. 245-246, 249-252.

Fleury de Chaboulon, I. p. 28-31.

Houssaye, 1815, I. p. 44.

Pasquier, III. pp. 8-9.

J. C. Hobhouse, *Letters*, I. p. 86.

² *Supplementary Despatches*, IX., Wellington to Castlereagh, 3 November, 1814; Wellington to Liverpool, 9 November, 1814; Wellington to Castlereagh, 21 November, 1814.

Jaucourt à Talleyrand, 18 October, 1814; 29 November, 1814.

Office and for depriving Beugnot of the direction of the police.¹

Louis had no fault to find with Dupont, who had always been ready to comply with all his wishes.² But his advisers impressed upon him that an officer of more firmness must be appointed in order to stamp out the growing spirit of disaffection in the army. The portfolio of War was accordingly passed to Marshal Soult, Duc de Dalmatie. Though in the first instance treated with suspicion and left without employment, Soult soon won golden opinions by the ardour with which he expressed his Royalist convictions. He had not had long to wait for his reward. In June, 1814, he was appointed to the command of the 13th military district with headquarters at Rennes, where he charmed the Royalists of the West by raising a subscription for the erection of a chapel to the memory of the *émigrés* who had fallen at Quiberon.³

No sooner was Soult installed at the War Office than he took up the question of the half-pay officers with an uncompromising vigour. He decreed that in future they must live at their native towns or villages. Those of them who had not been born in Paris would be required to leave for their birth-places without delay.⁴ Soult, furthermore, decided to initiate this reform by making a striking example. A few weeks before he had taken up office the police had arrested a doctor who was travelling through France to Naples, where he held a post at Murat's Court. Among the papers found in this man's possession were two letters written by General Exelmans, the Inspector-General of Cavalry. One was addressed to King Joachim himself, and in it Exelmans, who had been Murat's Aide-de-Camp, congratulated him on the fact that the Powers at Vienna had decided to leave him in undisturbed possession of his kingdom. "Had they not done so," added the General, "a thousand French officers trained in Your Majesty's school would have flown to your assistance." Exelmans' other letter was directed to Murat's Aide-de-Camp, and contained a reminder that there were certain arrears of pay owing to him. Dupont, after consulting with Louis, had sent for General Exelmans and had cautioned him to be more guarded in his language for

¹ Marmont, *Mémoires*, VII. pp. 76, 77.

Houssaye, 1815, I. pp. 77-78.

Wellington to Castlereagh, 5 December, 1814.

² Louis XVIII. à Talleyrand, 4 December, 1814.

³ Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 34, 35.

Houssaye, 1815, pp. 81-92.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 83-87.

Pasquier, III. pp. 57, 58.

Lavalette, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 136-138.

the future. The matter had, in short, been treated as nothing more than an indiscretion. Soult, however, though the case had been dealt with and settled by his predecessor, determined to reopen it in a very different spirit. Exelmans was deprived of his appointment and placed on half-pay. This brought him within the provisions of Soult's recent regulation on the subject of officers so circumstanced. He was accordingly directed to leave Paris and to take up his residence at Bar-sur-Ornain, his native town. The General was a cavalry officer with a splendid record of service, but somewhat of a swashbuckler, and with a strong theatrical vein in his character. He was the last man to submit tamely to treatment of this kind. He protested that he had not been to Bar-sur-Ornain for twenty years, that Paris was his home except when away on duty, and that, moreover, his wife was in an interesting condition and could not travel. As he persisted in refusing to obey the Minister's order he was placed under arrest in his own house. The affair became the talk of the town, the Liberals, especially, espousing his cause warmly. Lafayette and Lanjuinais visited him, Madame de Staël wrote to congratulate him on his firm attitude. Soon all Paris heard that, when the police had entered the General's house, he had bared his breast and told them to kill him, that every cupboard and drawer had been ransacked, that Madame Exelmans had fainted, and that her husband had made his escape over the wall at the back of the house, leaving behind him a letter addressed to the President of the Chamber, in which he entrusted his family to the protection of the Assembly and protested against the treatment to which he had been subjected. A few days, however, after his sensational flight, General Exelmans surrendered himself to the military authorities and was sent to Lille to be tried. On January 23rd, 1815, he duly appeared before a Court Martial. In addition to the charge of refusing to obey an order of the Minister of War four other offences were alleged against him. The letter which he had written to Murat was described as an act of espionage, and he was, further, charged with speaking in a disrespectful manner about the King. The trial was soon over. Exelmans was unanimously acquitted on all counts. Soult had only succeeded in making him a popular hero.

The failure of the Government to obtain a verdict caused great excitement.¹ The immediate effect was to render nugatory Soult's regulation with regard to the half-pay officers. The

¹ Benjamin Constant, *Mémoires sur les cent jours*, part i. pp. 89-90.
Fleury de Chaboulon, I. 69-70.
Houssaye, 1815, I. pp. 99-100.

month of January, 1815, proved a disturbed one in Paris. On the 15th the refusal of the *Curé* of Saint-Roch to allow the body of the actress Mlle. Raucourt, an excommunicate, to be brought into his church led to a serious disturbance, which could only be quelled by an order from the King that the doors were to be opened, and that the service was to proceed.¹ The events of January 21st, the anniversary of Louis XVI's execution, increased the general ferment. When he considered that his own or his family's dignity was at stake,² Louis was no believer in the wisdom of letting a dead past bury its dead. But, had memorial services been held only in honour of those members of the Royal Family who had suffered during the Revolution, the matter would have excited no unfavourable comments. The affair was regarded in a very different light when it was decreed that these tokens of respect were to be paid to the memory of a man like General Pichegru, who had entered into treasonable correspondence with the enemy, or to Cadoudal, who by everybody except the *émigrés* was regarded as an assassin, or to Moreau, who had been killed by a French shell at Dresden when attached to the Headquarter Staff of the Russian army.³

It was the King's desire that January 21st should be observed with peculiar solemnity. Previous to this the remains of Marie Antoinette and of Louis XVI had been exhumed from the disused cemetery of Ba Madeleine in the Rue d'Anjou. The search for the bodies of these illustrious victims had been conducted at night, with great secrecy, in the presence only of M. de Blacas, the Bishop of Nancy, and two or three other persons of high position. The report which they drew up and signed of the discovery of the bones of the King and Queen was not generally looked upon as conclusive. The absence of the Prefect, the Mayor, and all representatives of the local authorities did not escape the notice of the enemies of the Government.⁴ It had been decided that the remains were to be transported in state to Saint-Denis, the burial place of the Royal Family.

On January 21st the procession took place. The crowd assembled along the line of route displayed a great lack of reverence. The defective arrangements made by the authorities for the ceremony contributed not a little to deprive it of

¹ D'Hauterive à Talleyrand, 14 Fevrier, 1815.

Jaucourt à Talleyrand, 20 Janvier, 1815 ; 23 Janvier, 1815.

Fleury de Chaboulon, I. pp. 46-48.

Rovigo, *Mémoires*, VII. pp. 332-333.

Lavalette, *Mémoires*, II. p. 112.

² Houssaye, 1815, I. pp. 12-13.

³ Fleury de Chaboulon, I. 27-28.

⁴ Pasquier, III. pp. 61, 62.

solemnity. The funeral car was so high that its top came constantly in contact with the chains to which the street lamps were suspended. Its extrication caused delays which called forth derisive shouts of "*a la lanterne*" from the mob.¹ As an impressive spectacle the affair was a failure, the unfortunate effect of which was increased by the intemperate language of the Bishop of Troyes in the funeral sermon. More harmful still were the rumours which the day gave rise to. It was said that brigands and villainous Chouans had been brought into Paris by the Royalists during the past month. As soon as it was dark these cut-throats were to enter the houses of the regicides and slaughter them to a man. The night passed off without incident, but so general had been the credence attached to these wild stories, that a man of the stamp of Carnot deemed it necessary to sit up all night with loaded pistols by his side.²

Already, in the autumn of 1814, the threatening state of affairs in France was attracting the attention of foreign Governments. From the reports which reached the Cabinet, Lord Liverpool decided that it would be wise to recall the Duke of Wellington.³ Some of the discontented generals were alleged to have declared that his presence in Paris as British Ambassador constituted a national insult. Wellington himself, whose social relations brought him chiefly into contact with the extreme Royalists, was inclined to take an unduly favourable view of the situation. It is true that he had advised the English Government of the existence of a certain amount of discontent which he ascribed to the number of officers and civil officials thrown out of employment. But not for a moment does he appear to have entertained the notion that the Monarchy might be in serious danger. Lord Liverpool was urgent. "We shan't feel easy till we hear of your having landed at Dover," he wrote on November 13th. The Duke, on receipt of this letter, demurred no longer, and forthwith began his preparations for departure. He was still unconvinced, though he admitted that

¹ Rovigo, *Mémoires*, VII. pp. 333, 334.

² Fleury de Chaboulon, I. p. 68.

Houssaye, 1815, I. pp. 96-99.

³ *Supplementary Despatches*, IX., Liverpool to Castlereagh, 4 November, 1814; Liverpool to Wellington, 4 November, 1814; Liverpool to Wellington, 13 November, 1814; Wellington to Liverpool, 16 November, 1814; Wellington to Liverpool, 18 November, 1814; Liverpool to Wellington, 15 November, 1814; Wellington to Liverpool, 24 November, 1814; "Loyal Subject to Liverpool," 28 eleventh month: Castlereagh to Wellington, December, 1814; Liverpool to Castlereagh, 1 December, 1814.

Correspondance de Talleyrand, Jaucourt à Talleyrand, 2 October, 1814; 19 November, 1814.

Sir H. Maxwell, *Life of Wellington*, pp. 384-386.

"no man could be a judge of his own case." The necessity under which Lord Castlereagh found himself of returning to England for the opening of Parliament, and the desire of the Government to see Wellington replace him at the Congress of Vienna, had been the reason officially given for the Duke's recall. It was a fortunate decision, as he afterwards himself admitted. Had he remained another two months in Paris, he would probably have been seized, on the news of Napoleon's landing becoming known, and prevented from joining the army in Flanders.

Lord Liverpool was not the only statesman who viewed the situation in France with apprehension. At Vienna the Tsar talked to Talleyrand on the subject, and Metternich wrote about it to Fouché.¹ In initiating this correspondence, the Austrian Chancellor was actuated solely by a desire to obtain the best opinion about the condition of affairs in France. Metternich asked for information on three points: (1) What would happen if Napoleon were to return to France? (2) If the King of Rome were to appear on the frontier supported by an Austrian army corps? (3) If neither of these contingencies were to take place, but were a revolution to break out of itself? To these questions Fouché replied that everything would depend on the behaviour of the first regiment; should it go over to Bonaparte, the whole army would follow its example. In the second case, that France would declare for the King of Rome; and in the third, that the Revolution would be made in favour of the Duc d'Orleans. Fouché's excellent judgment is well exemplified by these answers.

Joseph Fouché, Duc d'Otrante, was fifty-five years of age and was one of the richest men in France. M. Madelin, his recent biographer, has estimated his fortune at between twelve and fifteen millions of francs. Though it is impossible that the whole of this wealth, accumulated in the course of a comparatively short political career, can have been acquired honestly, it is, no doubt, untrue to assert that it was the result of vulgar speculations. When the Empire was at its zenith Fouché had participated in the rewards which Napoleon was in the habit of lavishing on his Generals and Ministers at the expense of foreign countries. He had supplemented these lawful gains by fortunate speculations. To a man whose whole career had consisted in an intelligent anticipation of events, and who had no scruples about using for his own ends the exclusive information which as a Minister he had at his disposal, Stock Exchange

¹ Talleyrand à Louis XVIII, 25 Novembre, 1814.

Duc de Rovigo, *Mémoires*, VII. p. 328.

operations furnished the almost certain means of amassing a fortune. Titles and decorations had little attraction for him, but he worshipped money for the influence and the independence which its possession gave him. The desire for power, an intense interest in the business of government, and a love of intrigue were his ruling passions. Circumstances had prevented him from playing as prominent a part as he could have wished in the events of the Restoration, and, to his chagrin, he had found himself among those Senators whom the King had not elevated to the Peerage. Most men would have considered their careers as finished. Fouché had overcome too many obstacles in his eventful life, had experienced too many turns of fortune's wheel, to look upon his case as hopeless. He realized the difficulties with which the restored Monarchy would have to deal, he could estimate the men whom the King had about him at their just worth, and he thought it not impossible that in their perplexity they might be compelled to turn to him for advice.

It reads like a piece of monstrous impudence that Fouché, the oratorian who had abjured his vows, the regicide and terrorist of the Convention, the bloodthirsty Proconsul of Lyons, the Minister of the Empire whose sinister office had been the talk of Europe, should aspire to enter the Council of The Most Christian King, yet this presumption was not so unwarrantable as, at first sight, it would appear to be.¹ All through his life it had been his rule to prepare for every contingency and to avoid making unnecessary enemies. Under the Empire he had contrived to maintain friendly relations with men of every shade of opinion, and, strange to relate, had been a welcome guest in the most exclusive circles of the noble Faubourg. The gaunt, slovenly man with the pale, unhealthy face, the white lips, and the bloodshot, shifty eyes was not an attractive figure, nevertheless he had always been popular with women, and could number among his intimate friends great ladies like the Princesse de Vaudemont-Lorraine and the Marquise de Custine.² When, in 1810, disgrace had overtaken him the Faubourg Saint-Germain deplored his fall.³ At the Restoration there were many men, high in favour at Court and at the Pavillon de Marsan, who had not forgotten the numerous services rendered by the all-powerful Minister of former days.

Fouché, who had served every *régime* which had come into existence since the Revolution, had always been true to one

¹ Madelin, *Fouché*, I. pp. 383-385, 390-395 ; 400-412.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 379-380.

³ B. Constant, *Mémoires sur les cent jours*, part i. p. 96.
Rovigo, *Mémoires*, VII. pp. 306-307.

great political principle. He believed that no Government could endure which did not conform to the ideas and the institutions of the Revolution. Perhaps also the instinct of self-preservation warned him that his own well-being was irrevocably bound up in the maintenance of that system.¹ He had looked upon the Empire as the natural heir to the Revolution. Napoleon's war policy had been the obstacle to this evolution. He saw no reason, however, why the King should not, successfully, carry out the development which Bonaparte's overweening ambition had retarded. It was on these lines that, in June, 1814, he had submitted a paper to Blacas for Louis' perusal. In this remarkable document the mistakes already committed were fearlessly pointed out. The difficulties of the King's position were freely discussed, and remedies were proposed for the grievances of all classes, the *émigrés* included. As a substitute for the military glory, of which, during the last twenty years, France had drunk so deeply, Louis was urged to encourage education, arts, industry, and commerce, and to find a healthy outlet for the long-repressed political energies of the people in a sound parliamentary system. There was much in what Fouché wrote which was little to Louis' taste as a Bourbon, but he could not fail to be impressed with the statesmanlike sagacity of the advice tendered. The result nevertheless fell far short of Fouché's hopes. To his disappointment no offer of employment was made to him. As he ascribed this neglect to utilize his services to the influence of Monsieur and of the Duchesse d'Angoulême, he tried the effect of writing to the Comte d'Artois. This letter he soon afterwards published. In tone it was almost menacing.² The fate of the Stuarts was referred to as a warning, and the folly was pointed out of those Royalists, more dangerous than traitors, "who wished to drive the King along the path of re-action."

Finding that his advances met with no response, Fouché, as was his wont, began to intrigue against a Government which refused to employ him. His secret hostility, of which there are numerous proofs, ought not, however, to be ascribed solely to annoyance at the indifference with which he was treated. His many sources of information, his keen perception, and his experience in gauging public opinion convinced him that the Bourbons were becoming, daily, more unpopular. Having no faith in the stability of the restored Monarchy, he instinctively set himself to prepare for its approaching downfall.³ Between

¹ Madelin, *Fouché*, I. pp. 277-282, 407-408.

² *Ibid.*, II. pp. 310-315.

³ *Ibid.*, II. p. 319.

Talleyrand and himself there was no personal friendship and a great deal of distrust. Both could see, however, that the Government was following a wrong course, and that a revolution in the near future must be the result of the universal suspicion with which it was viewed. They had, moreover, at this juncture other bonds of union. It was plain to Talleyrand that even the great services which he had rendered to the cause of the Restoration could not overcome the aversion with which the King and his family regarded his revolutionary past.¹ But, if both of them had reasons for displeasure with the Bourbons of the elder branch, both had been in disgrace in the latter days of the Empire, and had good cause to fear Bonaparte's return to power. To most men who had played a prominent part in the Revolution, and even under the Empire, the enthronement of the Duc d'Orléans, a regicide's son, would have been more welcome than the restoration of legitimate Monarchy.

In the case of the Duke, infinitely better guarantees for constitutional government could have been exacted, and the tricolour might have been retained as the national flag. As early as July, 1814,² Talleyrand discreetly sounded him as to his views. His attitude was not encouraging, and he made it very clear that he would not associate himself with any subversive movement. "A Prince without energy or character," was Talleyrand's comment on his conduct. "Nothing to be done with a Bourbon who has neither a mistress nor a confessor," said Fouché.³ But, though the Duke's want of enterprise thwarted their schemes, so far as he was concerned, they were not at the end of their resources. The idea of proclaiming Emperor the King of Rome, under the title of Napoleon II, had much to commend it. Were this to be effected a council of Regency would have to be set up, which might be composed of Marie Louise, Eugène de Beauharnais, Marshal Davout, and themselves. This plan possessed the merit that it would enlist the support of the army, and the disadvantage that the child on whom they built their hopes was in the guardianship of Austria.⁴ The consent of that Power would therefore be a necessary preliminary to the carrying out of their plot. But, whether they proposed to proclaim his son or to enthrone the Duc d'Orléans, or, indeed, to bring about any change of Government, the close proximity of Napoleon himself to the coast of

¹ Duc de Rovigo, *Mémoires*, VII. pp. 313-316.

Chateaubriand, *Mémoires*, VII. p. 61.

² Houssaye, 1815, I. p. 115.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

⁴ Rovigo, *Mémoires*, VII. pp. 316-321.

Houssaye, 1815, I. pp. 115, 117.

France must always prove an obstacle to the successful consummation of their plans. Talleyrand, however, who was on the point of starting to represent his country at the Congress of Vienna, undertook to effect, if possible, the fallen Emperor's removal to some more distant spot, by working on the fears of the assembled Sovereigns and Plenipotentiaries.

Fouché in this autumn of 1814 retired to Ferrières, his country seat near Paris, giving out that in future he intended to occupy himself solely with domestic matters. Nothing was further from the truth. He was in correspondence with Talleyrand and Metternich at Vienna, and with Murat at Naples. According to the police reports he was in relations with Real and with Garat the Republican, whilst on his visits to Paris he frequented the Bonapartist *salons* of Cambacérès and the Duchesse de Saint-Leu. To Gaillard, his old comrade of the oratory, he sent notes on current events which were passed to the Grand Almoner, who laid them before the King. Louis was much struck by the perspicacity of these reports, which, as he informed the director of the police, contained more useful information than did those of his official agents.¹ Through the intermediary of a magistrate, M. Reverdin, Fouché entered into correspondence with Monsieur, and at the same time warned Dambray, the Chancellor, of the dangers which threatened the dynasty. But most important of all, he held in his hands the threads of the different plots which were hatching against the Government. Davout, Drouet d'Erlon, and the brothers Ballemand, the leaders of the military malcontents, confided in him, the Emperor's "mamelukes," as Talleyrand called them, Maret, Duc de Bassano, Savary, Duc de Rovigo, and the Comte de Lavalette consulted him. Notwithstanding that Savary, his successor as Imperial Police Minister, was jealous of him on professional grounds, and that Lavalette was very suspicious of him.² There were, indeed, good reasons for distrusting Fouché. With an unrivalled perfidy, after sympathizing with and encouraging their schemes, he would write to his friend d'André, the director of the police, to tell him of the danger which he saw in Napoleon's propinquity to France. "Let him be removed further away, or watch the coasts carefully, otherwise we shall have him back, in the spring, with the swallows and the violets," were words of warning he was never tired of conveying to the authorities.³

¹ Madelin, *Fouché*, II. pp. 318-320.

² Rovigo, *Mémoires*, VII. pp. 329-330, 339-340.
Lavalette, II. pp. 138-141.

³ Madelin, *Fouché*, II. p. 321.

To the excitement caused by the Exelmans affair and the events of January 21st were added rumours of war. Talleyrand had advised the King from Vienna that a show of force would strengthen his hand in negotiating, and would constitute a suitable reply to Murat's armaments in Italy. Sixty thousand men had, accordingly, been recalled to the colours, and a concentration on the line Chambéry-Grenoble had been begun.¹ The idea of going to war to preserve the territories of the King of Saxony, or in order to restore Naples to Ferdinand IV, evoked no enthusiasm whatever. The prospect that his reign would prove a peaceful one had been Louis' chief attraction. If, however, hostilities were to be embarked upon, many people began to think that it might be well to have Napoleon to conduct them.² Fouché, coolly watching events from Ferrières, came to the conclusion, early in February, 1815, that the time for action had come. His return to Paris was quickened, moreover, by a suspicion that the disaffected generals were on the point of striking a blow.³ As a fact, their preparations were already far advanced, and under Fouché's experienced direction they were rapidly completed. But when everything was ready, Davout, whether moved by distrust of Fouché or for some other reason, suddenly declined to have anything to do with the affair. Though his withdrawal was a great disappointment to the conspirators, they decided that matters should proceed without him. It was arranged that Drouet d'Erlon, who commanded the 16th Military District with headquarters at Lille, should set his troops in motion, on receiving the signal from Fouché, march on Paris and occupy the Tuileries, the two Eallemands with their brigades joining him on the road. Fouché himself undertook to prevent the National Guards from acting. The peculiar feature about the plot was that the conspirators were divided as to the object which it was to effect. Though the majority may, perhaps, have favoured the recall of Napoleon, others merely hoped to intimidate the King and to force him to redress their grievances, whilst some were for expelling Louis altogether, and for obliging the Duc d'Orléans to accept the Crown. All were agreed, however, that in order to kindle any enthusiasm among the troops they must invoke the name of the Emperor.

¹ Talleyrand à Louis XVIII., 17 Octobre, 1814.

Louis XVIII. à Talleyrand, 27 Octobre, 1814.

Talleyrand à Louis XVIII., 4 Janvier, 1815.

² Houssaye, 1815, I. pp. 106-107.

³ Rovigo, *Mémoires*, VII. pp. 330-332.

Houssaye, 1815, I. pp. 118-121.

Madelin, *Fouché*, II. pp. 323-324.

Lavalette, *Mémoires*, II. p. 142.

On the night of March 5th, 1815, Fouché went to the house of the Princesse de Vaudemont. Men of different shades of opinion frequented her *salon*. On this occasion several Ministers were present.¹ During the course of the evening he either contrived to overhear a conversation, or received a message from one of his numerous agents, which caused him to return home in haste, and to send a summons to General Ballemand to join him at once. The news which had so disturbed him was an unpleasant confirmation of his worst fears. Bonaparte had left the Island of Elba, had landed near Cannes, and was said to be advancing into the interior. This was, however, a piece of information which Fouché proposed to keep to himself, for the present. When Ballemand appeared, he told him that the police had discovered their plot and that he must start at once for Lille, warn Drouet d'Erlon of what had happened, and bid him strike without loss of time. Fouché's statement that the authorities had information of their plans was not altogether untrue. The Government had, in fact, despatched Marshal Mortier to Lille. His unexpected arrival disconcerted Drouet, who, pretexting an order from the Minister of War, had already marched off his troops. He now sent messages to recall them, and was placed under arrest by Mortier. In the meantime General Efebvre-Desnoëttes, who was in the conspiracy, had reached Compiègne with his brigade, where he received word from Drouet that everything was discovered. Together with the Ballemands he thereupon fled in disguise. All three of them were, however, captured in the course of the next few days.²

Fouché's motives for hurrying on this affair are easy to fathom.³ In his opinion vigorous action on the part of the generals was all that was required to overthrow the Bourbons. Once the military revolution accomplished, he intended to place himself at the head of the Provisional Government which would then be formed. In the meantime one of two things would have happened. Either Napoleon would have been defeated, or he would be triumphantly advancing on Paris. In the first case, as the leading member of the Provisional Government, he would be practically master of the situation, and in a position to decide what should happen. Whether Louis should be set up again, or the Crown be given to the Duc d'Orléans,

¹ Madelin, *Fouché*, II. pp. 325-326.

Rovigo, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 361-362.

² Houssaye, 1815, I. pp. 286-292.

Pasquier, III. pp. 130-154.

Rovigo, *Mémoires*, VII. pp. 362-364.

³ *Supplementary Despatches of Wellington*, IX., edited by his son (certified copy of paper by Savary), pp. 633-635.

or a Regency proclaimed. In the second, and more probable eventuality of the Emperor's success, matters would not be so favourable for him. But he would still have to be taken into account, and the military insurrection, which had been largely his work, could be made to appear in the light of a useful diversion on Napoleon's behalf, giving him a strong claim on his gratitude. The affair, however, had turned out a failure. Fouché, accordingly, put the matter on one side, and turned all his attention to the important events which were taking place in the south.¹

Though strange rumours were current all through the 6th, which disturbed the *Bourse* and depressed the *Rente*, nothing definite was allowed to transpire till the morning of March 7th.² Two Royal proclamations then appeared in the *Moniteur*, one convened the Chambers which had been prorogued till May 1st, the other called upon all loyal subjects to lay hands on Bonaparte wherever he should appear. At the Tuileries the news of his landing had been received very calmly, and, at first, with little apprehension. There were sufficient troops in the south-eastern provinces to rout the invader's followers, owing to the concentration which Murat's attitude had occasioned.³ It was decided that the Comte d'Artois should proceed forthwith to Lyons, and that the Duc d'Orléans should accompany him. They were to have the benefit of Marshal Macdonald's advice, to whom the necessary orders were transmitted. It was also resolved at the Council, which had been hastily called together, to give commands to the Duc d'Angoulême and the Duc de Berri, and to employ Marshals Ney and Gouvion Saint-Cyr. The occasion was looked upon as nothing more than an excellent opportunity for effectually disposing of Bonaparte, and for the Royal Princes to win military distinction.⁴

In Paris the sentiments of the well-to-do and the educated classes were hostile to Bonaparte. The Marshals, Generals, and other officials of the Empire, who had accepted employment under the restored Monarchy, were furious at the dilemma in which their old master's reappearance placed them.⁵ The middle classes, who saw looming behind Bonaparte the dreaded

¹ Napoleon's opinion on the subject. *Mémoires de Napoleon*, nouvelle édition, IV. p. 340.

² Houssaye, 1815, I. pp. 269-270.

³ Louis XVIII. à Talleyrand, 7 Mars, 1815.

Jaucourt à Talleyrand, 8 Mars, 1815.

⁴ Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 292-297.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, II. pp. 199-203.

⁵ B. Constant, *Mémoires sur les cent jours*, I. pp. 83-84.

Houssaye, 1815, I. pp. 270-276.

spectre of civil and foreign war, discovered that the Monarchy, which they had been criticizing and reviling for the past six months, was the Government which suited them the best. The working men, on the other hand, evinced from the moment that the news was made public strong Bonapartist sympathies. The attitude of the troops of the garrison was, on the whole, satisfactory. The half-pay officers, however, testified to their joy by noisy demonstrations, and made no secret of the delight which Napoleon's return afforded them.

In the country districts, though Provence, the South generally, and large portions of the West were Royalist, opinion was much more favourable to Bonaparte than in Paris. This difference of sentiment may be ascribed to two reasons. The provincial middle classes had experienced the insolence of the nobles and the interference of the clergy to an extent quite unknown in the capital. More important still, however, the rumours affecting purchases of national property, which had been current ever since the Restoration, obtained a much wider credence in the provinces than in Paris. The fears on this score, which the clause in the Charter had been drawn up to allay, had been intensified by the threats of the returned *émigrés* and the utterances of the priests.¹ This dread of seeing the old *régime* re-established, which was shared by the *bourgeoisie* and the peasantry alike, was to convert Napoleon's march into a triumphal progress.

The contemptuous indifference with which, at first, "Bonaparte's mad enterprise" had been treated at the Tuileries gave way to a feeling of intense alarm on receipt of the news of his entry into Lyons, which the return of Monsieur and the Duc d'Orléans confirmed. Soult was, in the first instance, made the scapegoat. His loudly expressed Royalist sentiments, for which he had been so much applauded, were now declared to have been a blind. In Court circles it was freely asserted that the Exelmans affair had been part of a plot which he had deliberately engineered in order to incense the army.² He was, moreover, accused of purposely placing the most disaffected regiments across Napoleon's path. Louis, though he acquitted the Marshal of treasonable intent, probably considered that he

¹ Fleury de Chaboulon, I. pp. 45-46.

B. Constant, *Mémoires sur les cent jours*, part i. pp. 36-38, 85-86. Houssaye, 1815, I. pp. 279-284.

J. C. Hobhouse, *Letters*, I. pp. 97-102.

² Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 288-292, 308-310.

Jaucourt à Talleyrand, 14 Mars, 1815.

B. Constant, *Mémoires sur les cent jours*, part i. p. 90.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, II. pp. 217-219.

might have exercised a wiser discrimination in this last respect.¹ In any case, when, on March 11th, Soult tendered his resignation, he did not hesitate to accept it. General Clarke, Duc de Feltre, "the soldier who owed everything to his pen," was appointed Minister of War in his place.² Royalist writers for the past year had been busily engaged in proving that Bonaparte was no general, and that he owed his victories to the brains of his subordinates. To oppose him with the man who had been for seven years his Minister of War appeared to the Court and the Faubourg Saint-Germain a move of almost diabolical astuteness.

On March 10th the Chambers met. Both the Peers and the Deputies presented an address to the King in which they protested their loyalty. The sentiments expressed on this occasion no doubt honestly reflected the feelings of the large majority. The Liberals, who by their constant opposition to Ministerial measures had incurred the hatred of the extreme Royalists, were now the firmest supporters of the Throne.³ They felt, and they did their utmost to impress their views upon their countrymen, that the only hope for the Constitution lay in the preservation of the Monarchy. It is significant of their small influence that, though at least two-thirds of the so-called representatives of the people were bitterly hostile to Napoleon's return to power, he could nevertheless march to Paris and take possession of the Government without firing a shot.

In their despair Ministers turned to Fouché.⁴ Though he was strongly suspected of having been concerned in the Drouet d'Erlon plot, Dambray, Blacas, d'André sought his advice. It appears certain that, between the 12th and 14th March, more than one attempt was made to induce him to enter the Ministry. Fouché declined these offers, which would have enchanted him had they been made a few weeks earlier. He was careful, however, to wrap up his refusal in profuse expressions of loyalty. He pointed out that Bonaparte, to judge by his proclamations, wished to enlist the support of the Republican party. Under these circumstances, he thought that it would be impolitic for the King to bring a man like himself, with pronounced revolutionary antecedents, into the Government. He had no doubt that he could serve His Majesty more usefully by remaining in the background. Under these plausible arguments he concealed

¹ Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 312-320.

Mémoires de Napoleon, nouvelle édition, 1905, IV. p. 7.

² Houssaye, 1815, I. p. 294.

³ B. Constant, *Mémoires sur les cent jours*, part i. pp. 63-72, 91, Villemain, *Souvenirs*, II. pp. 1-12.

⁴ Madelin, *Fouché*, II. pp. 329-332.

his real opinion, which was, that the cause of the Monarchy was hopelessly compromised. But, on the other hand, he had no faith in the duration of the new Imperial *régime*, and proceeded to lay his plans accordingly. Whilst he sent an emissary to meet Napoleon in Burgundy with congratulations and offers of service, he, at the same time, did all in his power to win the confidence of the Royalists. On March 15th it was conveyed to him that Monsieur himself wished to consult him. An interview was arranged and took place the same evening at the house of Madame de Vaudemont. It lasted two hours. Unfortunately, what passed between them has never transpired. It is related, however, that when Fouché parted from the Comte d'Artois he made use of these words¹: "Let your Royal Highness look after the King, I shall look after the Monarchy." Some writers have seen in this expression the proof of a compact, entered into with Monsieur, by which Fouché undertook to betray Napoleon in the interests of Royalty. Be this as it may, the Comte d'Artois, undoubtedly, went away well satisfied with the friendly intentions of the man he had come to see.

On the following morning, nevertheless, as Fouché was turning the corner on to the Boulevard, his carriage was stopped and a police officer handed him a warrant for his arrest. It was a most unpleasant surprise. The idea of spending the next few days, which promised to be so full of incident, in the Conciergerie was intolerable. He expostulated, swore the warrant was irregular, vowed that, in any case, a former Minister and Senator should not be taken up like a common malefactor in the streets, and bade his coachman drive home. On arriving at his house in the Rue Cerutti, now number 19 of the Rue Caffitte, whither the police followed him, he insisted that messengers must be sent to the King and to the Comte d'Artois to obtain confirmation of the action of Bourrienne, the newly appointed Prefect. Monsieur was surprised, and said, what was probably true, that he knew nothing about the matter. The King, on the other hand, expressed approval and directed that the affair should proceed.² The Prefect, Bourrienne, in point of fact, selected for his hostility to Napoleon, had acted under his instructions. Louis was, no doubt, of opinion that, in the present crisis, a man of Fouché's talents must be either in the Ministry or in the Conciergerie. But when the messenger returned it was only to

¹ Rovigo, *Mémoires*, VII. pp. 364.

Houssaye, 1815, I. p. 341.

Madelin, *Fouché*, II. pp. 332, 333.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 334, 337.

Bourrienne, *Mémoires*, X. pp. 266, 276-279.

Pasquier, III. p. 147.

find that Fouché had flown. According to one account, he had invited the officers into his library, where he had pressed a button on the wall and disappeared behind a sliding panel. A more prosaic and a more probable version of his escape is that, having contrived on some pretext to be left alone, he let himself down from a back window and, climbing over the wall into the Duchesse de Saint-Leu's garden, for which purpose a ladder was always ready, gained the Rue Taitbout and secreted himself in the house of his friend Lombard on the Boulevard close by. A languid pursuit proved fruitless. It may be surmised that a policeman of the time entertained for Fouché something of the feelings of an old Grenadier of the Guard for Napoleon. An interesting sequel to the story is furnished by Fouché's conduct on becoming, a few days later, Imperial Minister of Police. One of his first acts on taking office was to promote Foudras, the police inspector, who, so short a time before, had been commissioned to apprehend him.

The King had announced his intention of visiting the Chambers on March 16th.¹ On the afternoon of that day accordingly Louis, wearing for the first time in his life the Legion of Honour, proceeded, amidst the thunder of a Royal Salute, to the Palais-Bourbon, where the members of both Chambers awaited him. The large crowd assembled along the line of route gave him a fairly good reception. But the soldiers, though they had received a money bounty, and had been primed with an extra ration of spirits, looked extremely sulky. The Peers and Deputies made up, however, for any lack of enthusiasm on the part of the troops or the people by the warmth of their welcome. After the cheers which greeted his arrival had subsided, the King delivered his speech which he had learnt by heart. "He could not," he said, "end his career more fittingly than by dying for his country. He had no fears for himself, very many for France. . . . The man who had come to disturb the public peace, bringing in his train civil and foreign war, had also come to destroy that Constitution, which he was proud to think he had granted to his country. . . . Let us rally round the Charter and fight for its preservation to the death." As Louis concluded the whole assembly rose with loud shouts of "Long live the King, we will die for the King, the King for ever!" Then Monsieur walked towards his brother, with the evident inten-

¹ Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 332-333.

Fleury de Chaboulon, I. pp. 192, 193.

Houssaye, 1815, I. pp. 335-337.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, II. pp. 223-225.

Chateaubriand, *Mémoires*, VI. pp. 365-369.

tion of speaking, and silence once more fell upon the House. "Sir," said he, "I hope your Majesty will allow me to express how entirely I, and all the members of my family, share those sentiments which you have expressed so nobly." Then, turning towards the assembled Peers and Deputies, he shouted: "We swear to live and to die true to the King and the Charter which assures the happiness of our fellow-countrymen." It was the first public occasion on which he had ever mentioned the Charter by name. Louis held out his hand to him, the two brothers fell into each other's arms, and many of the spectators wept. Bolder applause than ever followed and continued, without intermission, till the King had left the building.

A great deal has been said about dying for the good cause, but it was the weakest point in the situation that nobody had any serious intention of putting these words into practice. The call for volunteers had met with a very poor response. The ordinance recalling all half-pay officers to the colours had been promptly obeyed.¹ The majority of them, however, had returned with the openly expressed desire of serving, not the King, but the Emperor, and their presence with their regiments, unquestionably, did much more harm than good. The National Guards, though always ready to cheer for the King, came forward, with the greatest reluctance, when asked to volunteer for the regular army.² The students, however, most of whom professed liberal politics, and who were, in consequence, the enemies of a military despotism, enrolled themselves in large numbers and were formed into battalions. Clad in a uniform of the time of Henry IV, and with colours embroidered and presented by the ladies of the Faubourg-Saint-Germain, they were, on several occasions, marched through the streets of Paris.³ As a means of arousing public enthusiasm and of obtaining recruits the experiment proved a failure. The Parisians were excellent judges of military matters, and were quite unimpressed with the ability of these young men to cope on equal terms with regular troops, feathered hats and colours worked by noble fingers notwithstanding. Though in the newspapers all rumours of desertions to Bonaparte were denied, and though he was always described as a fugitive flying before the Royal troops, these statements deceived nobody. If the

¹ Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 348, 349.

Fleury de Chaboulon, I. p. 196.

Lavalette, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 148, 149.

² Houssaye, 1815, I. pp. 331-332.

³ Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, II. p. 304.

Houssaye, 1815, I. pp. 329-330.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, II. p. 220.

garrisons of Grenoble and Lyons had not gone over to Napoleon, what had become of them? It was a natural question which everybody was asking, and which the official *communiqués* to the press did not explain.¹

The truth was that, by the end of the second week in March, the days of the Monarchy were, generally, looked upon as numbered. In Court circles, the ladies declared that they would not receive at their houses any young man who had not enlisted, and threatened to inflict corporal punishment on the Duchesse de Duras who had left Paris, but most of them were secretly preparing to follow her example. Even some of the Gardes du Corps cancelled their orders for new uniforms, it looked so very unlikely that they ever would be required.² The head-master of the College Henri IV discouraged his boys from shouting "*Vive le Roi!*" and quietly withdrew Napoleon's bust from the lavatory to which it had been consigned at the Restoration.³ Meanwhile the troops from the different garrisons in the North were being moved towards the threatened districts. The reports, however, from the commanding Generals as to the behaviour and spirit of their men on the march were most disquieting. It was proposed to form an entrenched camp, under the Duc de Berri, in the neighbourhood of Melun, in the hope that behind its earthworks the half-trained *Maison du Roi* and the volunteers might be able to resist successfully the disloyal regular regiments. To the objection that this position could easily be turned and that it could not, in consequence, be considered an effectual protection to Paris from the South, the Duc de Berri replied, with the assurance of an experienced strategist, that Bonaparte was too good a soldier to think of leaving a hostile force on his flank. But his words carried conviction to very few.⁴ By most people capable of forming an opinion, and who knew of his dispositions, Marshal Ney's army corps was looked upon as the last bulwark of the Monarchy.⁵ He had been on leave at the time of Bonaparte's landing, and had only reached his headquarters at Besançon on March 10th, after an interview with Louis at the Tuileries, in which he had expressed his loyalty in the strongest language. When he had

¹ Houssaye, 1815, I. pp. 349-350.

Pasquier, III. pp. 145, 146.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, II. p. 227.

² B. Constant, *Mémoires sur les cent jours*, part i. pp. 110-118.

Houssaye, 1815, I. p. 339.

Chateaubriand, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 376-379.

³ Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, II. p. 349.

Houssaye, 1815, I. pp. 350-352.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 346.

⁵ Pasquier, III. p. 127.

collected every man he could at Besançon he had moved his force, about 8000 strong, to Lons-le-Saulnier, whence he could threaten the right flank of Bonaparte's advance on Paris. But in the evening of March 17th the King received certain intelligence that Ney, with all his men, had gone over to the Usurper. Almost at the same time came the news that the old Guard, which was marching South under Marshal Oudinot, had assumed the tricolour at Troyes, and that the fidelity of the regular regiments in the camp at Melun was not to be depended upon.¹

Though Louis' resolution to leave Paris was practically arrived at from the moment when he heard of Ney's defection, a Council was held to consider the situation. Vitrolles proposed that His Majesty, accompanied by Ministers and the members of the Chambers, should proceed to La Rochelle and call upon the loyal inhabitants of the West to rise in his defence. But the Abbé de Montesquiou objected that the King of La Vendée would never again be King of Paris. M. de Blacas has been credited with the honour of suggesting a very ingenuous plan. He advised Louis to drive out in an open carriage, surrounded by the Peers and Deputies on horseback, to meet Bonaparte.² The Usurper could not fail to be impressed with the majesty of the spectacle and might be expected, incontinently, to beat a retreat. Marshal Marmont recommended that the King should remain at the Tuileries, which he would undertake to fortify. In the meantime the Royal Princes would leave Paris and attempt to raise the provinces. At the worst, should Bonaparte carry the palace by storm, he would gain nothing by putting the King to death, seeing that all the other members of the Royal Family would be still at large. This plan, which had it been carried out must have proved a serious embarrassment to Napoleon, did not commend itself to Louis. These discussions as to the course which Bonaparte would adopt, should he fall into his power, were singularly distasteful to him. A proposal from Bourrienne that His Majesty should betake himself to Lille had passed almost unnoticed. It was, nevertheless, in that fortified town near the Belgian frontier that Louis decided to take refuge. But he kept his intention to himself.³

March 19th, 1815, was Palm Sunday. The *Journal des Débats* of that day contained an extremely virulent article against

¹ Pasquier, III. pp. 147-148.

² Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 320-329.

Marmont, *Mémoires*, VII. pp. 87-90.

Bourrienne, *Mémoires*, X. pp. 270-274.

Houssaye, 1815, I. pp. 343-346.

Chateaubriand, *Mémoires*, VI. pp. 372-376.

³ Bourrienne, *Mémoires*, X. p. 300.

Bonaparte above the signature of Benjamin Constant. From an early hour a crowd eager for news began to collect round the Tuileries. The demeanour of the people was gloomy and depressed.¹ During the morning Louis reviewed his Household troops, and it was rumoured that, in the afternoon, he intended to drive out to the camp at Villejuif. He did not, however, make a second appearance in public. Shortly before midnight twelve travelling carriages entered the courtyard of the Tuileries, one of which drew up before the entrance to the Pavillon de Flore. In the hall were assembled courtiers, national guards, and old servants who had been informed of the King's approaching departure. As Louis, preceded by a man bearing a torch and leaning on the arm of Blacas and of the Duc de Duras, walked past them, the spectators fell on their knees. He was not an emotional man, but he was genuinely moved by the distress evinced by many of his humbler attendants. He spoke a few words to them, bade them return to their families, and expressed the hope that before long he should see them again. The carriage, into which he had been assisted, then bore him rapidly away under a strong escort of Gardes du Corps. He was followed, shortly afterwards, by Monsieur; whilst the Duc de Berri and Marshal Marmont rode off to the Champ de Mars, where the Household troops had been assembled. They at once started on their northward march to rejoin the King.²

After enduring but little over ten months the restored Monarchy had collapsed like a pack of cards. To succeed Napoleon, to efface the recollections of the old *régime*, and the policy of the emigration may not have been a task which was impossible of achievement, but the genius of a Henri IV was required for its performance. Even had Louis XVIII been a less indolent man, he was unfitted by age and infirmities from embarking on so colossal an undertaking. It was his misfortune that he could obtain no assistance from the members of his family, but in his choice of advisers and of ministers he acted unwisely. Lord Acton has expressed the opinion that, had the Bourbons reigned by Talleyrand's advice they would not have fallen.³ Instead, however, of listening to the counsels of the man to whom, above all others, he owed his crown, Louis elected to place his trust in his favourite, an *émigré*. A great deal of his unpopularity

¹ B. Constant, *Mémoires sur les cent jours*, I. pp. 92, 93.

Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, II. p. 350.

Pasquier, III., pp. 149-150.

² Houssaye, 1815, I. pp. 357-358.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, II. pp. 233-234.

³ *Historical Essays and Studies*, edited by J. Figgis and R. Laurence, p. 413.

was due to the influence exercised over him by M. de Blacas and to his lack of sympathy with the hardships which a change of *régime* had imposed on many of his subjects. Louis' ignorance, moreover, of the men, the ideas, and the institutions which had grown up in France during his absence, a want of knowledge which was shared by his chief advisers and his Ministers, often caused him to give offence, unintentionally, and to wound susceptibilities. But these circumstances alone are not sufficient to account for the discontent and unrest which could justify Napoleon's words that "by returning to France he had deprived the Duc d'Orléans, not Louis XVIII, of his crown."¹

Judged by the standard of the time, the Government of the first Restoration had been mild and liberal, and Madame de Staël could speak of it as one guiltless of all arbitrary acts. Louis' feelings towards the Charter have been compared to a "Union of reason" rather than to a "marriage of love."² Without doubt the description is just. Nevertheless he had carried out his promises and had faithfully adhered to the provisions of the Constitution. But, though most people may have believed in his honesty of purpose, they certainly had no good opinion of the intentions of the Comte d'Artois or of the men by whom he was surrounded. Louis was in bad health, and the reactionary views of Monsieur were notorious. It was felt, instinctively, that the Bourbons were not in sympathy with the national aspirations, and that they were the enemies of those revolutionary institutions which the great mass of Frenchmen were determined to perpetuate.

¹ Fleury de Chaboulon, I. p. 244.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, II. p. 327.

B. Constant, *Mémoires sur les cent jours*, part i. pp. 40, 41.

² *Louis XVIII. et Décazes*, par Ernest Daudet, p. 127.

J. C. Hobhouse, *Letters*, I. pp. 61-64.

CHAPTER III

NAPOLEON AGAIN

LOUIS had surrounded his departure with so much secrecy that his Ministers had only been informed of it during the night. They were directed to follow His Majesty to Lille, and each of them was given a large gratuity to cover expenses. The news of the King's flight spread rapidly.¹ Lavalette heard of it at six o'clock, and hurried to the Post Office to obtain confirmation of the rumour. This was his explanation when he was called upon a few months later to justify his conduct. At the Ministry Lavalette found Ferrand, the Postmaster-General, in the act of leaving and in some trepidation lest he should be detained. He put no obstacles in his way, and at once installed himself in his place. His first measure was to despatch a message to Napoleon, who was now at Fontainebleau, to acquaint him of the King's flight, and in the afternoon, having doubtless received instructions from him, he caused proclamations to be posted up, announcing that the Emperor would arrive in the course of a few hours and that "there would be no civil war."² In the meantime a crowd had collected round the Tuileries, where, towards ten o'clock, General Exelmans, in uniform and wearing the tricolour cockade, arrived followed by many half-pay officers. The General proceeded to take charge of the Palace. By two o'clock the tricolour was flying over the Hotel de Ville and from the summit of the Vendôme column. In the streets bands of working men marched in procession cheering the Emperor, but the shopkeepers and business people, haunted by the fear of war, were gloomy and depressed.³ On the *Bourse*, however, matters were viewed in a more hopeful spirit. The *rente*, which on the 18th had fallen to 68, rose to 73 francs now

¹ Chateaubriand, *Mémoires*, VI. pp. 383-386.

² Lavalette, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 151-156.

Fleury de Chaboulon, I. p. 256.

Houssaye, 1815, I. p. 364.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, II. p. 237.

³ B. Constant, *Mémoires sur les cent jours*, II. p. 3.

J. C. Hobbhouse, *Letters*, I. pp. 178-180.

that it appeared probable that Napoleon's entry into Paris would be effected quietly.¹ One by one and, at first, in some apprehension many of the former dignitaries and officials of the Imperial Court collected at the Tuileries. Most of them were accompanied by their wives, who set themselves to explore the rooms and galleries, and, before long, to tear down the Royal decorations from the walls. As they ripped off the lilies from the carpets, the pleasing discovery was made that they were only sewn on over the Napoleonic emblems. In half an hour, amidst much laughter and excitement, the great throne room became Imperial once more.² But as night drew on and still he came not, the exultation of the afternoon gave place to an intense anxiety. Then suddenly, towards nine o'clock, when even the most hopeful were beginning to fear that some untoward event must have happened, a sound of distant cheering and of horses galloping became audible from the direction of the quays. The noise increased and swelled to a deafening roar as a carriage, driven at great speed and surrounded by a motley escort of Polish Bancers, officers, and men of all ranks and of all regiments shouting and brandishing their swords, dashed through the gates. The generals and half-pay officers waiting in the courtyard drew their swords and, surging forward, compelled the carriage to stop some yards short of the entrance to the Pavillon de Flore. Napoleon alighted. He was dressed in his famous grey great-coat. In an instant he was seized and borne shoulder high up the great staircase, "His eyes closed, his hands stretched out in front of him, a faint smile upon his lips, like a man in a dream." On the first floor, Lavalette and Caulaincourt rescued him, and hurrying him into his private room, closed the door on the noisy crowd.³

Gradually quiet settled down on the Palace. The escort, picketing their horses to the railings of the Carousel, wrapped themselves in their cloaks and lay down to sleep.⁴ But upstairs in the Emperor's room the conferences were long and anxious.⁵ About midnight a stir among the throng of people waiting admission to his presence betokened the arrival of a person of

¹ Houssaye, 1815, I. p. 365.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 366-368.

Lavalette, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 159-161.

³ Rovigo, *Mémoires*, VII. pp. 370-371.

Fleury de Chaboulon, I. p. 258.

Lavalette, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 161, 162.

Villemain, *Souvenirs*, II. p. 47.

⁴ Houssaye, 1815, I. p. 367.

⁵ Madelin, *Fouché*, II. pp. 342, 343.

Mémoires de Napoleon, IV., nouvelle édition, p. 351.

importance. It was Fouché come to pay his respects and to offer his services. He was at once shown in, and after an audience of an hour's duration departed, not altogether satisfied. He had asked for the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, and he had had to be satisfied with the office of Police Minister.

Napoleon was under no illusions. The shouts of the peasantry and the cheers of the soldiers had not blinded him to the fact that by most persons of education his return was viewed without enthusiasm and, in many cases, with downright alarm. "They have let me come as they let the other go," he told Mollien on the day after his arrival. The restoration of order and of regular government and the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Powers were the measures which, at first, engrossed his attention.¹

After spending a night at Abbéville, Louis XVIII had taken refuge at Lille, whither, two days before, the Duc d'Orléans had been despatched to take up the command. In the meantime Monsieur and the Duc de Berri, with the *Maison du Roi*, were proceeding north to join him. Napoleon, accordingly, directed General Exelmans to start in pursuit with what cavalry he could collect. His orders were to avoid bloodshed, but he was to press the retreat of the Royalists and, if possible, to hustle them over the frontier. Louis made no long stay at Lille. His reception by the townspeople was fairly warm. He was disagreeably impressed, however, by the sullen demeanour of the troops. Immediately on his arrival he held a council, and to the Duc d'Orléans and to Marshal Mortier, both of whom had been bidden to attend, he put the direct question: Was it safe for him to remain in the town? The honour of protecting the King would not appear to have offered any attractions to either the Royal Duke or the Marshal. In any case, they opined that, though they feared no immediate danger, the arrival of the *Maison du Roi* would undoubtedly be the signal for an outbreak on the part of the garrison, and, therefore, it would be wiser for His Majesty to move on to Dunkirk. Nothing appears to have been settled, but on the morrow, the 23rd, Louis announced that he should cross into Belgium that afternoon. This plan he duly carried out, Marshal Macdonald taking leave of him at the frontier with the words: "*Au revoir, Sire, in three months' time.*"² The same evening the Duc d'Orléans

¹ Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. pp. 57, 61.

Villemain, *Souvenirs*, II. p. 48.

² Bourrienne, *Mémoires*, X. pp. 300-304.

Fleury de Chaboulon, I. pp. 308-310.

Houssaye, 1815, I. pp. 380-381.

Rovigo, *Mémoires*, VII. pp. 381, 382.

left for England, where his wife and family had preceded him. Before taking his departure, however, he wrote a letter, which was widely approved of, to the generals under his command.¹ He cancelled all orders which he had issued, and left it to their judgment to act as, under the circumstances, they might consider best for France. On the following day Mortier hoisted the tricolour at Lille.

When Monsieur and the Duc de Berri, who were being closely followed by Exelmans cavalry, heard that the King had "emigrated," they decided to follow his example. Leaving General Lauriston to disband the Household Troops, the two Princes, accompanied by Marshal Marmont and escorted by three hundred of their best mounted men, entered Belgian territory.² The Duc de Bourbon, who had been despatched from Paris on March 13th with a mission to raise La Vendée, had met with little encouragement in the west. The local leaders were everywhere of opinion that no rising could prove successful until Bonaparte had become involved in hostilities on the frontiers. Finding that he was in great danger of arrest and having no heart for the work, the Duke took ship at Nantes, on March 27th, and sailed for Spain.³

In the south the resistance to Imperial rule was of a much more serious character. Early in March the Duc and the Duchesse d'Angoulême had started on a visit to Bordeaux. On their arrival they were greeted with the news of Bonaparte's landing and of the Duke's appointment to command the right wing of the Royal army under his father.⁴ Whilst he proceeded to his post at Nîmes the Duchesse remained behind at Bordeaux. The inhabitants, under the leadership of Lynch, the Mayor, were staunch Royalists. The year before their town had been the first to hoist the Bourbon flag, and they had welcomed the arrival of Wellington's army. Volunteers now came forward in large numbers. The National Guards were loyal, and even the regular troops of the garrison appeared to be influenced by the prevailing sentiments. Intelligence of Bonaparte's progress was generally misleading, and the confidence of the Royalists

¹ Pasquier, III. pp. 179-181.

Chateaubriand, *Mémoires*, VI. pp. 387-388.

² Marmont, *Mémoires*, VII. p. 101.

Fleury de Chaboulon, I. pp. 311, 312.

Houssaye, 1815, I. p. 391.

Chateaubriand, *Mémoires*, VI. p. 390.

³ Houssaye, 1815, I. pp. 397-402.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, II. pp. 253-255.

⁴ Houssaye, 1815, I. pp. 402-415.

Cf. on these events *Mémoires de Napoléon*, nouvelle édition, 1905, IV. pp. 3-5.

continued unabated. But, on March 23rd, Vitrolles, who had left Paris on the day of the King's flight in order to raise the South, arrived, and it became impossible any longer to conceal the gravity of the situation. Madame was undismayed. Indeed, her firm attitude during these trying days was to elicit from Napoleon the remark that she was "the only man of her family."¹ But her courage was to prove of no avail. Directly it was known that Napoleon had returned to Paris the temper of the garrison underwent a marked change. On the 29th the report that General Clauzel was marching on the town with Imperial troops made matters worse. The rumour of his approach was correct. On the 31st, after a skirmish with the volunteers which he broke off as soon as possible, having orders to avoid bloodshed, he summoned the town to surrender. No one was to be molested on account of his opinions, but Lynch was advised to take his departure.² Clauzel, however, guaranteed that no obstacles would be put in the way of the Duchesse d'Angoulême's embarkation, and, at the same time, he warned the civil authorities that he should hold them responsible for any loss of life which further resistance might entail. A council was called to consider these proposals. General Decaën, commanding the military district, announced that the regular troops could no longer be depended upon, and the feeling of the meeting was distinctly in favour of accepting the terms offered. Madame, however, determined to try the effect of a last appeal to the soldiers. The regiments were paraded in their barracks, and she went round and addressed each in turn. The troops listened in respectful silence, but her words made no impression. Under these circumstances she was fain to admit that to attempt to defend the town with the National Guards and the volunteers would lead merely to a useless effusion of blood. The next day, April 2nd, Madame went on board H.M.S. *The Wanderer* and sailed for England. In the meantime Vitrolles had established himself at Toulouse as the King's Viceroy. But his tenure of office was short. On April 4th General Delaborde entered the town, proclaimed the Emperor, and sent Vitrolles a close prisoner to Paris.³

The Duc d'Angoulême had left Bordeaux on March 10th.⁴

¹ Fleury de Chaboulon, I. p. 319. Napoleon, however, denied having used these words.

Mémoires de Napoléon, nouvelle édition, 1905, IV. p. 359.

J. C. Hobhouse, *Letters*, I. pp. 55-56.

² Fleury de Chaboulon, I. pp. 313-318.

³ Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 420-428.

⁴ Fleury de Chaboulon, I. pp. 319-330.

Houssaye, 1815, I. pp. 417-437.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, II. pp. 267-277.

After establishing his headquarters at Nîmes and making arrangements for the enrolling and equipping of volunteers, he started to visit Marseilles, Avignon, Toulon, and other towns. Everywhere in the district the Duke's experiences were the same : the citizens for the most part loyal, but the troops sulky and disaffected. On his return to Nîmes he found that a considerable number of volunteers had been collected. As, however, many of these men belonged to the dregs of the population, and as it had been impossible to provide all of them with uniforms, they presented a villainous appearance. They were nicknamed the *Miquelets* by the country people, and their excesses were to call for bloody reprisals at no distant date. The Duke intended to march in three columns on Lyons and Grenoble. Napoleon as he passed through these towns had taken along with him the major part of their garrisons. With the departure of the troops the Imperialist enthusiasm had quickly cooled down, and the Royalists once more began to raise their heads. On the 29th March the Duke advanced. Montelimar and Valence were successively occupied, and, on April 2nd, the column which he commanded in person defeated an Imperialist force under General Debelle at Euriol.

Napoleon was now aware of the gravity of the situation, and sent General de Grouchy to Lyons with orders to act vigorously. When, however, he arrived at Lyons, on the 3rd, the tide had already turned. The right column of the Royal army, under General Ernouf, weakened and demoralized by the defection of its two regular regiments, had been routed near Grenoble and driven in disorder towards Marseilles. Meanwhile disaffection in his rear had compelled the Duke himself to retreat, and, on the 7th, being practically surrounded near Montelimar, he was forced to enter into negotiations. The next day a convention known as the capitulation of Ea Palud was drawn up. The regular regiments still under the Duke's command were to pass over to the Imperialists, the volunteers were to be allowed to lay down their arms and to return to their homes, and he himself was to embark at Cette and leave the country. Grouchy, however, refused to ratify this capitulation which General Gilly, his subordinate, had concluded, without referring to Paris for instructions, and pending their receipt he kept the Duke in close confinement. Napoleon, at first, had thoughts of keeping the Duc d'Angoulême as a hostage and of stipulating that the crown jewels, which the Bourbons had removed with them, should be given up before he could allow him to be set free. He soon yielded, however, to the persuasion of the Duc de Bassano, and sent orders that the terms of the capitulation were

to be carried out. The Duc d'Angoulême was accordingly embarked on a Swedish vessel at Cette in which he sailed to Spain. He was the last member of his family to leave France. No shame attaches to his surrender. To the full extent of his strength and of his abilities he had upheld the Royal cause. It was not, however, in his power to infuse his followers with enthusiasm, nor could he inspire the waverers and the faint-hearted with confidence. On April 16th, the day on which he was set free, a hundred guns fired off in every garrison town announced that France was once again at peace.¹

Though Napoleon, within a comparatively short space of time, had contrived to restore the appearance of domestic order, all his efforts to establish diplomatic relations with the Powers proved ineffectual.² When the news of his landing in France was brought to Vienna, the assembled Sovereigns and Plenipotentiaries at once drew up their declaration of March 13th, 1815. In it they proclaimed that Bonaparte, by leaving Elba in defiance of treaties, had placed himself outside the pale of civil and social relations, and "was in consequence handed over to the public vengeance as an enemy and a disturber of the peace." They announced, furthermore, that, if necessary, they were prepared to render military assistance to the King of France. It was generally anticipated, however, that Louis would be able to deal successfully with Bonaparte without resorting to their intervention. The tidings of the Usurper's progress quickly dispelled these illusions. Confronted with the certainty that he would be back again in Paris before many days were over, the Powers unanimously decided to adopt the strongest measures against him.³ On March 9th, at a Council of War at which the Tsar, Wellington, Schwartzemberg, Wolkonski, and Knesebeck were present, the military situation was discussed.⁴ At this meeting it was laid down as a principle that under no circumstances must negotiations of any kind be entered into with Bonaparte. Finally, on March 25th before the Sovereigns separated to return to their capitals, England, Austria, Prussia, and Russia formally renewed the Treaty of Chaumont of March 1st, 1814, according to the terms of which each Power agreed to maintain in the field an army of 150,000 men "until such time as Bonaparte should be rendered incapable of causing further trouble." England, moreover, bound herself to furnish an annual subsidy of five millions sterling to the three other

¹ Fleury de Chaboulon, I. p. 334.

² Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. pp. 63-66.

³ Villemain, *Souvenirs*, II. pp. 82-87.

⁴ Talleyrand à Louis XVIII., 19 Mars, 1815.

contracting Powers, and to pay thirty pounds for every man short of the stipulated number in her contingent.

In Paris all the ambassadors and *chargés d'affaires* asked for their passports. Their uncompromising attitude came as no surprise to Napoleon.¹ On the night of his arrival he had told Marshal Davout, Prince d'Eckmühl, Duc d'Auerstadt, whom he had appointed Minister of War, that, though he desired peace above all things, he must prepare for an early outbreak of hostilities. He knew that his only hope of avoiding a general war lay in the mutual jealousies of the Powers, and circumstances had placed in his hands an instrument which he proposed to use with effect.² The terms of the secret treaty of January 3rd, 1815, by which England, Austria, and France bound themselves to resist by arms, if necessary, the designs of Russia and Prussia in Central Europe, were within his knowledge. The common story that Jaucourt, who had been acting as Foreign Minister in Talleyrand's absence, had left a copy of this document behind him in the hurry of his flight, is no doubt untrue. It is more probable that some official charged with copying the treaty had revealed its existence to Caulaincourt, Duc de Vicenze, Napoleon's Foreign Minister. But in whatever way the secret was discovered, it is certain that it was at once brought to the knowledge of the Tsar. Alexander was very indignant at this proof, as he considered it, of Louis XVIII's ingratitude. Not for a moment, however, did he waver in his determination to employ his last man and to spend his last rouble in overthrowing Bonaparte. He even magnanimously refrained from reproaching Louis, who, as he instructed Pozzo di Borgo at Ghent, had enough troubles for the present.³

In his anxiety to convey the impression that his father-in-law, the Emperor of Austria, entertained no hostile designs towards him, Napoleon announced that Marie Louise was about to join him in Paris. To encourage this illusion workmen were employed to prepare her apartments.⁴ As a matter of fact, all his

¹ Houssaye, 1815, I. pp. 441, 442.

² *Ibid.*, p. 339.

Fleury de Chaboulon, I. p. 339.

Pasquier, III. pp. 286-287.

Supplementary Despatches, X., Castlereagh to Wellington, 8 April, 1815; Sir C. Stuart to Castlereagh, 6 April, 1815; Wellington to Castlereagh, 12 May, 1815.

Villemain, *Souvenirs*, II. pp. 119-125.

³ Nesselrode à Pozzo, 13 Mai, 1815.

Pozzo à Nesselrode, 23 Mai, 1815.

⁴ Bourrienne, *Mémoires*, X. p. 330.

Houssaye, 1815, p. 513.

Fleury de Chaboulon, I. p. 223.

F. Masson, *Marie Louise*, pp. 607-613.

letters to her for some time past had remained unanswered. When Neipperg brought her the news of Bonaparte's return to France, she had written to her father disassociating herself from his adventure, and placing herself under the protection of the Powers. In the previous autumn, on the occasion of a visit which she made to Aix en Savoie, the Austrian Foreign Office had selected Adam Albert Count von Neipperg to accompany her. He was forty-two years of age, a soldier and a diplomatist. It was not the first delicate mission which had been entrusted to him; but he was better known for his extreme hatred of Bonaparte, and on account of a black patch which the loss of an eye compelled him to wear on all occasions. Notwithstanding this disfigurement, he was supposed to exercise a peculiar fascination over women. In the course of a few weeks spent together, Marie Louise fell completely under his influence, and made a practice of handing to him, unopened, every letter which she received from her husband. Now that his daughter was in this satisfactory frame of mind, Francis II could unite, conscientiously, with his brother Sovereigns in their declaration of war to the knife against his son-in-law. All Napoleon's messengers were turned back at the frontier, and any hopes which he may have entertained of detaching the Emperor from the coalition were dispelled.¹

Napoleon was not more successful in his attempts to restore diplomatic relations with England.² By the help of Fouché a communication from Caulaincourt to Castlereagh, protesting the pacific intentions of his master, was delivered at the Foreign Office. But the English Government refused to be drawn into any discussions, and a letter, from Napoleon himself to the Prince Regent, was returned unopened. In order to pass his messengers through the iron ring which encircled France he was obliged to have recourse to the ingenuity of his Police Minister. The permission thus accorded Fouché to intrude in foreign affairs suited him very well.³ The Allied Powers had declared that their object in going to war was to overthrow Bonaparte, not to impose any specific form of government on the French people. Nevertheless, he was anxious to ascertain, for his own purposes, the nature of their ulterior views.⁴ He accordingly entrusted to his agents, who were generally successful in eluding the vigilance of the Austrians, Napoleon's communications and his own secret instructions in addition.

¹ F. Masson, *Marie Louise*, pp. 600-607.

² Houssaye, 1815, I. p. 202.

³ Madelin, *Fouché*, II. pp. 370-375.

⁴ Declarations of April 25, 1815, and May 9, 1815.

He was equally desirous of entering into relations with Louis XVIII. At Ghent, where the King had taken up his residence, the news of Vitrolles' arrest gave rise to serious apprehensions on his behalf. Madame de Vitrolles travelled to Paris to intercede for him, and, by Monsieur's advice, to interview the Minister of Police. Fouché undertook to do all he could, but he feared, or affected to fear, that her husband must go before a Court Martial.¹ A few days later, however, he was able to give her tidings of comfort. With the utmost difficulty he had extracted from the Emperor, who was much incensed, the promise that, whatever happened, his life should be spared. With that assurance she must return, forthwith, to Ghent in charge of one of his own people. The emissary whom Fouché thus introduced into the Royalist camp made good use of his opportunities. He saw Louis XVIII, and conveyed to him his employer's expression of goodwill and his hopes of His Majesty's speedy return to power. It is said that he even went so far as to ask for a promise that Fouché should be retained in office, in the event of the King's restoration. Louis, however, was not prepared to commit himself further than to say that his services should not be forgotten. Though Fouché may not have obtained as much as he had hoped, he had every reason to feel satisfied.² Monsieur and his friends were firmly convinced that he had saved Vitrolles' life, and in Royalist circles, generally, he was held in the highest estimation.³

Guizot has happily compared Fouché's attitude towards the government of the Hundred Days to that of an unsympathetic doctor, who, after diagnosing the patient, leaves his bedside to discuss with expectant heirs the length of time the sick man may yet survive.⁴ His secret correspondence with Metternich, however, very nearly brought his career to a sudden close. Napoleon had a police of his own, and by their means contrived to lay hands on the bearer of a message to Fouché. He was thus placed in possession of the sign by which Metternich's agent, M. Werner, in reality Baron Ottenfels, an Aulic Councillor, was to be recognized at Bâle. The appointment was kept,

¹ Chateaubriand, *Mémoires*, IV. pp. 432-435.

Villemain, *Souvenirs*, II. pp. 227-231.

Cf. Benjamin Constant, *Mémoires sur les cent jours*, II. pp. 37-38, from which it would appear that Vitrolles was in reality in great danger.

² Bourrienne, *Mémoires*, X. p. 364.

Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. pp. 86, 87.

³ Chateaubriand, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 427-429.

⁴ Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. p. 74.

Pasquier, III. p. 195.

but by Fleury de Chaboulon, Napoleon's confidential secretary. The complete ignorance in which Fouché had kept him of the communications he was carrying on with the Austrian Minister excited Napoleon's gravest suspicions. His continued silence with regard to them would furnish the strongest proof of their guilty character. But before Fleury's return Fouché received a timely warning from Real, the prefect of police, as to the state of affairs. At his next interview with the Emperor, accordingly, he mentioned that he had contrived to enter into relations with Metternich and had forgotten to speak of the matter before. Napoleon's wrath blazed forth at his words. "I ought to have you shot, Fouché," he roared. "I can't agree with you, Sir," answered the Minister, and forthwith began a long explanation of his conduct. After listening to his story, Napoleon affected to be satisfied with the honesty of his intentions.¹ Fleury's report, which was made a few days later, furnished abundant matter for suspicion, but no absolute proof of guilt. Ottenfels had been cautious, and had neither used words nor produced any document which could be considered as direct evidence of Fouché's treason. He might plead with justice that, in initiating a correspondence with the Austrian Minister, he was only acting in accordance with the permission which had been given him, and that, in a transaction of the kind, he could neglect no means whereby Metternich's confidence might be captured. In his heart, probably, Napoleon knew that Fouché was a traitor, but he, doubtless, thought that, in the precarious state of his fortunes, it would be impolitic to quarrel with a man who could command a large following among the old Jacobin party.²

During the months of April and May, 1815, Paris presented an appearance of general gloom. The theatres were ill attended, the shops were empty, business was at a standstill. The *rente*, which had stood at 78 in the early days of March, fell to 56 francs at the end of May. Despite reassuring statements in the press and the extracts from the *Morning Chronicle* which Napoleon caused to be published, it was plain to everybody that hostilities, on a gigantic scale, were imminent. Any illusions, indeed, which these *communiqués* might have created were dispelled, on April 13th, by the appearance in the *Moniteur* of

¹ Fleury de Chaboulon, I. pp. 1-34.

Rovigo, *Mémoires*, VIII. pp. 30-34.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, II. pp. 337-342.

Lavalette, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 180-182.

Pasquier, III. pp. 196-199.

² Fleury de Chaboulon, II. p. 41.

Caulaincourt's report on the state of foreign relations. Napoleon had reluctantly been compelled to make it public, in order to account for his military preparations and to show that the threatened war was not of his seeking.¹ A week later, on April 20th, the Swiss² announced that they had joined the coalition and had closed their frontiers, an example which was speedily followed by Ferdinand VII, who, on May 2nd, formally declared war. In the hope of avoiding, or of postponing, naval hostilities Napoleon directed that the Bourbon flag should be kept flying at sea. This subterfuge was unavailing. All through the months of April and May the British cruisers played havoc with the French shipping in the Channel and the North Sea, and, on April 30th, the Mediterranean, a few miles to the north of Ischia, was the scene of a sharp engagement between *La Melpomène* of 40, and H.M.S. *Rivoli* of 74 guns. After a gallant resistance, the French frigate was compelled to strike her colours, and was taken as a prize into Palermo.³

In the country districts the enthusiasm of the early days was soon chilled by the fear of war and of invasion. Though Carnot, the Minister of the Interior, dismissed a large number of the old prefects, most of those whom he appointed to succeed them had no real confidence in the duration of the Imperial *régime*, and were, in consequence, little disposed to use their powers rigorously. These lukewarm sentiments on the part of the prefects were shared by the mayors of many of the provincial towns, whilst the priests, as a body, openly expressed their hostility to the Imperial Government. Under these conditions the Royalists were inspired with renewed courage.⁴ The recall to the colours of reservists and of men on leave afforded them numerous opportunities for fomenting discontent and for encouraging desertion, which they had no scruples about using. But though the peasants and the working men could easily be induced to elude military service, the intensity of their hatred for everything connected with the old *régime* had been increased by Napoleon's proclamations from Lyons and his speeches during his march to Paris. His references to the Revolution revived recollections which had slumbered for twenty years. Caps of liberty reappeared, the words of the "*ça ira*" were heard again, and in some districts the houses of the nobles were

¹ Houssaye, 1815, pp. 522-531.

² *Ibid.*, I. pp. 464, 465.

³ *Ibid.*, I. p. 449.

James, *Naval History*, VI. p. 353.

⁴ Houssaye, 1815, pp. 502-512.

Lavalette, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 171-177.

attacked and set on fire.¹ Had Napoleon resorted to the methods of '93, had he proclaimed the country in danger, and had he given full sway to the passions of the mob, he might have assumed the dictatorship. But though in this crisis of his fortunes it was essential to arouse the enthusiasm of the people to a high pitch, and though it was almost equally necessary for him to wield absolute power, the notion of attaining his ends by appealing to the vile instincts of the populace appalled him. Like most men who had witnessed the scenes of the Revolution, he loathed and despised the *canaille*.² Never, he told Benjamin Constant, would he be the King of a *Jacquerie*. No doubt, also, he realized that salvation was not to be achieved by such means.

The taste for political discussions, which had profoundly affected the middle classes, and which had been one of the features of Louis XVIII's brief reign, had been strengthened rather than diminished by Napoleon's return. All educated persons indulged in it more or less, and even the soldiers were infected by the prevailing fashion. At Grenoble, Colonel de La Bédoyère, when he led his regiment over to the Emperor, had begged him to renounce the idea of acquiring absolute power; and at Auxerre³ Ney had expressed the same views in much less respectful language.⁴ At Eyons, Napoleon had proclaimed that the electoral colleges of the Empire would be convened in the Champ de Mars "in order to modify our Constitution according to the will of the people." It is impossible to say whether he had ever, seriously, entertained the notion that thirty thousand men could meet thus to propose and to pass laws, but, in any case, it was soon found to be a wholly impracticable scheme.⁵ He quickly realized, however, that it would be impolitic to postpone the framing of the Constitution till after the conclusion of hostilities. In the newspapers, from all of which he had removed the censorship, in the numerous

¹ Houssaye, 1815, pp. 486-492.

B. Constant, *Mémoires sur les cent jours*, II. p. 3.

Fleury de Chaboulon, I. pp. 217-223.

Chateaubriand, *Mémoires*, VI. pp. 454, 455.

Hobhouse, *Letters*, I. pp. 207-209.

² Fleury de Chaboulon, II. p. 20.

B. Constant, *Mémoires sur les cent jours*, II. p. 23.

Villemain, *Souvenirs*, II. pp. 172, 173, 174.

³ Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. p. 77.

Mme. de Staël, *Considérations*, III. p. 128.

Fleury de Chaboulon, I. pp. 178, 270.

Houssaye, 1815, I. p. 497.

Mémoires de Napoléon, IV., nouvelle édition, p. 342.

Villemain, *Souvenirs*, II. p. 172.

⁴ H. Houssaye, 1815, I. p. 322.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 540-543.

political pamphlets of the time, and in the many communications of which he was daily the recipient, he was always adjured to fulfil his promises. Making a virtue of necessity, and perhaps hoping to arouse the national enthusiasm by the creation of a "Liberal Empire," he appointed a commission to draw up the Constitution. Its labours proceeded slowly. On the eve of the war, in which England was to be the most dangerous of his enemies, most of the members of Napoleon's commission were intent, only, on copying the British Constitution as closely as possible. Carnot and the Emperor himself dissented from the theories of the majority, and it was when matters threatened to reach a deadlock that the idea occurred to him of assigning to Benjamin Constant the task which the commission appeared to be unable to carry out.¹

In consequence of the violent language which he had used against Napoleon, up to the very day preceding his entry into Paris, Benjamin Constant had deemed it advisable to seek safety in flight. But he soon came back, having ascertained from Eucien Bonaparte, with whom he had been on friendly terms under the Directory, that he had nothing to fear.² When Napoleon heard of his return, he sent for him, held a long conversation with him, and, finally, invited him to draw up and submit for his approval a Constitution. Constant consented, and set about his work with alacrity. This extraordinary change of front on the part of a man who, less than a month before, had declared himself a bitter opponent to Bonaparte, has been commented upon very adversely. Probably he was fascinated by Napoleon and flattered by the deference with which he listened to his opinions; perhaps, also, he was anxious to obtain employment for pecuniary reasons.³ He himself insinuates that his sudden conversion was due to his love of liberty, which made it a matter of indifference to him whether the head of the State styled himself King or Emperor, provided the people and the institutions were free.⁴ But, by whatever motives he may have been actuated, his Constitution was completed rapidly, and, after undergoing some slight modifications, was published

¹ Fleury de Chaboulon, I. pp. 288-289.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, II. p. 284.

Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. pp. 67-70.

Chateaubriand, *Mémoires*, VI. pp. 448-451.

Villemain, *Souvenirs*, II. pp. 175, 176.

² Houssaye, 1815, I. pp. 543, 544.

³ Pasquier, III. pp. 180-181.

Chateaubriand, *Mémoires*, VI. p. 380.

⁴ B. Constant, *Mémoires sur les cent jours*, II. pp. 1-17.

Hobhouse, *Letters*, I. pp. 422-424.

in the *Moniteur* of April 23rd.¹ It was announced, at the same time, that all Frenchmen were invited to signify by vote their approval or dissent, and that the result of this *plébiscite* would be made known at the great assembly which was convened for May 26th in the Champ de Mars.

The promulgation of the *Additional Act to the Constitutions of the Empire*, as it was officially called, the *Benjamin*, as it was nicknamed, disappointed expectations. The thorough Bonapartists deplored it as a weak concession to the Liberals, who nevertheless criticized it adversely, whilst the people, as a whole, received it with indifference, and in large numbers abstained altogether from voting either for or against it.²

Though the *Additional Act* had been drawn up in a more Liberal spirit than the Royal Charter, its provisions were not of a democratic character. The franchise had been lowered, but, on the other hand, Benjamin Constant had insisted on the institution of an hereditary Peerage. Napoleon had demurred to this last measure, and had objected, with Carnot, that it presupposed the existence of rich and powerful families. But where were they to be found? The laws on the division of property had been framed with the express object of preventing such a development. The old *noblesse* was hostile to him, the rich members of the new nobility were few in number, and, in some cases, had acquired their wealth by very questionable means. In thirty years' time his mushroom Peers, without traditions and without large properties, would still be merely soldiers or officials.³ It did not, however, require much persuasion to induce Napoleon to withdraw his opposition to an experiment which was thoroughly in harmony with his aristocratic instincts.

Benjamin Constant told Napoleon that he ascribed the adverse criticisms on the Constitution, and the general lack of interest which its publication evoked, to the universal belief that he did not intend to adhere to its provisions. Only by allowing the elections to proceed would he be able to dispel this impression. After hesitating for several days, and at last with many misgivings, he gave his consent. The *Moniteur* of May 1st, accordingly, contained a decree convening the electoral colleges. The consequences of this step, probably, far surpassed

¹ Houssaye, 1815, I. pp. 549-550.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 550-558.

J. C. Hobhouse, *Letters*, I. pp. 187-192.

Villemain, *Souvenirs*, II. p. 183.

³ B. Constant, *Mémoires sur les cent jours*, II. pp. 55-63.

Houssaye, 1815, I. pp. 547, 548.

Chateaubriand, *Mémoires*, VI. pp. 456-458.

the Emperor's worst forebodings.¹ Of the 629 Deputies elected, only 80 were out-and-out Bonapartists. On the other hand, however, 500 Liberals and about 40 Jacobins were returned.² Fouché had largely contributed to bring about this result. As Minister of Police he had instructed the prefects, who under the French system exercise an enormous influence over the elections, to work hard for the return of the Liberal candidates. "There is a nice Chamber preparing for him," he said gleefully to a friend of Villemain. "I shall spare him neither Barère nor Cambon, nor, you may be quite sure, Da Fayette. It will be an education for him."³ The elections of May, 1815, play an important part in the history of the Hundred Days. At the moment when he was about to engage on military operations against the armies of united Europe, Napoleon found himself saddled with a Chamber composed almost exclusively of his political antagonists. Without doubt this embarrassing state of affairs materially influenced his dispositions in the campaign, the initial movements of which he was already considering.

The great assembly in the Champ de Mars, which was held on June 1st, failed to rouse any popular enthusiasm. John Cam Hobhouse, afterwards Lord Broughton, a Whig and a not unfriendly critic, has recorded his impressions of the scene. Napoleon was clothed in a purple mantle without arm-holes, and wore on his head a black hat ornamented with plumes and looped up at the side with a diamond brooch. "The Emperor," says Hobhouse, "looked very ungainly and squat. Joseph and Jerome, caparisoned in fancy dresses of white taffety, as ill as the Princes of any legitimate house in Europe." Napoleon beguiled the monotony of the prayers, with which the proceedings began, by scrutinizing the people through his opera-glasses. The acceptance of the Constitution was then communicated to him, and he swore to observe its conditions.⁴ To an address from the electoral colleges he replied in a tame speech, which called forth little applause beyond the cheers of the soldiers. After the newly elected Deputies and the civil and military dignitaries had taken the oath of allegiance, the tedious ceremony concluded with a march past of the troops and the presentation of the eagles to the Imperial and the National Guards.⁵

Already before this two events had taken place which in-

¹ B. Constant, *Mémoires sur les cent jours*, II. p. 72.

² H. Houssaye, 1815, I. p. 564.

³ Madelin, *Fouché*, II. pp. 363-365.

Villemain, *Souvenirs*, II. pp. 224.

⁴ J. C. Hobhouse, *Letters*, I. pp. 400-420.

Bourrienne, *Mémoires*, X. p. 370.

⁵ Houssaye, 1815, I. p. 606.

creased the seriousness of the military situation. Joachim Murat, King of Naples, Napoleon's brother-in-law and the only European Sovereign whom he could regard in the light of a possible ally, had been driven from his kingdom, and, nearer at home, a Royalist insurrection had broken out in La Vendée. Immediately before quitting the Island of Elba, Napoleon had sent to apprise Murat of his plans and to instruct him to convey to the Austrian Government assurances of the pacific nature of his intentions. Murat had, hitherto, only been concerned to preserve his kingdom, which had been in jeopardy owing to the reluctance of the Powers at Vienna to recognize his right to retain it. But the news which reached him of Napoleon's triumphant progress convinced him that the hour had struck for realizing his dream of ruling over a United Italy. It appeared to him that at the head of his own army he could do as much in Italy as his brother-in-law had achieved in France with a mere handful of Grenadiers. As, however, he believed that Napoleon himself might wish to annex the Peninsula, he considered it advisable to anticipate him by putting his scheme into execution at once.¹ In the message, which Colonna d'Istria had brought to him from Elba, he was enjoined to prepare quietly for military operations, but under no circumstances to begin them unless the Austrians should attack France. Murat, who was only intent on pursuing his own schemes of aggrandizement, complied with the first and disregarded the second part of his instructions. With most indifferent success he tried to persuade the Austrian Minister at Naples that he was mobilizing with the sole object of maintaining, by arms if necessary, the territorial settlement which had been agreed to at Vienna. But on March 17th he threw off the mask and set his army in motion. From Ancona he detached a division to occupy Rome, whilst he himself pressed on northwards with the rest of his troops. On arriving at Rimini, on March 30th, he issued a proclamation calling on all patriots to rise for the unity of their country and to shake off the yoke of Austria. Continuing his advance on a broad front, he entered Bologna on the 2nd, and, on the 4th, occupied Modena and Florence with his left wing. Meanwhile all Northern Italy was in a ferment. The Austrians, however, were not unprepared, and were able to concentrate two divisions, under Bianchi and Neipperg, behind the Po. On April 9th and 10th Murat, who was a brilliant cavalry leader but no general, unsuccessfully attempted to force the passage of the river at Ochiobello. After sustaining severe losses he

¹ *Mémoires de Napoléon*, IV., nouvelle édition, 1905, pp. 8-16.
Houssaye, 1815, I. pp. 465-473.

was compelled to retreat. Directly he fell back the Austrians assumed the offensive, and gave the sorely shaken Neapolitans no rest. Murat's adventure ended on May 3rd at Tollentino, where, after a battle of forty-eight hours' duration, which he had been forced to accept under unfavourable conditions, his army was scattered to the winds. On May 18th, with the Austrians close behind him, he returned almost alone to Naples.¹ After parting from his wife, whom he was never to see again, he escaped disguised as a sailor and, a few days later, landed at Toulon a broken and a ruined man.

To all Murat's entreaties to be given a command in the French field army Napoleon turned a deaf ear.² He is said to have regretted his decision as he watched the fruitless charges of his cavalry against the British squares on the afternoon of Waterloo. He had, indeed, every reason to be incensed at the conduct of his brother-in-law. The Neapolitan army was only a pawn on the European chess board, but it was none the less provoking to see it swept away before the game had begun. Whilst Murat was striving to stem the headlong flight of his followers from the field of Tollentino, Wellington had been writing to Lord Stewart, the British Ambassador at Vienna, with regard to him. The Duke expressed the opinion that "Murat must be destroyed early or he will hang heavily upon us." But though the fact was still unknown to him, the Neapolitan army had passed out of existence, and the Austrian troops, who would have been immobilized in Northern Italy, had it continued in being, were free to join in the great invasion of France.³

Hardly had Napoleon been deprived by Murat's precipitate action of the assistance which he might have received from Italy, than he was compelled to send General Lamarque into La Vendée with a column which included a brigade of the Young Guard. The imminence of hostilities on the frontiers, the withdrawal of the garrisons from Angers, Nantes, and other towns, the despatch by the English Government to the dis-

¹ Spencer Walpole, *Life of Lord John Russell*, I. p. 77.

Villemain, *Souvenirs*, II. pp. 138-140.

² *Mémoires de Napoléon*, IV., nouvelle édition, p. 112.

Villemain, *Souvenirs*, II. pp. 186-187.

³ Wellington to Stewart, May 8, 1815, *Despatches*, XIV., edited by Gurwood.

Houssaye, 1815, I. pp. 565-584.

Madelin, *Fouché*, II. pp. 560-562.

Mémoires de Napoléon, IV., nouvelle édition, 1905, p. 21.

J. C. Hobhouse, *Letters*, I. p. 347.

Supplementary Despatches, X. p. 39. Memorandum of interview between Lord Harrowby and Louis XVIII.

Villemain, *Souvenirs*, II. p. 185.

affected districts of money, arms, and ammunition, had brought about the Royalist rising which, two months before, the Duc de Bourbon had, in vain, attempted to excite. The leaders had fixed on May 15th for the outbreak of the insurrection. At this juncture Fouché, who as Minister of Police had no wish to be concerned in the sanguinary repression of a Royalist rebellion, rendered valuable assistance to the Emperor. Sending for the Comte de Malartic, an old Vendéen chief, with whom he was well acquainted, he induced him to use his good offices in the interests of peace. He pointed out to him that the fate of Bonaparte would be decided on the northern frontier, and that a rising in La Vendée could have no influence on the march of events. It would enable the Emperor, however, to declare martial law and to call up local levies which, after the rebellion had been suppressed, would be employed against the armies of invasion. Malartic, accordingly, accompanied by two friends and furnished with a safe-conduct by Fouché, proceeded to the West.¹ Encouraged by the priests, some twenty thousand peasants had answered to their old leader's call to arms. But there was disunion among the chiefs. The veterans like Sapi-naud, d'Andigné, Suzannet, and d'Autichamp resented the pretensions of Louis de La Rochejacquelein to assume the supreme command. La Rochejacquelein had been first at Ghent and then in England, from where he had been conveyed to the coast of Brittany in H.M.S. the *Astrea*. The anger of the old chiefs at being superseded by a young and untried man disposed them to listen favourably to Malartic's proposals for an armistice. Moreover, the result of their first engagements with "the blues," under the energetic General Travot, had not been encouraging. When, however, La Rochejacquelein heard that they had opened negotiations with a view to a suspension of hostilities, he sent them peremptory orders to join him with their men, under pain of being deprived of their commands. But, immediately after sending off this summons, he became engaged with a flying column under General Travot, and, on June 4th, was killed in action near the village of Saint-Jean-des-Monts in the Marais. With the death of Louis de La Rochejacquelein the movement, which had never called forth much enthusiasm, practically collapsed. It had deprived Napoleon, nevertheless, of the services of about 8000 men whom he could ill afford to spare, and, but for the diplomacy of Fouché, a still larger number would have been required for its suppression.

By the beginning of May Napoleon had abandoned all hope

¹ Madelin, *Fouché*, II. pp. 359-363.
Houssaye, 1815, I. pp. 573-584.

of inducing the Powers to forego their intention of attacking him.¹ There were two alternatives before him. He could remain on the defensive and await the oncoming of his enemies, or he could fall upon them whilst they were carrying out their strategical deployment. To adopt the first plan was to repeat, under, on the whole, more favourable conditions, the campaign of the year before. Many eminent critics have pronounced this course to have been the one which he should have followed. During the Hundred Days, however, Napoleon was not an Autocrat, but was in the position of a constitutional Sovereign with a Parliament and a troublesome opposition. To have allowed the eastern provinces to become again the theatre of war might have been the soundest plan from the military point of view, but he could not afford to disregard the bad effect which such a decision would have had on public opinion. It was contrary, moreover, to his practice thus tamely to submit to his adversaries taking the initiative at their convenience. Lastly, and this was perhaps the reason which carried the most weight with him, it was only by a great victory that he could regain his old prestige and arouse the national enthusiasm, without which he could not hope to triumph over the formidable coalition with which he had to deal. Having decided to strike the first blow, the Anglo-Dutch-Hanoverian and the Prussian armies in Belgium presented the most suitable objective. They lay close to the French frontier in widely scattered cantonments on a front nearly one hundred miles long, from Mons to Namur. Generally speaking, Blücher's troops were quartered to the east and Wellington's to the west of the great high road which runs northwards through Charleroi to Brussels. Their combined strength amounted to about 200,000 men. Against these numbers, in the middle of June, beyond which date he could not safely postpone his attack, Napoleon was not in a position to bring into line more than 125,000 troops. He was thus outnumbered in the proportion of eight to five, but he counted on atoning for this disadvantage by the secrecy and the celerity of his movements. Owing to the wide front on which the Allies were disposed, it was impossible for them to concentrate and to unite in less than three days from the time of the first alarm. If, therefore, he could collect his people without arousing suspicion, he might hurl himself with all his forces upon one army

¹ *Mémoires de Napoléon*, IV., nouvelle édition, pp. 32-39.

Political and Military History of Campaign of Waterloo (translated from French of Baron de Jomini), pp. 112, 113.

Clausewitz, *Feldzug von 1815*, pp. 1-33.

Houssaye, *Waterloo*, pp. 94-99.

Villemain, *Souvenirs*, II. p. 232.

before the other one could go to its support. The chances of separating his opponents were, besides, enormously enhanced by the fact that they were operating from divergent bases. That is to say, that, whilst Wellington drew his supplies from the coast, the Prussian lines of communication ran eastwards to the Rhine. If his campaign in Belgium should prove successful, he would still have to deal with the Austrians and Russians. But, in addition to the enthusiasm which his triumph would excite in his own country, the disheartening effect which it was bound to have on the Allies would be incalculable. A great military disaster might drive the Tories from office, and, in that case, if the speeches of the Whigs had any meaning, their accession to power should be the signal for a reversal of policy towards him.¹

The first and, in some respects, the most difficult part of Napoleon's scheme was carried out with complete success. Early in June the concentration orders were communicated to the corps commanders, and, on June 14th, the whole army lay opposite to the Belgian frontier between Avesnes and Philippeville on a front of a little over thirty miles. Soon after midnight, on June 11th, Napoleon quietly entered his travelling carriage and was driven rapidly from Paris to Laon.² In the course of the day before he had received deputations from both Chambers. He had parted from them with the significant warning to beware of the fate of the Greeks of the Eater Empire, who had continued to discuss abstract questions whilst the enemy was thundering at the gates. Napoleon spent the night of June 14th-15th at Beaumont in the midst of his army, and, as the men rose from their bivouacs in the dim twilight of the summer morning, the last general order, which their Emperor was to issue on the opening of a campaign, was read out to them.³ The troops were reminded that the day was the anniversary of Marengo and of Friedland, "then as after Austerlitz and as after Wagram they had been too generous. . . . These Prussians now so arrogant were as three to one at Jena, and as six to one at Montmirail. Those among them who had been prisoners on the English hulks could describe their sufferings to their comrades. . . . Forced marches were in front of them, battles must be delivered, perils

¹ *Mémoires de Napoléon*, IV., nouvelle édition, p. 125.

² *History of Campaign of Waterloo* (from the French of Baron de Jomini), p. 115.

Houssaye, *Waterloo*, pp. 99-107.

³ *Moniteur*, June 13 (quoted by Houssaye), 1815, I. pp. 622-623. Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, II. pp. 349, 350.

J. C. Hobhouse, *Letters*, I. p. 468.

Mémoires de Napoléon, IV., nouvelle édition, 1905, pp. 44, 45.

must be encountered, but if they remained true the victory would be theirs. The moment had come to conquer or to die." A few hours later, the rattle of musketry across the frontier announced that contact with the Prussian outposts had been established and that the most celebrated campaign of modern days had begun.

Inasmuch as the governing idea of Napoleon's strategy was to crush one or other of the armies opposed to him, before they could unite, he could not think of moving against either of their outer flanks. To have adopted such a course would merely have resulted in driving whichever army he had threatened into the arms of its ally. He, accordingly, decided to burst in upon them by the great high road from Charleroi to Brussels, which ran through the centre of their cantonments.¹ At noon on June 15th Charleroi was in his possession. As he sat on a chair in the road and watched his troops filing through the town he had every reason to feel satisfied. By the secrecy and the swiftness of his concentration he had gained the start of three days, which was to make up for the paucity of his numbers. Before this, however, he had doubtless realized that he had sustained one great loss.² Berthier, the man who possessed in so high a degree the art of expressing his master's intentions in clear and lucid orders, his chief of the staff on all his great campaigns, was not with him on this occasion. He had followed Louis XVIII to Ghent, and had afterwards tried to return to France through Germany. Finding, however, that the Austrians would not let him pass he had gone to Bamberg, where he had been killed by a fall from a window as a Russian regiment was marching through the town. In default of Berthier, Napoleon appointed Marshal Soult Chief of the Staff. To Marshal de Grouchy he assigned the right, and to Marshal Ney the left, wing of the army, whilst the Imperial Guard and Mouton de Lobau's corps formed the reserve under his own immediate orders.³

About twelve miles beyond (north of) Charleroi the great highway is crossed, at the hamlet of Les Quatre Bras, by the road which runs east and west from Namur to Nivelles. It is a much vexed question whether Napoleon intended his advanced guards to establish themselves upon this road on the evening of the 15th. He himself, in the account which he dictated at St. Helena, has said that such an idea formed no part of his

¹ Houssaye, *Waterloo*, p. 118.

Mémoires de Napoléon, IV., nouvelle édition, 1905, p. 112.

² Bourrienne, *Mémoires*, X. p. 368-369.

Houssaye, *Waterloo*, pp. 56-62.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 122 (note).

plans.¹ On the contrary, to have denied to Blücher the use of this road would have precluded the possibility of his concentrating upon it, a mistake which he anticipated he would commit. In any case, whether in accordance with Napoleon's instructions, or in defiance of them, Ney confined himself to reconnoitring Les Quatre Bras, which was held by a brigade under Prince Bernard of Saxe-Weimar, whilst on the right the French only advanced to within a mile of Fleurus. The Emperor's orders for the 16th furnish good evidence that, though he was prepared for the eventuality, he did not expect to fight a great battle that day. The north-easterly direction taken by the picquets and advanced troops, who had been driven in during the previous afternoon, pointed to a retreat of the Prussian army towards its base.² Soon after nine, on the morning of the 16th, Napoleon quitted Charleroi and established himself in a mill near Fleurus, from where he saw with increasing satisfaction the sky line, on the rising ground to the north, grow dark under the successive arrival of heavy Prussian columns. By two o'clock he could feel assured that the whole, or the greater part, of Blücher's army was standing prepared to accept battle to the north of the Ligny brook.³

To reap full benefit from the great opportunity which had been vouchsafed him,⁴ Napoleon had to destroy the Prussian army, not merely to expel it from its positions. This he purposed to do by launching straight against it the troops of the right wing, which were under his immediate eye, supporting them, if necessary, by the reserve corps, which he ordered to close up. At the same time he sent instructions to Ney to brush aside whatever might be in front of him at Les Quatre Bras, march on Bry, and roll up the Prussian right flank. But just after Soult had sent off this communication to Ney, the Emperor was informed by a staff officer that Les Quatre Bras was held by a force estimated at 20,000 men. Napoleon had concluded correctly that it would be out of Wellington's power to concentrate his whole army during the day; he thought, nevertheless, that he might very likely have hurried up troops from

¹ *Napoléon Mémoires*, IV., nouvelle édition, pp. 54, 119.

Cf. Clausewitz, *Feldzug von 1815*, pp. 43-59.

Ropes, *Campaign of Waterloo*, pp. 55-61.

Jomini, *Political and Military History of Campaign of Waterloo*, p. 123.

Houssaye, *Waterloo*, pp. 122-130.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 133-140, 160, 161, 471.

Ropes, *Campaign of Waterloo*, pp. 135-138.

³ Houssaye, *Waterloo*, pp. 139-140.

Napoléon Mémoires, IV., nouvelle édition, 1905, p. 56.

⁴ Houssaye, *Waterloo*, p. 472.

Ropes, *Waterloo*, pp. 152-156.

Brussels and that a considerable body of them might be at Les Quatre Bras. It was no part of his plan, however, to defeat both Wellington and Blücher on the 16th. He was perfectly satisfied to contain the English—that is, to prevent them from going to the assistance of the Prussians—and he conceived that Ney ought to be able to effect this with one *corps d'armée* and his cavalry.¹ It was already past three in the afternoon; the Charleroi-Brussels road, up which Ney's troops were moving, lay about six miles to the west of the scene of action round Ligny. Six o'clock, therefore, would be about the earliest hour at which any considerable portion of them could deploy against Blücher. To save time, accordingly, he despatched an order direct to Drouet d'Erlon, commanding the rearmost of the two corps under Ney, to attack the Prussian right. It was the crucial moment of the campaign and Napoleon knew it, yet he appears to have entrusted this message of vast importance to an inexperienced aide-de-camp of his personal staff. After delivering to Drouet Napoleon's missive, Forbin-Janson, the officer in question, had been told to inform Ney of its contents. This, however, he neglected to do. Drouet d'Erlon himself does not appear to have understood clearly his orders and to have misread the words: "*sur la hauteur de Saint-Amand*" as "*à la hauteur de Saint-Amand*." Forbin-Janson, who knew nothing of the larger operations of war, was unable to explain matters, consequently the *corps d'armée* arrived on the battlefield of Ligny in prolongation of the French left instead of in rear of the Prussian right.² Its approach created great consternation and caused Napoleon to suspend for a time his attack, under the apprehension that an English corps had slipped past Ney and was moving against him.³ In the meantime the Marshal, who had become hotly engaged at Les Quatre Bras, was infuriated beyond measure on learning that Drouet had marched away without his permission, and, regardless of consequences, sent orders to recall him. Drouet obeyed, but, what is stranger still, nobody from the Headquarters Staff seems to have approached him to give him his correct direction. About nine

¹ Houssaye, *Waterloo*, pp. 154-163.

² This episode is given as M. Houssaye relates it, *Waterloo*, pp. 199-207. But it is in contradiction with Napoleon's own account as given in *Mémoires de Napoléon*, IV., nouvelle édition, 1905, pp. 58, 59, 65; and with other historians. M. Houssaye's version appears to be the most probable.

Cf. Ropes, *Waterloo*, pp. 181-182, 191-196.

³ Houssaye, *Waterloo*, pp. 171, 172, 177, 178.

Ropes, *Waterloo*, pp. 157, 158.

The whole of this affair is discussed very impartially by General Zurlinden in the *Revue des deux Mondes*, Janvier, 1906, *Ligny et Waterloo*.

o'clock, as darkness put an end to the fiercely contested struggle at *Ees Quatre Bras*, Drouet d'Erlon and his 20,000 men marched up. They had been on two battlefields, on each of which their presence was sorely required, yet they had come into action on neither the one nor the other.¹

After a terrific battle, Napoleon, just before nightfall, succeeded in dislodging the Prussians.² Though the victory was not of so complete a character as he had been entitled to expect, owing to no portion of his left wing having co-operated in the engagement, he was nevertheless disposed to think that the Prussians would be unlikely to trouble him further, but would retire on their base.³ In point of fact, General von Gneisenau had come to a very different and a very momentous decision. No one knew the fate which had overtaken Blücher. The old man had joined in the last charge, and was supposed to have been either killed or taken prisoner. His Chief of the Staff, however, after poring over his maps by the moonlight, gave the order for a retreat on Wavre. He had taken the soldier-like view of the situation. From the point which he had named the Prussians could co-operate with Wellington, but it entailed giving up their line of supplies by way of Namur and Liège and establishing a fresh one through Tirlemont and Maëstricht. The next morning, about seven o'clock, Wellington was made acquainted at *Quatre Bras* with the result of the battle and with the direction of the retreat by an officer of the Prussian General Staff. The retirement of his allies, which left him "*en l'air*," compelled him to conform without delay to their movement. Accordingly, he sent back word that he should retreat to *Mont-Saint-Jean*, where he would accept battle, provided he was assured of support from not less than one Prussian army corps.⁴

The next day, June 17th, about eleven o'clock, before devoting his attention exclusively to Wellington, the Emperor despatched Grouchy with a force of 33,000 men in pursuit of the Prussians. No military decision has ever provoked the same amount of controversy. The question has been keenly debated whether Napoleon was justified in detaching this large body of troops ; whilst the steps which Grouchy himself took to carry out his

¹ Houssaye, *Waterloo*, p. 213.

Ropes, *Waterloo*, p. 182.

² Houssaye, *Waterloo*, pp. 228, 232.

Ropes, *Waterloo*, pp. 198, 199.

³ Houssaye, *Waterloo*, pp. 233, 234.

Ropes, *Waterloo*, pp. 226-227.

⁴ Houssaye, *Waterloo*, p. 254.

Ropes, *Waterloo*, p. 233.

Despatches, XII., Wellington to Bathurst, June 19, 1815.

orders have been the subject of endless criticisms.¹ It must be understood, however, that, had the Prussians retired to Namur, as Napoleon supposed they had, it was very necessary to follow them with a considerable force. Otherwise, when he carried out his contemplated advance on Brussels, they might have re-occupied Charleroi and have severed his communications. But if the Prussians had gone north in order to join hands with Wellington, Grouchy, in that case, would either interpose and prevent their junction, or should arrive on his battlefield simultaneously with them. Grouchy, who had never before held a large or an independent command, was probably somewhat overwhelmed by the difficulties of his task. Though on the afternoon of June 17th his movements were unduly slow, he did contrive to ascertain and to report to Napoleon that a large portion of the Prussians had retreated to Wavre. At the same time he announced that he should interpose to stop them from moving on Brussels, if that should prove to be their intention. But it never appears to have occurred to him that they might be proposing to march directly to join Wellington and to take part in the battle which, he was aware, the Emperor hoped to engage to the south of the Forest of Soignies. If, however, Grouchy failed to rise to the occasion, he might complain, with justice, that he did not receive the assistance from the Headquarter Staff which he was entitled to expect.²

In the meantime Blücher, though he had been unhorsed and ridden over at Ligny, was up and doing. Wellington had said that he should stand at Mont-Saint-Jean, provided he were supported by one Prussian army corps. Though the approach of Grouchy was within the knowledge of the General Staff, Blücher decided that his ally should have the assistance for which he asked. Accordingly, about two o'clock in the morning of June 18th, Lieutenant von Massow arrived at the Duke's headquarters at Waterloo the bearer of a promise that not only one army corps, but three, if possible, should march to his support. Blücher had carried his heroic resolution despite the opposition of his all-powerful Chief of the Staff. Gneisenau dis-

¹ Houssaye, *Waterloo*, pp. 225-231.

Ropes, *Waterloo*, pp. 209-214, 218-225.

Napoleon relates these events in *Mémoires de Napoléon*, IV., nouvelle édition, 1905, pp. 67-74, 117. Grouchy (and his son afterwards) has told the story from his point of view. Not much credence should be attached to Napoleon's account, and still less to Grouchy's.

² Houssaye, *Waterloo*, pp. 225, 226, 240-250.

Ropes, *Waterloo*, p. 231.

General Zurlinden, *Revue des deux Mondes*, Janvier, 1906, *Ligny et Waterloo*.

trusted Wellington exceedingly, and feared that, after they were committed to their perilous flank march, he would abandon his position, if hard pressed, and leave them to inevitable destruction. The hesitations of the Prussian commanders as they neared the battlefield, the next day, were due to Gneisenau's strict injunctions that they must beware of engaging, before ascertaining that Wellington was really standing firm.¹

On the morning of June 18th Grouchy duly marched on Wavre, where, in the afternoon, he became involved in a sharp engagement with the Prussian corps of Thielman,² whilst Blücher and the remainder of his army joined Wellington. At Walhain, when at luncheon, Grouchy heard the guns of Waterloo. But, after a sharp altercation with his subordinate Gerard, who insisted that they must march to the cannon, he decided to adhere to his resolution of slavishly following in the Prussian footsteps of the day before.

During the night Napoleon's only fear had been that, after all, Wellington might not accept battle. He is said to have gone through the pouring rain to the outpost line to watch and listen.³ In the morning he was in good spirits. Owing to the sodden state of the ground and to the fact that some of his troops had not reached their bivouacs till nearly dawn, he was in no hurry to begin. Eight or nine hours of daylight would suffice for the purpose which he had in hand. Soult, who made no secret of his anxiety, evoked the rude remark "that Wellington was not a good general because he had beaten him in Spain. He could assure him that Wellington was a bad general and that the English were bad troops." At ten he rode along the front of the army, which cheered him wildly, and, at eleven, proceeded to some rising ground close to the farm-house of La Rossomme, about one mile in rear (south) of La Belle Alliance. Here a table and chairs were set out for him. He had on the field 74,000 men against the 67,000 opposed to him. His orders to Ney for the conduct of the battle were simple. Wellington's line was to be smashed in the centre.⁴

At half-past eleven the first assault on Hougomont was made. At one, Drouet d'Erlon, covered by the fire of the eighty guns in line at La Belle Alliance, attacked the English centre; whilst the Emperor wondered whether the column approaching

¹ Ropes, *Campaign of Waterloo*, pp. 227-230, 233-244.
Houssaye, *Waterloo*, pp. 274-275, 283, 284.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 284-297.

Ropes, *Waterloo*, pp. 255-272, 286-288.

³ Houssaye, *Waterloo*, pp. 276-279.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 307-310, 318-326.

Chateaubriand, *Mémoires*, VII. p. 24.

on the right betokened the arrival of Grouchy or the Prussians. At three, Ney launched the cavalry. At five, Bulow deployed against the French right rear at Planchenoit. At six, La Haye Sainte fell.¹ Ney thought he saw the red line quiver. At seven, Zieten came up and joined the left of Wellington. Napoleon played his last remaining card—the Guard was set in motion.

Soon lost to sight amidst the clouds of smoke, the Imperial Guard breasted the slope of Mont-Saint-Jean. On both sides of the great high road the much tried infantry of Reille and Drouet d'Erlon formed for the supreme attack. Up and down the staggering columns rode La Bédoyère shouting, by the Emperor's orders, that Grouchy had arrived at last.² But the despairing cry was heard that the Guard had given way. Above the deafening roar, screaming bagpipes, beat of drums, and British cheers announced that Wellington had signalled the advance. From the dense smoke which hid Smohain and Papelotte emerged no long-expected Grouchy, but a Prussian column.³ "We are betrayed!" the fatal shout went up. The Frenchmen broke and fled a panic-stricken mob. Close on their heels, breathing revenge and death, thundered the Prussian cavalry. Through Genappe, with its narrow street and narrower bridge, the chase swept on.⁴ Past Quatre Bras, where the trampled corn lay white with corpses stripped stark naked. The moon lit up the ghostly scene.⁵ Through Frasnes to Charleroi and on to France the headlong flight continued.

¹ Houssaye, *Waterloo*, p. 381. It was at this time that Wellington is supposed to have said "Night or the Prussians."

² Houssaye, *Waterloo*, p. 390.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 398-401.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 418-442.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 424, 429-432. (The bodies of the men killed in the action of 16th stripped by marauders and peasants.)

CHAPTER IV

A SECOND CHANCE

ON Sunday, June 18th, the Parisians could read, to the booming of the guns at Les Invalides, the short announcement in the *Moniteur* that on the 16th the Emperor had defeated the combined English and Prussian armies in Belgium. After the gloom and depression of the past weeks, that Sunday was a day of much rejoicing. Wellington, it was rumoured, had been taken prisoner, Blücher had been killed, their troops were scattered. But it was not the triumph of a united people celebrating a victory won over foreign enemies. The Royalists could ill conceal their disappointment, whilst the patriotic enthusiasm of the Liberals was tempered by the fear that military success would mean a return to despotism. It was ominous, moreover, that the tidings of victory caused the *rente* to fall four francs.¹

Fouché is believed to have been the first person to hear of the result of the Battle of Waterloo. He had made arrangements to receive the earliest intelligence.² During the last few days he had endured great anxiety. Since the discovery of his clandestine correspondence with Metternich he felt that the Emperor was only waiting his opportunity to crush him. If, contrary to his provisions, he were to return victorious from Belgium, his position would be critical. A disagreeable vision of the moat of Vincennes and the firing party passed before his eyes. But on the night of the 19th–20th he knew that he was no longer in danger. Napoleon's army had ceased to exist. Accordingly, he set himself to weave the web which was to complete the Emperor's downfall. The whole of the 20th was spent in visits and consultations with Ministers and leading Deputies. To all of them he expressed his convictions that Napoleon's abdication was the only possible solution of the present difficulties. But he ascribed his conclusion to different reasons. When speaking to Bonapartists, he insisted that a voluntary abdication could alone save the country from in-

¹ Houssaye, 1815, III. pp. 5–7.

² Madelin, *Fouché*, II. pp. 384–392.
Pasquier, III. p. 195.
Houssaye, 1815, III. pp. 10–12.

vation and dismemberment, perfidiously insinuating that in such a contingency the Austrians would not object to the proclamation of the King of Rome as Napoleon II. In conversation, however, with Liberals of the type of La Fayette he adduced arguments of another kind. In the desperate state of his fortunes Napoleon, undoubtedly, would attempt to assume a dictatorship. The Chambers therefore must be firm, and prompt steps should be taken to guard against a dissolution by force. Napoleon ought to be given the choice between abdication and deposition.

About noon, on June 20th, Lucien Bonaparte¹ received two communications which Napoleon had despatched from Philippeville the day before. In one, intended for his brother's eyes alone, he made no attempt to disguise the awful character of the catastrophe, and announced his immediate return to Paris. The next morning, at about eight o'clock, he arrived at the Elysée. Lavalette has described his exhaustion and the "epileptic laugh" with which he greeted him. He received Davout, the Minister of War, lying at full length in his bath. At the sight of him he raised his arms and, allowing them to fall with a splash, sprinkled the Marshal's uniform with water. Fouché was soon afterwards admitted. It was his policy to lure Napoleon to a sense of false security, in order that the Chambers should meet undisturbed. He had excellent reasons for supposing that any resolutions which the Peers or the Deputies might come to would be unfavourable to the Emperor. His only fear was that he might forestall them by some prompt and vigorous measure. Fouché, accordingly, professed to take a hopeful view of the outlook and depicted the condition of the public mind and the situation, generally, in a favourable light.² But whilst at the Elysée the hours went by in councils and deliberations; the Chambers met and came to an important decision. On the motion of La Fayette the Assembly was declared to be in permanent session. Anyone attempting to dissolve it would be guilty of High Treason.³ The Ministers of War, Foreign Affairs, Police, and the Interior were commanded to attend to make their reports, and, as a measure of precaution, it was decreed that the National Guards were to be called out and posted to protect the approaches to the Chamber. The Peers, also, lost no time in passing resolutions of the same character.

¹ Houssaye, 1815, III. pp. 7-8.

² Lavalette, *Mémoires*, II. p. 190.
J. C. Hobhouse, *Letters*, II. p. 67.

Houssaye, 1815, III. pp. 13-15.

³ Villemain, *Souvenirs*, II. pp. 173-181.
Houssaye, 1815, III. pp. 23-29.

As soon as it was known that the Emperor had returned a crowd collected round the Elysée. Napoleon would often leave the Council chamber to walk in the garden and to consult with Lucien. From the Avenue Marigny he could easily be seen over the low wall which then existed. His appearance was invariably greeted with loud cheers. Lucien, encouraged by the demeanour of the people, besought his brother to take advantage of it while there was yet time. He begged him to collect all the regular troops still in Paris, and to march boldly on the Chamber. Napoleon shook his head. He felt that it was no occasion on which to attempt a second 18th Brumaire. But, before coming to a final decision, he resolved to send his brother to the Assembly to make a last appeal to the loyalty of the Deputies.¹ After Lucien had departed to carry out his uncongenial task, Benjamin Constant arrived. As they paced together talking under the trees in the garden their conversation was interrupted by the fierce howls of the mob clamouring for arms. Constant, who knew too well the terrible nature of the weapon which the fallen man had in his power to use, was alarmed. But Napoleon soon set his fears at rest. "Listen to them," he said. "If I chose, in an hour's time the Chambers would be no more."² Do not be afraid, however. I did not return from Elba to make the streets of Paris run with blood."

In the Chamber Lucien was listened to without interruption whilst he implored the Deputies not to desert the Emperor. But when he said imprudently that, were they to abandon him, the world at large would judge their ungrateful conduct unfavourably, La Fayette sprang to his feet. "That is not true," he exclaimed. "We have followed Napoleon to the sands of Egypt, to the steppes of Russia, on to fifty battlefields, and that is why we now have to mourn the loss of three million Frenchmen." The following morning the alternative was placed before Napoleon of either abdicating voluntarily or of submitting to deposition. With the exception of Lucien, who still counselled the dissolution of the Chambers by force, and the drawing up of a stirring proclamation, everybody about him believed resistance to be hopeless. Accordingly, about noon, on June 22nd, Napoleon signed the Act by which, for the second time, he resigned his crown and abdicated in favour of his son, whom he now designated as Napoleon II.³

¹ Chateaubriand, *Mémoires*, VII. p. 2.
Houssaye, 1815, pp. 16-22.

² B. Constant, *Mémoires sur les cent jours*, II. pp. 139-140.

³ Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. p. 62.
Villemain, *Souvenirs*, II. pp. 294-295.
Houssaye, 1815, III. pp. 49-63.

The moment Napoleon's signature had been obtained to this document, Fouché hurried off with it in triumph to the Chamber, where it was read aloud. He then moved that a commission should be appointed with full powers to treat for peace with the Allied Sovereigns.¹ He proposed that it should consist of five members to be selected by vote, two from the Upper and three from the Lower Chamber. The motion having been adopted, he proceeded to canvass the Deputies both in person and by means of his creatures Jay and Manuel. He had intended from the first to play the leading part on the commission. By artfully suggesting that their talents might be employed more usefully in other directions, he contrived to spoil the chances of several dangerous competitors. At the same time he insinuated to the various groups that their different aims and interests would be safe in his keeping. Nevertheless, skilfully as he had prepared the ground, he was disappointed. He was chosen to act on the commission, it is true, but he obtained less votes than Carnot. The third Deputy elected, however, General Grenier, was an obscure person from whose interference he had nothing to fear; whilst the selection of Caulaincourt and Quinette by the Peers was not displeasing to him. Carnot, inasmuch as he had received the largest number of votes, considered himself naturally designated for the post of President. But he was speedily undeceived when the members of the commission assembled the next morning at the Tuileries.² Fouché said at once that before proceeding to business they must choose a President, and, bowing politely to Carnot, intimated that he was his selection. Carnot, thinking that he must return the compliment, told Fouché that he gave him his vote. Whereupon the other three followed his example and announced that Fouché was their choice also. Perhaps before this they had been approached with this end in view. In any case, Fouché had gained his object and, accordingly, promptly took possession of the presidential chair.

From the first days of Louis XVIII's residence at Ghent all the etiquette and ceremonial of Court life had been scrupulously maintained. Every morning Ministers would meet the King in solemn conclave round the council table. In the afternoon Louis, accompanied by M. de Blacas, would take his usual drive in his carriage and six horses. He appeared to be, indeed, not a King in exile, but a reigning Monarch on a summer visit to the

¹ Madelin, *Fouché*, II. pp. 398-401.
Houssaye, 1815, III. pp. 63-69.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 82, 83.
Madelin, *Fouché*, II. pp. 402-405.

country.¹ Chateaubriand, who, in the absence of the Abbé de Montesquiou in England, had been provisionally appointed Minister of the Interior, has described his empty duties and the jealousies of the different parties.² The extreme Royalists, the intimates of the Pavillon de Marsan, gathered round Monsieur and indulged in the same intrigues and persisted in the same quarrels as in Paris.³ They now could cast in the teeth of the Constitutionalists, with some show of reason, the reproach that their present troubles had been brought about by their absurd concessions to the demands of the Liberals. No blame, in any case, on this occasion could attach to their party, inasmuch as it had been rigorously excluded from participating in the government. They had little doubt, however, that before long they would all of them be back again in Paris, by which time they could only hope that the King would have learnt wisdom from his disagreeable experience.

Ghent was on Wellington's lines of communication, and all through the months of April and May was alive with the march of troops. It is impossible to read without a smile the story of the fallen King and his mock Court under these humiliating conditions.⁴ But the imperturbable confidence in the ultimate triumph of his cause, which had stood Louis in good stead during the long years of the old emigration, did not desert him now.⁵ Moreover, there was something about him which, despite his perpetual gout, unwieldy figure, and ignominious flight from his kingdom, commanded respect and preserved him from ridicule. Chateaubriand, who had certainly no liking for Louis XVIII personally, describes him as the "embodiment of Legitimate Sovereignty." At the Tuileries he had contrived to inspire the Marshals with feelings of greater awe than ever they had experienced in the presence of the Emperor.⁶ Occasionally, at Ghent, whilst out driving he would meet Wellington, and would return his salute with a gracious bow and with a protecting wave of his hand.

The ambassadors of the Powers accredited to the Tuileries had followed Louis to Ghent in their official capacities. This was a state of affairs of excellent augury, and one which gave him a recognized position which he had never enjoyed during

¹ Villemain, *Souvenirs*, II. pp. 167-169.

² Chateaubriand, *Mémoires*, VI. pp. 392-394.

Chateaubriand à Talleyrand, 28 Avril, 1815.

³ Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. p. 83.

Chateaubriand, *Mémoires*, VI. pp. 409-410, 427-428.

Beugnot, *Mémoires*, II. p. 237.

⁴ Chateaubriand, *Mémoires*, pp. 415-416.

⁵ Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. p. 85.

⁶ Chateaubriand, *Mémoires*, VI. pp. 416-420.

the emigration. But the Allies refused to entertain his suggestion of employing a French contingent in the coming operations. According to Mr. Creevey, Wellington himself scouted the notion in very uncomplimentary language when, on the look-out for news, he questioned him about it at Brussels. Nor was Louis' request acceded to that French Commissioners should be attached to the Allied Armies.¹ Consequently, Wellington's brilliant Staff, which trotted past Gronow on the morning of Waterloo, "gay and unconcerned as though riding to meet the hounds in a quiet English county," numbered among its members neither Marshal Marmont nor any of the French officers whom Louis had proposed should form part of it.² Undoubtedly it was well for him that the Allies adopted this course. As Talleyrand³ wrote, nothing could render him more odious to the mass of his subjects than the idea that the war was being undertaken in his interests and on his behalf.

On the evening of June 15th the news that Bonaparte had crossed the Sambre and that fighting had already taken place burst upon the little Court like a bombshell. Louis was urged to fly to Antwerp. There was, indeed, some reason for alarm. The Duc de Berri, with about 800 men, was at Alost, between Brussels and Ghent, but otherwise the town was unprotected and at the mercy of a cavalry raid. In the midst of the general panic and the excitement among his followers Louis maintained a serene composure. During the past year he had seen much of Wellington, and had formed a high opinion both of his character and of his abilities.⁴ The Duke had promised that, come what might, he would not leave him without news, and Louis had implicit faith in his word. All through the 16th and the 17th, when reports of Bonaparte's success and of his rapid advance were pouring in, he alone remained perfectly calm.⁵ Chateaubriand relates how Sunday, June 18th, was spent at Ghent.⁶ Whilst on a solitary walk the south wind carried to his ears a distant rumbling noise. Afraid of being overtaken

¹ *Creevey Papers*, I. p. 228.

Despatches, XII., Wellington à Duc de Feltre, 14 Juin, 1815.

² Gronow's *Reminiscences*, published by Nimmo, I. p. 186.

³ Talleyrand à Louis XVIII., 17 Mai, 1815.

Talleyrand à Bourrienne, *Bourrienne Mémoires*, X. pp. 340-341.

Houssaye, 1815, I. pp. 480, 481.

Metternich à Talleyrand, 22 Juin, 1815.

Despatches, XII., Wellington to Metternich, 14 June, 1815.

⁴ Chateaubriand, *Mémoires*, VII. pp. 8-9.

Houssaye, 1815, III. 130-132.

⁵ *Despatches*, XII., Wellington à Duc de Feltre, 15 Juin, 1815.

Wellington to Duc de Berri, 18 Juin, 1815.

⁶ Chateaubriand, *Mémoires*, VII. pp. 10-19.

by an approaching shower, he mechanically turned to retrace his steps. Then suddenly he stopped as the truth dawned upon him. It was no fast nearing thunderstorm, the sound of which had broken in upon his anxious thoughts, but the roar of a great battle. He describes eloquently his conflicting feelings as he leaned against a tree, in the peaceful country road, listening to the guns of Waterloo. When he returned to Ghent, everybody was in a state of panic. Monsieur had galloped in from Brussels with the news of the complete defeat of the English army. This proved too much for Louis' composure. Under the influence of his intense emotion he forgot even his infirmities, and contrived to walk alone to the window to listen breathlessly. The anxious hours went by, night came down, but no one about the King thought of either rest or sleep. At last, after midnight, a message from Wellington arrived. It was short and to the point: the French army was destroyed. Louis XVIII could go to bed.

During the morning of the 19th further despatches and details of the great battle came to hand. After the poignant emotions of the past few days the exultation of the Royalists knew no bounds.¹ That there was something unbecoming in their loud expressions of delight appears to have struck Louis. Turning to Marshal Victor, Duc de Bellune, at dinner, on the day which followed Waterloo, he told him that he had never drunk to the success of the Allies before his restoration because he had been unaware of the nature of their intentions.² "Now, however, that they are our Allies and that they are fighting Bonapartism, not the French people, we may drink to their success without ceasing to be Frenchmen." It would be interesting, nevertheless, to know the thoughts of Victor, a Marshal of the Empire, on this occasion. Though Louis had spoken with this assurance of "his Allies," a letter which Clarke, Duc de Feltre, his Minister of War, received from Wellington, on June 21st, came as a great relief. The Duke, who wrote from Nivelles, suggested that His Majesty should draw nearer to the French frontier. No time was lost in acting upon the hint, and on June 22nd the King proceeded to Mons.³ The direct road runs to the west of the battlefield; thus Louis, as he set his face once more towards France, was not obliged to drive through "the pool of blood at Waterloo."⁴

¹ Chateaubriand, *Mémoires*, VII. p. 19, says first news came from Pozzo di Borgo at 1 a.m. on June 19.

² Houssaye, 1815, III. p. 133.

³ *Despatches*, XII., Wellington to Duc de Feltre, 20 Juin, 1815.
Wellington to Duc de Berri, 20 Juin, 1815.

⁴ Chateaubriand, *Mémoires*, VII. p. 37.

The Royal stay at Mons was marked by an event of some importance. Here Louis was at last induced to part with M. de Blacas. All parties were agreed upon the necessity of the measure. Monsieur and his friends demanded it; Wellington, Pozzo, and Talleyrand recommended it; Guizot and the constitutional Royalists considered it an essential preliminary to the King's Restoration.¹ Blacas himself realized that, for a time at least, he must separate from his Royal master, and, by tendering his own resignation as Minister of the Household, spared Louis the painful necessity of asking for it.

After a stay of two days at Mons a second communication was received from Wellington, whose headquarters had, in the meantime, marched to Cateau-Cambresis. The Duke proposed that Louis should join him, "His Majesty's presence on French territory being desirable." The King consented gladly, and forthwith gave orders for departure at an early hour the next morning.² On the afternoon of June 24th, the day on which Wellington's welcome despatch had been received, M. de Talleyrand arrived at Mons. Ever since the Congress of Vienna had broken up he had taken matters very leisurely, under the erroneous impression that nothing of any importance would be likely to happen before the end of June. Consequently, he only reached Brussels after the battle of Waterloo, where he learnt, greatly to his displeasure, that Louis had quitted Ghent without consulting him, and was preparing to re-enter France under the auspices of the Duke of Wellington. To mark his disapproval, on arriving at Mons he took no steps to obtain an audience of the King.³ But, being informed during the night that the Royal escort was assembling under the Duc de Berri, he presented himself as Louis was about to enter his carriage. At the interview which was granted him he did all in his power to persuade the King to postpone his departure. To return to his kingdom in the rear of the English army must create, he told His Majesty, a very bad effect. He would prefer to see him make his way through Switzerland to the Royalist provinces of the south and establish himself at Lyons. Had the eastern frontiers not been in possession of foreign troops, Talleyrand's reasons for tendering this advice would be easy to understand. But, under the

¹ Bourrienne, *Mémoires*, X. pp. 356-360.

Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. p. 86.

Chateaubriand, *Mémoires*, VII. p. 40.

² *Supplementary Despatches*, X., Sir C. Stuart to Castlereagh, 22 June, 1815.

Despatches, XII., Wellington to Blacas, 28 June, 1815.

³ *Wellington's Despatches*, edited by Gurwood, XII., Wellington to Duc de Feltre, Le Cateau, 22 Juin, 1815.

⁴ Houssaye, 1815, III. pp. 136-137.

circumstances, as they existed, it is difficult to see what advantage Louis could have gained by making a circuitous and, perhaps, dangerous journey in order to enter France behind the Austrian rather than with the English army of invasion. Undoubtedly Talleyrand must have had reasons for wishing to [delay matters. Possibly he may have wished to obtain promises as to the future conduct of the Government before the King set foot on French soil; perhaps he may have had some secret understanding with Metternich.¹ But, by whatever motives he may have been actuated, his attempts to frustrate Louis' immediate return to France proved wholly ineffectual. Finding that all his remonstrances were made in vain, he took a bold step and intimated that, if His Majesty should persist in his intention, he would be compelled to give up the direction of his affairs,² and would respectfully ask to be allowed to visit Carlsbad. "By all means," said Louis. "I believe the waters are excellent; they will do you good, and we shall hope to hear news of you before long." With these words he signified that the audience was at an end, and, being assisted into his carriage, drove away, leaving Talleyrand speechless with astonishment and indignation.³

Monsieur and his friends were delighted. Not only had they succeeded in separating the King from Blacas, his favourite, but now the hostile influence of Talleyrand, his constitutional adviser, was removed as well. The future seemed to be in their hands. Their triumph, however, was to be short lived.⁴ Directly Louis arrived at Cateau-Cambresis the Duke of Wellington waited upon him. He had heard of the quarrel with Talleyrand, and made haste to inform His Majesty that he regretted it very much. He had little difficulty in bringing Louis to see that, in the present state of his affairs, it would be unwise to dispense with the services of so astute a person. A circular was sent, accordingly, to all the Ministers, Talleyrand included, who had remained behind at Mons, inviting them to meet His Majesty at Cambrai, whither he proposed proceeding.⁵ Well-

¹ Beugnot, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 265, 266.

Chateaubriand, *Mémoires*, VII. pp. 44-45.

² Cf. *Supplementary Despatches*, X., Metternich to Wellington, 24 Juin, 1815.

³ Chateaubriand, *Mémoires*, VII. pp. 46-48.

⁴ Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. pp. 90-93.

⁵ *Despatches*, XII., Wellington to Talleyrand, 24 June, 1815. *Supplementary Despatches*, X., Pozzo to Wellington (Cateau), 26 Juin, 1815.

Talleyrand to Wellington (Mons), 25 Juin, 1815. *Supplementary Despatches*, X.

Beugnot, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 268-270.

Pozzo à Nesselrode, 26 Juin, 1815.

ton, at the same time, wrote to Talleyrand, pointing out that it was on his advice that the King had decided to re-enter France, and he gracefully added that he flattered himself that, had M. de Talleyrand known the precise state of affairs, he would have recommended him to adopt the same course. Under these circumstances he ventured to hope that he would lose no time in rejoining His Majesty. Talleyrand was only too delighted to comply. Ever since his interview with the King he had been reproaching himself for his hasty conduct, which he felt to have been unworthy of a diplomatist of his experience.

Wellington and most of the other statesmen of the coalition looked upon the "pure" Royalists, who surrounded Monsieur, as men who were much more capable of ruining a kingdom than of governing it. The proclamation to which the King affixed his signature at Cateau-Cambresis, and which had, doubtless, been drawn up by Dambray at their instigation, furnished a case in point. In this document, which was to herald his return to power, Louis was made to announce to his subjects merely that he hoped to repair the ills which the war had brought about, to reward the deserving, and to set the laws in motion against those who had transgressed.¹

On June 26th the King entered Cambrai, which was in possession of the English, and received an enthusiastic welcome from the inhabitants.² The next day he held a Council which was attended by Ministers and the Royal Princes. Talleyrand, who strongly disapproved of the proclamation of Cateau-Cambresis, presented for the King's approval the draft of a second one. In his opinion His Majesty must consent to own that mistakes had been committed. It was desirable, moreover, that something should be said to reassure holders of national property. The reading of Talleyrand's proposed proclamation gave rise to a stormy scene. Monsieur wished to know whether some of the remarks which it contained did not refer to him? Talleyrand admitted that they did. "Truth compelled him to say that Monsieur had done a great deal of harm." The Duc de Berri, thereupon, sprang to his feet and exclaimed passionately that, were it not for His Majesty's presence, he would never allow such words to be addressed to his father. Louis, however, put an end to the altercation by deciding that the proclamation should be published in substance, but that some of the more objectionable sentences should be amended.³

On the following day, June 28th, Talleyrand, without much

¹ Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. p. 81.

² Chateaubriand, *Mémoires*, VII. pp. 52-53.

³ Beugnot, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 274-276.

difficulty, obtained Louis' signature to what has since been known as the proclamation of Cambrai.¹ It was a document of some length framed on the general lines which he had proposed. The most important portion of it, however, was the part which announced the policy which was to be pursued towards the persons who had taken office, or who had been concerned in the Government of the Hundred Days. On this subject the King declared as follows : " I promise, I who have never promised in vain, to forgive those misguided Frenchmen all they have done since I left Lille, on March 23rd, in the midst of so many tears, until I returned to Cambrai, amidst so much rejoicing. But the blood of my subjects has been shed owing to a treason without parallel in the world's history. I must therefore except from my forgiveness the instigators and promoters of that horrible affair. The Chambers, which I propose to convene at once, shall hand over those persons to the vengeance of the laws." The area of proscription was thus sensibly narrowed, whilst to throw upon the Chambers the unpleasant duty of selecting the culprits who were to be brought to justice was a statesmanlike conception. It was to prove a misfortune for the Monarchy that it was to be found impossible to adhere to this wise decision.

On deciding to quit the army and to return to Paris to see what could be done, Napoleon had ordered Soult to direct the retreat on Laon and to establish, if possible, communications with Grouchy. On the morning of June 22nd, before he had signed his abdication, news was received from the Chief of the Staff and from Jerome Bonaparte. Grouchy was reported to have effected his retreat to Givet, and hopes were entertained that within a few hours 50,000 men would be collected at Laon.² Napoleon instructed Davout to communicate this pleasing intelligence to the Deputies, and Carnot was entrusted with a message of the same nature to the Peers. After announcing the Emperor's abdication to the members of the Upper Chamber, Carnot, accordingly, proceeded to read out the reports from Soult and the other officers which had been received during the morning. He had nearly concluded when he was suddenly cut short by a loud and angry exclamation of " That is not true ! " The interruption came from a powerfully built man of medium height, with short reddish whiskers and a prominent chin. The new speaker continued in a voice hoarse with passion : " You are being deceived. I was there, I commanded under the Emperor. Things went all right at first. Milhaud's charges

¹ Houssaye, 1815, pp. 145-147.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 52-53.

were splendid. But the fire of the English was awful. Then the Guard fell into confusion. I did all I could. Perhaps something might have been saved had not some battalions been held in reserve and had Grouchy come up. I don't blame Grouchy. As darkness set in it became a rout. I know what I am talking about. I have seen disasters. I commanded the rear-guard in Russia. We are just as scattered now as we were then. It is childish to talk of fifty thousand men; ten or fifteen would be nearer the mark. There is nothing for it but to come to terms with the enemy." Marshal Ney's outburst was listened to in dead silence. Carnot, after muttering a few words, gave up all idea of combating its effect and resumed his place. It is difficult to account for Ney's extraordinary behaviour.¹ Perhaps the only explanation of it lies in the fact that, on reaching Paris that morning, he had paid Fouché a visit and was already supplied with two passports, one made out in his own name and the other in that of "Theodore Neubourg, merchant."

Napoleon had abdicated, but in favour of his son. In both Chambers, however, this condition was treated as though it had never been made. A motion of Lucien Bonaparte to proclaim Napoleon II gave rise to another scene. In a speech delivered with undue violence, but which was not without ability, La Bédoyère sought to convince his brother Peers that to accept the Emperor's voluntary abdication and to ignore his stipulation on the subject of his son was unworthy of them and, moreover, rendered the Act null and void. His impassioned words made no impression on a cold and wholly unsympathetic audience. "It seems that only traitors are to be listened to in this place," roared La Bédoyère. "You are not in the Guard room," answered Lameth. "Young man, you forget yourself," said Massena. The closure and the adjournment of Lucien's motion was carried shortly afterwards by a large majority.²

Fouché was for all practical purposes the ruler of Paris. The commission, the Presidency of which he had succeeded in obtaining, became, as he had always intended that it should, the Provisional Government, despite some opposition on the part of Carnot.³ The night before (June 22nd) he had released Vitrolles⁴ from prison, and had sent him word by his wife that he wished to see him at seven the next morning. When in due

¹ Villemain, *Souvenirs*, II. pp. 309-311.

H. Welschinger, *Le Maréchal Ney*, 1815, p. 72.

² Villemain, *Souvenirs*, II. pp. 337-339.

Houssaye, 1815, III. pp. 75-78.

³ Madelin, *Fouché*, II. p. 405.

⁴ Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 40, 43-45.

course the Royalist agent appeared, Fouché told him to start at once for Ghent, where he was to tell the King that he was working in his interests, but he added : " We shall probably have to go through Napoleon II, then the Duc d'Orléans ; in the end, however, we shall come to him." Vitrolles demurred to this, but Fouché assured him that, for the present, it was out of the question to think of recalling Louis XVIII. Finally, it was decided that Vitrolles himself should remain in Paris and put himself into communication with the King by means of emissaries of his selection.¹

One of Fouché's first acts was to despatch a commission to meet the Allied Sovereigns on the eastern frontier, to treat for peace on the basis of the territorial integrity of France and the recognition of Napoleon II. He selected La Fayette, Pontécoulant, Sebastiani, d'Argenson, La Forest, and Benjamin Constant for the purpose. He knew very well that their mission must prove fruitless, but it suited him to send away from Paris six men who might interfere with his designs.² In the course of his secret dealings with the Ministers of the coalition he had realized that they looked upon the restoration of Louis XVIII as the best solution of the question of the future government of France. Personally, he had strong leanings in favour of the Duc d'Orléans.³ As a regicide, he must necessarily be in a safer position under a son of *Egalité* than under a brother of Louis XVI. But before this Talleyrand had warned him that he was on a wrong track. Legitimate Sovereignty had been the watchword of the Congress. It was very unlikely, therefore, that the Powers, which had taken part in it, would sanction a usurpation even in favour of so eminently a respectable person as the Duc d'Orléans. Nevertheless, it was a consummation which would have been very gratifying to the majority of the senior officers of the army and to the Liberal party generally. All men, moreover, who had accepted employment under Bonaparte, or who had any fears that their conduct, during the past three months might be called into question, would have been immensely relieved to see the Duke assume the crown. Fouché, accordingly, determined to sound Wellington on the subject.⁴

Napoleon was still at the Elysée, very indignant that his son had not been proclaimed Emperor. As Fouché had no desire to drive him or the military and Bonapartist party too hard, he decided that it would be advisable to appear to comply with

¹ Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, III. p. 50.

² Madelin, *Fouché*, II. p. 411.

³ Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, III. p. 50.

⁴ Villemain, *Souvenirs*, II. p. 449.

his wishes. He entrusted, as usual, the management of this delicate business to Manuel, whose skill on this occasion fully justified Fouché's high opinion of him.¹ At the sitting of June 23rd the Chamber passed a resolution, "that Napoleon II had become Emperor by reason of the abdication of Napoleon I, and in accordance with the Constitution, but that, for the present, the affairs of the nation were to be entrusted to the commission, nominated yesterday, which consisted of men in whom the country might have confidence."

After the carrying through of this empty form, which doubtless did not impose on the fallen Emperor, but saved his dignity, Fouché considered that the time had come when he should leave Paris. The shouting of the crowd which daily collected round the Elysée was a nuisance and might become a source of danger. He had tried the effect of distributing money in order to put an end to these demonstrations. The people, however, took what was offered them and continued to shout all the same.² On June 24th, accordingly, he inspired a motion in the Chamber that "Napoleon be invited to leave Paris, where his presence constitutes a public danger." Davout was instructed to communicate this resolution to him. Fouché, at the same time, caused the guard at the Elysée to be doubled, and sent him warning that his life had been threatened. Probably there were no serious grounds for alarm, but Fouché was aware that he had a great dread of assassination. He gained his point. On June 25th Napoleon left Paris quietly and proceeded to the Malmaison.³

The day before Fouché had sent to Wellington his trusted Gaillard, who was also the bearer of a letter from Vitrolles to Monsieur.⁴ He was to try to obtain the Duke's opinion on the question of the Duc d'Orléans. On this point Wellington was not encouraging. To all representations of this kind, whether made by secret agents or by official negotiators, he always returned the reply that he had no authority to speak on the subject, but, that so far as his opinion was worth anything, the enthronement of the Duc d'Orléans would not inspire the same confidence as would the recall of Louis XVIII. But apart this question, it was on Wellington's moderation and statesmanlike qualities that Fouché rightly based all his hopes of bringing hostilities to a close and of saving Paris.⁵ On June 27th he nominated and despatched a commission to his headquarters

¹ Houssaye, 1815, III. pp. 88-94.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 100-102.

³ Pasquier, III. p. 265.

⁴ Houssaye, 1815, III. pp. 171-172.

⁵ Pozzo à Nesselrode, 1 Juillet, 1815.

to ask for an armistice.¹ Whereas the Constants, the La Fayettees and their friends, who composed the deputation which he had sent to the eastern frontier, were persons whose names were odious to the Sovereigns and Ministers of the coalition, the members of this second commission were men of a different stamp. La Besnadière, for one, was an avowed Royalist, who had accompanied Talleyrand to Vienna.² But, in addition to these official negotiators, Fouché employed several secret agents. Besides Gaillard there was Marshall,³ an English subject, who resided in Paris and who appears to have been connected with the police, and his friend, Macirone, an Italian who called himself an Englishman and who had been in the service of Murat.⁴ He also made use of General Tromelin, fresh from Waterloo, a Breton Royalist, who had escaped from the Temple with Sir Sidney Smith, and to whom, at a later date, Napoleon had offered the choice of entering his army or of being shot.⁵ The communications which these different people carried were all very much of the same character. Appeals for a cessation of hostilities, anxiety to see Wellington's army approach as soon as possible, assurances that Napoleon II had only been proclaimed in order to satisfy the military party, and on July 3rd the confident assertion that, once the army was separated from the Chamber, that body would recall Louis XVIII without loss of time. It is not very clear what Fouché's real intentions were with regard to Napoleon, had the Allies demanded that he should be given up.⁶ There is, however, a letter from Marshall to the Duke, under the date of June 28th, in which he says very distinctly that the Duc d'Otrante would be prepared to hand him over.⁷ This was probably the last thing which Wellington wanted.⁸ On this same date the French Commissioners had asked for a passport to America for Napoleon, and he had told them that he had no authority to grant anything of the kind. But, "as a private friend," he had already advised Blücher,

¹ *Supplementary Despatches*, X., Duc d'Otrante à Wellington, 27 Juin, 1815.

² Pasquier, III. pp. 263, 279.

³ Mme. de Boigne, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 34-35, 124-127.

⁴ Houssaye, 1815, III. p. 185.

⁵ On the subject of his curious adventures see Lenotre, *Vieux Papiers, Vieilles Maisons*, 2me series. "John."

⁶ *Supplementary Despatches*, X., F. Marshall to Wellington, 28 June, 1815, 11 p.m.

F. Marshall to Wellington, 28 June, 1815, 11.30 p.m.

Macirone to Wellington, 3 July, 1815.

Duc d'Otrante à Wellington, 1 Juillet, 1815.

⁷ *Supplementary Despatches*, X., Marshall to Wellington, 28 June, 1815.

⁸ *Despatches*, XII. (edited by Gurwood), Wellington to Sir C. Stuart, 28 June, 1815.

who was anxious to shoot him, "to have nothing to do with so foul a transaction. So far as he was concerned, the Sovereigns, if they wished to put him to death, could appoint some other executioner."

In the meantime Fouché had found an unexpected ally in Marshal Davout. He had been unemployed during the first Restoration, and had little to expect, seemingly, from the Bourbons. Nevertheless, as he informed Fouché on the 26th, and as he wrote to him on the 27th, he placed his personal feelings on one side and opined strongly that the recall of Louis XVIII was the only course which could arrest the onward march of the enemy. This admission on the part of the Minister of War, that further resistance was hopeless, greatly strengthened Fouché's hand, but he had no intention of allowing matters to proceed too quickly. He told the Marshal, accordingly, that it was inadvisable to allow Louis to enter the capital before some understanding in regard to the future had been arranged.¹ In point of fact, on his own account Davout had already secretly sent Archambaud de Perigord, Talleyrand's brother, to Cambrai to treat with Louis XVIII on those lines.²

Pasquier,³ who was in daily relations with Vitrolles, Hyde de Neuville, and other Royalist agents, considers that Fouché, without danger, might have recalled Louis XVIII at this juncture. Be this as it may, matters suddenly became disagreeably complicated. The Chamber, in fond recollection, doubtless, of revolutionary days, decided to send to the army a deputation of its members girt with their tricolour scarves. Davout had temporarily resigned his duties as War Minister and had assumed the active command of the troops. When the Deputies arrived at his headquarters at La Villette he was engaged with Vitrolles. Either because he was ashamed to hide him, or because he thought the moment a favourable one for acquainting the representatives of the people with the policy which he had adopted, he introduced him to them as "the Baron de Vitrolles, a gentleman who may be able to facilitate our negotiations with the Allies." The mention of the notorious Royalist's name provoked a storm of indignation, under cover of which Vitrolles prudently made his escape. After his departure Davout soon succeeded in pacifying his visitors, and invited them to visit the

¹ Houssaye, 1815, III. pp. 180-182.

Supplementary Despatches, X., Marshal Davout to Fouché, 27 Juin, 1815.

Fouché à Marshal Davout, 27 Juin, 1815.

² Houssaye, 1815, III. p. 231.

³ Pasquier, III. pp. 254, 265, 266.

Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, III. p. 54.

encampments and bivouacs. The Deputies returned to Paris much impressed by the firm attitude of the troops, who had cheered "Napoleon II" and shouted "No Bourbons!"¹

The members of the deputation do not appear to have made any complaint of Davout, but to have depicted the enthusiasm of the army in glowing colours. Rumours, however, of Vitrolles' presence at headquarters were soon in circulation. Some of the generals began to talk of surrounding the Tuileries and of shooting Fouché in the courtyard. Though no violent measures of this description were attempted, an address, signed by sixteen general officers and Davout himself, was presented to the Chamber. It was a protest against any notion of recalling the Bourbons, "who had treated the army badly and who were odious to the majority of the people." The Chamber accepted it, and ordered twenty thousand copies to be printed and circulated. At the same time (July 1st), to affirm their resolution, they formally proclaimed Napoleon II.² The day after the scene at La Vilette (June 30th) Fouché, when he took the chair at the Commission of Government, was attacked by Carnot on the subject of Vitrolles. "It appears that you have been sending him to La Vilette to try to seduce the worthy Marshal Davout," said he.³ Fouché, however, took these reproaches very philosophically, and consented, without raising difficulties, to issue a warrant for the arrest of the Royalist agent.

Though on the surface matters looked very bad, and though the interference of the Chambers with military affairs was provoking, Fouché did not despair.⁴ Independent of him, a powerful influence had been brought to bear on the situation. On the morning of June 30th the thunder of the Prussian guns in the attack on Aubervilliers, only a mile from the city walls, shook every window in Paris. With the exception of an infinitesimally small number of persons, nobody wanted to fight.⁵

Ever since Waterloo and the Emperor's abdication the town had presented quite a gay appearance. The theatres were well attended, crowds of richly dressed women, says Villemain, were to be seen everywhere, and the frequenters of the Boulevards occupied their accustomed chairs. There was a general belief that Fouché had an understanding with the allied commanders. But the arrival of crowds of peasants, driving before

¹ Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 85-92.
Houssaye, 1815, III. pp. 236-242.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 249-253.
Pasquier, III. pp. 282-284.

³ Houssaye, 1815, III. pp. 247-248.

⁴ Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 94-95.

⁵ Houssaye, 1815, III. p. 247.

them their cattle or carrying their belongings, carts full of wounded men, and the roar of the guns rudely dispelled these illusions. Only on the *Bourse* were matters cheerful. On the 29th the news that the enemy had occupied Le Bourget sent the *rente* up to sixty-three; whilst, the next day, the capture of Aubervilliers caused a further rise of one franc. Sismondi, who deprecated the idea of capitulation, at Madame de Rumford's was silenced by the rejoinder "that it was easy to see that he had nothing but his writing-table to lose." The municipal council waited on Fouché to beg him not to defend the town, and pamphlets, entitled *What are we fighting for?* or *Let us have done with it*, and productions of the same kind were circulated freely.¹

By Napoleon's orders strong field works had been thrown up on the north side of Paris, but on the south the defences were very weak—in fact, they hardly existed. The Prussian attack on Aubervilliers, which was intended only as a reconnaissance, soon disclosed the strength of the position. Blücher, accordingly, broke off the action and made dispositions to cross the Seine in order to begin serious operations on the south bank. The French force, under Marshal Davout, composed chiefly of the remnants of the Waterloo army and Grouchy's detachment, which had been withdrawn skilfully, numbered about 70,000 men. In their advance from the Belgian frontier the Prussians had kept two days' march in front of the English. Blücher's manœuvre was, therefore, a hazardous operation, involving a flank march and a wide separation from his allies, between whom and himself the river Seine would intervene. It was, in short, an undertaking to which a prudent General would commit himself only if he were convinced of the total demoralization of the army opposed to him, and this was not a description which could be applied fairly to the troops under Davout.² In his unpublished memoirs, which M. Houssaye quotes, the Marshal states that he could have attacked the Prussians, with an almost certain prospect of success, whilst they were circling round Paris.³ He had abstained from doing so, because a victory, which would have added to his personal renown, would have had disastrous results for his country. Without admitting that the defeat of the Prussians, even under the unfavourable conditions in which they had placed themselves, was a foregone conclusion, it is evident that Davout, by not attacking them on June 30th or

¹ Villemain, *Souvenirs*, II. pp. 454–455.

Houssaye, 1815, III. pp. 255–258.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 259–266.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 251, 279.

on July 1st, missed a great chance. But it is, perhaps, one of the few occasions in history when a general acted rightly in foregoing an opportunity which his enemy's foolhardiness had given him.

It was impossible for the ex-Emperor to remain any longer at the Malmaison. Already, on June 28th, Blücher, who had intelligence of his presence, had despatched a cavalry regiment to secure him, and the attempt had only been frustrated by the timely destruction of the bridge at Chatou. Fouché, very probably, would have had little scruple about surrendering him had he thought that any advantage was to be gained by it. But to allow him to be carried off by the enemy's cavalry would have served no useful purpose and would have provoked great indignation, seeing that he was practically a prisoner in charge of General Beker, whom he had sent to the Malmaison to look after him. Rescinding, accordingly, his previous instructions, Fouché despatched orders that Napoleon was to start at once for Rochefort, where two frigates would be placed at his disposal. The sound of the cannonade had, however, revived the fallen Emperor's spirits.¹ He had begun to pore over his maps and to think deeply. On the morning of June 29th, when he was to depart for the coast, he suddenly put on his uniform and persuaded General Beker to carry a last message for him to Fouché. He wished to offer his services, simply as a general, to the Commission of Government, and he undertook to embark for the United States directly he had defeated the enemy. The appearance of Beker at the Tuileries with this communication completely upset Fouché's habitual self-control. Angrily asking the general how he could have undertaken such a mission, he bade him return to the Malmaison and tell Napoleon that his proposal could not be entertained and that he must start forthwith. On hearing this answer, which Beker brought him back in all haste, the ex-Emperor made no protest. He took off his uniform, parted from his brother Joseph and from Hortense, and, accompanied by Bertrand, Savary de Rovigo, and Beker, drove away.² A fortnight later, on July 15th, Captain Maitland received him on the quarter-deck of H.M.S. *Bellerophon*.

To all Davout's and Fouché's demands for an armistice both Blücher and Wellington had returned refusals. The movement of the Prussians across the Seine compelled the Marshal to con-

¹ Houssaye, 1815, III. pp. 216-220.

Supplementary Despatches, X., Duc d'Otrante to Davout, 27 Juin 1815.

Beker à Duc d'Otrante, 29 Juin, 1815.

² Houssaye, 1815, III. pp. 222-230.

form to it and to transfer the bulk of his troops from the north to the south side of Paris. The march of the army through the streets and the imminence of battle increased the general alarm. Fouché felt that it was time to intervene.¹ In order to lessen his responsibility, however, he invited the *bureaux* of both Chambers and several Marshals and Generals present in Paris to attend the sitting of his commission of July 1st. He opened the conference by explaining the military situation. Carnot had that morning ridden round the positions on the left bank of the river, and the opinion which he now expressed as to the prospects of defending them successfully was not encouraging. He pointed out, moreover, that within a few days the Austrians and Russians would have come up, and that, in the end inevitably, they would be driven to capitulate under, doubtless, worse conditions than they could obtain at present. Soult and Massena, when asked to give their views, made it very clear that they had nothing to suggest, and that they looked upon the situation as hopeless. Marshal Lefebvre alone appears to have been in favour of continuing the struggle. But, someone having mentioned the Bourbons, the discussion threatened to become political. Fouché, accordingly, brought the proceedings to a close on the understanding that the question, being a military one, should be referred to a council of war, which was to be convened at once.

Davout had declined to attend the meeting on the plea that he could not spare the time. He saw that a capitulation was inevitable, and he had no idea of allowing Fouché to saddle him with the responsibility of declaring that the moment had come for initiating the negotiations.² To the council of war, which he was now instructed to assemble, he summoned eighteen Marshals and Generals. Ney, alone of all the officers of high rank in Paris, was not invited to attend. His speech in the Chamber of Peers had brought him into disrepute with the majority of his comrades. Fouché, knowing that Davout himself was not in favour of resistance, had little doubts as to the result of their deliberations. In order, however, to leave as little to chance as possible, he transmitted a list of questions, which were to be answered by the assembled generals. Among other points, he wished to be informed whether all the approaches to Paris could be defended successfully if attacked at the same time, and whether, should the outer works be carried, the Prince d'Eckmühl (Davout) could prevent the enemy from forcing his way into the town. However anxious the offi-

¹ Houssaye, 1815, III. pp. 269-273.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 268, 276-282.

cers might have been to prolong the defence, it was impossible for them to return other than very dubious replies to questions of this kind. After sitting from midnight till three in the morning of July 2nd, the council of war, presided over by Davout, submitted answers of a sufficiently doubtful nature to justify Fouché in opening negotiations for surrender.

In the course of June 29th and 30th Wellington had interviews with the French Commissioners. On both these occasions he expressed the opinion that the only hope of a durable peace for Europe lay in the recall of Louis XVIII.¹ On July 1st they informed him that Bonaparte had left Paris in order to take ship for the United States. This piece of news, he told them, removed the great obstacle to an armistice. If they would consent to the evacuation of Paris by the regular army, and to the town being held by the National Guards "until the King should order otherwise," he would do his utmost to prevail upon Blücher to consent to a suspension of hostilities. Müffling shortly afterwards was instructed to write to the Prussian Commander-in-Chief on the subject. In the evening of the next day, nevertheless, he was obliged to inform the French delegates that Marshal Blücher was very reluctant to grant an armistice, but he promised to communicate with him personally, and hoped to be able to give them a more favourable reply on the morrow.² Wellington was only desirous of obtaining for his country the objects for which the war had been undertaken. These were the overthrow of Bonaparte and the establishment in France of some form of government which should offer reasonable assurances for the preservation of peace in the future. The first had been attained—a victory under the walls of Paris and the occupation of the town would not assist, nay, might even prove detrimental to the consummation of the second. From motives of the most ordinary humanity, moreover, he was unwilling to force his way into the town at the point of the bayonet, or to fight a battle for the vain glory of riding in at the head of his victorious troops. There was another aspect to the question besides. He had reconnoitred the French works on the north side of the city and had noted their strength. It is true that the Prussians were now firmly established on the left bank of the river, where the defences were weak. But in order to join hands with them he must cross the Seine twice and pass through the Bois de Boulogne. It was a serious operation, and he did not feel justified in embarking upon it under the circumstances. Were the Allies to suffer a reverse the moral effect of Waterloo

¹ *Despatches*, XII., Wellington to Bathurst, 2 July, 1815.

² *Ibid.*, Wellington to Commissioners, 2 July, 1815.

would be lost, and it was impossible to say what might happen. Bastly, a delay of a few days would enable Marshal Wrede and his forty thousand Russians to come up.¹ These were some of the points which he set out in a memorandum addressed to Prince Blücher on the evening of July 2nd.

To the fierce old Prussian elder branch or younger branch, white cockade or tricolour were matters of supreme indifference. He had no thoughts beyond entering Paris, where he proposed to put into execution certain schemes which he had been nursing fondly for some time past. When Wellington's despatch arrived he was in bed, but its perusal afforded Gneisenau food for serious reflection. He answered that the Duke's proposals would require mature consideration, and he promised to lay them before the Field Marshal early the next morning.² Notwithstanding his impatience, Blücher had not ventured on carrying out his projected attack on July 2nd. But Wellington's army having closed up on the north side of Paris during the day, and communication with him having been secured by means of a pontoon bridge at Argenteuil, he was ready for the final struggle. Before dawn on the 3rd the fighting began. The occupation of Issy by the Prussians the day before threatened Vandamme's right, and he now sent forward a division to retake it. In the meantime Davout appeared to be making his dispositions for a great battle. But about half-past seven, when the action was becoming general, the fire slackened and soon ceased altogether. Guilleminot, the Chief of the Staff, Bignon, the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Bondy, the Prefect of the Seine, had been passed into the Prussian lines to treat for the surrender of Paris. On those conditions Blücher had consented to suspend hostilities.³

All through July 2nd Fouché had exhausted his ingenuity and done all in his power to obtain an armistice which did not involve the occupation of the capital. Besides the official Commissioners, he had despatched Macirone to Wellington and Tromelin to Blücher. It was only at midnight that in despair he had decided to send Bignon and Bondy to Davout with instructions to acquiesce in the last resort, to the entry of the Allies into Paris.⁴ The negotiations took place at the Château de Saint-Cloud. The terms agreed upon provided for the evacuation of the town by the French regular army, which was to

¹ *Despatches*, XII., Wellington to Blücher, 2 July, 1815.

² *Supplementary Despatches*, X., Gneisenau to Wellington, 2 July, 1815. Houssaye, 1815, III. p. 288.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 293-295.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 284-285, 292.

retire behind the Loire, and for the occupation of Paris by the English and Prussians. In addition to these points, only one of the eighteen articles, which the treaty contained, calls for mention. This was clause XII, which ran as follows: "The inhabitants and, in general, all individuals who may be in the capital, shall enjoy full liberty and shall not be molested or proceeded against on account of any offices they may hold, or may have held, nor on account of their conduct or political opinions."¹ It was afterwards claimed by some of the persons against whom the Government of Louis XVIII instituted proceedings, that they were covered by this article. But it must be apparent that the conditions which it set forth could only be binding on the parties who subscribed to it. It may be true that the clause in question was a snare, intended to make the capitulation more palatable and to pave the way for a monarchical restoration. If this be so it was a trap, in the setting of which neither Wellington nor Blücher had a hand. The article, which has been the subject of so much discussion, was proposed by the French Commissioners, who had the strictest injunctions from Fouché to press for its insertion in the treaty.²

The capitulation was brought to Fouché at the Tuileries about nine in the evening. He at once sent on a copy of it to the Chambers, having first, however, changed its designation of "capitulation" into that of "convention." Whilst they had been waiting for this document, Fouché and his fellow members of the Commission of Government had not been idle. They had at their disposal a sum of 140,000 francs for their expenses during the month of July, and they now decided to assign it to themselves as a gratuity. In the Chambers the news that the capitulation was an accomplished fact was received very calmly. Those members, who had given the subject their consideration, had been disposed to expect harder terms. The patriotic outburst evoked by the visit to the army at La Villette had not lasted long. The Deputies soon returned to their more congenial occupation of discussing the rights of man, of decreeing the abolition of titles of nobility and of framing stillborn constitutions.

It was a grievous disappointment to Fouché that he had not yet received any promise of employment from Louis XVIII. On July 3rd Macirone had conveyed to Wellington his wish to meet him personally, and, on the following day, General de Tromelin had carried a letter for him to the headquarters of the English army in which he expressed his longing "to pour out his soul" into the

¹ *Despatches*, XII., Convention of Paris.

² Houssaye, 1815, III. pp. 297-299, 300-302.

Duke's sympathetic ears. Wellington, in consequence, had invited him to meet him at Neuilly. It was out of the question for him to keep such a step a secret, and he was a little uneasy as to the light in which Carnot and his colleagues would regard the proceeding.¹ He overcame the difficulty, however, by taking Molé, General Valence, and Manuel with him, and by calling his visit a "mission." At Wellington's headquarters, on the afternoon of July 5th, Fouché met Talleyrand, Von Goltz, Sir C. Stuart, and Pozzo di Borgo. Much to the disappointment of these gentlemen, he made them a very unsatisfactory report of the state of public feeling. The Chambers and the mass of the people were, he said, bitterly hostile to the Bourbons. The conversation was prolonged till four in the morning, when Fouché went back to Paris. It had been arranged, however, that he was to return to dinner.²

In the meantime Louis XVIII was close at hand, having arrived, on July 5th, at Arnouville. Directly the cessation of hostilities had made communications possible, numerous Royalists had gone out to pay their respects to him. To avoid any unpleasantness, however, they were careful to assume their white cockades, only, when they were outside the city gates. All these people had the same story to tell. Nothing could have exceeded Fouché's skill in the management of public affairs since Waterloo. In the general chorus of approval the voices of Monsieur's friends were the loudest.³ "It was a universal madness," says Chateaubriand⁴ who was very hostile to him. "Religion and infidelity, virtue and vice, the Royalist and the revolutionist, the foreigner and the Frenchmen"—all were convinced that without Fouché "there was neither safety for the King nor hope for France." At Cambrai, already, Talleyrand had hinted to Louis that perhaps the inclusion of Fouché in the Ministry might be a judicious move, but he had exclaimed indignantly, "Never!"⁵ After the all-night sitting at Neuilly, when Talleyrand arrived at Arnouville he found Vitrolles, who was secretly indignant at not having been invited to join the party at the Duke's headquarters, awaiting him. "Well," said Talleyrand as his servant was assisting him to undress, "your

¹ *Supplementary Despatches*, X., Macirone to Wellington, 3 July, 1815. Otrante à Wellington, 4 Juillet, 1815.

Madelin, *Fouché*, II. p. 432.

² *Despatches*, XII., Wellington to Bathurst, 8 July, 1815.

³ Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, III. p. 105.

⁴ Chateaubriand, *Mémoires*, VII. pp. 65, 66.

Villemain, *Souvenirs*, II. p. 481.

Beugnot, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 286, 287.

⁵ Chateaubriand, *Mémoires*, VII. pp. 54, 55.

Duc d'Otrante has told us nothing, nothing at all." "He is much more your duke than mine," answered Vitrolles, "and there are generally ways of making people agree to what one wants. I think I could have managed it."¹

In the course of the morning Wellington rode over to Arnouville, and the King was seriously approached on the subject of Fouché. "The sword of Waterloo thrown into the scale" overcame Louis' resistance.² In the evening, when Talleyrand and Wellington had departed to meet Fouché for the second time, he beckoned to Vitrolles and whispered to him. "I have told him to do whatever he may think best in my interests, but he must be tender with me, *c'est mon pucelage*." Vitrolles says that he was shocked, and that he never smiled.³ The remark, indeed, is quite in Louis' style, and certainly does not convey the impression that the man who made it was overcome with grief and mortification at the idea of admitting into his counsels one who had voted for his brother's death. It may be that Beugnot, in speaking of his emotion when he lay before him Fouché's appointment as Minister, was thinking of his own, rather than of Louis' state of mind, on that occasion.⁴

Fouché, on his return to Paris empty-handed, is strongly suspected of having deliberately organized anti-Royalist demonstrations. The evacuation of the capital by the army under the terms of the capitulation was in course of progress. Some anxiety had been entertained as to whether this could be effected without disturbance. At first matters looked rather serious, but Carnot and Drouot succeeded in quieting the men. A loan of two million francs, which Fouché persuaded Laffitte, the banker, to advance, enabling the arrears due to them to be paid to the soldiers, contributed largely to their peaceable departure.⁵ In the afternoon of July 6th, Fouché drove out again to Neuilly.⁶ On the subject of the retention of the tricolour, to which he

¹ Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 113, 119.

² Bourrienne, *Mémoires*, X. p. 400.

Madelin, *Fouché*, II. pp. 435-439.

Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. pp. 97-98.

Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 109-110.

Pasquier, III. pp. 330-331.

³ Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, III. p. 114.

⁴ Beugnot, *Mémoires*, II. p. 290.

⁵ Villemain, *Souvenirs*, II. pp. 468-469.

Houssaye, 1815, III. pp. 304-310.

Pasquier, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 317-318.

Bourrienne, *Mémoires*, X. p. 408.

⁶ Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, III. p. 109.

Despatches, XII., Wellington to Bathurst, 8 July, 1815.

Madelin, *Fouché*, II. pp. 440-441.

Correspondance, Pozzo à Nesselrode, 8 Juillet, 1815.

affected to attach great weight, Wellington, who appears to have discussed the matter with Vitrolles, gave him his views. Had the King, the year before, consented to its preservation, he would have approved of the decision, but, now that it had become the emblem of rebellion, it was out of the question for His Majesty to think of retaining it. Soon afterwards Pozzo di Borgo, Sir C. Stuart, and Talleyrand arrived, and they sat down to dinner. Later on Castlereagh appeared and joined in the discussion. But Talleyrand, seeing that no progress was being made, suddenly announced that he was empowered to offer the portfolio of police to the Duc d'Otrante. The situation changed at once. Hostility of the Chambers, reports of the Commissioners sent to the eastern frontier which had created difficulties, everything was brushed aside. Fouché saw his way to Louis' entering Paris within the next forty-eight hours.

Matters having been arranged satisfactorily, Fouché took his seat in Talleyrand's carriage and was driven off to Saint-Denis, whither Louis had moved, in order to be presented to him. Chateaubriand, to his disgust, saw them enter the King's anti-chamber together; "vice leaning on the arm of crime," as he described it.¹ Louis received his new Minister well, and listened to his counsels of moderation. He remained firm, however, both on the question of the flag and with regard to the general amnesty which he proposed. From Saint-Denis Fouché returned to Paris, where there was still much to be settled. Nevertheless, he was not so absorbed in business that he had no time for lighter matters. A Deputy who called upon him, the next day, found him sitting in his Court dress and orders for the portrait which he intended to present to his young *fiancée*, Mlle. Gabrielle de Castellane.²

When the members of the Commission of Government assembled at the Tuileries for their sitting of July 7th, their president announced to them the result of his conferences at Wellington's headquarters on the two previous days. The Allies, he told them, were determined to restore Louis XVIII, their troops were in possession of the gates, they were to occupy the town during the day, and the King himself would make his entry on the morrow. Under these circumstances all they could do was to pronounce their own dissolution and send a message to that effect to the Chambers. He omitted, however, to inform his colleagues that he was himself a Minister of the Most Christian King. Carnot, Grenier, and Quinette objected strongly, and moved that they should follow the army behind the

¹ Chateaubriand, *Mémoires*, VII. p. 65.

² Houssaye, 1815, III. p. 321.

Boire, and that the Chambers should be convened at either Tours or Blois. Such a step, on their part, said Fouché, must lead to civil war. But whilst they were arguing a sound of drums was heard and, presently, a Prussian detachment with two guns entered the courtyard. The interruption came most opportunely.¹ Fouché sat down and drew up a message to the Chambers, in which he acquainted them with the unanimous intention of the Powers to restore Louis XVIII, and with the occupation of the Tuileries by foreign troops. "We can, therefore, only give the country our best wishes, and, as our deliberations are no longer free, we have decided not to meet again."

In ascribing to the Powers the intention of replacing Louis XVIII upon his throne at all costs, Fouché was attempting to lessen his responsibility at the expense of the truth. Wellington had always declared that the recall of their rightful King was the wisest course which the French people could adopt. He had made it clear, also, that it would be viewed favourably in the counsels of the coalition, whilst any other solution would be regarded as a usurpation, against the dangers of which the Powers would be obliged to protect themselves by exacting harder terms of peace. But he had never said more than that. Moreover, by exaggerating the part played by the Allies in Louis' Restoration, Fouché was acting most unfairly towards the Government of which he was now a member. Indeed, his conduct was already inspiring grave misgivings in the minds of those who had espoused his cause so warmly with Louis XVIII. Wellington, however, comforted himself with the recollection "that at all periods of the Revolution the actors in it have not scrupled to resort to falsehood, either to give a colour to, or to palliate their adoption or abandonment of any line of policy."²

Fouché's message failed to create any great excitement in the Chamber.³ The Deputies were too much engrossed with drawing up declarations of doctrine and amendments to the Constitution to be much disturbed by outside events. Manuel said philosophically that "he was not surprised at what had come to pass, and that the Commission of Government had been powerless to prevent it." The day before, on the news that the invaders' troops had occupied the suburbs, M. Dupont, the member for the department of the Eure, had moved that a deputation should be sent to acquaint the Allied Sovereigns with the work they were engaged upon, on hearing of which "they will listen to our words

¹ Houssaye, 1815, III. pp. 325-328.

Pasquier, III. pp. 325, 332-335.

² *Despatches*, XII., Wellington to Bathurst, 8 July, 1815.

³ Houssaye, 1815, III. pp. 328-329.

with a noble interest." But he was mistaken.¹ Wellington, already, had suggested to Fouché that the Chambers, and other political bodies illegally constituted during the usurpation, should pronounce their own dissolution and submit a respectful message to the King.² The next morning, accordingly, when the Deputies, intent on resuming their absorbing discussions, presented themselves at the Palais Bourbon, they found the building in possession of a picquet of the National Guard, commanded by the Vicomte de Boisgelin, who roughly ordered them to disperse. Announcing that they should protest, they filed away to the house of their president, Eanjuinais, where they drew up a report of what had taken place, and so passed out of existence.³ "Moderate, enlightened and truly national, developing, in circumstances of difficulty, qualities both of the head and the heart," is Mr. Hobhouse's description of them. Probably most people will be disposed to agree with M. Houssaye that "this miserable Chamber deserved no other end."⁴

On this same morning, July 8th, the *Moniteur* did not make its appearance till about eleven o'clock. It was printed in unusually large type, and was surmounted by the Royal arms. The dissolution of the Chambers was made known, and the entry of His Majesty into his capital was announced for the afternoon. At the same time the tricolour was everywhere pulled down, and the Bourbon flag was run up over all public buildings and monuments. The Royalists, thereupon, produced their white cockades, and two-thirds of the National Guards on duty in the streets followed their example. This course of action was not confined to the avowed supporters of the Monarchy. Many other persons who had sworn undying devotion to the three colours, now that they were confronted with the accomplished fact, spontaneously assumed the badge of Royalty.⁵

Louis XVIII made his entry into Paris by the Saint-Denis gate, and proceeded along the Boulevards to the Tuileries.⁶ The procession was preceded by an enthusiastic and rather disorderly crowd of National Guards, whose loyalty had impelled them to take part in the ceremony. There were no regular troops, but the citizen soldiers were followed by a motley array of mousquetaires, cheveau-legers, and other remnants of the *Maison du Roi*, some on horseback, some on foot. Behind them

¹ Villemain, *Souvenirs*, II. pp. 470-480.

² *Despatches*, XII., Wellington to Bathurst, 8 July, 1815.

³ Houssaye, 1815, II. p. 331.

J. C. Hobhouse, *Letters*, II. p. 285.

⁴ Houssaye, 1815, III. p. 332.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 332, 333.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 334-337.

rode the loyal Marshals, Oudinot, Macdonald, Gouvion-Saint-Cyr, Marmont, Victor, and the Generals who had accompanied Louis to Ghent. The King himself was seated in a large coach, drawn by six white horses, with the Comte d'Artois and the Duc de Berri riding by his side. An interminable file of cabs, country carts, and vehicles of all kinds, filled with English officers and sightseers, brought up the rear of the procession. Only when the wealthy quarter of the town had been reached did any cheering herald the King's approach. In the courtyard of the Tuileries a Prussian detachment was encamped. As Louis drove in, no guard turned out nor were compliments paid him, and he could see the soldiers busily engaged in hanging out their washing on the gilded railings of his Palace.

Thus ended Bonaparte's usurpation in 1815. Its opening scenes supply history with one of its most picturesque pages, the conclusion of the story is rich only in sordid details. Under conditions, as they existed, his adventure was foredoomed to failure. The acclamations of the peasantry on his march to Paris, the frenzied delight of the soldiers, as they tore off their white cockades and flocked to the colours of the Emperor, were not representative of a great national movement.¹ "It was the surge of the lake through which the boat cuts its way, a little foam thrown up at the moment and then still waters again." The political intelligence of the French people was undeveloped. Louis XVIII had not won their affections. The mistakes of his Government and the folly of the Royalists had prepared men's minds for one of those violent changes of which they had seen several examples during the previous twenty-five years. Bonaparte appeared with a dramatic suddenness, the soldiers cast in their lot with his and imposed him on their countrymen.

But the right of France to consent to pass under the rule of Bonaparte was challenged by all Europe in arms. It was realized in the counsels of the Powers that there could be no security whilst he was at the head of affairs in Paris. Even should he be disposed to remain at peace with his neighbours, in course of time he would be compelled inevitably to find occupation for the army to which he owed his throne. The younger generals, the men of the stamp of La Bédoyère, would expect to be granted, in their turn, opportunities of winning the wealth and the dukedoms which their seniors had acquired on foreign battlefields. At Vienna it was resolved to give him no breathing time, and to attack him at once. The weakness of his position was now disclosed. The professional soldiers were at

¹ Villemain, *Souvenirs*, II. pp. 114-117. Conversation with M. de Fontanes.

his disposal, but the people did not come forward to his support. A regular army which has not the nation behind it is an insufficient defence in a crisis.¹ Desmarest relates that the collapse of Prussia after Jena had impressed this truth upon Napoleon. On returning from Germany, in 1808, he made a stay at Metz. There had been complaints of the insolence of the cadets at the military school to the civilians of the town. He called the authorities before him and bade them put a stop to this state of affairs. "The Prussian army," he told them, "was unpopular because of its insolence. Once it was defeated, it disappeared, and there was nothing to take its place. The army will only be strong so long as it is national." In 1815 the French army was not unpopular; it had, indeed, the warmest sympathies of the people, but it had not their personal support.

In 1792 the idea that the Sovereigns were contemplating an interference in the internal affairs of France had sent a thrill of indignation through the country, which had called forth volunteers in thousands and had made the people submit to compulsory service. In 1815 the situation appeared to be the same, yet it evoked a very different response. This fact is perhaps the best proof that the analogy existed only on the surface. But the national enthusiasm which Bonaparte was powerless to kindle among his people, burnt fiercely in the ranks of the principal contingents which he went out to meet in battle. Under the influence of his oppression the Prussian army was animated by a patriotic spirit which had been unknown at Jena. The English regiments were made up largely of young soldiers and militia men, but all ranks were united in the conviction that "Boney" was the national enemy. The French troops were eager for the struggle, and displayed a furious courage on the battlefield. They could not, however, escape from the unfavourable conditions under which they were called upon to fight. Many of the senior officers knew that they had no mercy to expect from the Bourbons. The knowledge that the halter was round their necks appears to have detracted greatly from their military value. Nearly all of those who were not so deeply implicated were doubtful of success and were heartily sick of war. The political rôle, moreover, which the army had played in recent events had relaxed the bonds of discipline. The men knew that, on the morning on which they had crossed the frontier into Belgium, General de Bourmont had gone over to the enemy with the whole of his divisional Staff.² On the afternoon of Waterloo a French officer had galloped into the ranks of the

¹ P. M. Desmarest, *Quinze ans de haute police*, pp. 198-200.

² Houssaye, *Waterloo*, pp. 110-113.

52nd regiment of the English Line shouting "*Vive le Roi*" and crying out that the guard was advancing.¹ Under such conditions the exclamation "We are betrayed!" rose readily to the soldiers' lips and their defeat became a rout.

It has been said, often, that the Napoleon of the Hundred Days was an inferior man, both physically and mentally, to the soldier of Italy and to the victor of Austerlitz. The evidence which is adduced to support this theory is most unconvincing. In any case it cannot be disputed that he performed an unprecedented amount of work during those three months, whilst the skill with which he first planned and then concealed his concentration from his enemies, has won the admiration of all students of such matters. It is unnecessary to say more of his strategy than that he began the campaign outnumbered in the proportion of nearly two to one, and that for the decisive battle he deployed a force slightly superior to the army opposed to him. This preponderance, it is true, depended on the ability of Grouchy with 33,000 men to contain the Prussians who had been defeated at Ligny. But Napoleon, after his return from Elba, was dealing with changed conditions. The men by whom he was served were inspired by a very different spirit to the one which had animated them in his earlier days. In those times, moreover, he had gone out to meet the kings; in 1814 and 1815 he had to encounter the nations.

From the Belgian frontier the Allies marched to Paris without meeting with any resistance worthy of the name. The collapse of France after Waterloo was as complete as that of Prussia after Jena. In the first case it was Bonapartism, in the second it was the army of Frederick William which had been routed. On neither occasion was it a truly national force which had suffered defeat. But a country which allows an unhealthy militarism to develop is passing through an unfortunate phase in its existence. Frequent and violent changes of Government have produced a demoralizing effect wherever they have taken place.

Oaths lightly broken, an utter lack of principle on the part of public men of all descriptions: these were the features of the time. Benjamin Constant avowed himself the bitterest opponent of Bonaparte, yet within a month he had accepted a salary from him and a seat at his Council of State. Ney betrayed the King and went over to Bonaparte. Nevertheless after Waterloo, by depicting the state of the army in the blackest colours, he strove to paralyse Carnot's efforts to revive the national spirit. Davout entered into secret communications with the Royalists, but he signed an address to the Chambers which declared that "the

¹ Houssaye, *Waterloo*, p. 391.

Bourbons were odious to the majority of Frenchmen." The doings of Fouché require no comment. The Deputies, at a great crisis in the existence of their country, busied themselves solely with the discussion of abstract questions and with the formulating of empty doctrines.

Under these conditions Louis XVIII remounted his throne. The Powers replaced him there because "Legitimate Sovereignty" was the watchword of their policy, and because his enthronement offered the best guarantee for the preservation of peace in the future. The circumstances, under which his second Restoration was effected, were more humiliating than those which had attended his first recall to France. Most of the difficulties which had beset him in 1814 confronted him still, whilst others had supervened in addition. But the life had been trampled out of militant Bonapartism for the time being.

CHAPTER V

THE BOURBON TERROR

A SINGULARLY disagreeable piece of news awaited Louis. Blücher had entered Paris with the firm resolve of blowing up the Pont d'Iena and of exacting a large monetary indemnity from the town. It was owing to a pure accident that the bridge, of which the name recalled unpleasant recollections to the Prussians, had not been destroyed on the day of His Majesty's entry. The mine had been duly laid, but, for some reason or another, it had not exploded. Talleyrand, as soon as he heard of it, handed in a strong protest to Von Goltz, the Prussian Minister. Blücher, however, was obdurate. Not only did he swear that the bridge should be blown up, but, he added that he hoped that M. de Talleyrand might be standing upon it at the time. This was, exactly, what the King, in a letter which he wrote and gave to Talleyrand, threatened to do himself if Blücher persisted in his intention.¹ But Louis was not called upon to carry out his heroic words. It proved unnecessary for him to be wheeled, in his arm-chair, upon the devoted bridge. A second attempt to destroy it was, indeed, made the next day. But it resulted only in some small damage being done to one of the piles and in the drowning of a Prussian soldier. An appeal had, in the meantime, been made to the Duke of Wellington. He had great influence over the savage old Prussian, and his intervention was successful. Blücher consented to let the matter remain in abeyance until the arrival of the Allied Sovereigns. In the end, the bridge was allowed to stand, on condition of losing its objectionable name. It was re-christened Pont des Invalides.

¹ *Despatches*, XII., Wellington to Blücher, 9 July, 1815 (midnight).

Ibid., 9 July, 1815.

Ibid., 10 July, 1815.

Supplementary Despatches, XI., Blücher to Wellington, 9 Juillet, 1815.

Pasquier, III. p. 341.

Houssaye, 1815, III. pp. 337-341.

Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 124-126.

Pozzo à Nesselrode, 9 Juillet, 1815.

Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. p. 101.

It was Wellington, again, and Castlereagh who induced Blücher to forego his intention of exacting an indemnity of one hundred million francs from the town of Paris. Both refused to associate themselves in any way with such a step, and, what was probably more effectual, pointed out that, if the contribution were levied, it would have to be divided, in equal shares, among the Allies. To mark his displeasure, Blücher remained at Saint-Cloud, and refused to move his headquarters into the town.¹ In his private capacity, however, he was a constant visitor to Paris,² where he became a well-known figure at Very's Restaurant and at the gambling tables of the Palais Royal.

The Talleyrand Ministry, which came into existence with the second Restoration, was essentially a Cabinet of moderate men. The *émigré* party was quite unrepresented in it. On the other hand, every member of the new Government had, in some capacity or another, served under the Empire. The most important appointments were distributed as follows. Talleyrand was President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Fouché was Minister of Police, Pasquier had the Home Office, and Marshal Gouvion-Saint-Cyr the War Office. Vitrolles was Secretary to the Council, and was allowed to be present at all Cabinet meetings. No time had been lost in calling together the Chambers.³ By a Royal Ordinance of July 13th the electoral colleges were convened for August 14th. As regards these elections certain modifications in the Charter were decreed. In order to give the country a fuller representation, the number of Deputies to be returned was raised from 258 to 402. The *minimum* age of the electors was at the same time reduced from 30 to 21, and that of the Parliamentary candidates themselves from 40 to 25 years. These changes were, however, to be considered as purely tentative in character. As soon as the Chambers met a bill was to be introduced to deal with and reform, if necessary, the electoral laws.⁴ The events which now took place have been made a constant subject of reproach against Louis XVIII and his Government. But, in order to judge these matters fairly, the state of France must be realized. The main French army, which under Davout had withdrawn behind the Eoire, had not yet accepted the Monarchy. It was necessary to obtain its sub-

¹ *Despatches*, XII., Wellington to Müffling, 8 Juillet, 1815.

Supplementary Despatches, XI., Müffling to Wellington, 8 Juillet, 1815.

² Ange de Lassus, *La Vie au Palais Royal*, pp. 120-121.

Houssaye, 1815, III. p. 342.

Supplementary Despatches, XI., Hardinge to Lord Stewart, 26 July, 1815.

³ Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 131-132.

⁴ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, III. pp. 470-474.

mission. It assumed the white cockade and the white flag with less difficulty than might have been expected owing to Davout's personal influence, and to Gouvion-Saint-Cyr's firmness. The example of the Army of the Loire was soon followed by the different detachments scattered about the country. But, in the meantime Louis' Restoration had not stemmed the tide of invasion. Austrians, Russians, Bavarians, continued their onward march. Though in most districts local armistices were concluded and hostilities generally ceased, this was not invariably the case.¹ The acknowledgment of the Bourbons by the garrisons of the fortified towns of the North and East by no means implied their immunity from attack. The accumulation of stores and war material of all kinds in their magazines was a prize which some of the Allies were unwilling to let slip. Fighting, in connection with some of these second-class fortresses, went on till September. The protracted resistance of Longwy and of Huningue, in particular, added a glorious page to the annals of French history.² If, however, with these exceptions, active warfare had, by the third week in July, practically come to an end, the burden of war was still terribly oppressive. Lord Castlereagh computed that there were, at this time, over a million foreign soldiers living on the country, the daily cost of their maintenance exceeding one million and a half francs. In addition to this, Paris had been called upon to pay an indemnity of eight million francs, and large contributions had been exacted from other towns. Such a state of affairs was in a great measure inevitable; it was certainly no more than France deserved. It was not, however, the sum total of the woes which the country had to endure.³ The Duke of Wellington always preserved a strict discipline and punished all excesses with a merciless severity. A very different view of their duties was taken by the commanders of the armies of other nations. The Prussians, with lively recollections of what they had suffered under French occupation, pillaged and robbed systematically. If the Austrians and Russians displayed some degree of moderation, the conduct of the contingents from the smaller states, like Belgium and Wurtemberg, was uniformly odious. It was not till Wellington had forcibly pointed out the danger of driving France to despair that the Allied Sovereigns

¹ Pasquier, III. pp. 351-352.

Houssaye, 1815, III. pp. 409-417.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, III. pp. 455-458.

² Houssaye, 1815, III. pp. 498-504.

Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, III. p. 135.

³ *Supplementary Despatches*, XI., Castlereagh to Liverpool, précis of most secret and confidential despatches, 24 July, 1815.

imposed any check on the behaviour of their troops,¹ or put a curb on the rapacious exactions of their generals.

Whilst his kingdom was thus held in the iron grasp of an overwhelming military occupation, Louis was helpless to resist the demands of the Powers. The disbanding of the French army, and the exemplary punishment of the chief individuals concerned in the recent revolution, were two measures which the potentates and statesmen of the coalition considered to be indispensable. The dissolution of Napoleon's old army had, indeed, become inevitable. Its traditions made it wholly incompatible with the safety of the Bourbon throne. The lawless and ambitious designs which animated some of its chief officers were justly considered to be a perpetual menace to the peace of Europe. It was on July 16th that Louis signed the ordinance which deprived him of an army and decreed the formation of a new one. The matter was, however, kept secret till certain precautions had been taken.² The painful duty of carrying it out then devolved on Marshal Macdonald. Davout had, in the meantime, tendered his resignation. It was three months before the disbandment was fully completed. But the affair was well managed and passed off with little disturbance.³

By the Proclamation of Cambrai, the King had announced that the Chamber would be called upon to select those persons who had deserved punishment for acts committed prior to March 23rd. It was impossible, however, for the Parliament to meet before the autumn. And, in the meantime, not only were the Powers insisting, but Louis' own adherents were clamouring for the prompt adoption of punitive measures. Fouché, as Minister of Police, was accordingly instructed to prepare a list of the individuals most deeply compromised. It was a task which he embarked upon with great reluctance. He had accepted office under Napoleon during the Hundred Days, as

¹ Pasquier, III. pp. 344-345.

Despatches, XII., Wellington to Castlereagh, 14 July, 1815.

Supplementary Despatches, XI., Mayor of Cateau to Wellington, 1 Août, 1815.

Mayor of Roys to Wellington, 6 Août, 1815.

Despatches, XII., Wellington to O.C. cavalry at Beauvais, 27 September, 1815.

H. Houssaye, 1815, III. pp. 483-490.

² Pasquier, III. pp. 354-356.

Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 136-137.

Supplementary Despatches, XI., Liverpool to Castlereagh, 28 July, 1815.

³ Pasquier, III. pp. 380-381.

Houssaye, 1815, III. pp. 417-423, 434.

Marmont, *Mémoires*, VII. p. 169.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, III. pp. 524-525.

early as March 20th, and was, himself, far more guilty than many men whom he must doom to proscription. A full and complete amnesty for all political offenders was the policy he would have wished to see adopted.¹ Nevertheless, in the course of the next few days, he submitted for the King's approval the names of over one hundred persons. "In justice to him," said Talleyrand, "we must allow that he has omitted none of his friends." It has been said that he tried to make the number as large as possible, in order to convince His Majesty, and his colleagues in the Cabinet, of the impossibility of discriminating among such a quantity of people, all equally guilty. If this was his intention, the object failed completely. The numbers he proposed were considerably reduced. Several Ministers succeeded in eliminating the names of personal friends, but on July 25th the *Moniteur* contained a list of no less than fifty-seven persons, against whom steps of some kind or another were to be taken.² The proscribed individuals were divided into two classes. The first, and more important division, consisted of nineteen generals and other officers, denounced for having borne arms against the King, who were to be brought before Courts Martial at once. The second list affected thirty-eight persons, who were ordered to withdraw from Paris within the space of three days. They were to proceed then to wherever the Minister of Police might appoint for their place of abode. The Chambers would decide, when they met, whether they were to be merely banished, or whether legal proceedings should be instituted against them. It was a strange document in several ways. Neither titles nor Christian names appeared in it. Marshal Soult, Duc de Dalmatie, whose name figured at the head of those comprising the second group, was described merely as "Soult." On the other hand, General Savary, Duc de Rovigo, who was placed last in the first category, was designated simply as "Rovigo." The fact that Bavalette had been, for many years, a civilian seemed to have been overlooked, and he appeared among the officers notified to stand their trial before the Military Courts. "One might almost have imagined," writes an historian of the Restoration, "that Fouché thought he was still working for the Committee of Public Safety."³

¹ Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 145-148.

Supplementary Despatches, XI., Liverpool to Castlereagh, 15 July, 1815.

Liverpool to Canning, 4 August, 1815.

² H. Welschinger, *Le Maréchal Ney*, 1815, p. 107.

Pasquier, III. pp. 368-369.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, III. pp. 508-516.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 519-520.

Never, probably, has so important a State Paper been drawn up with such levity. It, however, possessed one merit which has been generally overlooked. The publication of the names of the persons against whom proceedings were to be initiated, amounted to a warning that they must look to their own safety. It was certainly so understood by the parties concerned. When, a few days later, the agents of the Government arrived at Macdonald's headquarters to execute the warrants, all the threatened officers had fled. Fouché himself had furnished everybody who needed one with a passport. He had lent money to some, and had, in short, done all in his power to save those whom he knew could expect no mercy if caught.¹ It was, probably, a subject of secret congratulation to the King and to his ministers that no arrests had been made. But any short-lived satisfaction which they may have experienced on this score was certainly not shared by the majority of Royalists. Ever since Louis' return to power his adherents had been animated by a fierce vindictiveness.² The outrageous behaviour of the Gardes-du-Corps in the streets towards all persons suspected of Bonapartist sympathies, was already a constant source of disorder.³ Nor was this feeling confined to the barracks and the *cafés*. It flourished in much higher spheres.⁴ The most aristocratic salons of the Faubourg-Saint-Germain breathed a spirit of so furious a resentment as can with difficulty now be realized. In these circles the news, which became known early in August, that the arch-traitor, Ea Bédoyère had been captured lurking in Paris, was received with a savage exultation.

Charles Huchet, Comte de Ea Bédoyère, of a Breton family, was at this time twenty-nine years of age. He was the youngest Colonel in the French army. To record his distinguished services from 1806 to 1814 is to repeat the history of the great campaigns of the Empire. In 1813, when invalided home after a wound received in Germany, he had married Mlle. Victorine Georgine de Chastellux. The ancient and noble family to which the young lady belonged had been almost ruined by the Revolution, and, since the first Restoration, had adopted extreme Royalist sentiments. Owing to the influence of his wife's relations, Colonel de Ea Bédoyère had obtained the command of a regiment, and had been decorated with the order of Saint-Louis. There can be no doubt, however, that he never in his heart rallied to the

¹ Houssaye, 1815, III. pp. 435-436.

² Pasquier, III. pp. 387-388.

³ Viel Castel, *Restauration*, III. pp. 443-445.

Supplementary Despatches, XI., Private Intelligence, 19 July, 1815.

⁴ Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. pp. 134-135.

Marmont, *Mémoires*, VII. pp. 200-201.

Bourbon cause. He was one of those young officers of Napoleon's army who had come under the great soldier's personal observation, and who had been singled out for rapid promotion. To such a man the fall of the Empire meant the close of a brilliant career. The idea of settling down to garrison life under an unwarlike old King must, in any case, have presented a singularly distasteful prospect.¹ The return from Elba found La Bédoyère quartered at Chambéry. The troops there were already under orders to proceed to Grenoble, and the news of Napoleon's landing only hastened their departure.

The Chambéry brigade marched into Grenoble about noon on March 7th. The town was the headquarters of the Military District. Marchand, the General Officer in command, was anxiously awaiting this reinforcement. The attitude of the garrison had been far from reassuring ever since Bonaparte's landing had become known. He was now advancing on Grenoble, and might even arrive before the gates during the course of the day. With the idea of gaining time, Marchand had despatched a battalion of the 5th Regiment and a company of engineers to blow up the bridge at Ponthaut. But no news had been received from this detachment since its departure.²

After the General had inspected the new-comers, the positions to be held by the different corps were pointed out to the commanding officers. In the course of the afternoon these posts were duly occupied. Up to this time nothing in La Bédoyère's conduct seems to have called for remark. He appears to have received and executed his orders without comment or protest. But his men had not been long in their places before their Colonel presented himself before them, waving his sword and shouting to them to follow him. Led by La Bédoyère, with drums beating and with loud cheers for the Emperor, the regiment marched out of the town before the eyes of the whole garrison.³ When he was clear of the last houses, La Bédoyère halted his two battalions, and forming them into a square, produced the old regimental eagle. After a stirring speech the march was resumed. A few miles further on Napoleon's advanced guard was met with. It consisted of those very troops whom Marchand had the day before sent out to destroy the Bridge of Ponthaut. Their defection is one of the most dramatic episodes in Napoleon's marvellous adventure. When he found them across his path, prepared,

¹ *Grande Encyclopédie*, La Bédoyère.

Bourrienne, *Mémoires*, X. p. 257.

Marmont, *Mémoires*, III. p. 80.

Mme. de Boigne, I. pp. 414-415 ; II. p. 63.

² Houssaye, 1815, I. p. 251.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 252-254.

apparently, resolutely to bar his further progress, he had sent strict orders to his own people not to fire a shot. Dismounting from his horse, he had then deliberately walked up to within a few yards of the muzzles of the opposing muskets, and, throwing open his coat, commanded any man "who wished to shoot his Emperor to do so now and at once." Napoleon had not miscalculated the effect which such a proof of his faith in the affection of the French soldiers for him, would have on the troops. With a ringing cheer they tore off the white cockade, trampled it under foot, and begged for the honour of marching at the head of his column.

La Bédoyère's desertion had completely dissipated any last feelings of loyalty to the Royal cause, which may still have existed in the hearts of the garrison of Grenoble.¹ The gunners on the ramparts now plainly told their officers that they must not expect them to fire. When, about seven o'clock, Napoleon appeared before the southern gate, and, after an angry parley with the officer in command, forced his way into the town, the whole of the troops received him with enthusiasm. For his exploits on this occasion La Bédoyère was created a Peer and promoted to the rank of General. He could not, or pretended that he could not, understand why the Emperor heaped such honours upon him. But Napoleon knew why. He fully realized what La Bédoyère's treason had been worth to him. "Up to Grenoble I was an adventurer; after that a Prince," were the words he used in describing this affair. In the Waterloo campaign La Bédoyère served on the Emperor's staff, and returned with him to Paris. After the abdication he distinguished himself by the violence of his language against the Bourbons, and by his advocacy of the claims of Napoleon II in the Chamber of Peers.² When, in accordance with the terms of the capitulation, the French army retired behind the Loire, La Bédoyère accompanied it. Here he received timely warning that his name was at the head of every list of proscribed persons. Amply supplied with money, furnished with a passport for the United States, there does not appear to have been any reason why he should not have fled the country. Such was, at first, his intention. But, from Riom he suddenly returned to Paris. His motives have never been explained. It is supposed by some that he came back to take part in a Bonapartist plot. Another suggestion is that he wished to see his wife and child.³ Whatever the reasons for his journey to Paris may have

¹ Houssaye, 1815, I. pp. 254-258.

² *Ibid.*, p. 259.

³ Pasquier, III. pp. 402-403.

Houssaye, 1815, III. pp. 508-509.

been, he travelled by the ordinary diligence and it cost him his life. He was recognized by an agent of the police, who happened to be his travelling companion. On his arrival he was tracked to a house in the Faubourg-Poissonnière, and within a few hours was a prisoner in the Abbaye. Matters then moved quickly. On August 14th he appeared before a Court Martial. At his trial La Bédoyère conducted his own case with both skill and dignity. But for his behaviour no defence was possible. He was condemned to be shot. On August 19th his appeal was rejected by the Superior Court, and, the same afternoon, his distinguished career terminated under the bullets of his own countrymen on the plain of Grenelle.

There had been considerable apprehension among the Royalists that the Chastellux influence might be exercised on La Bédoyère's behalf. The fear was unfounded.¹ In her efforts to save her husband Madame de La Bédoyère received no assistance from any member of her own family. The news that the sentence had been carried out was received with a sigh of relief in aristocratic salons. In the general thirst for blood the ladies of the noble Faubourg made themselves horribly conspicuous. For good and for evil, the prominent part played by women in the political convulsions of their country is a feature in the history of France. No one who has ever read an account of the scenes of the Red Terror can forget the Furies of the Guillotine. The terrible women, who, with the thriftiness of their race, would sit knitting at the foot of the scaffold looking up to shriek approval as the head of the aristocrat was held up to their gaze. The *Tricoteuse* of the Faubourg-Saint-Antoine was to find her counterpart in the *Brodeuse* of the Faubourg-Saint-Germain. Ladies of the highest rank, it is said, had crowded to La Bédoyère's trial. They had trembled lest he should be reprieved. They had gloated over his death. "And now for the other one!" was the cry, as soon as La Bédoyère's execution became known. The "other one" was Marshal Ney, Duc d'Elchingen, Prince de Moskowa, who had been arrested at a country house in Auvergne, and was now in Paris, a close prisoner.²

Wiser far than his adherents, Louis XVIII had heard of Ney's capture with dismay.³ There had been good reason to hope that he would be able to effect his escape. Fouché had afforded him

¹ The attempts of Mme. de la Bédoyère to interest Madame Krüdener on her husband's behalf are related by Madame de Boigne, II. pp. 90-93, 99-100.

² Viel Castel, *Histoire*, III. p. 548; IV. p. 377.

³ Marmont, VII. p. 188.

Houssaye, 1815, III. pp. 567-568.

every facility, had supplied him with passports, made out in several different names. Ney seems to have intended flying to Switzerland. But at Eyons he heard that all the roads on that frontier were in possession of the Austrians. Not wishing to run the risk of attempting to pass through their lines, he turned back, and sought refuge at the house of one of his wife's relations. Information of his presence there was, within a few days, brought to the prefect.¹ The popular version of his capture is that, whilst hiding in the upper part of the *château*, he had left a sword lying about which in former days the Emperor had given him. This was recognized by a visitor, who reported the matter to the authorities. A domiciliary visit by the police, and Ney's arrest followed. He was carried by easy stages to Paris, where he arrived on August 19th, the day of La Bédoyère's execution, and was at once confined in the Conciergerie to await his trial.

The bloodthirsty fury of the Royalists was mainly inspired by terror. The surprising ease with which Bonaparte had made himself master of the Government baffled their comprehension. The existence of a deeply laid plot appeared to them the only reasonable explanation. That Napoleon must have had accomplices, not only in the army, but in all branches of the public service, seemed evident. Without doubt he had been in constant communication with his adherents for months preceding his landing in France. The idea that the return from Elba was the result of a far-reaching and carefully prepared conspiracy was not confined to Frenchmen. It was the opinion of almost all the statesmen of the coalition. The military insurrections of Drouet d'Erlon² and the Ballemands, which had so nearly coincided with Napoleon's venture, lent colour to the theory. Hardly anybody then supposed that these episodes were independent actions, uninspired by Bonaparte. Whereas, after the first Restoration the Royalists had confidently believed that the fallen Emperor had scarcely a follower worthy of the name, they now saw Bonapartism lurking everywhere.³ The majority were consumed with the dread of an unknown, mysterious power which might rise at any moment to confound them. To combat this danger, Royalist vigilance committees were formed all over the country. Every man watched his neighbour, and an almost universal system of delation sprang into existence. One half of France, it has been said, was spying on the other. The abuses to which this deplorable state of affairs lent itself need no comment.

¹ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, III. p. 525.

² *Ibid* p. 61.

³ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, III. pp. 506, 507, 508.

Cruelty is often the result of fear. Under the influence of an overmastering terror men are little inclined to mercy. The presence of foreign armies and the fact that in most departments the out-and-out Royalists were in the minority, imposed some check on revengeful proceedings. But in the distant provinces of the West and South the situation was different. In La Vendée, and in Brittany, a state of civil war had actually existed.¹ Here, after hostilities had come to an end, bands of armed peasantry still terrorized the country. Gangs of ruffians, encouraged in some cases by the rural clergy, pillaged the houses and threatened the lives of the purchasers of national property. The diligences were stopped, rapine and disorder flourished unchecked.² It was in the South that the worst excesses were committed. No sooner had the result of the Battle of Waterloo become known, than Marseilles broke into revolt. The Imperial troops in the town numbered only about fifteen hundred men.³ In face of the menacing attitude of the mob, Verdier, the General commanding in Brune's absence, decided on evacuation. Freed from all restraint, the Royalist fury knew no bounds. During the two days, June 25th and 26th, no less than two hundred persons are supposed to have been massacred in the streets. From Provence the movement spread rapidly westward to Languedoc and Gascony. Avignon, Montpellier, Nîmes, Uzès, Toulouse, and many other places were the scenes of most horrible cruelties. At Avignon, Marshal Brune, who had handed over the command of his military district to the Royalist Marquis de Rivière, was butchered by the mob in a house in which he had taken refuge. After the capitulation of La Palud the Duc d'Angoulême had sought refuge in Spain. When the overthrow of Napoleon had reopened the road to France, he had returned, and had been invested by the King with the supreme command of all the military districts of the South. But, already, before His Royal Highness' arrival, his disbanded troops, the *Miquelets*, had emerged from their retreats. Most of them had old scores to settle, all of them were eager for plunder. Murder and outrages of all description heralded their reappearance.⁴

At Nîmes, where the political question was aggravated by religious animosities, the streets ran with the blood of Protestants and Bonapartists. A ruffian, nicknamed Trestailions, soon became known as the leader in these abominations. Uzès also

¹ Pasquier, III. pp. 356-358.

² Viel Castel, *Histoire*, III. p. 506.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 339-342.

⁴ Houssaye, 1815, III. pp. 453-461.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, III. pp. 536-539.



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witnessed some terrible scenes, and could boast of a popular hero, Quatre-vingt-trois,¹ so named because his followers claimed that his deeds of infamy had surpassed even those of Trestailons. Another band of cut-throats, the *Verdets*, emulated the achievements of the *Miquelets*. They wore a green uniform, the colour of the Comte d'Artois' liveries, and were supposed to be especially attached to him. The murder of General Ramel at Toulouse, under peculiarly atrocious circumstances, was one of their chief exploits. The Royalists, even in these districts, had not always matters entirely their own way.² The Protestants in the department of the Gard, assisted by disbanded soldiers and deserters, attacked and defeated a Royalist corps. Civil war seemed on the point of breaking out. The intervention of an Austrian division, under Neipperg, became necessary. These troops soon restored order and dealt summary justice on all offenders caught with arms in their hands. But, with their departure, the disturbances were renewed. It was not till the end of the year that a more peaceful state of affairs began to prevail.³

The Duc d'Angoulême had spared no efforts to repress disorder and to protect innocent persons from the vengeance of his followers. But he had no regular troops at his disposal, and was, in many cases, ill served by the local authorities. In addition to these difficulties, which greatly retarded the re-establishment of good order, he had had to contend with a threatened Spanish invasion.⁴ Ferdinand had declared war on Napoleon and had massed troops on the frontier. Beyond this he had not ventured to go. In August, however, believing France to be helpless, and hearing much talk of indemnities and of a prospective dismemberment of the country, he conceived the time had come for action. In hopes of obtaining some share in the plunder, he ordered his generals to advance. The Duc d'Angoulême was at Bordeaux, presiding over the elections, when the news reached him. He at once called out the National Guards, and collected as many volunteers as possible. The Duke himself, on August 27th, proceeded to Perpignan, to confer with Castānos, the Spanish commander. D'Angoulême's firm demeanour on this occasion averted the danger. The general agreed to retrace his steps, and the contemplated invasion collapsed.

The massacres and atrocities which for many months desolated the South, were in general the spontaneous acts of the lowest

¹ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, III. pp. 501-505.

Houssaye, 1815, III. pp. 463-473.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 473-480.

³ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, IV. pp. 9-14.

⁴ Pasquier, III. pp. 406-408.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, IV. pp. 15-17.

class of the inhabitants. To some extent, perhaps, the outrages committed by the *Miquelets* and the *Verdets* were the inevitable ills which Civil War and Revolution bring in their train. They were, at any rate, in most cases the work of miscreants who found, in the political convulsions of their country, opportunities for indulging their natural propensity for robbery and bloodshed. The judicial murder of the brothers Faucher at Bordeaux, belongs to a different category of crime. The dregs of the population were not, in this instance, the guilty parties. The highest civil and military officials in the district must be held solely responsible for it. The condemnation of these men is one of the most shameful episodes in the history of the "White Terror." The story throws a lurid light on the spirit and the passions of the time.

At La Réole, a town about forty miles from Bordeaux, there lived two twin brothers, César and Constantin Faucher. They were the sons of an officer, and both of them under the old *régime* had served for a short time in the army. When the Revolution broke out the brothers enthusiastically embraced the new doctrines. At Rochefort they were condemned to death as Girondins, and were only pardoned on the scaffold. In La Vendée, and on the eastern frontier, both achieved distinction in the ranks of the armies of the Republic. Under the Consulate, the two Fauchers, who had by this time risen to the rank of Generals, appear to have entered the Civil Service. But, as staunch Republicans, on the proclamation of the Empire, they resigned their appointments and retired into private life. When, however, in 1814, Wellington's army entered France, they again tendered their services to the Government. During the Hundred Days César was returned as member for the Gironde to the Chamber, and Constantin was elected Mayor of La Réole. After Waterloo, when General Clauzel declared the region to be in a state of siege, Constantin received the command of the district of Bazas and La Réole. As there were no troops in either place, the appointment meant very little. Such as it was, however, he resigned it, without protest, on receipt of orders from the Royal authorities to do so. César, in the meantime, had rejoined his brother in his native town, after the dissolution of the Chambers in Paris. Both of them, on July 21st, duly witnessed the hoisting of the Bourbon flag at La Réole. The affair passed off quite quietly. But the next day an infantry regiment of the Line, on the march to Bordeaux, pulled down the Royal colours and occasioned some disturbance. On account of this manifestation, a Royalist corps was despatched to La Réole. Before these troops arrived, however, order had been restored

and the Bourbon flag replaced. For some reason, the Fauchers were supposed to have fomented the disorder which had taken place during the passage of the Line detachment through the town. The attitude of the Royalists towards them became, in consequence, so threatening that the two generals barricaded themselves in their house and armed some of their friends and servants. They sent an account to General Clauzel of their proceedings, and of the steps they proposed taking, if they were molested, in the future. Clauzel had just become aware that his name was in the list of proscribed officers. He was on the point of flying from Bordeaux when the letter from the Fauchers arrived. Either from thoughtlessness, or because he could not conceive that it contained anything of a compromising nature, he handed it over, before his departure, to the prefect. The Royal authorities, however, took a different view of the matter.¹ A large force of *gendarmes* was sent to La Réole to apprehend the Fauchers on the charge of being in illegal possession of a depot of firearms. A perquisition, made by the police at their house, brought to light one regulation musket, eight sporting guns, and two or three toy cannon. The discovery of these weapons was held sufficient to substantiate the accusation. The brothers were, accordingly, removed to Bordeaux and thrown into prison.

Public opinion was bitterly hostile to them. The newspapers one and all clamoured for their blood. As free-thinkers, moreover, the Fauchers had incurred the animosity of the priests and clerical party. Clauzel had been succeeded in the command of the Military District of Bordeaux by the Comte de Viosmesnil, an old *émigré*, holding the most exaggerated views. He was the last man to show mercy to two Republicans, old combatants of Ea Vendée, whom circumstances had placed in his power. After an imprisonment of six weeks in a filthy cell, crawling with vermin, the Fauchers appeared before a Court Martial on September 22nd. To the eternal shame of the Bordeaux bar, no member of it could be found with sufficient courage to undertake their defence. The distinguished Ravez, afterwards President of the Chamber of Deputies, a personal friend of the accused, had been retained. In view, however, of the popular fury against them, he had considered it prudent to throw up his brief. This abstention on his part had been triumphantly recorded in the papers as another proof of the Fauchers' guilt. It was an example which the rest of the bar were urged to follow.² The

¹ Houssaye, III. pp. 512-518.

² *Causes politiques du XIX siècle par une société d'avocats*, Paris, 1827, Procès des frères Faucher.

ill-fated men reduced to their own unaided efforts, found themselves indicted on four counts: (1) retaining a command after the Government had withdrawn it; (2) inciting their countrymen to Civil War by collecting an armed force at their house; (3) repressing by force the loyal impulses of the inhabitants of La Réole; (4) attempting to recruit a rebel corps from among the soldiers of His Majesty.

The evidence called in support of these charges was of the flimsiest description. Nevertheless both brothers were condemned to death. The Fauchers, though convinced it was hopeless, yielded to the entreaties of a niece, and appealed. The procedure before the Revisionary Court does not admit of the accused being present. They had, therefore, to be provided with Counsel. M. Emerigon, the *bâtonnier*¹ of the Bordeaux bar, reluctantly came forward. The conduct of this worthy offers a melancholy spectacle of human cowardice. The last thing M. Emerigon had at heart was the interests of his unfortunate clients. He was solely occupied in excusing his own presence before the Court. He begged that it might be understood that he was merely there to expound the law, and not as the legal defender of the accused. The appeal was, of course, rejected. On the following day, September 27th, the two brothers were shot. During their imprisonment, at their trial, before the firing party, both had displayed courage of a high order. A letter which one of them wrote to a friend, on the morning of their execution, testifies to their remarkable equanimity.² "In an hour's time we shall be no more. We are about to die owing to a judicial error, for which a time of great popular excitement must be the excuse."

It is given to few men to review their own case in so philosophic a spirit.

¹ Leader chosen annually.

² Letter quoted by Houssaye, 1815, III. p. 518.

CHAPTER VI

THE ROYALIST VICTORY

THE elections, in accordance with the Royal Proclamation of July 13th, had taken place in August. They were the first which had occurred under the Restored Monarchy. To understand the events which sprang from them, a brief description becomes necessary of the somewhat complicated machinery by which the Deputies were returned to the Chamber. The Charter had laid it down that, in order to be eligible to vote, a man must be not less than thirty years of age, and must pay three hundred francs in direct taxation. The would-be Deputy himself had to contribute a thousand francs a year towards the taxes, and was required to be forty years of age. The Royal Ordinance, which regulated the elections of 1815, had modified the age limit for both electors and candidates, but had not interfered with the pecuniary qualifications as established by the Charter. The principle which governed the choice of the Parliamentary representatives was that of "Indirect Election."¹ That is to say, the persons qualified to vote were divided into two categories or degrees. The electors in the first degree were eligible to belong to the *college d'arrondissement*; those in the second might be members of the departmental college. But admission to this latter body was limited to the proportion of one elector to every thousand inhabitants. Furthermore, to belong to the departmental college the voter must be one of the six hundred most heavily taxed individuals in the department. When the elections began the *college d'arrondissement* voted first, and selected a number of candidates equal to the number of Deputies which the department was entitled to return. This selection was not final. A week later the departmental college met and proceeded to the direct election. In making their choice, however, the members of it were bound to return half the candidates put forward by the *college d'arrondissement*. Each electoral college had a President who was appointed by the King. These officials were selected with great care. At

¹ Weil, *Elections Legislatives*, pp. 56, 57, 63-65.

the elections of 1815 the Comte d'Artois, the Duc de Berri and the Duc d'Angoulême all presided over departmental colleges. When the President was not a Royal person or a local magnate, he was generally the official candidate of the Government. The colleges themselves were usually divided into sections, each of which had a Vice-President. Ostensibly, this was done to save the elector the trouble and expense of a long journey to record his vote. The real reason, however, why a sub-division of the electoral colleges found favour with the authorities had little to do with the convenience of the elector. By breaking up the colleges into small boards of this description, the voter could be brought more directly into contact with, and under the influence of, the President of his section.¹

In these early days it was not yet the custom of the Parliamentary candidate to bring himself openly to the notice of the electors.² The modern practice of a direct appeal to a constituency only began to find favour some years later. Any canvassing which took place assumed the form of a, so to speak, secret intrigue. Those candidates, however, whose election was favoured by the Government, found an active champion in the prefect. On their behalf he would set in motion all the powerful machinery which he had at his command. It was his duty to leave no stone unturned which could secure the return of persons agreeable to Ministers. From the nature of things, bribery, as between the candidate and the elector, was not resorted to. Though the Government might furnish its officers, and sometimes the Presidents of electoral colleges with funds wherewith to prosecute the campaign, corruption, in the ordinary sense of the word, was not a feature of French elections. But, if the voter was not exposed to temptations of this kind, he was subjected to pressure infinitely more fatal to an independent exercise of the suffrage. The weighty influence of the prefect, the social prestige attaching to the President of his college were all brought to bear upon him. This direct interference by the Government and its agents in elections was the great evil of the French system.³

Ever since the time of Napoleon, the number of officials in France has been very great.⁴ In the early days of the Restoration it was computed that, exclusive of military officers, half a million of individuals were in the employment of the State. A large proportion of the members of an ordinary electoral college were

¹ Weil, *Elections Legislatives*, p. 123.

Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 142-144.

² Weil, *Elections Legislatives*, pp. 131-137.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 125.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 120-122.

public functionaries of some kind. The ease with which pressure could be exercised on these persons must be obvious. A refusal to vote for the Government candidate was, in the case of an official, to court certain dismissal from office. In 1822, when Marshal Victor, Duc de Bellune was at the War Office, it was brought to his notice that a Captain La Fontaine, at Dijon, had voted for an opposition candidate. The Minister, forthwith, decreed that he was to be imprisoned for a month. The matter was taken up by the Liberals, and formed the subject of an interpellation in the Chamber. The Marshal's answer was to dismiss the culprit from the army and to deprive him of his pension.¹

At the elections of 1815, in order to ensure the triumph of the Royalists, Pasquier, the Minister of the Interior, revived a practice which the laws of the Empire had sanctioned. He says, however, that he disapproved of it, but that Talleyrand and the King wished the experiment to be tried. On July 21st, accordingly, a Royal Ordinance appeared, empowering prefects to add twenty members to each departmental college, and ten to each *college d'arrondissement*.² In theory the persons so nominated should have been men who had rendered distinguished service to the country. In practice this was a side of the question which was generally ignored. In the eyes of most prefects a reputation for holding "healthy opinions," and of being a man who could be depended upon "to vote straight," far outweighed any past services to the State. With a very few exceptions it was on these lines, solely, that the specially selected voters were chosen. An average departmental college numbered about two hundred electors. The effect of introducing into such a body twenty members, absolutely committed to vote for the Ministerial candidates, speaks for itself.³

The comparatively Liberal character of the Cabinet has already been pointed out. The obvious policy for Ministers was to secure, if possible, a preponderance of Deputies in the Chamber holding views more or less in harmony with their own. But, in their endeavours to secure a Royalist majority, and to prevent the election of any members of the Chamber of the Hundred Days, they greatly overshot the mark. The result of the polling far surpassed expectations. An overwhelming Royalist majority was returned. The new Deputies, however, with scarcely any exceptions, were men of such extreme views,

¹ Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VI. p. 166.

² Pasquier, III. pp. 363-365.

Marmont, VII. pp. 173-174.

³ Weil, *Elections Legislatives*, pp. 65-66.

that the position of the Cabinet became, at once, seriously endangered. An "incomparable Chamber" (*Chambre introvable*), Louis is supposed to have said in the early days of this amazing victory.¹ A favourable opinion, however, which he was not to entertain for long.

It was impossible for Ministers to have any illusions as to the difficulties which they would have to encounter during the coming Session. The loyal addresses which poured in from the electoral colleges probably reflected, only too accurately, the opinions of the newly returned Deputies. A demand for the exemplary punishment of political offenders, and a thinly veiled hostility to the Cabinet, was the dominant note. Fouché was, unquestionably, the particular object of these attacks. He had, it is true, been returned for no less than three departments, one of which was Paris, and had elected to be a representative of the capital. The feeling against him was, notwithstanding, very bitter. Fouché's active participation in the elections of the Hundred Days has been mentioned. It does not appear, however, that he had had much to do with those which were just over. He had probably never for a moment anticipated such a result. Not foreseeing the danger, he had done nothing to avert it. Possibly, also, his attention may have been too completely engrossed with an important event in his private life.² On August 1st he had married Mlle. Gabrielle de Castellane. The young lady was good-looking and many years his junior. Though penniless, she belonged to an aristocratic family.³ It was not Fouché's first experiment in matrimony. His previous marriage had, however, been of a very different kind. The first Madame Fouché was a person of very humble extraction, remarkable only for her extreme plainness. But Fouché had been fond of her. This very immoral politician was always an excellent husband, an affectionate father; he had, in short, all the domestic virtues. He was now a Minister of the Most Christian King. At his wedding Louis had been a signatory to the marriage contract. Through his wife he was allied to the noblest families. At fifty-six, after a singularly eventful life, he seemed to have reached a position whence he could defy the vicissitudes of fortune. Yet his career was all but over. At the summit of his greatness, exile and obscurity were close upon him.

Louis had accepted Fouché because he believed that it was the price which he must pay for his return to Paris. But he had never trusted him. M. Eugène Forgues has recently brought to

¹ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, IV. p. 379.

² Madelin, *Fouché*, II. pp. 473-474.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 466-467.

light a curious document, *The Secret Dossier of Fouché*.¹ It is a strong testimony to the amount of confidence reposed in the Minister of Police. From the moment of Fouché's installation in office, he became, presumably by the King's orders, the object of a minute supervision. Every morning his old friend Vitrolles, now Secretary to the Council, would receive a detailed report of all Fouché's doings. The name and, so far as possible, the business of every visitor was recorded. If he seemed to be in a good humour, or if he appeared depressed, the fact was duly noted. This vigilance was not relaxed even on his wedding-day. The next morning Vitrolles could read, with doubtless much amusement, that Fouché, the night before, was supposed to have been "*très galant*." But the really humorous side to the situation was, that this elaborate system of espionage was carried out under the auspices of the faithful Foudras, Fouché's chief lieutenant, the man who had been commissioned to arrest him, in the previous March, and whom a few days later, after Napoleon's return, Fouché had promoted and rewarded.

Before the second Restoration was more than a few weeks old, the affection of the Ultra-Royalists² for Fouché had sensibly cooled down. The anxious days at Arnouville, when they had all believed that he was the only man who could manage the King's entry into Paris, were soon forgotten. The only thing which they remembered now was that Fouché was a regicide. His colleagues, too, in the Cabinet were beginning to find his presence among them disagreeably compromising. After the elections it became clear that, if the breakers were to be surmounted, the Ministerial boat must be lightened. Obviously Fouché was the person to be thrown overboard.³ Talleyrand began to talk to him of the charms of the United States. The post of French Ambassador at Washington might, he thought, soon become vacant.⁴ But Fouché was not disposed to take the hint. He wished to cling to office as long as possible. He had still, to a certain extent, the support of Wellington, who had already once intervened to save him when his dismissal had been decided

¹ E. Forgue's *Revue Historique*, 1906, XC., "Dossier secret de Fouché."

² The term Ultra-Royalist is supposed to have been first used by Fouché, and it now became the usual designation of the party. Viel Castel, *Histoire*, IV. p. 83.

³ Houssaye, 1815, III. p. 530.

Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. pp. 100-103.

Despatches, XII., Wellington to Dumouriez, 26 September, 1815.

Supplementary Despatches, XI., Castlereagh to Liverpool, 14 September, 1815.

⁴ Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 198-201.

Pasquier, III. pp. 390-394.

upon. The return of the Duchesse d'Angoulême, however, sealed his fate. She made no attempt to conceal her repugnance for him, and flatly declined to receive him. King and Ministers were both agreed that the position was no longer possible. On September 15th, the *Moniteur* announced his appointment to the Embassy at Dresden. For another fortnight he stayed on in Paris, trying to brave it out. Then suddenly, on October 4th, for no well-explained reason, he fled to Brussels, almost in disguise. It was the great mistake of his life, he said afterwards. Worse troubles, however, were to follow.¹

The Cabinet survived Fouché's dismissal but a few days. The Ultra-Royalist reaction, which the result of the elections foreshadowed, was not the only obstacle to its continued existence. The Tsar of Russia's great antipathy to Talleyrand had, from the first, been a source of weakness. The Autocrat had not forgotten the Secret Treaty of January 3rd, and, not without reason, held the President of the Council responsible for it. Possibly, also, Talleyrand himself may have considered the moment favourable for resignation. He foresaw that, if he were to remain in office, he must, at no distant date, subscribe to humiliating conditions of peace. It was a disagreeable necessity from which he was anxious to escape. In consultation with his colleagues, it was accordingly settled that the Ministry should resign in a body.² But, so far as his own retirement was concerned, Talleyrand was under the delusion that it would only be temporary. He was convinced that in the near future his services would have to be again invoked. The readiness, however, with which the King accepted the situation, came as somewhat of a surprise.³

Louis was, probably, quite prepared for the retirement of his Ministers. No sooner had he received their resignation than he sent for the Duc de Richelieu and pressed him to undertake the task of forming the new Cabinet. Two months before the Duke had been offered a seat in the Government, but he had declined on the grounds that he could never be the colleague of Monsieur Fouché. That objection could not be raised any longer. Nevertheless, the King found him very reluctant to accept the greater honour which he now proposed to confer on him. It was the Tsar who, in the end, persuaded him to consent. Little as his private inclinations prompted him to enter the political arena, ill-qualified as he considered himself to be for the arduous

¹ Madelin, *Fouché*, II. pp. 436-488.

² Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. pp. 100-101, 104, 105.
Marmont, VII. p. 216.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, IV. pp. 88-95.

³ Vitrolles' *Mémoires*, III. pp. 228-229.

position of First Minister of the State, Richelieu could not be deaf to the inducement which his old master held out to him. If he would accept office, Alexander promised to exert all his authority and influence to obtain better terms of peace for France.¹ The Duc de Richelieu, the grandson of the *roué* Marshal, was a man of a singularly elevated character. In the early days of the Revolution he had emigrated, and had entered the Russian service under the Empress Catherine. After a short visit to France, in 1801, he returned to Russia, but was not received favourably by the Emperor Paul. His successor, Alexander, however, conceived a great liking and respect for him, and appointed him Governor of Odessa. Under Richelieu's enlightened administration the town had grown and flourished. It was here that the greater part of his twenty-five years of exile had been spent. He is said to have always looked back on this time as the happiest of his life. Though the Revolution had entailed on him the entire loss of a large fortune, he had no sympathy with the prejudices and blind resentment of the *émigrés*. To the difficult task which now confronted him, he could only bring a sound intelligence and a high-minded devotion to the interests of his country. But though he had neither great abilities nor wide knowledge, he was a man of studious habits, well versed in military questions, and with a good grasp of European politics. The many years, however, which he had spent abroad, had deprived him of nearly all acquaintance with the internal affairs of France. Richelieu was by nature of a shy and retiring disposition. This had, on occasions, the effect of making his manners appear abrupt, not so say actually rude. He was often at too little pains to conceal his dislike for social ceremonies. In an age, moreover, when men still attached importance to questions of dress, he was rather neglectful of his personal appearance.²

That the new President of the Council might have time to select his colleagues, the King had postponed the meeting of the Chambers till October 7th. Richelieu's first attempt at Cabinet making was not altogether happy. He laboured under the serious disadvantage of being unacquainted with almost all the leading politicians. To conciliate the Comte d'Artois and the extreme party, Clarke, Duc de Feltre, and the Comte de Vaublanc were respectively offered the War Office and the Home Depart-

¹ Pasquier, III. p. 374.

Marmont, VII. p. 216, 217.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, IV. pp. 95-99.

Supplementary Despatches, XI., Castlereagh to Liverpool, 25 September, 1815.

² Mme. de Boigne, II. pp. 123, 124, 125.

ment. Clarke, notwithstanding his Imperial antecedents, had at Ghent and elsewhere completely identified himself with the Ultra-Royalists. There was little fear that he would hesitate to carry out the harshest measures against his old companions in arms. Vaublanc was at this time Prefect of Marseilles. He also had served the Empire, but had remained faithful to the Monarchy during the Hundred Days.¹ The supreme self-confidence and vanity which, at his first interview with Richelieu, he displayed, convinced the latter of the new Minister's unfitness. It was, however, considered to be too late to withdraw an offer which had been so readily accepted. But, as events were to prove, the step which was destined to have by far the most far-reaching consequences was the promotion to Cabinet rank of the Prefect of Police, Elie Décazes. Louis XVIII, owing to his distrust of Fouché, had, on several occasions, directly confided certain secret enquiries to him. In the course of the interviews which had thus taken place, Décazes had captivated the King's fancy. The retirement of M. de Blacas had deprived Louis of that sympathetic companionship which was so necessary to his existence. Décazes' rise in the Royal favour made rapid strides. On the fall of the Talleyrand Ministry, he was selected to conduct the negotiations which were set on foot to induce M. de Richelieu to form a new Cabinet. Décazes appears to have made a highly favourable impression on the Duke, and it is said that Richelieu stipulated that, if he was to be President of the Council, Décazes must be Minister of Police.²

Richelieu had not only followed Talleyrand as President of the Council, he had also succeeded him as Minister for Foreign Affairs. It devolved on him, therefore, to pick up the thread of the peace negotiations at the point at which Talleyrand had left them. The outlook was not encouraging. It seemed probable that, in expiation for her return to Imperial rule, during the Hundred Days, France would have to submit to immense sacrifices. As to the nature of the penalties and the full extent of the guarantees which they proposed to exact, the Great Powers were not entirely agreed. In this divergence of views lay the one hope of French diplomacy.

The demands of Prussia were, especially, exacting. As set forth by Hardenburg and Humboldt, her safety could only be secured by the retrocession of practically all the conquests of Louis XIV. If France, they contended, were to be left in

¹ Marmont, *Mémoires*, VII. pp. 221-224.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, IV. pp. 120-126.

² *Ibid.*, p. 101.

Marmont, *Mémoires*, VII. pp. 225-228.

E. Daudet, *Louis XVIII et Décazes*, pp. 88-93.

possession of her existing frontiers, her eyes would, as of yore, be constantly turning towards the Rhine. Any move in that direction would be a menace to German interests, and must lead to another war. Austrian policy accorded in the main with that of Prussia. In Metternich's scheme, however, territorial concessions did not occupy quite so prominent a place. He was fully agreed that the military position of France, on her eastern frontier, must be sensibly weakened. But he was prepared to see this effected, to a great extent, by the dismantling of her fortresses of the first and second line.¹

The Russian note, which had been drawn up by the Count Capo d'Istria, differed materially from the views expressed by the German Powers. Little was demanded beyond the payment of a war indemnity and the maintenance, for a stipulated time, of an army of occupation. Alexander was well disposed towards France. But he was still smarting under the ingratitude, of which he considered the treaty entered into at Vienna was a proof. It was, however, no part of his plan to weaken her permanently, for the benefit chiefly of Austria and Prussia. On the contrary, a strong France would prove a useful check on German ambitions. The restoration of the balance of power in Western Europe became, accordingly, the basis of his policy. These friendly intentions of the Tsar were encouraged by his Ambassador, the Corsican Pozzo di Borgo. The latter's benevolent dispositions were not entirely disinterested. Since 1814 he had been in receipt of a large pension for his services to the Bourbon cause. Talleyrand even intended making him Minister of the Interior. Pozzo was unwilling to accept the post, but his real motives for refusing are not very clear.²

After the enormous expenditure in the war, a long period of peace was essential for England. The question for her to determine was, whether that end could be best attained by supporting the harsh demands of Austria and Prussia, or by espousing the moderate views of Russia. In the first instance Lord Liverpool and the Cabinet had unhesitatingly favoured the adoption of the German policy. Both Castlereagh and Wellington, however,

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, II. pp. 36-63.

² E. Daudet, *Louis XVIII. et Décazes*, pp. 52-53.

Correspondance de Pozzo avec Nesselrode, II. pp. 211-219.

Supplementary Despatches, XI., Liverpool to Castlereagh, 15 July, 1815.

Liverpool to Castlereagh, 28 July, 1815.

Liverpool to Castlereagh, 3 August, 1815.

Liverpool to Castlereagh, 11 August, 1815.

Castlereagh to Wellington, 12 August, 1815.

Mémoire by Knessebeck, 13 Août, 1815.

Hardenberg to Prince Regent, 18 September, 1815.

held different opinions. In two despatches, almost identical in tone, they proceeded to combat the attitude taken up by the Prime Minister. By removing from France a large tract of territory, it was hoped so to weaken her, in a military sense, that she would be unwilling to begin another war of aggression. But were the German Powers sufficiently strong to repel all attempts of France to reconquer the provinces, which it was proposed to deprive her of? Neither Wellington nor Castlereagh thought so.¹ The chief lesson, they conceived, of the recent wars was the enormous strength which France could put forth when stirred by a great national impulse. If she was now compelled to submit to a serious loss of territory she would, without doubt, in a few years try to win back all which had been taken from her. Were England to become a party to a treaty for the dismemberment of France, she must, as an inevitable consequence, be drawn into any war which such an agreement might lead to.

The opinions expressed by Wellington and Castlereagh carried great weight with the Cabinet. More moderate counsels began to prevail. The adhesion of the English Government to the principles of the Russian policy had at once the effect of making Prussia lower her tone. Nevertheless, the demands of the Allies, as formulated in a note, dated September 15th, were sufficiently exacting. Talleyrand had despaired of obtaining less arduous terms. But with the advent of Richelieu to the Foreign Office, a notable improvement in French affairs became apparent. The Tsar, true to his promise, refused to allow France to be deprived of several fortresses such as Condé, Givet, Charlemont, and Joux, which, according to the Ultimatum of the 15th, were to be given up. Thanks also to his good offices, the war indemnity was reduced by a hundred million francs. Finally, on October 2nd, the definite terms of the treaty were agreed upon by the representatives of the five Great Powers concerned. The actual document was not, however, signed till November 20th. The principal articles provided for the occupation of France by an Allied Army of one hundred and fifty thousand men under the Duke of Wellington, for a term not exceeding five years. An indemnity of seven hundred million francs was to be paid. The

¹ *Despatches*, XII., Wellington to Castlereagh, 11 August, 1815.

Wellington to Castlereagh (memorandum), 31 August, 1815.

Supplementary Despatches, XI., Castlereagh to Liverpool, 24 July, 29 July, 3 August, 12 August, 17 August, 1815.

Liverpool to Castlereagh, 11 August, 18 August, 23 August, 1815.

Castlereagh to Liverpool, forwarding précis, pp. 137-142.

Liverpool to Castlereagh, 28 August, 1815.

Memorandum by Castlereagh, 31 August, 1815.

Castlereagh to Liverpool, 21 Septembre, 1815.

fortress of Bandau was to be added to Bavaria, and Chambéry and all that part of Savoy which had been left to France in 1814 was to be given back to the kingdom of Sardinia.

These negotiations throw a flood of light on the aims and aspirations of the different Powers. A cursory glance over the history of the period between 1815 and 1870 shows that the fears of the Prussian statesmen were well founded. From the vantage-ground of her bristling frontier in Alsace and Lorraine, France, during those fifty-five years, cast many covetous glances towards the Rhine. But after a lapse of time the conditions began to change. The hegemony of Germany was passing from Austria into the strong hands of her northern rival, Prussia. When the inevitable struggle came, France was destined to lose those conquests of Louis XIV which Stein and Hardenburg had hoped to have seen her deprived of in 1815.

The Allied Sovereigns took their departure from Paris towards the end of September. Before separating, however, they had affixed their signatures to that strange document, known as the "Holy Alliance." It was an ideal which had been conceived by Madame de Krüdener, and which had been brought into the world by the Tsar Alexander. If in its maturer years it failed to realize the high expectations formed for it at birth, this must be ascribed to the demoralizing influence of contact with the realities of life. Universal peace and brotherhood were the aims set forth in its several articles. These admirable sentiments were, however, couched in language so vague and of such extreme religious mysticism as to create suspicion, when they did not excite amusement.

The treaty had been signed by the Sovereigns themselves, not as is customary, by their Plenipotentiaries. This peculiarity saved the English Government from an awkward dilemma. The Prince Regent was able to excuse himself on constitutional grounds from adding his name to it, whilst, in an autograph letter, he expressed himself as completely in sympathy with the excellent principles which it contained.¹

¹ *Supplementary Despatches*, XI., Castlereagh to Liverpool, 28 September, 1815.

Text of Treaty, pp. 178-180.

Liverpool to Castlereagh, 3 October, 1815, enclosing draft of letter of Regent to two Emperors and King of Prussia.

CHAPTER VII

LA CHAMBRE INTROUVABLE

THE twice-adjoined opening of the Session took place at last on October 7th. During the previous three weeks the new Deputies had been arriving in Paris in large numbers. Many were quite strangers to Paris life. Few had given any thought to the business of Government, or had any knowledge of Parliamentary usages. That they should at once, in their inexperience, look out for leaders, and fall under various influences, was to be expected. M. de Vitrolles was the person naturally marked out to guide the political footsteps of a Royalist country gentleman. He himself had been elected to represent the department of the Lower Alps. The trust, moreover, which Monsieur was well known to repose in him, placed him above suspicion. During the First Restoration and under the Talleyrand Ministry he had been Secretary to the Council, a post which, much to his indignation, Richelieu had since abolished. Vitrolles was from force of habit a conspirator and an intriguer. But he was a clever man with a clear understanding of the Parliamentary system.¹

At the beginning of the Session he had published a pamphlet entitled *The Ministry under Representative Government*. It was an attempt to explain the principles of party Government. Most of the new Deputies might have studied it with great advantage. In point of fact, however, they gave it a most unfavourable reception. The words Majority, Opposition, and other terms which Vitrolles had used in their Parliamentary sense, made a disagreeable impression on them. According to their notions, there could be only two parties in the State—Royalists, like themselves, who were for the King, and Jacobins, Bonapartists, and other Revolutionaries, who were opposed to him. Owing to this publication, many of the Deputies, from the South especially, who would naturally have gravitated towards

¹ Marmont, *Mémoires*, VII. pp. 186-187.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, IV. p. 139.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, IV. pp. 70-71.

Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 238-239.

Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. p. 136.

Vitrolles' *salon*, went elsewhere for guidance. Several of them, in consequence, fell under an influence which, from this time forward, was gradually to become a factor of increasing importance in political life. .

In Revolutionary and Republican days, the practice of the Roman Catholic religion had been carried out under difficulties. Small bands of the faithful were in the habit of meeting secretly, to perform their devotions, under the direction of some favourite priest. Thus a Jesuit, the Père Delpuits, formerly attached to the ducal house of La Rochefoucauld used to minister to the spiritual wants of a select group of true believers.¹ Most of them would, in those days, have been termed "Heretofores." One of their number, a pious maiden lady, was the possessor of a large room in the Rue du Bac, which she had placed at the disposal of the little society. At this, their place of meeting, the Père Delpuits did not confine himself to holding religious services, and to administering spiritual comfort to his flock. In accordance with the rules of his order he proceeded to form "a Congregation": that is to say, a sort of lay brotherhood, the members of which were bound to use, for the general good of the society, any political or other useful influence which they might be able to command. The Empire came and went. The Père Delpuits died, and the room in the Rue du Bac passed to Mlle. de Polignac. But the Congregation remained. It so far possessed no political importance. None of its members had occupied high posts in the Government, nor in any of the Services. Even under the First Restoration, though the King himself and Monsieur, Jules de Polignac, Matthieu de Montmorency, and other leading Royalists are supposed to have become affiliated, it cannot be said that the doings of the society had, in any way, affected the march of events. But with the elections of 1815 the situation changed. Several members of the Congregation were returned to the Chamber. For the first time since the assembly of the States-General the Royalists appeared to be the complete masters of France.² It was an opportunity for exercising that occult influence on political affairs which the Society of Jesus has seldom let slip. Among the new Deputies was a rather obscure lawyer of the name of Piet. The man would long ago have been completely forgotten but for one fact—he had a large drawing-room. Henceforward, it became the political headquarters of the Royalist party. Piet himself and many of the Deputies who

¹ Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, IV. pp. 71-74.
Viel Castel, *Histoire*, IV. pp. 477-481.

² Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. p. 107.
Pasquier, IV. p. 12.

frequented his house are generally spoken of as having been members of the Congregation. This statement, which is constantly made by historians of the Restoration, must be received with caution. In M. de Grandmaison's list of persons who were affiliated to the association there is no mention of Piet.¹ This is a remark which applies to several individuals popularly believed to have belonged to the Congregation. It is possible that the public rumour was incorrect which supposed that Piet and most of his Ultra-Royalist friends were affiliated to a secret religious society. It cannot, however, be denied that the clerical spirit exercised a powerful influence over their councils. The country Deputy, feeling strangely awkward and out of place in Paris; was always sure of a hearty welcome at M. Piet's. Knotty points which had arisen during the day's debate, words and sayings which had baffled his comprehension, were here explained to him. The line which he, as a noble, a Royalist, and a Catholic should adopt on pending questions was made clear. Before the Session was far advanced Piet's *salon* had become a force which Ministers had to reckon with.²

The first three months of the Session were almost exclusively occupied with the passing of various exceptional measures. Three bills for the suppression of seditious cries and writings, for the suspension of individual liberty, and for the establishment of special tribunals, known as Prevotal Courts, were passed in quick succession by overwhelming majorities. This repressive legislation has been a never-failing source of reproach against the Chamber of 1815. Had, however, the Royalists brought to the framing of these important laws a calm spirit of judicial impartiality, history would have little to say against them. The necessity for special legislation would probably have been recognized by now. But, unfortunately, brutal and intemperate language became an ever-recurring feature of these debates. An ill-concealed determination to undo the work of the Revolution, a fierce desire for revenge, such were the feelings which too evidently inspired the greater number of the speakers. It was the extravagant ideas, so freely ventilated during the passing of these bills, which first opened the eyes of all sensible men to the real character of the Royalist majority. The blame which justly attaches to the "Incomparable Chamber" should, however, only in a very limited degree, be extended to Louis XVIII and his Ministers.³

¹ Geoffroy de Grandmaison, *La Congrégation*, Paris, 1889.

² Chateaubriand, *Mémoires*, VII. pp. 233-237.

³ *Supplementary Despatches*, XI., Arbuthnot to Liverpool, 30 October, 1815.

Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. pp. 118-119.

In abnormal times it has been the almost invariable practice of Governments to introduce laws to deprive the citizens of those liberties and privileges which they enjoy under ordinary conditions. That the situation of the country was altogether peculiar must be admitted. It is difficult indeed to conceive circumstances which more urgently called for the passing of exceptional measures than the state of affairs in 1815. The conditions demanded the vigorous repression of seditious cries, and made it no longer possible to treat their utterance as a mere mis-demeanour. The presence of the Army of Occupation was in itself amply sufficient justification for the imposition of a severe press law and for the censorship of all public writings.¹ The effect of the "suspension of individual liberty" somewhat resembles that produced in England by the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act. Suspected persons could be arrested and detained without trial for an indefinite period. But the large number of minor officials to whom these arbitrary powers were delegated constituted a serious danger. The defect was not unnoticed in the course of the debates. The amendments, however, on this score, advocated by Royer-Collard and a very few of the more moderate men, were rejected. In consequence, mainly of this absence of proper safeguards, the law was greatly abused.² The arrests made under its provisions became far too frequent. It may be true also that some unscrupulous officials used it as an instrument for paying off old enmities and for settling private quarrels.

But if the working of the law against individual liberty was to prove very unsatisfactory, the effect of the establishment of the Prevotal Courts was to be simply deplorable. In any country conditions may arise making the creation of special tribunals a measure of absolute necessity. At times of great lawlessness and disorder, when party, religious, or racial feeling runs high, trial by jury may become impossible. Something closely resembling such a state of affairs undoubtedly prevailed in many districts of the South and West of France. For the trial of certain kinds of crimes of violence, Prevotal Courts had, indeed, existed down to 1789. The Military Commissions of the Consulate and the Empire had to some extent taken their place.

The bill for the revival, on an extended scale, of the Prevotal Courts was introduced by the Minister of War on November 17th. It was not proposed to confine their action to especially disturbed

¹ Pasquier, IV. pp. 8-12

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, IV. pp. 179-195.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 160-176.

Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. p. 120.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, IV. pp. 446-449.

provinces. Every department was to be furnished with one. A President, a Provost, and four members constituted the Court. The President and the members were to be selected from among the Judges of the Tribunal of First Instance of the department, and the Provost himself was to be a military officer not below the rank of Colonel.¹ The arrest of delinquents, the preliminary enquiry, and the getting up of cases generally, was vested in this official, to whom very wide powers were delegated. There was to be no appeal from these Courts and, if a capital sentence were passed, execution was to follow within twenty-four hours.

Summary, or semi-military methods, were probably necessary to strike terror into the lawless bands of the West and to put an end to the disturbances of the South. But if Courts so constituted are not to become terrible instruments of oppression and cruelty, an inflexible, if rough, spirit of justice must characterize their proceedings. In a country subject to their jurisdiction, when the press has been muzzled, the high character of the Provost and his colleagues is the citizens' only guarantee for the safety of their lives and the preservation of their liberties. Events were, however, soon to prove that the majority of these tribunals were quite unworthy of the enormous powers conferred on them. With some possible exceptions, it was to be found that the persons who composed them were fully as subject to local influences and prejudices as ordinary jurymen. But the conduct of the Provosts themselves was to provide the largest crop of scandals. In the exercise of their magisterial duties, these officers habitually indulged in a wealth of invective, and stooped to methods of intimidation which deservedly brought their office into disrepute.

Whilst the Lower Chamber was busy discussing the establishment of the Prevotal Courts, the Peers were sitting in judgment on an illustrious prisoner.² Marshal Ney, after his arrest, had been claimed by the Minister of War. The intention was to bring him, with as little delay as possible, before a Court Martial. Difficulties had soon arisen. There was little anxiety on the part of the other Marshals to officiate at the trial of a distinguished colleague. Marshal Moncey, indeed, had declined to comply with the order which appointed him President. He had, in consequence of this disobedience, been deprived of his rank and awarded three months imprisonment. It was not till November

¹ Pasquier, IV. pp. 54-55.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, IV. pp. 196-207.

² Pasquier, IV. pp. 30-31.

Houssaye, 1815, III. pp. 568-569.

9th that the Court Martial at last assembled. A large and fashionable audience crowded to the proceedings. But the sightseers were doomed to disappointment. Ney, at once, entered a protest against the competency of the Court to try him. As a Peer of France he stood upon his right to be judged by his Peers. The Military Court, only too delighted to be relieved of an unpleasant task, unhesitatingly upheld his objection. Ney was accordingly taken back to the Conciergerie.

It has often been said that Ney's legal advisers, in allowing him to take this step, committed a great mistake. It has been suggested that a Court Martial would have spared his life. On what grounds any tribunal, least of all a military one, could have avoided passing the death sentence, it is impossible to conjecture.¹ Ney, himself, had certainly no illusions on that score. "*Ces b-lâ me fuzilleraient comme un lapin*" were the words he used to Berryer when,² to his great joy, he heard that his objection had been upheld. But, if he conceived that he had nothing to hope from his military judges, it is certainly strange that he should have imagined that the Peers would be more disposed to leniency. That body had recently been reconstituted. Its functions had become hereditary, and its numbers had been increased by ninety-four new creations. Those of its members, however, who had, during the Hundred Days, sat in Napoleon's Upper Chamber, had since been deprived of their Peerages by the King. The new legislators were, with few exceptions, members of the old families. There was, in short, little in the composition of such an Assembly to encourage the belief that it would be disposed to show sentimental sympathy to a man like Ney. But any faint hope in this direction, which may have been entertained, must have been completely dispelled by Richelieu's language.³ It was on the occasion of announcing to the Peers that they would be called upon to try the Marshal, that the usually temperate President of the Council saw fit to indulge in this outburst. His speech is said to have been composed by Lainé. Talleyrand called it M. de Richelieu's *ukase*. No scruples about prejudging the case seem to have crossed his mind. No thought that he was speaking of a man as yet untried restrained him.⁴ The Peers were simply told by the First Minister of the State that they must do their duty, and not hesitate to punish a great criminal.

The trial occupied the 4th, 5th, and 6th of December. The

¹ Pasquier, IV. pp. 31-32, 37.

² H. Welschinger, *Le Maréchal Ney*, p. 171.

³ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, IV. pp. 2-5.

⁴ Pasquier, IV. p. 32.

Welschinger, *Le Maréchal Ney*, p. 185.

well-known story of Ney's desertion, after he had boasted that he would bring back Napoleon in a cage, need not be repeated. The line of defence set up by Berryer, his leading counsel, consisted in an attempt to make out that he was covered by Clause XII of the capitulation of Paris. It was a preposterous notion. Nevertheless, fruitless efforts had been made to obtain from the Duke of Wellington an opinion favourable to this contention. Madame Ney herself had had an interview with the Duke on the subject. But neither her appeals before, nor Berryer's eloquence during the trial, was to avail.¹ By the evening of December 6th the public proceedings had come to an end. It only remained for the Peers to record their votes.²

Ney's presence was no longer necessary. For the last time he was removed to the little room on the second floor of the Luxembourg Palace which he had occupied since the beginning of the trial. After he had eaten a hearty meal, destroyed some papers, and smoked a cigar, he lay down on his bed and went to sleep. Between three and four he was aroused. Of 161 Peers 136 had voted for his death, and an official had come from the Chamber to read his sentence to him. It covered ten closely-written sheets. "To the point, to the point," roared Ney, exasperated with its repetitions and legal jargon: "Death by shooting within twenty-four hours." He was informed that, henceforward, he could see only a priest, his lawyer, and his wife and children. According to a generally accepted, but very improbable story, Ney declined any spiritual assistance, and only consented to receive a priest on the remonstrances of one of the men of the guard. His interview with his wife, which took place about five o'clock, was short. Ney, most of the time, paced the room talking of his trial. "I shall fling myself at the King's feet," sobbed his wife. Ney, anxious, no doubt, to bring the painful

¹ *Despatches*, XII., Memorandum respecting Ney, 19 November, 1815. *Supplementary Despatches*, XI., Madame Ney to Regent, 13 Novembre, 1815. *Vide* p. 122.

Additional note, 14 November, 1815.

Madame Ney to Liverpool, 13 November, 1815.

Marshal Ney to Wellington, 13 November, 1815.

Wellington to Ney, 15 November, 1815.

Sir C. Stuart to Castlereagh, 16 November, 1815.

Madame Ney to Sir C. Stuart, 16 November, 1815.

Communication of Madame Ney to Sir C. Stuart, pp. 237-238.

Liverpool to Madame Ney, 21 November, 1815.

Bathurst to Sir C. Stuart, 21 November, 1815.

Holland to Liverpool, 23 November, 1815.

Liverpool to Holland, 24 November, 1815.

Sir C. Stuart to Castlereagh, 4 December, 1815 (two enclosures).

² Houssaye, 1815, pp. 580-585.

H. Welschinger, *Le Maréchal Ney*, 1815, p. 330.

scene to a close, advised her, if that were her intention, to lose no time about it. Accompanied by Madame Gamot, her sister, she hurried off to the Tuileries.¹ After waiting about an hour at the foot of the great staircase, stared at by footmen and guards, Clarke, the Minister of War, appeared. The two women rushed at him, but he thrust them aside and continued his way. At last they succeeded in gaining admission to the Duc de Duras. Madame Ney implored him to obtain for her an interview with either the King or the Duchesse d'Angoulême. He went away. Before long, however, he returned, and taking Madame Gamot aside, told her that everything was over. It was true. At about half-past eight, Ney, who after his wife's departure had gone to sleep again, was told that the hour had come. He dressed himself with some care in a blue frock coat, a white neckcloth, knee breeches and black silk stockings, and entered the cab which was in waiting. On arriving at the appointed spot in the Avenue de l'Observatoire, he refused to allow his eyes to be blindfolded, and taking off his hat, placed himself in front of the firing party. He began to speak, but the words "Frenchmen, I protest" were scarcely uttered when a volley rang out and Ney fell, dying as he had lived, "the bravest of the brave." The drums beat, the troops shouted, "*Vive le Roi!*" and a quarter of an hour afterwards his body was carried to a neighbouring hospital, where it remained on view during the day.²

"By allowing himself to be caught he has perhaps done us more harm than even on March 13th," were Louis' prophetic words when he first heard of Ney's arrest.³ Few people, however, had the King's prescience. Nobody yet realized the political capital which was to be made out of Ney's execution. At the time there was nowhere much sympathy felt for him. On the *Bourse* the news of his death made "things better." But a few years later Ségur's history of the Russian campaign appeared. Many persons then read for the first time of Ney's exploits. Henceforward he was to be the great French soldier whom the Bourbons had massacred at the bidding of the foreigners. "Straight to the heart, my men," the words which he did not use, were to become a legend far more dangerous to the dynasty than Ney, in his lifetime, had ever been.⁴

In the evening the Duc de Berri went to the Play. At his

¹ H. Welschinger, *Le Maréchal Ney*, 1815, pp. 343, 344.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 336-338.

³ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, III. p. 524.
Marmont, *Mémoires*, VII. pp. 189-190.

⁴ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, IV. pp. 337-342.
Madame de Boigne, II. pp. 133-136.
Pasquier, IV. pp. 41-43.

appearance the audience rose and cheered him. "Two or three more nice little executions," said an old *émigré*, "and Your Royal Highness will have all France at your feet." The news was, indeed, expected daily that at least one more "nice little execution" would soon take place. On November 29th the Assize Court of the Seine had found Marie Chamans Comte de Lavalette guilty of an illegal assumption of authority at the Post Office, on the morning of March 20th, and he had been sentenced to death. General commiseration was felt for him. His mild and amiable disposition had made for him numerous friends.¹ Compared to the heinous treasons of some of the generals, his offence appeared trivial. During the first Restoration Lavalette had held no post under the Government. No breach of his oath of fidelity could be imputed against him, and the affair at the Post Office had taken place after the King had fled from Paris. But, on December 14th, the Court of Cassation rejected his appeal. Nothing now, except the hope that the King might exercise his prerogative to pardon, stood between Lavalette and the guillotine.

Richelieu, though personally unacquainted with Lavalette, was well-disposed towards him. He was prepared to recommend him as an object of Royal clemency. The obstacle to such a course was the hostility of the majority of the Deputies to the condemned man. But a graceful way of overcoming the difficulty was suggested. The birthday of the Duchesse d'Angoulême was at hand. It was proposed that she should, on that occasion, make an appeal on Lavalette's behalf to her uncle the King. Richelieu accordingly broached the subject to her. She asked for time to consider the matter, and, on the following day signified her refusal. Some of the ladies of the Court had, it is said, induced her to promise to abstain from intervention. It may be presumed that the daughter of Louis XVI did not require much persuading.² As soon as it had been decided that the sentence was not to be interfered with, the strictest orders were given lest Madame de Lavalette should gain admittance to the Royal apartments.³ But Marshal Marmont undertook to brave the King's displeasure, and to place her in his path. This promise

¹ *Vide* p. 72.

Marmont, *Mémoires*, VII. p. 190.

Causes politique du XIX. siècle par une société d'avocats, Paris, 1827.
Procès de Lavalette.

² Pozzo à Nesselrode, 30 Décembre, 1815.

Marmont, *Mémoires*, VII. pp. 192-193.

Mme. de Boigne, II. pp. 139-140.

³ Marmont, *Mémoires*, VII. pp. 194-197.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, IV. p. 363.

Mme. de Boigne, II. pp. 141-142.

Lavalette, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 272-275.

he duly carried out. His generous devotion, however, which brought down on him the implacable fury of the courtiers and the "Ultras," proved of no avail. Madame de Lavalette was enabled to throw herself at Louis' feet, but, though he spoke to her kindly, he could not be moved to hold out the smallest hope of grace. She then tried to seize the Duchesse d'Angoulême's dress, but Madame eluded her grasp. Lavalette's last chance seemed gone.

In the meantime a measure of the first importance was before the Chamber. As far back as November 11th one of the leaders of the extreme party, the Comte de La Bourdonnaye, had brought forward the project of a Law of Amnesty. A secret committee of the Chamber had been appointed to examine these proposals. Great pains were taken to prevent any of the deliberations from transpiring; nevertheless, ugly rumours were soon noised abroad. It was whispered that, under the cloak of a so-called amnesty, a most formidable proscription was to be set on foot. The loss of his office was the least which any public servant might expect who had accepted employment during the Hundred Days. La Bourdonnaye's bill, if it ever became law, would, it was said, affect some eleven hundred persons.¹ The excitement became intense. Richelieu felt it was time for the Government to intervene.

On December 8th, the day following Ney's execution, the President of the Council, accompanied, in order to give additional solemnity to the occasion, by all his colleagues in the Cabinet, proceeded to the Lower Chamber. After saying that a great and necessary example had just been made, Richelieu went on to introduce a Ministerial Bill of Amnesty. The Government scheme was a comparatively genuine one. Prosecutions which were pending, or which had begun, against persons named in the First Article of the Royal Proclamation of July 24th, were to proceed. All those whose names had appeared in the Second Article of the same document, together with the whole of the Bonaparte family, were to be banished. With these exceptions it was proposed to pass the sponge of forgiveness over everything which had happened. By skilfully alluding at the end of his speech to Henri IV, the mention of whose name always provoked an enthusiastic outburst, Richelieu succeeded in obtaining a fairly good reception for his measures. But in the evening, when the matter was discussed in the Royalist *salons*, the Government Bill was pronounced to be unsatisfactory and miserably

¹ Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. p. 122.
Viel Castel, *Histoire*, IV. pp. 345-350.
Pozzo à Nesselrode, 15 Décembre, 1815.

inadequate. The temper of the *salons* was soon reflected in the Chamber. To examine, to report on, and to amend, if necessary, Richelieu's Law of Amnesty, a committee had to be formed. It was found to consist of those same Deputies who had been considering La Bourdonnaye's proposals.¹

The relations between the Cabinet and the majority in the Chamber had ceased to be amicable. The conduct of the Government, in suddenly introducing the Bill of Amnesty, and thus cutting the ground from under the feet of La Bourdonnaye and his followers, had widened the breach. But an event, which soon afterwards occurred, was to furnish the extremists with an opportunity which they fondly imagined would enable them to drive from office the two Ministers whom they particularly detested. On the evening of December 20th, on the eve of the day fixed for his execution, Lavalette escaped from the Conciergerie, disguised in his wife's clothes. The Parisians generally were delighted and amused beyond measure. In the Faubourg-Saint-Germain and in the Chamber, fury and consternation reigned. There was a reason for this extraordinary animosity towards an inoffensive man. Lavalette's relations with Bonaparte were known to have been most cordial and confidential. Though it had been impossible to prove it against him, no Royalist, worthy of the name, had any doubt that Lavalette had been one of the leaders in that gigantic conspiracy which had brought Bonaparte back from Elba. His marvellous escape from prison seemed to them but a further manifestation of that mysterious power of the Revolution which they all dreaded.²

On December 22nd, M. de Sesmaisons³ gave notice of his intention to bring forward a motion calling upon the Ministers of Police (Décazes) and of Justice (Barbé Marbois) to furnish the Chamber with an explanation of the affair. The next day, in expectation of some exciting scenes, the galleries from an early hour began to fill with spectators. The proceedings opened quietly. Sesmaisons, in a temperate speech, pointed out the unusual circumstances which had attended Lavalette's imprisonment. The invariable precaution of watching a man by day and night, when under sentence of death, had been unaccountably omitted. Why, after his appeal had been rejected, had his execution not followed at once? Many things in con-

¹ Pasquier, IV. pp. 57-58.

Viel Castel, IV. pp. 351-357.

² Pasquier, IV. p. 46.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, IV. pp. 368-369.

E. Daudet, *Louis XVIII et Décazes*, pp. 102-103.

Lavalette, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 304, 308.

³ Pasquier, IV. p. 47.

nection with this affair seemed to require explanation. He moved, accordingly, that the Ministers concerned should be called upon to give one. But the speakers who succeeded him went much further. In violent language they criticized the actions of the Ministers, and demanded the appointment of a committee to inquire into their conduct.

M. de Bouville, member for the Seine-Inférieure, in order to show that the escape of the prisoner must have been connived at by someone in authority, treated the Chamber to a pantomimic exhibition. Crouching down, as if encumbered with petticoats, he was trying to pass under a low doorway, he covered his face with his handkerchief, into which he pretended to cry noisily, and gave what he considered was a true picture of Lavalette leaving the Conciergerie.¹ M.M. de Vaublanc and Bellart were the principal speakers on behalf of the Ministers. They strongly deprecated, as a danger to the Monarchy, the attitude which the Chamber had taken. Nevertheless, it was decided to appoint a committee to report on the propriety of proceeding further with Sesmaisons' proposal.

A new and objectionable feature was introduced into this debate. It had been conducted with much bitterness of language. This was, however, no unusual circumstance. There had been interruptions and angry shouts of disapproval. Such things are to be expected when the subject is of absorbing interest. But these cries had not all come from the body of the Chamber. A large and fashionable audience in the galleries had listened to the proceedings with breathless excitement, and had applauded or loudly dissented from, the different speakers. In these demonstrations the ladies had made themselves particularly conspicuous by the fury of their gestures. This very Royalist Chamber was, indeed, beginning to present more and more disagreeable points of resemblance with the National Convention of hateful memory.

It was soon known that the committee, which had been nominated to consider M. de Sesmaisons' proposal, had a scheme to propound. It was to take the form of an address to the King, humbly praying His Majesty to dismiss M.M. Décazes and de Marbois, both of whom, it was asserted, had ceased to enjoy the confidence of the nation.²

Richelieu was by disposition neither a combative nor a sanguine man. His brief experience of political life had not been at all to his taste. In this crisis he was determined that the Cabinet

¹ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, IV. pp. 373-375.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 377-381.
Pasquier, IV. 51-52.

should not dissociate itself from the fate of the two Ministers whose resignation was demanded. But, as was his wont, he saw the outlook in the blackest colours. His younger colleague, Décazes, was, however, far from despairing. The unmerited attacks and unjust suspicions of which he had been the object, had braced him for the fray. He was strong, moreover, in his knowledge of Louis' increasing affection for him. The situation was critical. If the Cabinet were to fall, the King must seek his new Ministers from among the "Ultras." It was impossible to say to what lengths such a Government, supported by an overwhelming majority, might not go. But Louis XVIII, both on this as on subsequent occasions, was to give proof of his unswerving loyalty to his Ministers. Before the address could be laid before him, he sent a significant message to the committee. His Majesty wished it to be understood that there was only one way of discovering whether the country had lost confidence in Ministers, and that was—by consulting it. The effect of this threat of dissolution was instantaneous. A general election was the last thing which the dominant party wished for. The work of the committee was hastily suspended, and the great storm subsided almost as quickly as it had arisen.¹

The danger was, for the moment, averted. It was felt, however, that it was over the Amnesty Bill that the real battle would be fought. On December 27th, M. Corbière, the reporter of the committee, appointed to examine the Ministerial Bill, presented his conclusions. All the exceptions to the general pardon, which Richelieu had proposed, were agreed to. But a great many others were recommended. The committee, in short, by the mouth of its reporter, advocated the accepting of the Government Bill, with, practically, the whole of La Bourdonnaye's merciless scheme tacked on to it. The month before, the fierce Angevin gentleman in introducing his project had gone straight to the point.² He had asked for "Fetters, executioners, capital punishment. . . . Death, death alone can put an end to these eternal plottings." Corbière, the lawyer from Rennes, wrapped up equally bloodthirsty demands in a language of specious reasoning. It was for the Chamber, he contended, to define the kind of conduct which was to constitute a crime against the State, not to lay down the punishment which should be meted out to the criminal.³ It was on this principle that he had drawn up his famous "categories," which were to make the name of

¹ Pozzo à Nesselrode, 30 Décembre, 1815.

² Pasquier, IV. pp. 60-62.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, IV. pp. 33-34.

Corbière the best hated in France. Accordingly, to all those individuals excluded from the general pardon by the Ministerial Bill, it was proposed to add : (1) Persons who had been accessory to the return from Elba; (2) public functionaries of all descriptions who had recognized Bonaparte before March 23rd; (3) General Officers who had declared in his favour prior to the same date; (4) General Officers who had fought against the Royal Armies. Owing to its extreme vagueness, it will be seen what a splendid field for persecution the first exception alone provided. But Corbière's ingenuity went further than this. Confiscation had been specifically forbidden by the Charter. The committee, however, under a thin disguise, purposed to re-establish it. In future a person convicted of an offence under any of these headings was to pay to the Treasury an indemnity proportionate to his crime, and to the extent of his fortune. Finally, in direct violation of the principle which purported to have governed the framing of the report, a decree of perpetual banishment was to be imposed on all regicides who had accepted employment during the Hundred Days, or who had signed the *Additional Act*.

The Government Amnesty Bill had, to some extent, allayed the consternation which the rumours of La Bourdonnaye's scheme had caused. But when the character of the Corbière amendments became known, these apprehensions returned with tenfold force. There was hardly a middle-class family without some member who saw himself threatened in his fortune, his liberty, or his life. Richelieu requested Wellington to postpone his intention of withdrawing the British contingent from Paris, and from 64 francs the *rente* fell to 59, a testimony to the general feeling of alarm. According to statistics drawn up for the King's information by the department of the police, the "categories," if ever they became law, would draw into their net between eight and nine hundred persons. Such a widespread apprehension could not fail to find an echo in a Chamber which numbered some four hundred members. Those Deputies who belonged to the provincial aristocracy, or who frequented the *salons* of the Faubourg-Saint-Germain, were not disagreeably affected by this state of affairs. On the contrary, they probably derived considerable satisfaction from the knowledge that the measures they contemplated were causing terror among a class which they detested. But there were others who were connected by the closest ties of family and friendship with men to whom these "categories" meant ruin and perhaps worse.¹ Under such circum-

¹ *Supplementary Despatches*, XI., Wellington to Bathurst, 1 January, 1815.

Viel Castel, IV. pp. 393-395.

stances it was impossible for them to be blind to the dangerous situation which the extreme Royalists were creating. Gradually, and almost imperceptibly, an Opposition Party was coming into being. These seceders grouped themselves round three men, Royer-Collard, Pasquier, and de Serre, who were destined to play prominent parts in the Parliamentary history of the future. The three leaders had observed the strength and advantage which their adversaries derived from their meetings in Piet's *salon*. They determined to imitate them, and, accordingly, hired a room for the purpose in the Rue Saint-Honoré. In this way they were able to meet quietly, to discuss plans, and to apportion rôles in the coming struggle.¹

Hitherto there had been but one party. Everything had been passed by overwhelming majorities. On the question of the amendments to the Amnesty Bill, Richelieu had tried to induce the members of the committee to abate their pretensions. In all directions his attempts had failed. In this dilemma the Government was to find an ally of unexpected strength. The Club of the Rue Saint-Honoré, as the Comte d'Artois' followers disdainfully called it, and which Wellington suspected of Jacobinism, was becoming a well-organized and compact little body. Its members were now prepared to offer their whole-hearted support to Ministers in their struggle with reaction.² Pasquier had not the eloquence of de Serre; he had, certainly, neither the learning nor the highminded disinterestedness of Royer-Collard, but he was, perhaps, the most astute tactician at that time in the Chamber. In discussing the situation with Richelieu Pasquier advocated a compromise. He proposed that the Government should consent to the clause which banished the regicides. Under those conditions he thought that there was a very good chance of defeating the infinitely more objectionable "categories." But the King, when consulted, expressed the greatest reluctance to sanction a step which so flagrantly violated the Charter. Ministers and their followers were, accordingly, compelled to try to carry through their bill in the shape in which it had been originally introduced.

The great debate began on January 2nd and occupied four days. By the fierceness of their invectives and the violence of their denunciations of everything connected with the Revolution, the "Right," or extreme Royalists, tried to beat down all opposition. On the other side the men soon to be known as the

¹ Pasquier, IV. p. 62.

² Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. pp. 115, 125, 126.

Despatches, XII., Wellington to E. Cooke, December, 1815.

Pasquier, IV. p. 59.

"Centre" party strove, by closely reasoned arguments, delivered in language of studied moderation, to impress on the Assembly the injustice and danger of the proposed measures. On January 6th, when the Chamber met, the outlook was most unpromising. According to the usual procedure, the reporter ascended the tribune. After defending his amendments from the attacks which had been made against them, M. Corbière announced that the committee maintained them all. Thereupon Richelieu asked for a short adjournment, in order that he might consult with the King.¹ In an hour and a half the sitting was resumed. His Majesty, said Richelieu, could not consent to any compromise with regard to the indemnities, the categories, or the regicides. In a brief speech the President of the Council then implored the Chamber not to allow a law of forgiveness to become a source of discord and of further misery to the country.

It only remained now for the Chamber to divide on the different clauses of the bill. Those upon which the Government and the committee were both agreed excited little interest, and were passed practically unanimously. But then came the question of the "categories," and the character of the scene changed completely. The excitement was breathless. The ceremony of counting the votes was carried out solemnly and deliberately in a Chamber hushed in silence. With blanched faces the friends and relations of the men to whom these proceedings meant life or death, freedom or imprisonment, were peering down from the galleries.² At last the President announced the result, and a tremendous shout of "*Vive le Roi!*" rent the air. But the Deputies, whose voices were generally on these occasions the loudest, were silent. By a majority of nine the "categories" had been rejected.³

By a very much larger number of votes the indemnity clause was thrown out. The banishment of the regicides was, however, carried through without opposition. It was the one consolation of the Ultra-Royalists in their unexpected defeat. Three days later Richelieu carried the Bill to the Upper Chamber.⁴ The King, he announced, in face of the unanimous wish of the nation, as expressed by its chosen representatives, withdrew his opposition to the clause dealing with the regicides. The Law of Amnesty then passed the Peers without further discussion, and, on January 12th, 1816, duly received the Royal assent. But in these last days the Minister of War had not been idle. Orders had been

¹ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, IV. pp. 397-408.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, IV. pp. 35-46.

² Pozzo à Nesselrode, 10 Janvier, 1815.

³ Pasquier, IV. p. 63.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 65-66.

hastily despatched to the military districts, to institute proceedings against certain officers, before it should be too late. By these means General Chartran, whose name did not appear in Fouché's list, was capitally convicted and shot at Lille.

The Amnesty Bill, shorn of most of the objectionable amendments which the Ultra-Royalists had wished to see affixed to it, had thus become law. Nevertheless, the numerous exceptions which it still contained took from it that character of general forgiveness which its name implies. If it brought within sight the end of the era of Courts Martial and State Prosecutions, it also banished without trial a large number of persons.¹ Soult, Grouchy, and many other officials, chiefly military but also civil, who had held high appointments during the Hundred Days, were now started on the road to exile. The French regicides do not deserve much sympathy, nevertheless their lot was hard. Loss of civil rights and of the privilege of owning property in their own country was, in their case, added to lifelong banishment. Some of them were old men, who had long ago fallen into obscurity and oblivion. On the other hand, there were among them persons whose names recall the great events of the time. There was Cambacérès, fellow consul of Bonaparte, and Arch-Chancellor of the Empire, the Abbé Sièyes, the framer of numerous Constitutions, Carnot, "the organizer of victory," and more recently the colleague of Fouché on the Commission of Government. Real, chief actor in many a dark and mysterious police affair, and David, the painter. Lastly, there was Fouché, who was driven from his Legation at Dresden, and compelled to spend in exile the few remaining years of his life. In favour of Tallien alone an exception seems to have been made. Protected, doubtless, by recollections of the 9th Thermidor, he was allowed to live on in poverty and obscurity in Paris. Many of the exiles made homes for themselves in Brussels. The choice of countries disposed to receive them was very limited. Though the Tsar offered Carnot an abode in Russia, most Governments refused to admit them within their frontiers. A strict Alien Bill, which the Revolution has given rise to, and which was still in force, deprived these outcasts of their customary haven of refuge. England, which has often welcomed political "undesirables" of an infinitely more objectionable stamp, in 1816 closed her doors on the French exiles.

The expulsion of the regicides was accompanied by a very interesting discovery. Among these men was a certain

¹ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, IV. 427-429.

Cf. *Supplementary Despatches*, XI., Wellington to Sir C. Stuart, 9 May, 1816.

Courtois.¹ After "the days of Thermidor" this worthy had been commissioned to go through the papers of Robespierre. His search brought to light the now well-known letter which Marie Antoinette had written, a few hours before her execution, to Madame Elizabeth. It is presumed that Fouquier-Tinville had sent it to Robespierre along with other documents in the Queen's case. For reasons of his own, the "Incorruptible" appears to have abstracted it and kept it for himself. Courtois also seems to have thought that it was much too interesting a document to bury in the archives of some Government office. He, accordingly, in his turn, purloined it, without saying anything about it. The police, in 1816, in overhauling Courtois' papers, before he left France, are generally believed to have, accidentally, discovered it. Pasquier, however, says that the man himself forwarded it to the authorities of his own accord. By the King's commands Décazes communicated it to the Deputies. The reading of the last earthly wishes of the unfortunate Queen gave rise to a scene of much emotion in the very Royalist Chamber.²

By the end of January the mystery which attached to Lavalette's escape from the Conciergerie had been, to a great extent, unravelled. The three persons, who had successfully smuggled him out of Paris, were by that time in custody. It is a well-known story how, after he had contrived to leave the prison in his wife's clothes, Lavalette's friends took him to the room which had been prepared for him. Strange to say, it was at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that a hiding-place had been found. Among the permanent officials of that department was a M. Bresson. This gentleman, in revolutionary days, had owed his life to the devotion of some strangers who had hidden him at great personal risk. His wife had, in consequence, made a vow to save any political fugitive from justice who might in the future come across her path. When approached on the subject, both M. and Madame Bresson promptly agreed to offer Lavalette the hospitality of their apartment. Here he remained concealed for about a fortnight.³ The voice of the street crier offering a reward for his apprehension, and warning householders of the penalties attaching to the offence of harbouring a political offender, would occasionally relieve his dullness. The activity and vigilance of the police was such that it seemed almost hopeless for him to attempt to pass out of Paris.⁴ The Princesse de Vaudemont had played an important part in the arrange-

¹ Vulaballe, *Deux Restaurations*, IV. pp. 46-50.

² Pasquier, IV. pp. 77-78.

³ Lavalette, *Mémoires*, II. p. 300.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 307, 314-316.

ments, and materially contributed to the success of Lavalette's escape from prison. Among the many foreigners who frequented her *salon* was a young Englishman named Bruce. He was an ardent Whig, and was lavish in his expressions of sympathy for those whom he and his party termed the victims of the Bourbons. It was, accordingly, suggested to him that he might assist in the saving of one of the most deserving of them.¹ Bruce readily assented, but asked leave to associate in the enterprise his friend Major-General Sir Robert Wilson who was on a visit to Paris. The services of the English General were eagerly accepted, and henceforward he became the prime mover in the undertaking.

Wilson had served with distinction both in the Low Countries and in Spain, but, during most of the great campaigns of the Empire, he had been attached to the Russian army as English Commissioner. From the ranks of the pursuers he had witnessed the destruction of the Grand Army, and had been in conversation with Moreau when the latter was struck down, in 1813, in an engagement outside the walls of Dresden. At the peace he took up Whig politics with enthusiasm, and in the Waterloo campaign was unemployed.² During his visit to Paris, along with his friend Lord Kinnaird, he appears to have been intimately connected with many persons ill-disposed towards the restored monarchy.³ As a politician he cannot be taken very seriously, and as an officer he probably belonged to a type less common in his day than it is at the present time. In coming forward to Lavalette's assistance, Wilson was actuated, no doubt, by a generous wish to rescue a fellow-creature from a cruel fate. Without doing him an injustice, however, it may be inferred that the prospect of becoming the hero of so romantic an adventure appealed strongly to his love of notoriety. Proceeding to the British Embassy, he announced that he was returning to England with his brother-in-law. The necessary papers were at once supplied him. The second passport which he obtained was required, however, not for his brother-in-law, but for Lavalette, who had in the meantime been furnished with the uniform of an English General. On January 10th, thus disguised, he set out from Paris in a cabriolet, accompanied by Wilson. They were preceded by Captain Hely Hutchinson of the 1st, now the Grenadier Guards, on horseback, an officer whom Wilson had taken into his confidence. It was the very morning when Lavalette was

¹ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, IV. p. 382.

Lavalette, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 267-269, 316-317.

² *Dictionary of National Biography*.

³ Pozzo à Nesselrode, 6 Février, 1816.

being executed in effigy on the Place de Grève. The fugitives experienced several anxious moments, but on the second day successfully crossed the Belgian frontier.¹ Whilst Lavalette proceeded to Bavaria, Wilson returned to Paris, where he wrote an account of the whole affair to Lord Grey. It is difficult to conceive an act of greater folly. He cannot have been so ignorant of the methods of the French police as to be unaware of the risk of writing such a letter. As a matter of fact they were already hot upon his scent. The tailor, who had made the mysterious uniform which had been delivered without having been tried on, furnished a valuable clue. The letter to Lord Grey, which they opened, confirmed their suspicions, and gave them the names of Wilson's accomplices. All three were shortly afterwards arrested, and in due course received sentence of three months' imprisonment.²

There was still much work to be performed before the Chambers could put aside their labours. The Budget had to be voted, and a law to regulate the conditions under which, in the future, elections were to be carried out had to be passed. The solution of this last question was looked upon as the most important piece of legislation which awaited the attention of Deputies during the Session. Vaublanc, the Minister of the Interior, accordingly, on December 18th, introduced the new Electoral Law. For the next three months the time of the Chambers was largely taken up in discussing these proposed measures. Inasmuch as the bill was destined never to become law, the matter can be briefly dismissed. Vaublanc's abortive Electoral Bill should be remembered, however, as having, for the first time, brought into prominence the real abilities of an obscure country gentleman from Toulouse. Villèle, a name which was soon to be widely known, was appointed reporter of the committee which, according to practice, had to examine the Ministerial proposals. As a scheme for endowing a civilized country with a system of Parliamentary representation, the bill reads almost like a hoax. Under its provisions the electoral colleges were to consist almost entirely of Government officials chosen by the prefects. That it should be bitterly opposed is not to be wondered at. The fiercest opposition to it, however, came not from the "moder-

¹ Lavalette, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 318-329.

² *Supplementary Despatches*, XI., Wellington to Bathurst, 15 January, 1816.

Grenville to Wellington, 8 March, 1816.

Bathurst to Wellington, 9 March, 1816.

Wellington to Grenville, 14 March, 1816.

Wellington to Bathurst, 16 March, 1816.

Lavalette, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 331-332, 348-363.

ates," but from the Ultra-Royalists.¹ Owing to their breach with the Cabinet, they were loath to see the electoral machinery placed in the hands of the agents of the central government, to an even greater extent than was the case before. But among the amendments to the Ministerial bill which Villèle's committee brought forward was one which dealt with the annual renewal of the Chamber. It was a proposal to which the Ultra-Royalists attached still more importance than they did to the question of the electoral colleges. In accordance with the Charter a fifth part of the Chamber had to be replaced each year. It is a system known as the *Rota*, which had been devised in order to lessen the intensity of electoral crises. The Ultra-Royalists, being in the majority, were anxious to see it abolished and the English system of a general election at the end of a stipulated number of years adopted instead. Were a partial displacement of Deputies to take place annually, the relative strength of parties would soon disappear, seeing the enormous power which the Government possessed of influencing the selection of candidates. In the course of the debates the Ministerial bill underwent profound modifications.² Indeed, when at last it was carried to the Upper Chamber it contained very few of its original clauses. The Peers, to the indignation of the Ultra-Royalists, made short work of what had cost the Deputies three months of time and trouble.³ Accepting the report of their committee that most of the amendments proposed were a violation of the Charter, they rejected the whole bill (April 3rd) by a substantial majority.

When Corvetto, the Finance Minister, introduced the Budget, the obstructive character of the tactics to which the Ultra-Royalists intended to resort, became manifest. The majority of the Deputies selected to sit on the committee proved to be men who had been deliberately chosen on account of their complete ignorance of financial matters. The sale of State lands and forests was one of the principal measures by which the Minister proposed to meet the deficit. It was a step to which the Royalists were determined not to consent. The idea also of paying the creditors of the Hundred Days in full, appeared to them preposterous. They proposed to meet these claims with Exchequer Bonds of 100 francs, which were, however, only quoted at 60. This amounted to nothing less than a declaration of partial

¹ Pasquier, IV. pp. 78-79.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, IV. pp. 509-548.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, IV. pp. 51-59.

² Pozzo à Nesselrode, 19 Janvier, 1816.

³ Pasquier, IV. p. 81.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, IV. p. 589.

bankruptcy. The effect of such a course of action on the public credit was probably little understood by the majority of the committee, or of the Royalists, generally. In any case it seems to have been an aspect of the question to which they were very indifferent. At last, after many compromises and long negotiations, chiefly conducted by Pasquier on behalf of the Government, a Budget was voted. It had been found necessary, however, to completely drop the proposed sale of the State forests, and to adjourn the question of the payment of arrears to another Session.¹

The secret of the opposition of the Royalists to the sale of the forests lay in the fact that these domains had been, with few exceptions, Church property. In the Royalist schemes for undoing the work of the Revolution, the restoration of ecclesiastical power and influence occupied a foremost place. But in order to be powerful the clergy must be wealthy and independent. During the latter half of the Session many propositions dealing with the condition of the Church had been brought before the Chamber. The members of the Congregation had, as may be supposed, taken a prominent part in these discussions. The demands of the clerical party were not confined to the mere improvement of the material circumstances of the clergy. It was desired that the control of the University, public education, and the care of the civil registers should pass into ecclesiastical hands. Whether Louis XVIII had any religious belief at all may be doubted. It cannot, at any rate, be questioned that any convictions he may have had were not very deep-seated.² He knew well, however, that the clergy were firm supporters of the throne. On political grounds, therefore, he was disposed to encourage them and to meet their wishes, as far as he considered it safe to do so. Seeing the strong feeling which existed in the Chamber in favour of legislation in the interests of the Church, the King directed that a bill should be brought forward to provide the clergy with a largely increased income.³

It was not, however, a salaried clergy that the clerical Royalists wanted. The Church, according to their ideas, should form a corporation or body in the State. It must possess landed property. They hoped before long to see the retrocession to their former owners of all the ecclesiastical lands which were now held by the State. But the clergy were debarred from being legatees and the possessors of landed estates. Such a demand could not,

¹ Pasquier, IV. pp. 82-87.

² Viel Castel, *Histoire*, IV. pp. 548-580.

³ Vulaballe, *Deux Restaurations*, IV. pp. 63-70.

⁴ Pozzo à Nesselrode, 29 Janvier, 1816.

⁵ Pasquier, IV. pp. 93-98.

therefore, be made at once. By numerous amendments to the Ministerial bill, however, and by proposals to remove from the Church all disabilities of this kind, it was hoped to advance the good cause. These efforts met with only a qualified success.¹ The Vicomte de Bonald, the Christian philosopher, it is true, succeeded in obtaining the repeal of the Divorce Law which had been included in the Napoleonic Civil Code. But the end of the Session, which the King brought to a close as soon as the Budget had been passed, left many of the clerical questions in abeyance. Some, also, of the amendments to which the party attached great importance were rejected by the Peers.²

The attitude of the Hereditary Chamber affords food for reflection. In the main its members were drawn from very much the same class as were most of the Deputies. To some extent, no doubt, the old "nobility of the Court" had more representatives in the Upper Chamber, whilst the provincial aristocracy predominated in the Lower.³ But, be the reason what it may, it is incontestable, that far less extreme views prevailed among the Peers than among the Deputies. In their struggle with reaction, both the Government and the "Moderates" in the Lower Chamber discovered that they need not look in vain to the hereditary legislators for support.

On April 29th, 1816, after a sitting which had lasted seven months, the King declared the Session closed. Though the Ultra-Royalists had not achieved as much as they had hoped to do, they were not dissatisfied. It was understood that the displacement of a fifth of the Chamber was to be suspended during the current year, owing to an arrangement which had been come to between the Comte d'Artois and the King. The Deputies, accordingly, dispersed to their homes full of hope and of confidence in the future. A great disappointment was in store for them.⁴

¹ Vulabellé, *Deux Restaurations*, IV. pp. 74-80.

² Pasquier, IV. p. 81.

³ Pozzo à Nesselrode, 2 Mars, 1816.

⁴ Vulabellé, *Deux Restaurations*, IV. p. 81.

Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. p. 138.

CHAPTER VIII

GENERAL DONNADIEU

BEFORE the Allied Sovereigns quitted Paris in the autumn of 1815, they had arranged that their Ministers should continue to meet to discuss current events. It, accordingly, became the practice for Sir Charles Stuart, the British ; General Pozzo di Borgo, the Russian ; General Vincent, the Austrian ; and Baron Von Goltz, the Prussian Ambassador, to hold weekly conferences on French affairs. The police, however, generally contrived to obtain copies both of the minutes of the proceedings and of the reports which these diplomatists sent to their respective Governments. Décazes was thus enabled to inform the King and the Duc de Richelieu of everything which had passed at these interviews.

The foreign statesmen had looked upon a strong Royalist Chamber as an event of the happiest augury. But, as the reactionary character of the Royalist majority became apparent, they began to modify their views. The dangerous theories which the presentation of the Budget had called forth, changed these misgivings into feelings of genuine alarm. The four ambassadors, thereupon, decided that the time had come when the King's attention should be called to the apprehensions which the conduct of the Chamber was exciting.¹ The Duke of Wellington, it was unanimously decided, was the most fitting person to undertake this mission. At a meeting which took place on February 28th, Wellington, at the invitation of the members of the conference, produced the letter which he proposed to send to the King of France. After excusing his interference on the ground that His Majesty had himself requested him to bring to his knowledge anything which he might consider required his special attention, Wellington went straight to the point. The scenes in the Assembly were, he said, matters of public notoriety. The Cabinet, though it deservedly enjoyed the confidence of every European Government, had no influence in the Chamber. The Finance Minister was now on the point of being compelled

¹ E. Daudet, *Louis XVIII. et Décazes*, pp. 115-116.
Viel Castel, *Histoire*, V. pp. 1-2.

to abandon his Budget. This was a matter which closely concerned all the Great Powers. Certain members of the Royal family, and some persons about the Court, by the strong support which they gave to the opposition, were rendering the task of Ministers doubly difficult. It was much to be desired that His Majesty should see fit to intervene to put an end to such a state of affairs.¹

Wellington, however, did not confine his remonstrances to this letter. A few days later he sought a personal interview with the Comte d'Artois.² At their meeting the Duke strongly deprecated the constant interference of His Royal Highness and of the Duchesse d'Angoulême with the conduct of public affairs. On this occasion Monsieur gave proof that he was no unworthy pupil of the Jesuits. He showed that he could juggle with words and elude a disagreeable question with no little skill. But the Duke had come well furnished with facts. He was able to bring forward specific instances in which the intervention of Monsieur and of the Duchesse d'Angoulême could not be gainsaid. Driven at last into a corner, the Comte d'Artois somewhat sulkily admitted that he had not always exercised his influence in favour of Ministers. But, if he was in the future to be expected to support the Cabinet, he must be kept informed of the objects of the Government policy. They parted coldly, and the Duke could not flatter himself that anything he had said had made much impression on Monsieur.

Louis XVIII was painfully affected by the receipt of Wellington's letter. It was a disagreeable reminder of the tutelage which he must submit to, so long as the war indemnity remained unpaid, and the Army of Occupation had not been withdrawn. Nobody knew better than he did how well-founded all Wellington's criticisms were. Though he does not appear to have taken any direct steps to remonstrate with his brother, Wellington's communication probably quickened his determination to bring the Session to a close as speedily as possible.³ It may, also, be reasonably inferred that, when a few months later, Louis had to come to a more momentous decision about the future of the Chamber, his resolve was greatly influenced by recollections of this humiliating episode.

The story of Wellington's intervention at the instance of the

¹ *Supplementary Despatches*, XI., Wellington to King of France, 29 February, 1816.

Pozzo à Nesselrode, 2 Mars, 1816.

² *Ibid.*, 16 Mars, 1816.

E. Daudet, *Louis XVIII et Décazes*, pp. 123-125.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, V. pp. 4-5.

³ E. Daudet, *Louis XVIII et Décazes*, pp. 122-123.

Powers soon became known. The indignation of the familiars of the Pavillon de Marsan and of the extreme party at this affront was intense. Some of the more hot-headed even muttered threats that before the Bourbons could be firmly established on the throne they must "mount their horses." The possession of an army and a navy is, however, an essential condition to the waging of war. In 1816 France had neither the one nor the other.¹

Before the close of the year 1815 the disbanding of the old Imperial army had been completed. In order to provide some kind of a military force a rough-and-ready scheme had been drawn up. It was proposed to raise by voluntary enlistment a legion to consist of three battalions in each department. Cavalry, Artillery, and the technical Corps, on a limited scale, were to be provided by the same means. This plan would, it was calculated, furnish an army of about three hundred thousand men.

By an Ordinance, dated September 1st, 1815, the King had wisely abolished the Mousquetaires and other Household troops, with the exception of the Gardes-du-Corps. In their place a *corps d'armée* of Royal Guards about twenty-five thousand strong was to be formed.² Though the regiments which composed it were to be specially recruited for, these corps presented none of the absurdities and anachronisms which had characterized the *red companies* raised in 1814. On the contrary, in a short space of time, they became a highly efficient body. The officers and men serving in them enjoyed, it is true, certain favours and distinctions. These privileges did not, however, exceed those which may properly be extended to troops who are specially entrusted with the protection of the person of the Sovereign.

Ever since his assumption of office, Clarke, the Minister of War, had been occupied with the question of the officers for the new army. Incontestably, the elimination of a number of men of notoriously anti-dynastic views was a step of elementary wisdom. But, in dealing with the corps of officers, who, as a body, had deservedly won the respect and affection of their fellow-citizens, it was advisable to proceed with tact and discrimination. All undue harshness was to be deprecated. Clarke cannot be said to have displayed any of the qualities required for such a task. The "purification" of the public services was a constant cry of the Ultra-Royalists. They wished to see every-body who had served the Usurper declared ineligible for em-

¹ E. Daudet, *Louis XVIII et Décazes*, pp. 130-131.

² Marmont, *Mémoires*, VII. pp. 212-215.

Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 168-176.

ployment in any official capacity. The Minister of War was only too disposed to listen to such demands. Two Commissions were appointed and installed at the War Office.¹ One, presided over by Marshal Victor, Duc de Bellune, was to enquire into the conduct of all the officers of the old army. For purposes of selection Clarke drew up twenty-one "categories." The name of every officer was to appear in one or other of these divisions. Those whom the Commission might consider the least deserving of censure were to be placed in the first categories. The more guilty ones, in an ascending scale, were to be classified among the higher or last groups. Only those who had the good fortune to figure in the earlier divisions were to expect re-employment. The second Commission, under the Presidency of the Comte de Beurnonville, was to adjudicate on the claims for inclusion in the new army of the numerous Royalist officers who had served in irregular corps of all kinds.

Whilst Marshal Victor's Commission carried out the work of elimination with a ruthless severity, the members of the second Committee lent a ready ear to the often preposterous pretensions of every Chouan and *émigré* who came before them. These proceedings gave rise to a widespread feeling of indignation which was far from being confined to military society. It may be doubted whether anything stirred up more animosity or created more bitter enemies to the dynasty than the harsh treatment meted out to the officers of the old army.²

Recruiting for the new legions was not pressed very vigorously. In the spring of 1816 one weak battalion was generally the strength of the departmental regiments. The men who had come forward to serve were mostly disbanded soldiers of the old army. It was whilst their military force was in this condition that Ministers were informed that a serious Bonapartist insurrection had broken out at Grenoble. The first news, which was received in Paris on May 6th, shortly after the close of the Sssion, had been conveyed by the telegraph³ from Lyons. In the course of the next few days General Donnadieu's despatch came to hand. It described the rebellion as a most formidable affair. The real facts of the case were these.

During the Hundred Days the Duc d'Orléans had not joined the Royal Family at Ghent, but had gone to England. He had made it clear both to the King and to the Duke of Wellington

¹ Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, IV. pp. 6-10.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, pp. 251-257.

² Marmont, *Mémoires*, VII. pp. 167-169.

Pozzo à Nesselrode, 15 Décembre, 1815.

³ Chappé's semaphore system.

that he could not associate himself with any hostile action against France. This attitude, coupled with the letter which he had written to the generals under his command before leaving Lille, had won him many friends. It had greatly increased, however, the distrust which the King entertained for him. After the second Restoration he had paid a short visit to Paris to offer his congratulations to Louis, and had then returned to England.¹ But by the opening of the Session, in October 1815, he was back again ready to take his place in the Upper Chamber. On October 13th he had opposed some passages in the address which the Peers were preparing to submit to the King. He had counselled the employment of more moderate language in speaking of the Bonapartists.² The sittings of the Peers were held in secret. The matter, however, soon leaked out and was much talked about. The Duke's friends advised him to have a true account of the episode drawn up and circulated for general information. A certain Didier, who was known to one of the frequenters of the Palais Royal, was accordingly commissioned to have the Duke's pamphlet printed. But the police soon discovered what was going on and reported the circumstances. The King and all the Royal Family were very angry. The Duc d'Orléans received, in consequence, a peremptory order to leave Paris and to return to England. Before his departure, however, some of his people succeeded in recovering his manuscript and in destroying the type which had been set up. This appears to have been the whole extent of Didier's connection with the Duke's affairs. There is not the faintest reason to suppose that he had ever, at any time, had any direct or personal dealings with His Royal Highness.

There are persons in whom the love of adventure and of intrigue overmasters every other human passion. In troublous times the rôle of the conspirator has overwhelming attractions for them. Paul Didier was a man of this class. Seeing the period of political convulsion in which his lines were cast, it is only remarkable that he should have lived to the age of fifty-eight. His career had been a singularly chequered one.³ By profession a lawyer, he had been in turn a revolutionary, a Royalist plotter, an *émigré* and an enthusiastic admirer of

¹ *Despatches*, XII., Wellington to Duc d'Orléans, 6 June, 1815.

Supplementary Despatches, X., Duc d'Orléans to Louis XVIII., 25 April, 1815; 17 May, 1815; 12 June, 1815.

Liverpool to Canning, 13 June, 1815.

² *Vaulabelle, Deux Restaurations*, IV. pp. 91-92.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 86-90.

Pasquier, IV. pp. 112-113.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, V. pp. 79-80.

Bonaparte. A pamphlet which he had written on the subject of the Concordat had been approved of by the First Consul. He had rewarded its author with the chair of Jurisprudence at the University of Grenoble. But Didier soon wearied of the monotony of regular work on a fixed income. He began gradually to neglect his duties for the more exciting field of speculative adventures. Before long his time was completely absorbed in the floating of industrial and commercial undertakings. His restless imagination led him into every scheme by which fortune may be rapidly acquired, from the cutting of a canal, or the opening of a new road, to the promotion of a mining company. It is a curious but not uncommon characteristic of men of this stamp, that they are often themselves carried away by the alluring prospects which they hold out to potential shareholders. They actually come to believe in the genuineness of their own statements.

By the year 1813 Didier was a bankrupt flying from his creditors. He now turned again to political speculation. Events, however, seem to have moved too quickly for him. The Bourbons were brought back before he had had time to draw attention to himself in any way. For services rendered in the old days he conceived that he had claims on the gratitude of the restored dynasty. The subordinate post in connection with the Council of State to which he was appointed after the first Restoration was, in his opinion, a very inadequate requital. He is supposed to have played some small part in the Fouché-Drouet d'Erlon plot in March, 1815. The story of his relations with the Duc of Orléans, after the second Restoration, has already been told.

The early days of 1816 found Didier at Lyons. He was busily engaged in trying to persuade his dupes of the existence of a society to which he gave the name of the association of national independence. Both Fouché and Talleyrand were supposed to be members of it. It had been formed, he assured his listeners, with the object of restoring France to her former greatness and of driving out Louis XVIII, who was to be replaced on the throne by the Duc d'Orléans. The police were not long in ignorance of the propagandism which he was carrying on. But Didier himself contrived to elude their vigilance. Many of those, however, whom he had succeeded in enrolling were thrown into prison.¹

From Lyons Didier fled into Dauphiné. At Grenoble he was, of course, well known, and, inasmuch as he was "wanted" by the police, he had to be careful of showing himself. He soon,

¹ Vulaballe, *Deux Restaurations*, IV. pp. 93-95.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, V. p. 81.

however, established relations with the numerous half-pay officers resident in the town. The whole district was strongly Bonapartist. The previous year Napoleon's march through the province had resembled a triumphal progress. The recollection of it was fresh in the memory of the country people. The peasants were imbued with a strong military spirit, and most of them had been soldiers of the Grand Army.¹ Didier's experience at Eyons had taught him that it was useless to attempt to arouse enthusiasm by invoking the name of the Duc d'Orléans. With countrymen, old soldiers, and half-pay officers, he was merely another Bourbon.

All through the months of March and April Didier was hard at work preaching his revolutionary doctrines in the villages round Grenoble.² Among a population hostile to the Bourbons he soon obtained a large following. The night of May 4th was fixed upon for the rising. The peasants were to assemble before nightfall in the woods, and, at a given signal, to make a converging march on Grenoble. The half-pay officers and the conspirators within the town were to overpower or to suborn the guards and throw open the gates. As soon as Grenoble had raised the tricolour, Eyons would follow suit, and General Drouet d'Erlon, who was waiting on the Swiss frontier, would appear and take over the military direction of the movement. Such at least was the story with which Didier deluded his unfortunate adherents. But, though there was hardly a word of truth in any of his statements, he was full of confidence and prepared, unhesitatingly, to stake his life on the success of the undertaking. Both Montlivaut, the Prefect of the Isère, and General Donnadiou, who commanded the district, were uncompromising Royalists. Montlivaut had acted as Secretary-General to Josephine after her divorce and, like many other men in similar circumstances, hoped, by the truculent zeal which he displayed in the service of the Monarchy, to obliterate his Imperial past. Nobody had made more arbitrary use of the great powers which the suspension of individual liberty and other coercive legislation had placed at his disposal. Numerous instances of his tyrannical proceedings are recorded. In political cases he decreed that the witnesses should be marched to the Court handcuffed two and two. General Donnadiou was a man of the same stamp but of a more violent and turbulent disposition. He had been on several occasions in trouble under the

¹ Vulabellé, *Deux Restaurations*, IV. pp. 108-114.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, V. pp. 82-85.

² The best account of these events is contained in Vulabellé, *Deux Restaurations*, IV. pp. 114-148.

Cf. also Pasquier, IV. pp. 111-115.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, V. pp. 86-112.

Empire, and, in its latter years, had been left without employment. At the Restoration he had embraced monarchical principles with ardour. He had followed the King to Ghent, and had been rewarded with the command of the Grenoble district and the rank of Lieutenant-General.

The Legion of the Isère, the department of which Grenoble is the chief town, commanded by an *émigré* officer, Colonel de Vautré, was the only regular regiment of the garrison. It consisted of but one battalion some five hundred strong. The reports which, during the month of March, had reached the prefect of the existence of a certain degree of disaffection in the neighbouring villages induced the General to ask for reinforcements. His request could not easily be complied with; nevertheless some small detachments were sent him, which brought up the strength of the garrison to about eight hundred men. Montlivaut, following the practice of other agents of the Government, had arranged with the parish priests to keep him supplied with intelligence. It was not, however, till May 2nd that he received any news of an alarming character. The information, which was then conveyed to him, led him to order the arrest of several half-pay officers and other suspected persons in the town. But when Donnadiou heard that some National Guards had been requisitioned to patrol the suburbs and to assist the police in their perquisitions, he flew into a violent rage. He accused his civilian colleague of trespassing on his department, and treated his alarm as ridiculous and childish. Nothing could overcome Donnadiou's obstinacy. It was not till the evening of May 4th, when one or two persons arrived who had actually seen the peasants mustering for the attack, that, to use his own words, "The scales fell from his eyes." Once convinced of the reality of the danger, he made his dispositions promptly enough. They were not, however, conceived with any idea of avoiding unnecessary bloodshed, but solely with the object of inflicting the heaviest punishment on the insurgents. Instead of ordering the gates to be closed, Donnadiou gave directions that they should be left open.

The arrests which Montlivaut had effected had been made, more or less, at random. The only person of any importance in the plot who had been seized was a half-pay officer, and he had been released the next day. This action by the police had, nevertheless, almost completely dislocated Didier's plans. The chief conspirators in Grenoble, concluding that the authorities had discovered everything, were panic-stricken and determined to fly. Thus most of the men on whom Didier had been depending to open the gates and to concert movements in his

favour, within the town, deserted their posts. The fugitives joined Didier in the country during the 3rd, or on the morning of the 4th. That desperate man was not, however, to be deterred by the news which they brought. The movement, he decided, should proceed.

When, a little before midnight on May 4th, Didier's main column was approaching Grenoble, it came into contact with some patrols which had been sent out to reconnoitre. They fell back rapidly. The peasants pressed on and discovered to their joy that the Porte de Bonne was open. They felt sure that it must be in the possession of their friends. But as they rushed forward with a shout of triumph, the first volley crashed into them. It came from Vautré's corps, which, after a momentary hesitation, was now firing steadily. A few wild shots from the peasants and Didier's insurrection was over.

The moment the insurgents gave way Vautré gave the order to advance. The pursuit continued throughout the night. Near the village of Eybens, about three miles from Grenoble, Didier, who had brought up some reinforcements, made a last effort to stay the flight of his followers. But, though he set them an heroic example and exposed himself recklessly, he could not rally them. His horse was shot under him, and he escaped capture only by seeking the cover of the woods which bordered the road. In accordance with the plan of operations, Colonel Brun, a half-pay officer, had led another party of rebels against the north of the town. After a brief skirmish with the Royal troops, the Colonel, hearing that the main column was in retreat, succeeded in drawing off his men unmolested.

On the Royal side there had been no casualties. Six, however, of the rebels had been killed, and considerably more had, probably, been wounded. The alarming description of the affair which Donnadiou had sent to Paris has already been related. The first account of an engagement which a General sends back must necessarily be written before he is in full possession of all the facts of the case. Admitting this, Donnadiou's despatch to the Minister of War furnishes abundant proof that it was drawn up with the deliberate intention of exaggerating the seriousness of the insurrection. "Long live the King—Your Excellency," so began the first of these extraordinary documents. "All the roads for three miles round Grenoble are covered with the corpses of His Majesty's enemies. The troops covered themselves with glory. . . . We have already caught more than sixty scoundrels whom the Prevotal Court will make short work of. . . . Four thousand brigands took part in the attack on the town."

On May 7th three men appeared before the Provost's Court

and were condemned to death. Two of these, old soldiers of the Imperial Guard, were guillotined the next day. In the meantime, however, General Donnadieu had received instructions from Paris to place the whole department under Martial Law. On the 9th, accordingly, a batch of thirty prisoners was taken before a Court Martial presided over by Colonel de Vautré. In view of the prominent part which this officer had been called upon to play in the affair, another person might, with advantage, have been appointed President in his place. General Donnadieu, apparently, thought differently. The proceedings before the Provost's Court had been marked by several unedifying incidents. But Vautré's conduct put these completely into the shade. "Stop, Scoundrel, "Sit down, Scoundrel," was the ordinary language which he used in addressing the unfortunate men he was supposed to be trying. He had grudgingly allowed three advocates who were present in Court to conduct the defence of the prisoners. But their speeches were delivered amidst a running fire of adverse comments, or interrupted by the President's angry shouts "to cut it short." The trial was concluded in one day. Nine of the accused were acquitted and twenty-one were condemned to be shot. Seven of these were recommended to the King's mercy, but the sentence passed on the remainder was put into execution the next day. On the 15th, however, Donnadieu was instructed from Paris that no recommendation to mercy could be entertained, and that the twenty-one death sentences must all be carried out. The eight men in question were, in consequence, executed without further delay, among them being a boy of sixteen.

Didier, for whose capture General Donnadieu had been empowered to offer a reward of twenty thousand francs, was soon caught.¹ After wandering about in great misery among the mountains of Savoy, his whereabouts were betrayed by an inn-keeper. He was taken to Turin and forthwith handed over to the French police. The views of the Sardinian authorities on this subject seem to have been peculiar. They were quite prepared to give up Didier, a political prisoner, without even waiting for the official demand of the French Government for his extradition. On the other hand when, in 1822, Mingrat, a parish priest, fled into Savoy after murdering his mistress and cutting up her body into small pieces, they declined to surrender him. On May 23rd, only six days after his arrest, Didier was in gaol at Grenoble. He did not appear, however, before the Provost's Court till June 8th. In the meantime great efforts were made to induce

¹ Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, IV. pp. 151-158.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, V. pp. 119-120.

him to make revelations, and it was conveyed to him that his life would be spared if he would confess everything. But nothing could be extracted from him. Probably there was little to tell, and the theory of the Government that there were important persons behind him was, without doubt, erroneous. On the evening of June 9th he was condemned to death. On the 10th, the day of his execution, Donnadiou visited him to make a last attempt to induce him to reveal all he knew. According to the General's report Didier, after much persuasion, said, "Let the King keep the Duc d'Orléans and M. de Talleyrand as far from the throne and from France as possible." It must be remembered however, that there were no witnesses to this scene, and that there is only Donnadiou's uncorroborated statement as to what happened.¹ A few hours later Didier ascended the scaffold with unshaken firmness. His was the twenty-fifth execution in connection with the affair of Grenoble.

The Government behaved most generously in the matter of rewards. General Donnadiou was created a Viscount and a Knight of Saint-Louis. A gratuity of one hundred thousand francs was also awarded him. Previous to this the Duke of Wellington had written to him commending his firm attitude and tendering him his congratulations. Montlivaut was advanced to the rank of a Councillor of State. Vautré was made a Baron and promoted Major-General, whilst the Legion of Honour and minor recompenses were distributed lavishly. From this time forward Donnadiou became the idol of the Ultra-Royalists. After all, they were wont to say, there was nobody like a man brought up in the school of Bonaparte for dealing with popular movements.²

The affair of Grenoble is one of the most deplorable episodes of the Restoration. It was necessary to impress on the people of Dauphiné that attempts to upset the Government could no longer be made with impunity. But this end could have been attained without resorting to wholesale executions. Had, however, the death sentences been carried out after the accused had had the benefit of a fair trial, the necessity for making a great example might be held to have justified their number. The conduct of Ministers, in advising the King to reject all recommendations for pardon before they had heard the reasons

¹ Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, IV. pp. 161-162.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, V. pp. 122-124.

² Pasquier, IV. p. 116.

Supplementary Despatches, XI., Wellington to Donnadiou, 20 May, 1816.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, V. pp. 114-115.

Marmont, *Mémoires*, VII. p. 231.

which had led the Courts to make them, cannot be defended. But in passing judgment on the Government it must be remembered that the two chief officials on the spot had sent in grossly misleading reports. How greatly the authorities in Paris had been deceived came out by degrees, and, chiefly, owing to an amusing circumstance. The dignity of a State Councillor, to which Montlivaut had been raised, gave him the precedence over the General at state functions. Donnadiou's indignation knew no bounds, and it was due to the recriminations of these two worthies that most of the truth about the events at Grenoble leaked out. Montlivaut was soon afterwards transferred to Caen, and the opportunity was taken, before long, of removing Donnadiou from his command.¹

Shortly before the outbreak of Didier's insurrection, the police in Paris claimed to have brought to light the existence of a dangerous conspiracy.² A nice sense of honour can hardly be a distinguishing feature of the professional spy's character. When business is slack he is apt to exchange the more or less legitimate part of the detective for the highly objectionable and illegal rôle of the *agent provocateur*. Police officials, and even their superiors, do not always discountenance this well-known tendency of their agents. If a certain amount of disaffection is believed to exist, it is sometimes held to be convenient "to bring it to a head." It is impossible to read any detailed account of trial of "The Patriots of 1816" without coming to the conclusion that the more serious crimes alleged against them were deliberately suggested by paid agents of the Government. All the twenty-eight persons, including one woman, who appeared before the Assize Court of the Seine, belonged, with the exception of a half-pay officer and one or two others, to the working classes. Of the three men charged with being the ringleaders, Pleignier was a leather-dresser, Carbonneau a public writer in reduced circumstances, and Tolleran an engraver out of work. Some change which the Minister of War had decided on, with regard to the regulation cavalry boot, had injured Pleignier's business, and had inspired him with a bitter hatred for the reigning dynasty. He appears to have conceived the notion of forming an association, of which all the members were to be provided with special cards. Pleignier had prepared them with the assistance of Tolleran the engraver. Along with a Masonic sign they all bore

¹ Pasquier, IV. p. 117.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, V. pp. 116-119.

² *Causes politiques du XIX^e siècle par une société d'avocats*, Paris, 1827.
"Procès des patriotes, 1816."

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, V. pp. 150-170.

the inscription : " Union, Honour, Country," hence the name of " Patriots " given to the conspirators.

The formation of a society of this kind was an illegal act. Nevertheless the authorities, though aware of its existence, showed no disposition to intervene. Different methods were adopted. At the suggestion, so at least the prisoners asserted, of a man called Sheltein, who was, without doubt, employed by the police, a treasonable proclamation was issued. The chief conspirators were in the habit of meeting at various taverns. At one of these gatherings there was a good deal of vague talk about an attack on the Tuileries. Sheltein, the police spy, however, again came forward with a definite proposal. He suggested that barrels of gunpowder might easily be exploded in a sewer which ran from the Palace to the Seine, and came out near the Pont Neuf. Two or three days later the whole party were arrested.

At their trial the Crown Prosecutors pressed the case against the prisoners with the greatest acrimony. There was evidently a strong desire on the part of the Government to strike terror among the disaffected working classes. " The leather-dresser and the engraver must in future keep to their shops, and learn that they must no longer attempt to make history," were words used by the President in the course of his examination of Tollerón. They doubtless explain the true reasons which actuated the authorities in initiating the proceedings.

On July 27th the three ringleaders suffered the full penalty usually reserved for parricides. They were conveyed barefooted and draped in long black veils to the Place de Grève, where the executioner chopped off their right hands, after which they were decapitated. The other conspirators escaped with long terms of imprisonment.

During the first half of the year 1816 there were numerous other political prosecutions about the country.¹ The most noteworthy case being the Court Martial of General Mouton-Duvernét at Lyons. This officer, who had been long in hiding, was the last person to suffer death for participation in the events of the Hundred Days. The otherwise gloomy summer was enlivened, however, by a Royal marriage of great importance to the dynasty. At the close of the previous year Blacas, who had been sent as ambassador to the Neapolitan Court, had negotiated the betrothal of the Duc de Berri to the Princess Caroline, granddaughter of Ferdinand IV, King of the Two Sicilies. The future Duchesse de Berri was a Neapolitan Bourbon, that is, a direct descendant of Philip V of Spain, the grandson of Louis XIV.

¹ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, V. pp. 134-139.

But besides this cousinship she was related to the French Royal Family through her mother, Marie Clementine, the daughter of Leopold II, Emperor of Austria, and the niece therefore of Marie Antoinette, and through her grandmother, Marie Caroline, who was the sister of the unfortunate Queen of France. On April 24th the marriage by proxy took place at Naples, the bride's uncle, Leopold, Prince of Salerno, representing the Duc de Berri. On May 21st, 1816, the Princess arrived off Marseilles, in which port she was quarantined for ten days, and only arrived at Fontainebleau, where it had been arranged that her first meeting with her husband was to take place, on June 15th.¹ It was in the forest, at the cross roads of La Croix de Saint-Herem,² that Louis XVIII and the Royal Family awaited the bride. Talleyrand was present as Grand Chamberlain. Twelve years before he had officiated in the same capacity and at the same spot, when Napoleon had driven out from Paris to meet the Pope Pius VIII, who had come to France to crown him. The young Princess is said to have created a good impression on the King and on her husband. On Sunday, June 16th, she made her state entry into Paris, receiving a warm welcome, and on the following day the marriage ceremony was celebrated at Notre Dame. The happy event was made the occasion of festivities and popular rejoicings. Honours and decorations were distributed freely. Two old *émigrés*, the Duc de Coigny and the Comte de Viomesnil, whose rôle in the affair of the Fauchers at Bordeaux has been related, were created Marshals of France, a rank to which the Comte Beurnonville and Clarke, Duc de Feltre, the Minister of War, were elevated at the same time.³

The Duchess de Berri, though not beautiful, and indifferently educated, was bright and agreeable and possessed of some personal charm. The Elysée was given to the newly married couple as a place of residence. Both were fond of society and of entertaining. Their parties were soon noted for a gaiety which formed a singular contrast to the dull ceremonial and strict etiquette which prevailed at the Tuileries.⁴ The Duchesse de Reggio, the wife of Marshal Oudinot, had been chosen as first Lady of Honour to the young Princess. This was looked upon as a gracious concession to the new nobility, and was widely

¹ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, V. pp. 129-130.

Imbert de Saint-Amand, *Duchesse de Berri et Louis XVIII*, pp. 30-50.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 65-70.

Mme. de Gontaut, *Mémoires*, pp. 159-165.

³ Vulaballe, *Deux Restaurations*, IV. p. 214.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, V. pp. 131-132.

⁴ Mme. de Boigne, II. pp. 258-261.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, V. pp. 130-131.

appreciated. Outside the Faubourg-Saint-Germain it was hoped that her appointment was intended to inaugurate a new departure, and that the Royal Family meant to extend their social relations beyond the families of the old nobility. But this expectation was fulfilled only to a very limited extent. Matrimony, moreover, made little difference to the Duke's private habits. He soon returned to the pleasures of his bachelor days, and what was, perhaps, more unfortunate still, retained his rough manners and continued to indulge in his wild outbursts of fury.

CHAPTER IX

THE FAVOURITE MINISTER

LOUIS XVIII's relations with Décazes were daily becoming closer and more intimate. Every day they spent long hours together. Many of the King's letters to his favourite have now been published. They are couched in language of the warmest affection. "My dear Boy," was the paternal fashion which Louis usually adopted in addressing his Minister. At the Pavillon de Marsan and in the Faubourg-Saint-Germain the situation was viewed with feelings of the liveliest indignation. Various calumnies were put into circulation to account for the favour which Décazes enjoyed. One baseless fabrication was the common assertion that Madame Princetau, his sister, had succeeded in awakening the long dormant passions of the old King. But together with this slanderous invention another explanation was readily accepted. Décazes, it was said, owed his position to the skill with which he kept Louis entertained with highly spiced anecdotes about well-known persons, which came to his knowledge through the police reports.¹ It is, of course, possible that the King may have derived amusement from the light which they threw on the seamy side of human nature. He had a decidedly cynical turn of mind, and a liking for revelations obtained in this way was, to some extent, hereditary in his family. It was not, however, by pandering to such tastes that Décazes succeeded in establishing his great ascendancy over his Royal master.

Louis had from the first been greatly pleased with Décaze's intelligence. The King's indolence and dislike for the details of public affairs was proverbial. But when business had to be discussed with his Police Minister, Louis soon discovered that it engrossed his attention to the full. Décazes had successfully solved the problem as to how his master's interest could be aroused and kept alive. Taking advantage of his comparative youth, he almost invariably approached the matter which he had in hand in the character of a pupil who had come to seek instruc-

¹ Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, IV. pp. 433-437.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, VI. pp. 92-96.

tion. Louis was immensely fascinated by the notion that he was inculcating his own ideas of statecraft on the receptive mind of his young minister. All through his life he had felt the need of a confidential friend. The place in his affections which Blacas had occupied was vacant. He had given it to Décazes, whose cultivated intelligence was congenial to him, and who had found out the secret of how to make even the routine of business attractive.¹

Before the Parliamentary Session had come to an end, Décazes had determined that the Chamber must be dissolved.² But to effect this object successfully it was not sufficient to persuade the King to carry it out. Richelieu and his colleagues in the Cabinet must be brought to see the necessity for such a step. The action of the President of the Council had removed one important obstacle to the realization of his plans. No sooner had the Chambers risen for the summer recess than Richelieu had declared to the King that either Vaublanc must go, or he himself would resign. In the course of the debates on the Electoral Bill, Vaublanc had announced that he personally disapproved of the Government's intention to retain the system of the *Rota*. But Vaublanc's misdeeds did not end here. The control of the National Guards was an important branch of the Home Department. The Comte d'Artois was, it is true, the Colonel-General of the citizen troops. Monsieur's appointment was, however, intended to be a purely honorary one. Nevertheless, Vaublanc had deliberately allowed him to assume effective command of the force. The Comte d'Artois had not been slow in availing himself of the opportunity thus afforded him of so widely extending his influence.³ Regular Headquarter Staff offices, supervised by his Aides-de-Camp de Bruges and Jules de Polignac, had been, accordingly, set up. But the correspondence with which these *bureaux* dealt was not exclusively military in character. Commanders of provincial corps were encouraged to report on the spirit which prevailed in their districts,⁴ and on the attitude taken up by their prefect and his subordinate officials. The command of the National Guards, as understood

¹ Marmont, *Mémoires*, VII. p. 226.

Madame de Boigne, II. pp. 283, 284.

E. Daudet, *Louis XVIII et Décazes*, pp. 203-205.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 131-132.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, IV. pp. 238-240.

Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. pp. 148-149.

³ Marmont, *Mémoires*, VII. p. 230.

Pasquier, IV. pp. 90, 109.

E. Daudet, *Louis XVIII et Décazes*, pp. 135 and 265.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, V. pp. 69-72.

⁴ Pasquier, IV. p. 253.

by Monsieur, was thus converted into a kind of opposition Ministry of Police. In short, it threatened to become a formidable political engine, the action of which, at elections especially, might prove a serious embarrassment to the Government.

The removal of Vaublanc was a step very displeasing to the Pavillon de Marsan and the Ultra-Royalists. Though Louis was reluctant to annoy his brother, he could not hesitate between the Minister of the Interior and the President of the Council. Vaublanc was dismissed, and his place at the Home Office was taken by Lainé, the President of the Chamber of Deputies.

Vaublanc was the Minister who was the most closely in sympathy with the extreme Royalists, and who would, in consequence, have been certain to have most strenuously opposed the idea of dissolution. Nevertheless, it would be a great mistake to suppose that the other members of the Cabinet, from the President downwards, were prepared to approve the drastic measure which Décazes contemplated. Richelieu, though he might deplore the violence and short-sighted policy of the majority in the Chamber, could not forget that the party, after all, consisted of men who were devoted to the Monarchy. He was, moreover, related by the ties of family, or connected by the friendly intercourse of daily life, with the most prominent members of it.¹ But his most passionate desire was to see his country freed from the humiliating presence of the Army of Occupation. Once convinced that the conduct of the Ultra-Royalists was retarding the consummation of his dearest hope, Richelieu hesitated no longer. The adhesion of the President of the Council to the scheme of dissolution carried with it the assent of Lainé, the Minister of the Interior. Clarke was won over by his elevation to the rank of a Marshal of France on the occasion of the Royal Marriage. There was little difficulty in bringing Corvetto, the Minister of Finance, into line with the views of his principal colleagues. But Décazes had not confined his negotiations to members of the Cabinet. He had discreetly sounded and then taken into his confidence the leaders of the "Moderates," Royer-Collard, Pasquier, and de Serre, who had all expressed their warmest approval of his plans and had promised him their heartiest support.²

Décazes has no title to rank as a great statesman, but, in his handling of this affair, he gave proof that he was possessed of diplomatic ability. His management of the King was equally

¹ Pozzo à Nesselrode, 21 Mars, 1816; 14 Avril, 1816. Crousaz-Crétet, *Richelieu*, pp. 202-204.

Marmont, *Mémoires*, VII. p. 252.

² Pasquier, IV. pp. 121-124.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, IV. p. 239.

skilful. Louis had on many occasions been angered by the conduct of the Chamber. He believed, however, that the predominant party truthfully reflected the opinions of the majority of his subjects.¹ He had, recently, been much gratified by the liberal and generous spirit in which the Deputies had voted the money for the Duc de Berri's establishment. Décazes did not attempt to combat the King's views. He made it his practice, however, to let him see the reports which, as Minister of Police, he received from the departments. In most of them there was frequent mention of the insolent and presumptuous language which the Deputies were indulging in in their constituencies. A recent indisposition of His Majesty's had, it was said, filled them with joy. If only Monsieur could come to the throne, the work of the Counter-Revolution might begin in earnest. Décazes also showed the King the letters which he received from private correspondents in the provinces. One, especially, from Maine de Biran, in which the philosopher spoke of the behaviour of the *émigré* party as a serious danger to the Monarchy, greatly impressed His Majesty. When the King's mind had been sufficiently prepared, Décazes opened his batteries.

The correspondence between Louis and his favourite Minister, which M. Ernest Daudet has published, shows that perseverance and tact was required to bring the King to the required point. It was not until August 21st that Décazes appears to have finally triumphed over Louis' irresolution.² But the result was then seen in the ordinance of September 5th, by which His Majesty dissolved the Chamber of Deputies, and declared that at the coming elections the Charter would be strictly adhered to. That is to say, that the number of the members of the popular Assembly would be reduced to 258, the number provided by clause 36 of the Charter, and that no candidates would be eligible for Parliamentary election who had not attained the age of forty.

A remarkable feature about the affair had been the absolute secrecy which had surrounded the negotiations. Not a whisper, not a suspicion of the *coup d'état* which was pending had transpired. Of the foreign statesmen present in Paris Wellington alone appears to have been aware of what was going on.³ After the King had affixed his signature to the famous ordinance, the disagreeable task of acquainting the Comte d'Artois devolved

¹ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, V. pp. 202-218.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, pp. 240-245.

Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. pp. 149-151.

² E. Daudet, *Louis XVIII et Décazes*, pp. 132-147.

³ *Supplementary Despatches*, XI., Wellington to Castlereagh, 30 August, 1816.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, V. p. 222-223.

on Richelieu. Louis himself retired to bed, giving the strictest orders that he was not to be disturbed. Monsieur was amazed beyond measure, and announced his intention of at once seeking his brother's presence with a view to induce him to reconsider his determination. This was, however, impossible. It seems that it was not till the following evening that he conveyed his disapproval, in writing, to the King.¹ Judging by a note from Louis to Décazes, Monsieur's letter was couched in very moderate language, and Louis' reply to it seems to have been expressed in the same tone. But unlike their father, both the Duc d'Angoulême and the Duc de Berri waited on His Majesty to assure him that they fully concurred with the step which he had taken. The younger brother, however, soon reverted to his former ideas.

The great news appeared in the *Moniteur* on September 7th. The King and the Government were not long in doubt as to the spirit in which the public would receive it. At the Opera, Richelieu was the object of an enthusiastic reception. From all parts of the country poured in expressions of congratulation and approval. The general feeling of relief and of restored confidence was reflected in a substantial rise of the *rente*.

At the elections which followed the dissolution, the Ultra-Royalists, notwithstanding all their efforts, were, as a party, defeated. When the Session 1816-1817 opened, Ministers found that, in a greatly reduced Assembly, they could count on a working majority of between fifty and sixty.²

Thus passed away the Incomparable Chamber. Circumstances had given the Royalists the greatest chance which they had had for a generation, and this opportunity they had misused. Their advent to power had taken place at a time of national trouble and humiliation. But they had done nothing to alleviate the misfortunes under which their country was groaning. On the contrary, they had shown very plainly that their aims and their aspirations were distinct from those held by the great mass of their fellow-countrymen. The independent spirit, however, displayed in the aristocratic Chamber of 1815, stands out in marked contrast to the cowardly and servile attitude which was characteristic of the middle-class assemblies of the Empire and

¹ E. Daudet, *Louis XVIII et Décazes*, pp. 148-149.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, V. pp. 230-233.

Pasquier, IV. pp. 125-126.

Madame de Boigne, II. pp. 230-231.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, IV. pp. 245-246.

Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. pp. 152-153.

² Pasquier, IV. pp. 131-132.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, V. pp. 235, 237, 261, 273.

of the first Restoration. It is to the *chambre introuvable*, with all its faults, that France owes her first lesson in Parliamentary Government.

Disappointed ambition and wounded vanity had driven both Chateaubriand and Talleyrand into the ranks of the Ultra-Royalists. Chateaubriand had expected a post in the Government or an Embassy, and was furious at the neglect with which he had been treated. Talleyrand was enraged beyond measure to see that the ship of State could be steered without his assistance. Richelieu, "the Minister who knew the Crimea so thoroughly," as he ironically described him, had become, in consequence, the object of his keenest aversion and the target for his bitterest sarcasms.¹

It was an open secret, during the summer of 1816, that Chateaubriand was preparing a book, in which he proposed to lay down the true principles of representative government. But *The Monarchy according to the Charter*² was to be more than a mere exposition of the author's views on abstract questions of State. It was to be, in effect, a sweeping condemnation of the past policy of His Majesty's Ministers. When the Ordinance of September 5th had appeared, the book, though completed, had not yet been published. Chateaubriand, who shared to the full the indignation of the party whose cause he had espoused, had, thereupon, added a postscript. These final words were, as they were no doubt intended to be, even more offensive than the rest of the work. A few advance copies were already in circulation. Décazes obtained one of these and placed it before the King. Louis, who had never liked "the Chateaubriand," as he called him, was very angry, and directed that he should be told that it was His Majesty's wish that the book should not be published. To this intimation, though it was conveyed to him most courteously by Dambray, the President of the Chamber of Peers, Chateaubriand turned a deaf ear.

On the early morning of the day on which *The Monarchy according to the Charter* was to appear, the police entered the premises of the publisher, Lenormand, and proceeded to carry off every copy of the book. But before the seizure had been completely effected Chateaubriand, theatrically attired in his Peer's robes, himself arrived. His protests were, however, of no avail, nor was the contention successful which he afterwards

¹ E. Daudet, *Louis XVIII et Décazes*, pp. 153-155 and 169-170.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 155-159.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, V. pp. 240-253.

Pasquier, IV. pp. 129-130.

made to the Minister of Police, that the property of a Peer was inviolable.¹

Décazes' action had been perfectly legal though exceedingly unwise. The intervention of the police had been made possible owing to a technical infraction of the law which Denormand had committed. When, however, the publisher had paid the thousand franc fine to which his offence had rendered him amenable, the authorities had no longer any power to prevent the publication of Chateaubriand's book. Décazes had merely delayed the appearance, but had not permanently suppressed the obnoxious work. Louis was not slow to point out gently to his favourite the foolishness of his proceedings. But the King, though he might regret the seizure on account of its futility and of the halo of martyrdom which it conferred on the victim, had no idea of allowing Chateaubriand's flagrant disregard of his wishes to go unpunished. Under date of September 20th, 1816, there appeared an ordinance in the *Moniteur* to the effect that "the Vicomte de Chateaubriand having thrown a doubt on the Ordinance of September 5th, being a manifestation of our Personal Will . . . ceases to be a member of our Council of State."

The post from which Chateaubriand had been dismissed was a purely honorary one, but it carried with it a salary of 20,000 francs. To a man as chronically impecunious as he was this was a serious loss. He was compelled, or pretended to be compelled, to sell his library.² His country place near Paris, La Vallée aux Loups, he was, also, obliged to part with. Chateaubriand had hoped to dispose of this property by means of a lottery. Ninety tickets of a thousand francs each were to be offered for sale. By purchasing them the Ultra-Royalists might gracefully testify their gratitude to one who had lost so heavily in the service of their cause. But, as the event was to prove, the sympathy of these gentlemen was not prepared to take so practical a form. The lottery scheme turned out a failure and had to be abandoned. Poor Chateaubriand's estate was then put up for auction with a reserve on it of 50,000 francs. At an advance of only one hundred francs, Mathieu de Montmorency secured it.

It would have been a more pleasing trait in Louis XVIII's character had he overlooked Chateaubriand's misdeeds. He had always shown himself a true friend to the Monarchy, even at times when it would have been greatly to his interest to have

¹ E. Daudet, *Louis XVIII et Décazes*, pp. 161-166.
Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, IV. pp. 247-250.

² Chateaubriand, *Mémoires*, VII. pp. 257-258.
Madame de Boigne, II. 242-243.

acted otherwise. In 1814 his pen had done splendid service, and had materially helped to bring about the Restoration. Such a man was certainly entitled to be treated with very great consideration.

The case of Talleyrand was different. His constant complaint, that the great services which he had rendered to the dynasty had met with inadequate requital, had little justification in fact. When he and his colleagues in the Cabinet had resigned, in 1815, the King, though disliking him, had made him one of the four Grand Chamberlains of the Court, at an annual salary of a hundred thousand francs. Talleyrand at this time seems to have been divided between his infatuation for Madame Edmond de Périgord, his nephew's wife, and his jealousy of the Duc de Richelieu. All through the year 1816 his conduct had been very unlike that which might have been expected from a statesman of his skill and experience. In a society so closely policed as was that of Paris, the unguarded expressions and the violent abuse of the Government which he freely indulged in was, of course, duly reported. Nor did he always reserve these criticisms for the sympathetic ears of his new friends the Ultra-Royalists. Foreign ambassadors were equally the recipients of his angry denunciations of Richelieu and of Décazes. He would probably have been surprised and not a little disgusted had he known the impression which he sometimes contrived to leave behind him.¹ "He has prodigiously gone to pieces," wrote Von Goltz. "There was nothing more to be done with him," said Wellington.

Matters reached a crisis at a dinner given at the English Embassy on November 17th. Talleyrand had taken Pasquier, the President of the Chamber, aside and had begun his usual diatribe against the Government. His language on this occasion was particularly violent, and he behaved like a man who had completely lost his head. Pasquier had great difficulty in tearing himself away from him. But when at last he had shaken hands with him and was taking his departure, Talleyrand followed him, and, before the astonished company, began a loud and vulgar abuse of Décazes.² This scene was the next day the talk of the town. Three days later Talleyrand was officially warned that he was relieved temporarily of his duties of Grand Chamberlain, and was not for the present to show himself at Court. But Talleyrand, though in disgrace, was a power in the land. His

¹ E. Daudet, *Louis XVIII et Décazes*, pp. 169-177.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, V. pp. 313-316.

Pasquier, III. p. 376.

Mme. de Boigne, II. pp. 227-228.

² Pasquier, IV. pp. 135-140.

house in the Rue Saint-Florentin continued to be frequented. He was still associated with all the plans of Monsieur and of the Ultra-Royalists. Décazes at this time seems to have been seriously advised, but to have scornfully refused, to stop his mouth with a large bribe.¹ It was Talleyrand's opinion that it was useless to think of driving Richelieu from office so long as Décazes continued to enjoy the King's favour. It will be remembered that, after Waterloo, the Comte d'Artois, Talleyrand himself, though his politics at that time differed very much from Monsieur's, and all the Ultra-Royalists had clamoured for Blacas' dismissal. But their views with regard to him had since undergone a great change. Blacas was, after all, one of themselves, and, as such, was to be infinitely preferred to Décazes with his middle-class leanings and ideas. A scheme was accordingly set on foot to bring back Blacas to Paris, in order that the old favourite might supplant the new one in the King's affections. On questions of high politics, on everything to do with constitutional Government, the minds of most of the intimates of the Pavillon de Marsan were a blank. By tradition and by hereditary instinct, however, they were admirably qualified to prosecute a Court intrigue of this description. They entered upon it with zest.

A leading part in the conspiracy appears to have been played by the Duchesse de Narbonne-Pelet. It is significant that she was one of the ladies about the Duchesse d'Angoulême. Her relations with the Court dated from the old days at Hartwell. Louis liked her society and often talked to her. The Duchess was on excellent terms with Blacas. She now wrote to him to leave his Embassy at Rome and to come to Paris without warning and *incognito*.² In order to prepare the King's mind for the reappearance of his old favourite, she had recourse to a rather vulgar stratagem. There was much talk at this time in clerical and in high society of the extraordinary prophecies of a young peasant, called Martin. Louis had little if any religious feeling, but there was a certain vein of superstition in his nature. When the Duchess spoke to him about this wonderful prophet he expressed a strong wish to see him. The young man was accordingly brought to him, and, having, no doubt, been carefully tutored as to what he was to say, succeeded in making considerable impression on Louis. But, whether the King was really disturbed or not by this interview, it certainly failed to produce the effect for which the conspirators had hoped. Shortly after-

¹ E. Daudet, *Louis XVIII et Décazes*, pp. 179-182.

Mme. de Boigne, II. p. 272.

Pozzo à Nesselrode, 10 Mai, 1817.

² Mme. de Boigne, II. pp. 271-272.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, VI. pp. 91-92.

wards, on April 22nd, 1817, Blacas suddenly appeared in Paris. His arrival created enormous excitement, the *Bourse* was disturbed and a sensation was produced in all the chanceries of Europe. But the matter ended there.¹

Madame de Boigne relates that, on the day of M. de Blacas' first interview with the King, she made a point of attending Décazes' reception to see how he bore himself. The host, however, appeared cheerful and quite in his usual spirits.² He does not appear to have had any serious cause for alarm. Notwithstanding all the reports to the contrary, which the Ultra-Royalists put into circulation, Louis seems to have been little moved by his old favourite's reappearance. He gave him a cordial welcome, and overlooked the fact that he had quitted his post without leave. But, when Richelieu forcibly pointed out the inconvenience of his further stay in Paris, Louis promptly ordered Blacas back to Rome. The plot had woefully miscarried. "Of course, under the Charter," writes Madame de Boigne, "there was no such thing as exile, but I do not know whether it was entirely of her own free will that, shortly after this, Madame de Narbonne rejoined her husband at Naples."³

The first Session of the new Parliament, that of 1816-1817, had been marked by no sensational scenes. But though its course had been uneventful, it saw one noteworthy measure carried and passed into law. This was the Electoral Bill of February 5th, 1817. Legislation in the direction of some degree of Parliamentary Reform was the natural corollary to the Ordinance of September 5th. Of the law in question, the best which, perhaps, can be said for it, is that it was certainly the most popular of the several enactments on the subject which successively came into force under the Restoration. It abolished the system of Indirect Election.⁴ In future the privilege of the direct vote was to be conferred on every Frenchman of thirty years of age and upwards, who contributed 300 francs of direct taxes. There was to be only one electoral college which was to meet at the chief town of the department. A fifth of the Chamber was to be renewed annually. Such were the main provisions of the new law. Lainé and Decazes were the two Ministers chiefly concerned in drawing them up. Royer-Collard and other leaders

¹ Pozzo à Nesselrode, 25 Avril, 1817 ; 10 Mai, 1817.

E. Daudet, *Louis XVIII et Décazes*, pp. 183-186.

² Mme. de Boigne, II. pp. 278-279.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 282.

⁴ Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, IV. pp. 257-259.

Pasquier, IV. pp. 142-143.

Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. pp. 165-171.

of the Moderate party were, however, called into their counsels. But a very important part of the work was confided to François Guizot, the young Protestant lawyer, who was still debarred by youth from a seat in the Chamber. The framers of the law entered upon their deliberations with the fixed intention of devising a scheme whereby the ascendancy at future elections might be given to the middle classes. This end they unquestionably attained by conferring an equal voting power on all persons taxed at 300 francs and upwards. So long as these conditions prevailed there was little likelihood that the Ultra-Royalists would be ever again in the majority. No deadlier blow could possibly have been dealt them.

When the bill was introduced into the Chamber they, of course, opposed it with all their strength. Those arguments in favour of maintaining the two degrees of electors, which Villèle had brought forward in the previous Parliament, were all heard over again. But they proved of no avail.¹ On January 8th, 1817, Ministers carried their bill through the Lower Chamber by a majority of thirty-two. It was very doubtful, however, whether the vote of the Deputies would be confirmed by the Peers. The Comte d'Artois and his satellites were known to be very hostile to the new law. But Louis was prepared to come to the assistance of his Ministers. His intervention took a simple but effective form. He forbade all members of his family, and all officers of his household, who had seats in the Upper Chamber, from attending the sittings of the Peers whilst the Electoral Bill was under discussion. On January 30th the law was passed in the Hereditary Chamber by 95 votes against 77.

During the course of this Session the Government also introduced and carried measures to abate the stringency of the law for the suspension of individual liberty, whilst maintaining, for the present, the censorship of the press. On both these questions the Ministerial policy was vigorously opposed by the Ultra-Royalists. La Bourdonnaye and his followers who, the year before, had loudly insisted on the necessity for exceptional legislation, had now the most Liberal arguments to urge against its continued enforcement. The tactics of party government were beginning to be understood.²

The weather during the year 1816 had been exceptionally bad all over Europe.³ In France acute agricultural distress was

¹ Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, IV. pp. 260-263.
Crousaz-Crétet, *Richelieu*, pp. 229-230.

² Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, IV. pp. 265-269.
Pasquier, IV. pp. 143-144.

³ Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, IV. pp. 273-281.
Pasquier, IV. pp. 162-163.

superadded to the misery which recent invasions had left behind them, and to the burden of a prolonged military occupation. In the spring of 1817 the state of affairs in many districts amounted to a famine. The Government, by importing foreign corn in large quantities, and by other measures, contrived to somewhat mitigate the severity of the crisis. This scarcity of food led in places to the outbreak of riots and disturbances. They were, however, in no case serious, nor had they any political character. Unfortunately, offences in connection with them came within the cognizance of the Prevotal Courts. These tribunals, as was their wont, acted with merciless severity. Several poor wretches, including one woman, were condemned to death and executed, whilst others received long terms of imprisonment.

But these proceedings sink into insignificance by the side of the doings of the military commander at Lyons, General Canuel, who might be described as a bad imitation of General Donnadieu.¹ He occupied the almost unique position of being a General of the Empire who had seen no service against a foreign enemy. Under the Republic he had been employed in La Vendée, where he had distinguished himself by a merciless cruelty to all Royalists who fell into his hands. During the Hundred Days, however, this had not prevented him from volunteering to serve under the orders of La Rochejacquelein in the very country in which he had earned his infamous notoriety. After the Restoration the appointment to command the Lyons district had been his reward. The decorations and honours which had been showered on his colleague Donnadieu, at Grenoble, had filled him with envy. If only an insurrection were to break out in his district, similar good fortune, he argued, would be in store for him. In a large city filled with a half-starving population all the elements for such an outbreak were at hand.

The accounts of the odious events which followed are very conflicting. The relations of them differ greatly according as to whether they emanate from Royalist or Liberal sources. It appears, however, to be beyond the possibility of doubt that, as early as the autumn of 1816, Canuel had set on foot a secret police of his own. It is equally certain that the agents whom he thus employed deliberately acted, as he intended that they should, the part of *agents provocateurs*. At least one officer of the garrison was found ready to worm himself into the confidence of his often disaffected comrades on half-pay, in order to

¹ Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, IV. p. 282.
Marmont, *Mémoires*, VII. pp. 233-235.
Viel Castel, *Histoire*, VI. pp. 115-117.

foment, and then betray, their designs. It is satisfactory to learn that the double part which this person was playing became known to the conspirators, and that he paid the penalty of his treachery with his life.¹ Canuel's hopes were realized. He was at last able to report to Paris that, on June 8th, a Bonapartist rising had broken out in several villages near Lyons. Thanks to his vigilance it had been suppressed. But the situation in his district was still causing him the gravest apprehension.

Canuel's despatch was grossly misleading. The outbreak which he reported had proved a miserable affair. The rioters, mostly peasants and artisans out of work, led by a half-pay officer of the name of Oudin, had, indeed, proclaimed Napoleon II. But a small force of *gendarmes* had sufficed to disperse them. No lives appear to have been lost, and by the next day the rebellion had everywhere been stamped out.²

A reign of terror now began in Lyons. Hundreds of persons were thrown into prison. The Provost's Court entered upon its bloody work, and numerous capital sentences were passed. The guillotine was conveyed from village to village, and a boy of sixteen was beheaded in front of his mother's door. At Oudin's execution abominable scenes took place. The officer in command and most of the men of the escort arrived drunk. These atrocities continued all through the months of July and August, but, early in September, a fortunate circumstance brought them to a close.³

The Prefect of Lyons, the Comte de Chabrol-Croussol, was an honest but weak man. Afraid, doubtless, of being accused of irresolution, he had allowed his better judgment to be overborne by Canuel's vehemence. Sainneville, the Lieutenant of Police, was, fortunately, in a different situation. He had always disapproved of Canuel's methods, and had discredited his alarmist tales. Now that events appeared to have justified the General's fears, his position was an awkward one. He was open to the accusation of having shown little foresight and vigilance. Moreover, he had been away from his post, and on a visit to Paris at the time of the outbreak of June 8th. It was, therefore, distinctly to his interest to minimize, as much as possible, the

¹ Marmont, *Mémoires*, VII. p. 246.

Pasquier, IV. p. 179.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, IV. pp. 285-299.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, VI. pp. 119-124.

² Marmont, *Mémoires*, VII. pp. 238-239.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, IV. p. 295.

³ Pasquier, IV. pp. 171-178.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, IV. pp. 297-303.

Marmont, *Mémoires*, VII. pp. 236-237.

seriousness of the disaffection. In his reports to Décazes, accordingly, he not only treated the stories of the civil and military authorities as gross exaggerations, but asserted that any overt acts of rebellion which had taken place were to be ascribed solely to the instigation of Canuel's agents.¹

On the first receipt of the news from Lyons the measures which Canuel had taken had met with the warmest approval. The General had been rewarded with the title of Baron.² But now, in the face of the grave divergence which existed between his account of matters and that of the Lieutenant of Police, it was feared that there had been undue precipitation. Under these circumstances the King, on the advice of his Ministers, decided to despatch Marshal Marmont to act as his Lieutenant in the disturbed district.

Under the conditions which prevailed the mission with which Marmont had been entrusted could have been confided to no one but a soldier. It was a common saying of Louis XVIII that it was almost impossible to find a Marshal of the Empire who could speak a dozen words without making use of an oath. But Marmont combined a wide general knowledge with polished manners. It might have been expected that he would display the qualities required for the conduct of the enquiry which he was charged to make. Though he certainly deserves the credit of having put an end to the horrible state of affairs which existed at Lyons, he cannot be said to have carried out his investigations in anything approaching a judicial spirit.

Marmont's first reports to the Government, made with undue haste, were favourable to both Canuel and the Prefect. But after he had been joined by Colonel Fabvier, his Chief of the Staff, his attitude underwent a complete change. Henceforward he saw everything through the eyes of his subordinate.³ Fabvier was a Liberal, and judged by his subsequent conduct, even at this time, probably entertained anti-dynastic views. In consequence of Marmont's revised opinion, General Canuel was, on October 6th, deservedly removed from his command. The Marshal had recommended that much severer measures should be taken with him. Some of his other proceedings are, however, open to severe criticism. The party spirit, which he allowed Fabvier to introduce into the enquiry, gave the Ultra-Royalists in the

¹ Marmont, *Mémoires*, VII. p. 243.

² *Ibid.*, p. 241.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, IV. pp. 303-304.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, VI. pp. 143-148.

³ Pasquier, IV. pp. 175-179.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, IV. pp. 305-308.

Chamber numerous opportunities of attacking the Ministry.¹ Nor did matters end there. A war of pamphlets between Canuel and Fabvier, which terminated in an action at law, kept the unfortunate affairs of Lyons for an unduly long time under the public notice.²

¹ Marmont, *Mémoires*, VII. p. 249.

Pasquier, IV. p. 180.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, VI. pp. 156-157.

² Marmont, *Mémoires*, VII. pp. 255-257.

Pasquier, IV. pp. 183-186.

CHAPTER X

THE LIBERATION OF THE TERRITORY

DURING the course of the year 1817 the composition of the Cabinet had undergone some important changes. Pasquier had succeeded Dambray as Minister of Justice and Gouvion-Saint-Cyr had taken the place of Clarke at the War Office. The retirement of the latter freed the Government from its last connection with the Ultra-Royalists, the Duc de Feltre having signalized his tenure of office by his persecution of his former comrades of the Imperial army.¹ The elections, which took place in the autumn of this year, for the renewal of the first fifth of the Chamber, were watched with the keenest interest. It was the first experiment under the new law. On the whole Ministers had reason to be satisfied. The disquieting feature of the situation was the appearance, as candidates, of more advanced politicians such as La Fayette, Manuel and Benjamin Constant.² The Government, indeed, was compelled to exert the utmost pressure and to use all its influence to prevent their election. As it was, the Independents or Liberals, as they became known later, scored a notable increase of seats.

A clause in the Treaty of November 20th, 1815, admitted of the withdrawal of the Army of Occupation at the end of three years. This was a possibility which Richelieu had never lost sight of. Ever since he had affixed his signature to the terms of peace, he had made up his mind that the year 1818 should see his country relieved from its humiliating burden. Though the raising of the money, required to pay off the war indemnity and other kindred charges, was the most important step towards the realization of Richelieu's hopes, this was not the only measure which had to be considered.

¹ *Supplementary Despatches*, XII., Richelieu to Wellington, 12 Septembre, 1817.

Pozzo à Nesselrode, 2 Août, 1817.

Ibid., 28 Août, 1817.

Pasquier, *Mémoires*, IV. pp. 144, 186.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, V. pp. 166-176.

² Pozzo à Nesselrode, 3 Octobre, 1817.

Pasquier, IV. pp. 190-193.

To convince the Allied Sovereigns that the general outlook was reassuring was a preliminary essential to obtaining their consent to evacuation. Richelieu's personal relations with the Ministers of the Powers were excellent. He had had, moreover, the most flattering assurances that the policy which he and his colleagues were pursuing was warmly approved of abroad.¹ But before the condition of France could be pronounced in all respects satisfactory, before she could resume her place among the nations, she must possess an army suited to her position. Were Richelieu able to show that she was on the high road to fulfil this requirement, his negotiations would be materially assisted.² The more or less provisional measures which had been adopted after the disbanding of the old army in 1815 were based upon voluntary enlistment. The number of men which such a system could provide had proved insufficient. No sooner, therefore, was Gouvion-Saint-Cyr installed in office than he was instructed to draw up a scheme for the raising of an army of a more national character.

The Session of 1817-1818 opened on November 5th. In the King's Speech references to the negotiations for the liberation of the territory occupied a foremost place. His Majesty was also able to announce that the Prevotal Courts need no longer be continued. The outlook for the Government was on the surface, very promising. As a result of the annual election of a fifth of the Deputies, the Ultra-Royalists now numbered only 75, as against 155 Ministerialists and 25 Independents. But, already in the Council of State during the preparation of the bills to be introduced into the Chamber, divergencies of opinion manifested themselves. As the Chamber settled down to business the differences in the ranks of the "Centre" or Ministerial Party became very apparent. The name of M. Royer-Collard, the President of the Council of Public Instruction, has, already, been several times mentioned. He was deservedly looked upon as one of the most eminent men in the Chamber. His intellect, his learning, and his rhetorical powers were remarkable. But these gifts were allied to an overweening self-confidence and to an overbearing character.³ In the pedantic manner which was habitual to him, he had formulated certain political doctrines, to which all his life he adhered. They were briefly these. The State was to be divided into three Powers.

¹ *Correspondance de Pozzo*, III. p. 143.
Tsar à Richelieu, 7 Juin, 1817.

² Pozzo à Nesselrode, 19 Août, 1817.
Ibid., 3 Octobre, 1817.

³ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, V. pp. 258-261.
Pasquier, IV. pp. 196-206.

(1) Legitimate and hereditary Monarchy, in whose hands the executive powers of the nation should be concentrated.

(2) An hereditary Peerage, which represents the necessary inequalities of individuals.

(3) A Chamber of Commons to represent the element of equality which must be recognized alongside of that of inequality. This assembly should be recruited from the middle classes. In pursuance of this doctrine Royer-Collard had collaborated in the drawing up of the Electoral Law. He always, however, combated the theory that the Lower Chamber represented the nation. It should, he considered, only represent a certain portion of it—the interests of the middle classes.¹

Royer-Collard had opposed the Ultra-Royalists because their absolutist tendencies threatened to upset the equilibrium of his perfect State, in favour of the Monarchy. He had, in consequence, warmly supported the Cabinet in its struggle against the predominance of the extreme party. But, now that the Ministerial policy was triumphant, he found many points to disapprove of in the projected laws which the Government was proposing to bring forward.² A group, always small in numbers, but influential by reason of the high reputations and intellectual attainments of the men who composed it, gathered round Royer-Collard. This exceedingly select party was made up, in the Chamber, of Camille Jordan, de Serre (the President of the Chamber), and Beugnot; in the Council of State, of Guizot and Barante. The *Nain Jaune*, which was now being published in Brussels, called them the *Doctrinaires*. The designation was a happy one. It has been their nickname ever since.³

Gouvion-Saint-Cyr's Army Bill was the most important measure of the Session. On a very limited scale the new law reintroduced the principle of conscription. It also regulated the advancement of officers. In future this was to be based on a regular system of promotion by seniority. A certain number of commissions were to be reserved annually for men who had risen from the ranks. A reserve corps of veterans was to be formed. The bill, in its passage through the Chamber, was vigorously opposed by the Ultra-Royalists.⁴ Its democratic character appalled them. They denounced the element of compulsion which it contained as a violation of the Charter, the

¹ *Grande Encyclopédie*, Royer-Collard (Pierre Paul).

² Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. pp. 161–163.

³ Littré, *Doctrinaire*.

Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. pp. 155–160.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 172–175.

Pasquier, IV. p. 216.

Crousaz-Crétet, *Richelieu*, pp. 266–270.

automatic promotion of officers as an infringement on the Royal Prerogative. The Government was, however, supported by all its usual followers and by the Independent Left. A remarkably fine speech by Gouvion-Saint-Cyr, which had been composed for him by Guizot, clinched matters. The bill passed the Lower Chamber by a large majority. In the House of Peers the issue was in much greater doubt. All the influence of the Pavillon de Marsan was brought to bear against it. Monsieur even addressed a vigorous letter of protest to the King. But Louis, though many of Gouvion's provisions must have been distasteful to him, was, as usual, loyal to his Ministers. He flatly declined to intervene, and the bill, on March 9th, 1818, was carried in the Hereditary Chamber by twenty-two votes.¹

In their projected legislation on the question of the press, the Government was not equally successful. A coalition of the Right, the Doctrinaires, and the Left, were arrayed against the Ministerial Bill. The Government was forced to submit to numerous amendments. Under these circumstances its final rejection by the Peers was not altogether displeasing to its promoters. The existing Press Law was, in consequence, allowed to remain in force for another year. Again, in the debates on the ratification of the Concordat which Blacas had effected with the Pope, the Government had to face the opposition of the Doctrinaires. The matter was not, however, proceeded with. It was decided to reopen the negotiations with His Holiness.²

It was evident that the Cabinet could no longer count on the whole-hearted support of the Centre. The members of it were showing a marked disposition to part company. Whilst some of them were inclining towards the Royalists, the Doctrinaires were leaning heavily to the Left. It was, in fact, assuming the shape which it was soon to permanently adopt, that of a Right and Left Centre party. This divergence of views among the Ministerialists was reflected in the Cabinet. Richelieu had already serious misgivings on the subject of the Electoral Law. He deplored the breach with the Royalists of the Right, and would gladly have come to any reasonable terms with them. Both he and Lainé had an unconquerable aversion to Royer-Collard, and a general distrust of his group. Décazes, on the other hand, was inclined to follow his friends the Doctrinaires,

¹ Pozzo à Nesselrode, 15 Février, 1818.
Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, IV. pp. 315-331.

² Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. pp. 195-197.
Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, IV. pp. 331-335, 335-337.
Pasquier, IV. pp. 208-213, 215, 226.

and to look to the Left for support. These differences were not as yet acute, but they pointed unmistakably to trouble in the future.¹

The great task of Richelieu's career was meanwhile approaching a successful conclusion. For the past eighteen months arrangements for loans wherewith to pay off the residue of the war indemnity and other claims outstanding against France had been in progress with Baring Brothers, of London, and Hope and Co., of Amsterdam.² It had been a long and a difficult operation. The sum required was, for those days, gigantic. Laffitte and the French bankers whom Richelieu had consulted had ridiculed the notion that the amount required could ever be obtained. They had declined to have anything to do with it. It was Ouvrard, the boldest speculator of his time, and a man of by no means unblemished reputation, who had opened the negotiations between the great English house and the French Government. Though the pretence under which he had brought Messrs. Baring and Labouchère to Paris turned out to be a false one, the meeting between them and Richelieu had led to business. It was only later on, when the success of the loan was fully assured, that the French bankers headed by M. Casimir Perier indignantly demanded to be given a share in the transaction.³

Neither Richelieu nor Décazes had any knowledge of financial matters. Corvetto, the Minister of Finance, though a man of experience and ability, was, it would seem, hardly competent to carry out an affair of this magnitude. Serious mistakes were several times committed.⁴ In one notable instance a miscalculation on Corvetto's part would have entailed a loss of £60,000 sterling, but for the generosity of the Barings, who consented to forego an advantage of which they might with perfect propriety have availed themselves.

The claims put in by almost every Government in Europe against France amounted to an enormous sum. The committee

¹ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, V. pp. 319-327.

Crousaz-Crétet, *Richelieu*, pp. 270-271.

² Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, IV. pp. 337-342.

³ Mme. de Boigne, II. pp. 245-257.

Supplementary Despatches, XI., Wellington to Castlereagh, 6 December, 1816.

Pozzo à Nesselrode, 14 Janvier, 1817 (2 letters).

Pasquier, IV. pp. 235-236.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, V. pp. 441-448.

Crousaz-Crétet, *Richelieu*, pp. 278-279.

⁴ *Supplementary Despatches*, XII., Wellington to Liverpool, 24 Juin, 1818.

Crousaz-Crétet, *Richelieu*, p. 148-149.

Pozzo à Nesselrode, 25 Juin, 1817.

Pasquier, IV. pp. 236-237.

of the four ambassadors in Paris who were to deal with the matter, had made but little progress towards a settlement. As time went on these accounts swelled in volume, and were made to extend to periods long antecedent to Revolutionary and Imperial times. One small German Prince went so far as to demand payment for 4000 *Ritters* supplied to Henri IV by an ancestor, during the Wars of Religion. By July, 1817, the sum required to settle these claims would, if admitted, have far exceeded fifty millions sterling. Added to her other liabilities it was quite out of the power of France to meet such exorbitant demands.¹ In this difficulty Richelieu appealed to the Tsar for help. The result of this action was that Alexander, after consulting with his brother potentates, wrote personally to the Duke of Wellington² asking him to act as supreme arbitrator to the commission of claims. It was a striking testimony to the confidence universally reposed in Wellington. He lost no time in setting to work, and it was whilst engaged on this arduous task that an attempt to assassinate him was made.

About one o'clock in the morning of February 11th, 1818, as Wellington's carriage was entering the courtyard of his house, in the Rue des Champs Elysées, at the corner of the Place Louis XV (now Place de la Concorde), a man fired a pistol shot at him. The bullet had not struck the carriage, but the mark of it was plainly to be seen on the wall. When the news reached the authorities the consternation in Governmental circles was extreme. Within a short time both Décazes and Pasquier were on the spot. The Duke thereupon gave them a letter which his Adjutant-General, Lieut.-General Sir George Murray, had recently received from Lord Kinnaird in Brussels.³ It contained a warning that a man had been told off to murder Wellington,

¹ Vulabellé, *Deux Restaurations*, IV. p. 338.

² Crousaz-Crétet, *Richelieu*, pp. 274-275.

Supplementary Despatches, XII., Tsar to Wellington, 30 Octobre, 1817.

F. Somerset to Wellington, 26 November, 1817.

Pozzo à Wellington, 3 Décembre, 1817 (enclosures), pp. 157-169.

Wellington to Tsar, 13 Décembre, 1817.

³ Pasquier, IV. pp. 220-221.

Supplementary Despatches, XII., Wellington to Bathurst, 12 February, 1818.

Kinnaird to Murray, 30 January, 1818.

Wellington to Clancarty, 12 February, 1818.

Kinnaird to Murray, 13 February, 1818.

Clancarty to Castlereagh, 17 February, 1818 (enclosures).

Clancarty to Wellington, 19 February, 1818 (enclosures), pp. 308-324.

Wellington to Bathurst, 23 February, 1818 (enclosures), pp. 336-342.

Ibid., 8 March, 1818.

Ibid., 19 March, 1818.

and was only waiting his opportunity to do so. This communication pointed clearly to the direction whence the blow had come. In the meantime a diligent search for the assassin was in progress, and he, Cantillon by name, a former sergeant in the army, was soon caught and lodged in prison.¹

Brussels was at this time full of French exiles, political refugees, and malcontents generally. It was from here that emanated a flood of seditious writings and of pamphlets against the Bourbons. Representations on this subject had been made to the Netherlands Government. But no action had resulted from these complaints. It was, says Pasquier, quite the right thing, at this time, for Bonapartists to proceed voluntarily to Brussels, just as in former days the Royalists had emigrated to Coblenz.² The truth was that the machinations of these men were secretly encouraged by a Royal Personage. The Prince of Orange had fought honourably and had been wounded at Waterloo, under the orders of the Duke of Wellington. Soon afterwards he had married a sister of the Tsar. This alliance with the Romanoffs appears to have turned his head. He now aimed at nothing less than the Crown of France. Louis XVIII he persuaded himself would soon be driven from power. If that should take place, he proposed to present himself as a candidate for the French Throne. Nor was he averse to hurrying on the consummation of this much to be desired event. During the summer of 1817 he formed the plan of putting himself at the head of the Russian and Belgian contingents in the Army of Occupation, with a view to marching on Paris. It was necessary, however, to obtain the consent of the Tsar. Carnot was chosen as a suitable person to sound him on the subject. But this embassy never started on its mission. Alexander had heard rumours of what was going on, and sent his brother-in-

¹ *Supplementary Despatches*, XII., Décazes to Wellington, 16 Mars, 1818 (enclosures).

² Pasquier, IV. pp. 221-222.

Cf. *Supplementary Despatches*, XII., Clancarty to Wellington (enclosures), 24 July, 1817.

Clancarty to Wellington (enclosures), 25 September, 1817.

Ministers of four Courts to Wellington, 27 September, 1817.

Clancarty to Wellington, 30 September, 1817.

Ibid., 29 October, 1817.

Ibid., 15 December, 1817.

Wellington to Clancarty, 6 January, 1818.

Ibid., 24 March, 1818.

Prince of Orange to Wellington, 15 April, 1818.

Wellington to Prince of Orange, 18 April, 1818.

Vols. XI. and XII. of the *Supplementary Despatches* are replete with allusions to the conduct of the French Revolutionaries in the Low Countries.

law strict injunctions to keep quiet. The scheme had, in consequence, come to nothing.¹

In one respect especially did the Bonapartist and "Liberal" malcontents at Brussels resemble the Royalist *émigrés* at Coblenz. Both were equally ready to place what they considered to be the interests of their own party before the good of their country.² When, therefore, the refugees at Brussels perceived that Richelieu's patriotic exertions to bring about the withdrawal of the Army of Occupation were likely to be crowned with success, they were intensely chagrined. Never, if they could help it, should the Bourbons have the credit of having "liberated the territory" before the full term of five years should have elapsed. No more effectual way of hindering the evacuation occurred to them than to send a hired assassin to Paris to shoot the Generalissimo of the foreign armies which occupied their country.

It is strange that an English gentleman should have been found in close relations with such people. Lord Kinnaird was a Whig.³ He had been in Paris during the Hundred Days, and had pronounced himself a bitter opponent of the war which the Allied Powers had declared on Bonaparte. After the Restoration he had become conspicuous through his intimacy with the partisans of the fallen Emperor, and, generally, with anyone who was supposed to be disaffected to the Monarchy. His proceedings soon attracted the attention of the police. He was invited to leave Paris after the arrest of Wilson and his accomplices, and, in consequence, followed some of his friends to Brussels. As he refused to divulge the name of the person who had informed him of the attempt which was to be made on Wellington's life, the Belgian authorities decided to arrest him. But before this could be carried out, Lord Kinnaird fled from Brussels, in company with his informer, by name, Marinet. They arrived together in Paris, where both were taken into custody. Wellington, however, obtained Kinnaird's release, and lodged him in his own house. He had to undergo a severe examination at the hands of the police. But on April 14th he was allowed to depart. The Duke of Wellington's kindness he repaid by including him in an accusation of bad faith which he made against the Government for having arrested Marinet, the informer.⁴

After a long enquiry Cantillon was put on his trial and ac-

¹ Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, IV. pp. 444-445.

² Pasquier, IV. pp. 223-224.

³ Kinnaird (Charles, 8th Lord), representative Scotch peer (1780-1826).

⁴ *Supplementary Despatches*, XII., Décazes to Wellington, 15 Avril, 1818. Lord Kinnaird to Chamber of Peers, 15 Avril, 1818 (enclosures). Wellington to Décazes, 29 Avril, 1818.

quitted by a French jury. Under Napoleon's Will he benefited to the extent of 10,000 francs. "Cantillon," ran the codicil in which he was named, "had as much right to assassinate that oligarch (Wellington), as he had to send me to perish on the rock of St. Helena." ¹

After an assiduous labour of five months, on April 25th, 1818, an agreement on the question of the claims against France was arrived at and signed by the representatives of the four Great Powers. Wellington had succeeded in reducing them to a sum of about nine millions sterling. He had also arranged that this amount should be consolidated and paid over to the Allies, who were to undertake to settle with all creditors.² Richelieu at once carried the news to the Chamber, and submitted the financial measures to which the Assembly would be asked to consent. But all arrangements of this kind were to be of a contingent character. They were only to be put into execution should the Allied Sovereigns, who were to meet in Congress at Aix-la-Chapelle, agree to a complete withdrawal of their troops.

The Deputies, when Richelieu made his announcement, were in the midst of a rather warm discussion on the Budget. The two million francs of secret-service money, annually asked for by the Minister of Police, had furnished the Ultra-Royalists with a pretext for an attack on Décazes. Villèle maintained that, during the past two years, no plot had come to light in which the mischievous interference of the police spy was not to be plainly discerned. La Bourdonnaye went further. He demanded the complete suppression of the office. Under a Constitutional Government it was an anomaly. It encouraged delation, and was an engine of national demoralization. No one could well dispute the justice of these views. The protests, however, emanated from a quarter not usually associated with Liberal ideas. They were, moreover, too obviously influenced by motives of personal hostility to carry much weight. The motion was allowed to drop.³

Hatred for the brilliant and fortunate Police Minister had become almost a matter of religion with the Ultra-Royalists. But, secure in the constantly increasing affection of the King, Décazes could afford to defy them. He would have been more than human had he never given himself the satisfaction of

¹ Pasquier, IV. p. 225.

Norvins, *Histoire de Napoléon*, II. p. 522.

² *Supplementary Despatches*, XII., Wellington to Castlereagh, 23 April, 1818. Particulars of these arrangements are contained in Vol. XII. of *Supplementary Despatches* and in the *Correspondance de Pozzo et de Nesselrode*, Vol. II.

³ Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, IV. pp. 341-342.

returning some of the impertinences to which he was subjected. On the whole, however, his attitude calls for nothing but commendation. Both in public and in private affairs his influence over Louis was almost invariably exercised on the side of moderation. To use his own words, "the nationalization of the Monarchy and the royalization of France" were the objects which he always kept in view.¹ The man who could so correctly gauge his country's real requirements cannot have been entirely lacking in the qualities of a statesman. It seems difficult to reconcile the two facts, that Décazes should advocate a Liberal and strictly constitutional policy, whilst continuing to wield the arbitrary powers and to carry out the repugnant duties of a Minister of Police. There can be no doubt, however, that he found his office most uncongenial, and that he sincerely hoped that the day would soon come when it might be possible to dispense with it altogether. Meanwhile, he repressed as far as possible the over-zealous royalism of the prefects. He had already effected the removal of some of those officials, who by their reactionary excesses, had made themselves particularly odious. At the same time he constantly endeavoured to accustom the King to the idea of gradually extending a full and complete pardon to the proscribed of all parties. It was mainly due to him that at the close of 1817 Louis had allowed the Duc d'Orléans to return to France.²

The year 1818 was the most brilliant period of Décazes' career. The King had raised him to the Peerage and made him a Count. In the spring he had been affianced to, and had soon after married, Mlle. de Saint-Aulaire.³ She belonged to an ancient family, and was the grandchild through her mother of the last reigning Prince of Nassau-Sarrebrück. The Comte, her father, had rallied to the Empire, and was, at this time, a prominent Deputy on the Liberal side. The young lady was possessed of a considerable fortune in her own right, and was looked upon as one of the great matches of the day. Overtures for her hand had been made on behalf of Raoul de Montmorency, a member of that now extinct noble family who had rallied to the Empire, and who had since acted as aide-de-camp to the Duc d'Orléans. Her engagement to him had been almost decided upon when Décazes had presented himself and had won approval. It was another crushing defeat which he had inflicted on the Faubourg-Saint-Germain.⁴

¹ E. Daudet, *Louis XVIII et Décazes*, pp. 249-251, 253-258.

² Viel Castel, *Histoire*, VI. pp. 440-441, 459-461.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 326-327.

⁴ E. Daudet, *Louis XVIII et Décazes*, pp. 207-208, 230-231.

During the summer of 1818 the particulars of an extraordinary plot were confided to both Lainé and to Pasquier. The communications to the two Ministers had been made on the same day, and in both cases by respectable persons who had neither of them taken any part in the alleged conspiracy.¹ The story which the two men told was identical on all material points. The explanation as to how they had become possessed of their information was satisfactory in every respect, yet the tale which they unfolded was so improbable that it was almost impossible, at first, to attach credence to it.

The Ultra-Royalists had formed the plan, they said, of seizing all the members of the Cabinet on some day when they would be returning to Paris from Saint-Cloud, where the King was in residence. The captured Ministers were to be conveyed to Vincennes and imprisoned. The governor of the fortress was in the plot. Two Colonels, one commanding a cavalry regiment of the Guard, the other a corps of Swiss infantry, had promised to place their troops at the disposal of the conspirators. The King was to be induced to appoint a new Ministry. If he should refuse to comply, he would be deposed. Perhaps even it might be found necessary "to treat him like Paul I."

At the next Council at Saint-Cloud the matter was discussed in the King's presence. Whilst Ministers were giving their opinions as to the amount of faith to be attached to these revelations, Décazes produced a paper which corroborated them in a remarkable manner. In his official despatch-box, which had just been brought to him from Paris, he had found a letter from Donnadieu to Chateaubriand. In it the General, after referring to the gracious way in which the King had received him at a recent *levée*, added that that would not prevent him from taking part in the great event, "the execution of which should no longer be deferred." The story of how this document had come to find a place among Décazes' papers is instructive. A police agent had, it appears, been introduced into Chateaubriand's household. The man had contrived either himself to steal the letter or to suborn a servant to abstract it for him. In the opinion of Ministers well acquainted with the General's writing, and with his usual signature, there could be no question about its authenticity. The affair now became very serious. A Peer of France was involved. It was decided that no immediate action should be taken. Searching enquiries were, however, to be set on foot, and the doings of suspected persons were to be watched.

¹ Pasquier, IV. pp. 241-248, whose account of these events has been followed in all particulars.

The police reports of the next few days proved highly interesting. It was discovered that, on the occasion of the last Councils which had been held, La Rochejacquelein's cuirassiers and Bezenval's Swiss regiment had been marched into the close vicinity of Saint-Cloud. Other suspicious movements of a like nature had been noted. Both Commanding Officers enjoyed the friendship of Monsieur and belonged to the Pavillon de Marsan *clique*. A watch set on the Café de Valois, in the Palais Royal, which was much used by officers of the Guards, revealed the existence of an unusual agitation among its habitual frequenters. A constant coming and going was observed between the *café* and the terrace of the Tuileries by the waterside. At this place long and earnest conversations were held. General Canuel was reported as being particularly assiduous at these meetings, and as appearing to take a prominent part in the discussions.

It was impossible any longer to doubt the existence of the plot. A Cabinet Council, to consider what steps should be taken, was held at the Duc de Richelieu's house. Pasquier recommended that the two Colonels should be quietly removed from their commands, but that nothing else should be done. It was out of the question to make public the means which had been adopted to obtain possession of Donnadiou's letter to Chateaubriand. Promises had been given to both the original informers that their names should not be revealed. Hampered in this way, it was hopeless to expect to obtain convictions. In the very peculiar circumstances of the case, it might, besides, prove highly inconvenient should the examining Magistrate push his enquiries too far. Pasquier's excellent advice was disregarded. It was decided to proceed against some of the more obscure conspirators. Care was, however, to be taken to strictly circumscribe the area of investigations. This expedient is a common feature in the trials of the Restoration. When from motives of policy it was considered inadvisable to prosecute the principals, it was quite usual to strike at the minor agents on the fringe of the conspiracy. Warrants were, accordingly, only issued for the apprehension of General Canuel, and three or four other officers, who like him had been in trouble in connection with the affairs of Lyons. A former Chouan chief, Chapedelaine by name, who on various occasions had had relations with the secret police, was also taken into custody. The prediction of Pasquier was verified in every particular.¹ After a long detention Canuel, along with those of his fellow-conspirators who had not already been discharged from prison, was, on November 3rd, 1818, put on his trial and acquitted.

¹ Pasquier, IV. pp. 249-250.

A great deal of mystery surrounds what has been generally known as the "waterside conspiracy." Is it possible that the *regnandi dira cupido*, which Louis XVIII always ascribed to his brother, can have induced Monsieur to attempt to achieve his object by a Palace Revolution? If the information which had come to the knowledge of the Cabinet were correct, then Colonel de La Rochejacquelein must have been one of the chief conspirators. But he gave his word of honour to Richelieu that he had had nothing whatever to do with the plot. The Ultra-Royalists asserted that the whole story had been trumped up by Décazes and the police, in order to bring discredit on their party.¹ According to them the affair at the worst resolved itself into a few unguarded expressions uttered by some discontented officers, whose feelings had been, doubtless, worked upon by *agents provocateurs*. This theory might very well be accepted, but for the episode of the "secret note" which bears so marked a resemblance to the "waterside plot."²

In the early days of July, 1818, just at the time of the arrest of Canuel and his accomplices, a pamphlet was shown to Richelieu. Copies of it had been freely circulating in the different chanceries of Europe. It was a skilfully drawn-up paper which purported to depict the actual condition of affairs in France. The general outlook was pronounced to be most threatening. Jacobinism everywhere dominant, in the Cabinet and in the King's Council. The country was marching rapidly to a revolution. The repercussion of such a calamity could not fail to be acutely felt all over Europe. The writer then went on to discuss the various remedies which might be applied to this alarming state of affairs. In his opinion the only practical solution to the question lay in compelling the King to alter his system of Government by changing his Ministers.

The origin and history of this "note" was soon discovered. It was at once traced to the Pavillon de Marsan. Vitrolles, Monsieur's "useful man," was the author of it. It had been copied and issued from the offices of the National Guards which were still controlled by the Comte d'Artois. The foreign governments, to which it had been transmitted, had been made to understand that it represented the opinions of the King's brother, the heir to the throne.³

¹ Pozzo à Nesselrode, 12 Juillet, 1818.

Pozzo à Lieven, 17 Juillet, 1818.

E. Guillois, *Complots militaires sous la Restauration*, pp. 103-107.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, VII. p. 104.

² *Supplementary Despatches*, XII., Wellington to Castlereagh, 17 July, 1818.

Pasquier, IV. pp. 251-252.

³ Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 254-260.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, VII. pp. 44-46.

The iniquity of the policy which dictated the sending out of the "secret note" must be apparent to everyone who remembers what the situation was at the time. The King and his Ministers were striving to persuade the allied Sovereigns that France was in so healthy a state that she might be relieved, with safety, from the burden of further military occupation. This was the moment which Monsieur and his followers selected for sending to them false information well calculated to make them withhold their consent.

A letter which Donnadieu had written, in the previous February, to the Duke of Wellington is another connecting link between the "waterside conspirators" and the instigators of the "secret note."¹ In this long communication the General was at pains to impress upon the Duke his conviction that the withdrawal of the Army of Occupation would be followed by a revolution in France. The unpatriotic attitude taken up by a small section of Frenchmen at Brussels towards the "liberation of the territory" has been pointed out. These malcontents were, however, obscure men of desperate fortunes who made up the scum of the Bonapartist party. But can anything be urged to extenuate the guilt of the Comte d'Artois who inspired the "secret note"? Can any excuse be offered for the conduct of the Duc de Fitzjames or of the Duc de Crussol, who are said to have proceeded to London expressly to influence English Ministers against evacuation. Well might Richelieu despair of his country and long for the day, when, his mission accomplished, he could lay aside the hateful burden of office.²

The contents of the "secret note" were made public. Décazes felt that this was an opportunity, which must not be allowed to escape, for exposing the anti-national policy of his adversaries.³ Angry as the King was there was little which he could do. Vitrolles was, however, summarily dismissed from the Council of State. It was the only office which he held. As he was a poor man the deprivation of the salary attaching to the post was a loss which fell heavily upon him. He was, also, closely examined by the magistrate engaged in investigating the "waterside plot." Without doubt the authorities would have been very pleased had they been able to implicate him in it. But he was too clever to commit himself. It is highly probable, however, that he was, if not the instigator, at any rate, deeply concerned in that affair as well.

¹ *Supplementary Despatches*, XII., Donnadieu à Wellington, 12 Février, 1818.

² Mme. de Boigne, II. pp. 371-373.

³ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, VII. pp. 48-50.
Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 267-270.

If ever a man was guilty of treason, it was the author of the "secret note." Nevertheless, it is difficult not to feel sorry for Vitrolles. He had excellent abilities, and had on several occasions rendered signal service to the Royal cause. But he had also done work of a kind for which it was inconvenient to reward him. He was, in fact, rather a compromising friend. This last scandal made matters worse. Monsieur, on whose behalf he had incurred his final disgrace, could only offer him a gift of money. Even after he became King, though he reinstated him in the Council of State, he appears to have thought that Vitrolles was not exactly a man of whom it was advisable to take much public notice.¹

The foundation of the *Conservateur*, destined to become very celebrated during its brief existence, dates from this time.² According to Vitrolles it was at his suggestion that Monsieur consented to advance twenty-four thousand francs towards starting a paper which was to be the mouthpiece of the Royalists. The *Minerve*, the Liberal organ, had been particularly severe of late. The creation of the *Conservateur* would, they hoped, enable them to answer these attacks. Its policy, however, was to be the defence of Religion, the King, the Charter, Liberty, and honest folk in general. Such, at least, was the programme which, in its first number, Chateaubriand announced would be invariably adhered to. All the leading members of the Royalist party were invited to take shares in, or to contribute to the new venture. Chateaubriand, to whose pen it was to owe most of its fame, had a large interest in it. The Abbé de Lamennais before long joined the Staff. Mathieu de Montmorency, Jules de Polignac, Villèle, Bonald, Talaru, and Vitrolles himself were connected with it.

For gentlemen to embark seriously on journalism was an entirely new departure. In the opinion of Richelieu it was one to be greatly deplored. He foresaw that, in this instance, its effect would be to widen the breach between the Royalists and the Ministerialists. Generally speaking he regretted it as a disagreeable symptom of the all-pervading democratic spirit. The idea of "a Montmorency entering the lists against an Etienne" was a shock to his aristocratic instincts.³

From a financial point of view the *Conservateur* proved a success. But in the course of pursuing Chateaubriand's programme it was found necessary to ridicule and satirize the

¹ Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 273-275.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 276-288.

³ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, VII. pp. 108-111.

Crousaz-Crétet, *Richelieu*, p. 297.

pretensions of the middle classes, and to attack all institutions which owed their origin to the Revolution. This development, though it made the paper extremely popular in fashionable circles, was hardly conducive to promoting the real interests of Royalty.

Monsieur's bad behaviour was not allowed to go altogether unpunished. Though he was not actually deprived of the Colonel-Generalship of the National Guards, the control and all the business in connection with them was handed over to the Minister of the Interior. The political use which Monsieur had made of his command has already been explained. Far from diminishing, this evil had increased fourfold. The influence of the Congress was now paramount at the headquarters of the National Guards. The opportunity for putting to an end so intolerable a state of affairs had come at a critical time. The date of the opening of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle was approaching. The autumn elections were near at hand. They would certainly be watched with the keenest interest by the Sovereigns and statesmen who were to take part in the conference. Their result might sensibly affect the decisions which the Powers must come to. Ministers were now assured that, in the coming electoral campaign, the opposition of Monsieur, concealed behind his command of the citizen army, need no longer be apprehended.¹

The Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle began officially on September 30th, 1818. It was a brilliant gathering. The Tsar of Russia, the Emperor of Austria, and the King of Prussia were present in person. Capo d'Istria, Nesselrode, Metternich, Wellington, Castlereagh, Hardenberg and, by the grace of the Allies, Richelieu, were among the statesmen who attended and took part in the deliberations. As early as October 9th the Allied Sovereigns had given their consent to the withdrawal of the Army of Occupation. There was a complete unanimity among these potentates and their advisers that no good purpose could be served by retaining their troops in France. Wellington had pointed out, before this, that if the occupation were to be prolonged, he must take steps to safeguard his position. In face of the exasperation which such a decision would create, it would become advisable to concentrate between the Scheldt and the Meuse. He was not without fears, however, that the initial movements to effect this combination might precipitate a crisis. The possibility that his scattered forces might be

¹ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, VII. pp. 97-102.

Pasquier, IV. pp. 252-254.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, IV. pp. 363-364.

attacked, whilst still widely separated, was one to be seriously apprehended. There was no desire in the councils of the Powers to bring on a popular uprising in France. The readiness with which the Allies gave their consent to evacuation, may, in consequence, be ascribed far more to Wellington's fears than to any feeling of confidence in the stability of the Bourbon throne.¹

As soon as this had been settled, both the Tsar and the King of Prussia paid an unofficial visit of congratulation to Louis XVIII. Relations of the most friendly and cordial nature were established. To the Tsar, especially, Louis was at great pains to make himself agreeable. After a very brief stay, Alexander returned to Aix-la-Chapelle, whither, a few days later (November 3rd), the King of Prussia followed him. There were still important matters to be discussed.

Richelieu claimed that France, now that she was emancipated from foreign control, should be admitted into the Alliance of the Powers. This was a view of the situation which the Allies were not prepared to adopt.² The treaty in question was but a continuation of the one originally signed at Chaumont in 1814, renewed at Vienna March 25th, 1815, and again in Paris on November 20th of the same year. It was directed primarily against France. The potentates and statesmen assembled at Aix-la-Chapelle were all agreed that events might, before long, occasion a fresh recourse to its provisions. The result of the French elections were known. Lafayette, Benjamin Constant, and Manuel, names of ominous import, had been successfully returned. The Liberal revival, which had evidently begun, was pregnant with revolutionary possibilities. Under these circumstances there could be no question of allowing the Alliance to lapse. But, whilst there was thus a complete accord as to the necessity of maintaining the conditions of the Treaty of Chaumont, there was a divergence of opinion as to the advisability of enlarging its scope by the contracting of a wider alliance, to which France might become a party.

Following the lead of the Tsar, Metternich proposed that a general declaration should be drawn up, based on the Holy Alliance. It was to guarantee the territorial *status quo* and Legitimate Sovereignty. This attempt to provide "the transparent soul of the Holy Alliance with a body," was a solution of the difficulty which Castlereagh's instructions forbade him to

¹ *F. O. Continental*, Aix-la-Chapelle, September to December, 1818. Memoranda and Declarations, Memorandum No. I.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, VII. pp. 89-95.

² 4 Vols. *F. O. Continental*, Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, Castlereagh, Paris. Wellington, January to September, September to December, 1818. *Cambridge Modern History*, X., The Congresses, pp. 14-18.

entertain. The continental Powers, on the other hand, were disposed to support the scheme. They were not, however, prepared to enter into any arrangements which involved a separation from Great Britain. After an exchange of views, extending over several days, the matter was at last settled by a compromise. On November 15th, 1818, the Quadruple Alliance, for the purpose of watching over France, was renewed in the form of a secret protocol, which was communicated in confidence to Richelieu. At the same time a declaration was drawn up, to which France was invited to adhere. It set forth that the five Powers intended to maintain the intimate union contracted by the Sovereigns, and pronounced its object to be the preservation of peace on the basis of respect for treaties.

The signing of these two diplomatic instruments concluded the business of the Congress in so far as French affairs were concerned. Richelieu could return to Paris. He had successfully carried through the two great objects which for the last three years he had always had in view. The Declaration to which, as his country's representative, he had affixed his signature, however vague and colourless it might be, had consecrated the principle that France could now be admitted, on equal terms, into the European Concert. At the same time the Treaty of October 9th definitely provided for the complete withdrawal of the Army of Occupation by November 30th, 1818.

CHAPTER XI

CABINET CRISES AND A TRAGEDY

RICHELIEU had always intended to resign office when the last foreign soldier should have quitted French territory. The strife of parties and the intrigues of the past three years had disgusted him with public life. In the future, moreover, domestic politics would occupy the foremost place in the business of the State, and he was doubtful of his ability to deal with them successfully. At Aix-la-Chapelle, however, his conversations with the Tsar, Wellington, and Metternich, caused him to abandon his intention. Alexander's Liberal ideas had undergone great modifications, and he was now convinced that Frenchmen were, with few exceptions, either "corrupted by bad principles or by violent party sentiments."¹ This was a view of his countrymen with which Richelieu in his heart concurred. He could, besides, agree entirely with Wellington about the evils of a free press, and could share Metternich's fears upon the subject of the dangers which the growth of Liberalism portended. All of them assured him that he was the only man in whom they had complete confidence, and impressed upon him that it was his duty to remain in office. Richelieu readily sacrificed his private inclinations, and, when he returned to Paris, no longer thought of retiring. He was determined, however, to impart to the policy of the Government a new direction.²

In Richelieu's opinion the electoral law of 1817 would have to be repealed. It had alienated the Royalists from the Government, and brought into existence a strong Independent party. But to carry out such a measure an alliance between the Ministerialists and the Right would have to be concluded. Molé, the Minister of Marine, with whom Richelieu had been in correspondence, appears to have conducted the negotiations. The Ministerialist Peers were in the habit of meeting in the *salon* of Cardinal Bausset, and those members of the Upper Chamber,

¹ *F. O. France*, Aix-la-Chapelle, 1818, Castlereagh to Liverpool.

² Pasquier, IV. p. 270.

Broglie, *Souvenirs*, II. pp. 24-25.

Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. pp. 214-215.

E. Daudet, *Louis XVIII et Décazes*, pp. 281-287.

who generally voted with the Right, in the apartment of M. de Talaru, which was in the same building. Molé, without, however, taking any of his colleagues into his confidence, succeeded in arranging an understanding between these two groups.¹ Richelieu himself whilst at Aix-la-Chapelle had been in frequent communication with Décazes. Their letters show that the two Ministers were not of the same opinion about the military reforms which Gouvion-Saint-Cyr was proposing to effect, but they contain no allusions to the complete reversal of policy, upon which the President of the Council had resolved to embark.²

When the Chambers met, on December 10th, the effect was seen of the negotiations which had taken place between the *Cardinalists*, as the frequenters of Cardinal Bausset's *salon* were called, and the leaders of the Right. Ravez, the Royalist candidate, was elected President of the Lower House, and the composition of the *bureau* of the Upper Chamber testified to the existence of a good understanding between the Ministerialists and the Right.³ Three Cabinet Councils, however, held on December 12th, 14th, and 17th served to disclose that Ministers were no longer agreed. Molé openly advocated an alliance with the Royalists, whilst Gouvion and Décazes protested against any departure from the line of policy which the Government had pursued hitherto. Richelieu said very little, but showed plainly that he was in agreement with Molé. The King, on the other hand, declared himself upon the side of Décazes. "Let us plant our flag," said he, "upon the ordinance of September 5th, hold out our hands to the Right and to the Left, and look upon all those who are not against us as with us." This Royal pronouncement appears to have brought to a conclusion the business of the Council of the 17th.⁴

On the following day the prospects were obscured of uniting the Ministerialists and the Right. The election of the Vice-Presidents and Secretaries of the Lower Chamber proved unfavourable to the Royalist candidates. Richelieu appears to have attributed this result to Décazes's opposition, and to have concluded that his hostility would render ineffectual all attempts at a fusion of parties. Seeking an audience of the King he tendered his resignation, an example which was followed, on Dec-

¹ E. Daudet, *Louis XVIII et Décazes*, pp. 289-293.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, VII. pp. 183-184.

Crousaz-Crétet, *Richelieu*, pp. 303-305.

² E. Daudet *Louis XVIII et Décazes*, pp. 270-273.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 294-295.

Pasquier, IV. p. 271.

Crousaz-Crétet, *Richelieu*, pp. 306-307.

⁴ E. Daudet, *Louis XVIII et Décazes*, pp. 296-298.

ember 22nd, by Décazes and the other members of the Government. Louis had no personal liking for Richelieu, but he was reluctant to lose the services of a Minister so highly esteemed in the Cabinets of the Powers. Moreover, he knew not by whom to replace him, and dreaded the prospect of having to send for Talleyrand. The Duke, however, would only consent to reconsider his determination on the understanding that Décazes should depart forthwith as Ambassador to St. Petersburg. This idea that a fallen Minister must go into exile savours strongly of the old *régime*. But his peculiar position with the King imparted an unusual character to the situation, and both Wellington and Pozzo di Borgo are said to have advised Richelieu to make his departure from France a condition to his remaining in office.

Décazes appears to have placed his fate unreservedly in Louis' hands, and to have made no attempt to dissuade him from accepting Richelieu's conditions. All the Duke's efforts, however, to form a Cabinet proved ineffectual. Neither Pasquier nor Gouvion would join the Ministry without Décazes, and a combination which involved the entry into the Government of Villèle, the Royalist leader, had to be abandoned. He was, in consequence, obliged to acknowledge that he had failed in all directions, and to recommend the King to send for either Marmont or Macdonald. Neither of them, however, appeared suitable to Louis, who, upon the recommendation of Pasquier and Décazes, decided to entrust the task of forming a Cabinet to General the Marquis Dessoles.¹

The names of the new Ministers were published in the *Moniteur* of December 30th; Dessoles was President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs; Décazes was Minister of the Interior; Gouvion-Saint-Cyr, Minister of War; the Baron Louis, Minister of Finance; and de Serre, Keeper of the Seals. The Ministry of Police was abolished; henceforward the business of that office was to be conducted at the Home Department by a Secretary General.² The new President of the Council had been Chief of the Staff to Moreau in the Hohenlinden Campaign. In 1814 he had taken an active part in bringing about the recall of the Bourbons, and had been appointed by the Provisional Government to the command of the National Guards. Since that time, however, he had played only an insignificant part in public affairs. His political views were greatly influenced by his friendship for Béranger, who, though he had been a Minister

¹ Pasquier, IV. pp. 272-274.

E. Daudet, *Louis XVIII et Décazes*, pp. 302-307.

² Viel Castel, *Histoire*, VII. p. 245.

during the first Restoration, was almost a Republican.¹ It was apparent, from the earliest days of the existence of the new Cabinet, that Dessoles was to be completely overshadowed by Décazes. Moreover, a certain divergence of opinion manifested itself quickly among its members. The President of the Council, Gouvion-Saint-Cyr, and the Baron Louis advocated an alliance with the Left, whilst Décazes, de Serre, and Portal held that the Government must plant its flag in the Left Centre and Doctrinaire camp.² Décazes, at this time, was greatly under the influence of Guizot, whom he had appointed to an important post at the Home Office. He was soon to discover, however, that the Doctrinaires were exacting masters. Their views had none of the elasticity which political combinations require, and they insisted, in return for their support, in filling the Council of State and the *prefectures* with their friends.³ The Lower Chamber at this time was divided into four groups of about equal strength—the Right, the Right Centre, the Left Centre, and the Left. The Government could alone depend for support, with any degree of confidence, upon the Left Centre, but, on the other hand, only the Right was openly hostile. Under these conditions, the Ministerial policy resolved itself into a continuous attempt to balance one party against the other—the system of *la bascule*, as it was called. The name of Décazes has been associated always with this form of parliamentary tactics, in which he attained great proficiency.⁴ In the Upper Chamber the Government was in a hopeless minority. When Richelieu retired the *Cardinalistes* at once threw in their lot with the Ultra-Royalists, who were thus enabled to command an overwhelming preponderance of votes in the House of Peers.

Upon the *Bourse*, and by the country generally, the new Government was regarded with favour. The middle classes were disposed to look upon the retirement of Richelieu as a victory achieved by their champion, Décazes, over the aristocracy. The Duke, it was popularly supposed, had bound himself at Aix-la-Chapelle to repeal the electoral law. In the society of Monsieur and in that of the Faubourg-Saint-Germain the composition of the new Cabinet was regarded as a further triumph for Décazes. Richelieu, however, was too independent to be a favourite at the Pavillon de Marsan, and had too little

¹ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, VII. pp. 259–260.

² Pasquier, IV. pp. 279–282.

E. Daudet, *Louis XVIII et Décazes*, p. 315.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, VII. pp. 260–261.

³ Pasquier, IV. pp. 276–277.

Nettement, *Histoire*, V. pp. 6–9.

⁴ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, VII. pp. 266–267.

sympathy with Ultra-Royalist prejudices to be popular in the *salons* of the noble faubourg.¹

It was a matter of common knowledge that Richelieu had retired as poor a man as on the day on which he had accepted office. The 10,000 francs which he drew as a Gentleman of the Bedchamber constituted his whole income. Yet, despite his great services to the State, when on January 11th Dessoles introduced a bill to confer upon him and his heirs a pension of 50,000 francs, it was opposed by the Right and by the Left. Upon hearing of the proposal which had been brought forward regarding him, Richelieu, who was in the country, wrote at once to the Presidents of both Chambers, begging that the matter might be allowed to drop. The Government, however, ignored his protests and decided that the affair should proceed. But, in view of the vigorous opposition of both the Royalists and the Independents, it was found necessary to reduce the proposed grant to a life pension. In this attenuated form it was passed in the Lower Chamber by the narrow margin of twenty-nine votes. Meanwhile, in addition to the ignominy of having been the subject of acrimonious debates in the Parliament, the Duke had been attacked in the *Conservateur* and in a pamphlet, by which Lanjuinais, a Liberal peer, sought to show that he was in no need of money. Richelieu was deeply hurt, and resolved to present the whole sum to a hospital at Bordeaux—the first town in France to hoist the flag of the Bourbons. “After all, the sacrifice is a small one,” he wrote to a friend; “they have deprived me of the pleasure of leaving the money to my nephew.” But Décazes, whose friendship for the Duke subsisted in spite of their political differences, persuaded the King to appoint him to the post of *grand veneur*, and to raise the emoluments of the office to the sum of 50,000 francs.²

The Cabinet having been formed after the opening of the Session, some weeks had to elapse before Ministers could be in a position to bring forward any bills of importance. A sudden attack upon the Government was, however, delivered by the opposition in the Upper Chamber. The good relations which had been established between the *Cardinalistes* and the Royalist Peers, who frequented Talaru's *salon*, had not been disturbed by Richelieu's inability to form a Cabinet. In the counsels of these two groups it was decided that one of their number should move that an address be presented, praying the King to abrogate

¹ Pasquier, IV. pp. 282–283.

Viel Castel, VII. p. 268.

² Crousaz-Crétet, *Richelieu*, pp. 318–322.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, VII. pp. 268–283.

the electoral law. The Marquis Barthélémy, a *Cardinaliste*, who was deputed to bring forward this resolution, and who, in consequence, attained for a time considerable celebrity, was a nephew of the more famous Abbé, the author of *The Voyage of the Young Anarcharsis*. The Marquis himself, in revolutionary days, had been one of those Directors who had been deported with Pichegreu after the *coup d'état* of the 18th Fructidor. He had returned to France under the Consulate, and had sat in the Senate of the Empire. The Government now pressed him to abandon his proposal, and he was threatened with the King's displeasure should he persist in proceeding with it. But he was not to be deterred, and on February 20th duly brought forward his motion. Despite the efforts of Décazes and the Liberal Peers a day was fixed for its discussion, and, on March 2nd, a form of address for presentation to His Majesty was adopted by a large majority.

Were the Right Centre members, who corresponded to the *Cardinalistes* in the Upper House, to unite with the Royalists in the Lower Chamber, the Government would sustain a defeat which must entail its resignation. Décazes organized petitions and demonstrations all over the country in favour of the existing electoral law, and encouraged the censored press to denounce the Barthélémy proposal with the utmost violence.¹ At the same time he determined to deal in drastic fashion with the Hereditary Chamber. A bill to change the date on which the financial year was to begin had been sent up to the Peers. It was a measure of pure convenience and involved no party principles, nevertheless it was thrown out by ninety-three votes to sixty-four. The majority in the Upper Chamber, it was clear, intended to oppose the Government systematically. Décazes was prepared for the situation. Two days later, on March 6th, the names were published in the *Moniteur* of sixty-one new Peers whom the King had created.²

Fifteen of the new legislators were men who had forfeited their seats in the Upper Chamber in 1815. In addition several marshals, general officers, and former dignitaries of the Empire figured in this vast creation. Barante, the Doctrinaire, and Lacépède, the scientist, besides many officials and civil servants completed the list. Louis had allowed Décazes a free hand in making his selections, and he had availed himself of this opportunity of extending his policy of conciliation. The Royalists were indignant and, perhaps, genuinely alarmed at the number

¹ Pasquier, IV. pp. 283, 284.

Nettement, *Histoire*, V. pp. 26-30.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, VIII. pp. 320-331.

² Viel Castel, *Histoire*, VII. pp. 349-352.

Pasquier, IV. pp. 285-286.

of persons of pronounced Imperial antecedents thus introduced into the Upper House. But Décazes's trust in them was to be justified by their loyal conduct, good sense, and moderation, which was to enhance greatly the reputation of the Hereditary Chamber in the eyes of the people. Though favouritism may have been responsible for a few of the promotions, Décazes, on the whole, would seem to have exercised a wise discretion. Nevertheless, by the creation of a majority in this arbitrary manner, he had established a dangerous precedent.¹

Not since the dissolution of the *chambre introuvable* had any measure created so much excitement at the Pavillon de Marsan and in the *salons* of the Faubourg-Saint-Germain. The chorus of disapproval from the fashionable world was swelled by the voices of the members of the *corps diplomatique*. With the exception of Sir Charles Stuart, the Ambassadors of the Powers severely condemned the action of the Government, and made no secret of their regret that Richelieu was no longer at the head of affairs. Owing in part to the cosmopolitan character of aristocratic society of the time, and in part to the tutelage which they had been accustomed to exercise over the French Government, the representatives of the Powers would indulge in public criticisms of Ministerial proceedings to an extent which, in these days, would be considered intolerable. The question, indeed, would appear to have been discussed of handing in a collective note of remonstrance, a plan which was abandoned only because of the refusal of the British Ambassador to participate in it.²

The Barthélémy proposal came before the Lower Chamber on March 20th, and, after a debate extending over two days, was rejected by a substantial majority. On the 22nd, de Serre introduced the great legislative measure of the Session. It consisted of three bills to regulate the position of the public Press. Three prominent Doctrinaires—Guizot, the Duc de Broglie, and de Serre himself—had been concerned in drafting these projects of law. They proposed to confer a real liberty upon the newspapers, to abolish the censorship, which was to be replaced by a moderate pecuniary guarantee, and to refer all press offences to a jury for trial. Two months were consumed in discussing these three bills, which the Government finally carried through in the shape in which they had been introduced. The brilliant oratory of de Serre relieved the dullness of these long debates,

¹ E. Daudet, *Louis XVIII et Décazes*, pp. 349-351.

Nettement, *Histoire*, pp. 47-50.

² Viel Castel, *Histoire*, VII. pp. 353-357.

Pasquier, IV. pp. 287-288.

E. Daudet, *Louis XVIII et Décazes*, pp. 253-257.

and added greatly to the prestige of the Government.¹ Much as they disliked the spirit of these measures, the Royalists, since they had been in opposition, had too often denounced the censorship to venture now on advocating its retention. They were compelled, in consequence, to see it abolished in sulkily silence, and to intervene only when clauses dealing with newspaper attacks upon religion were under consideration. In this direction they were successful in obtaining some trifling concessions.²

Despite the Liberal character of the measures for which it was responsible, the Government, when the Session closed on July 7th, had lost the support of the Left. This party had been agitating busily for the recall of all political exiles to France, and, in the heated discussion which the petitions of these offenders gave rise to, the rupture between the Independents and the Cabinet was consummated.³

It was not without reason that Richelieu had described as monstrous the alliance between the Jacobins, Independents, and Bonapartists, which, about this time, came to be known as the Liberal party. Despite the hostility of the members of the Chamber of the Hundred Days to the Emperor, and their insistence upon his abdication, they had been forgiven by the Bonapartists on account of their opposition to the recall of the Bourbons. In their common hatred of the dynasty all their former differences were to be forgotten. Décazes was soon forced to realize that the aims of a party so constituted must necessarily be revolutionary.⁴ Without doubt there were members of the Left, such as Saint-Aulaire, his own father-in-law, or Broglie, who held no anti-dynastic views, and who could be described only as Constitutional Monarchists. Victor Duc de Broglie, who three years before had married Madame de Staël's daughter, had now a recognized place upon Beugnot's famous "sofa," which, he had once laughingly declared, could seat all the Doctrinaires. In 1815 the Duke had been the only Peer who had voted for the acquittal of Marshal Ney, on the ground that he believed him to be guiltless of any criminal intention.⁵ Nevertheless, he had no leanings towards Bonapartism,

¹ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, VII. pp. 359-368.

² Pasquier, IV. pp. 289-293.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, VII. pp. 378-424.

Nettement, *Histoire*, VII. pp. 66-99.

³ Pasquier, IV. pp. 291-293.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, IV. pp. 422-424.

Nettement, *Histoire*, V. pp. 106-114.

⁴ Thureau Dangin, *Le parti libéral*, pp. 26, 78.

⁵ Broglie, *Souvenirs*, I. p. 330.

but was a genuine Liberal. He was a fervent admirer of the British Constitution, and numbered among the prominent Whigs of his day many personal friends. The maintenance of the electoral law of 1817 was at this time the watchword of the Doctrinaires, who were in consequence prepared to take the Dessolles-Décazes Cabinet under their protection. But their sentiments were always of that cold and reasoned kind, which never allowed an opportunity to escape of passing adverse criticisms upon the objects of their friendship.

Notwithstanding that he was a Deputy of only a few months' standing, Benjamin Constant was the most prominent member of the Left proper. His opposition was embittered by the knowledge that his conduct during the Hundred Days had made him an object of suspicion to Royalist Governments. He was not a revolutionist, however, nor should he be classed among the anti-dynastic members of the party. The exact character of his political creed is impossible to define, probably he had no very settled convictions of any kind. But if he judged by the Constitution, which in 1815 he drew up for Bonaparte, he would appear to have entertained a wholesome dread of pure democracy. Though he was only fifty-two years of age at this time the effects were already plainly visible upon his feeble frame of hard living, and of long hours spent at the gaming-table.¹

Casimir Perier had not yet achieved the position to which he was to attain a few years later. He was a rich manufacturer, and the member of a good middle-class family. His views were constitutional, tempered, however, by a bitter hatred of the old aristocracy and the clerical party.² Laffitte, on the other hand, was a determined enemy of the dynasty. Yet the Bourbons had treated him well, and in 1814 had made him Governor of the Bank of France, a position which he still retained. He was the son of a carpenter at Bayonne, and by his own talents had risen to be the leading banker of his country. He was warm-hearted and generous, but, like many self-made men, was prodigiously vain. It was his pleasure to dispense a sumptuous hospitality at Maisons, his celebrated house near Paris, and at his *hôtel* in the Rue d'Artois. But the magnificence of his entertainments was powerless to attract the aristocratic society of the day. It is said that the knowledge that the doors of the Faubourg Saint-Germain must remain impenetrably closed against him was responsible for much of his hostility to the *régime*. In 1817 he was returned to the Chamber at the head of

¹ Thureau Dangin, *Le parti libéral*, pp. 33-41.

² *Ibid.*, p. 130.

the list in every electoral district of the town, and could console himself for other disappointments by reflecting upon Talleyrand's remark "that the man was indeed a power in the land who owned Paris for his rotten borough."

Before leaving France in 1815 Bonaparte had confided to Laffitte a large sum of money which, it is said, he had empowered him to use at his discretion for any purpose conducive to the interests of his cause. Though the allegation has been denied, it may be regarded as almost certain that most of the anti-dynastic movements and conspiracies which took place under the Restoration were assisted financially by Laffitte.¹ Richelieu had always an unconquerable aversion to him, and hoped to see him dismissed from the governorship of the Bank of France—a wish which he was to gratify before long.² Nevertheless, the Duke would have rendered a far greater service to the Monarchy had he set himself to soothe the wounded feelings and to disarm the hostility of the banker. But though he was free from many of the prejudices of his order he was too thorough a French aristocrat to realize the enormous power of which, under modern conditions, men such as Casimir Perier, and Laffitte could dispose.

Manuel the creature of Fouché in the Chamber of the Hundred Days, was a most dangerous enemy of the Bourbons. He was by profession a lawyer, and had served in the armies of the Republic. He was no orator, but a cool and skilled debater and, in the Chamber of the Restoration, was to evince a peculiar talent for reviving exasperating recollections of the emigration, and for confronting the aspirations of the old privileged *noblesse* with those of the middle classes. But his aims were exclusively revolutionary and were not confined to a parliamentary opposition, which was, indeed, a mere cloak to his more serious proceedings. Traces are abundant of his active participation in the many plots, which, during the next few years, were hatched against the Monarchy.³

La Fayette and Voyer d'Argenson, two of the most violently anti-dynastic members of the Left, belonged not to the middle classes, but to the best families of the old nobility. On some occasion, after the Comte d'Artois had succeeded his brother as Charles X, he is reported to have said that "only two men in France had never changed since 1789, one was La Fayette and the other was himself." In 1819 Marie-Joseph-Paul-Yvès-

¹ Pasquier, IV. p. 394.

² Thureau Dangin, *Le parti libéral*, pp. 31-54.

³ Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. pp. 239-240.

Thureau Dangin, *Le parti libéral*, pp. 48-51.

Roche-Gilbert-Mottier, Marquis de La Fayette was sixty-two years of age. Time had not modified his chief characteristic which Jefferson has described as "a canine appetite for popularity." It was still his great delight to sign himself a "National Guard of '89." Upon his election to the Chamber, in 1818, he entered recklessly, and with none of Manuel's circumspection, into all the plots of the disaffected. The doctrine of the sovereignty of the people had no more devoted admirer than this aristocratic revolutionary.¹ Marc-René-de-Voyer-de-Paulmy, Marquis d'Argenson, the stepfather of the Duc de Broglie, was fully as ready as La Fayette to embark upon any enterprise directed against the reigning dynasty. He appears to have entertained some visionary schemes for the reconstruction of society upon a socialistic basis, and has been described as "full of illusions about humanity, and of contempt for his fellow-men."²

The year 1819 was one of general unrest in Europe. From Russia came the news of a military revolt the suppression of which had been attended with much bloodshed. In England the affair dignified by the name of the Manchester massacre testified to the existence of much popular discontent. Throughout Italy the activity of the Carbonari augured ill for the continued maintenance of tranquillity. In Spain the signs of an impending revolution were plainly manifest. In Germany the murder of Kotzebue and students' riots were symptoms of the impatience of the people to see those reforms carried out which, they had been led to expect, were to be inaugurated once Bonaparte should have been overthrown. In order to devise means of repressing this growing demand for Liberal institutions, Metternich and representatives from the Northern German States met in solemn conclave at Carlsbad. The result of their deliberations was soon made public in the form of the famous *decrees*, which were to stifle constitutional liberty in Germany for a generation.³

Though the *Carlsbad decrees* only concerned Germany, they were regarded, not without reason, by the French Liberals as reflecting the reactionary views entertained by the Sovereigns of continental Europe. It was a theme which provided the democratic press with an excellent field for the exercise of its newly-acquired freedom. For the first few weeks which followed the abolition of the censorship, the French journalists hardly

¹ Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. p. 239.

Thureau Dangin, *Le parti libéral*, pp. 41-47, 146.

² Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. pp. 240-241.

Thureau Dangin, *Le parti libéral*, pp. 54-56.

³ Pasquier, IV. pp. 311-317.

realized the magnitude of their power. This state of affairs, however, did not last for long. Liberty degenerated rapidly into licence, and it was soon abundantly evident that in press prosecutions juries were not to be trusted.¹ As is often the case in France, the first symptoms of unrest manifested themselves at the Universities. During the summer of 1819 disturbances took place at the schools of Law and of Medicine. The suspension of M. Bavoux, a popular professor of advanced political views, was resented by his pupils, and was made the occasion of a turbulent demonstration against the authorities of the University. Bavoux and several students were prosecuted in consequence. The Government, however, was unable to obtain their conviction, a circumstance which was hailed as a triumph by the Liberal press. For a different reason the Royalist papers had discussed this affair at length. These disturbances they contended furnished the best of arguments against the secular character of the education at the Universities.²

Many Royalists were firmly convinced that, in order to stem the advancing tide of democracy, the people must be won back to religious principles. This was an opinion with which the governing classes in England generally concurred. Lord Liverpool's government, indeed, had sanctioned the expenditure of a million pounds of public money upon the erection of new Churches.³ In France, in the year 1819, the proselytizing zeal of the missionaries attracted universal attention. The society of *Les missionnaires de France* was directed by the Abbé Rauzan and the Abbé de Forbin-Janson, and was in close touch with the Congregation of the Rue du Bac. The missionaries were generally sturdy priests, selected for their brazen voices. Their visits to country towns were always announced long in advance. The local authorities both civil and military, acting, doubtless, upon hints or orders received from Paris, as a rule afforded them assistance and protection. Their proceedings in the districts which they visited generally began with a procession headed by a choir of young men and girls singing hymns set to the tune of popular songs of the day. On arriving at some prominent spot a gigantic crucifix would be set up, in expiation of the offences against religion, committed by the inhabitants in revolutionary times. The activity of the missionaries, however, was frequently displayed in more objectionable ways. In

¹ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, VII, pp. 541-547.

Pasquier, IV. pp. 302-303.

² Pasquier, IV. 295-297.

Nettement, *Histoire*, V. pp. 135-142.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, VII. pp. 523-535.

³ Walpole, *History of England* (1902 edition), I. pp. 388-390.

their discourses and sermons the institutions of modern France were denounced, and purchasers of national property were held up to execration. They are said, moreover, to have resorted to vulgar artifices in order to impose upon the ignorance of their audiences. Disputations were organized, at which disguised priests would advance the most puerile arguments in support of philosophical doctrines, which the missionaries would refute triumphantly to the discomfiture of their pretended adversaries.¹

Even if great allowance be made for the unscrupulous character of anti-clerical attacks upon the Church, it is clear that these crusades against unbelief had a very harmful effect. The favour extended to the missionaries by high civil and military officials tempted numerous individuals to indulge in the most odious forms of hypocrisy. Far from conducing to peace and goodwill the visits of these fanatical priests were, as a rule, a cause of strife and of discord.² Sensible people, moreover, alarmed by their intolerance, and disgusted by the shameless impositions which they saw practised around them, began to distrust a Government which encouraged such proceedings.

From the little house in the Bois de Boulogne, which he had hired for the summer recess, Décazes ruled France. Neither the unscrupulous animosity of the Ultra-Royalists nor the virulent opposition of the Left disturbed him. Strong in the support of the wealthy *bourgeoisie* and of the official classes, he counted, with confidence, upon the autumn elections for swelling the ranks of the Ministerialists in the Chamber. The first Industrial Exhibition held in Paris, the brilliant success of which was to shed a lustre over his administration of the Home Department, was opened by the King on August 25th. At the same time he pursued steadily his policy of reconciliation. During this summer the Royal pardon was extended to several regicides, and Bonapartists, as deeply compromised in the events of the Hundred Days as Bassano and Excelmans, were allowed to return to France.³

The secret revolutionary societies, with which Germany, Spain, and Italy were permeated, had not yet spread to France. An association of some importance, however, had come into existence known as *the friends of the liberty of the Press*. This league numbered among its members the Duc de Broglie and most of the prominent Liberals in and out of Parliament. Though strictly speaking an illegal association, it was tolerated by the

¹ Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, IV. pp. 425-430.

² Viel Castel, VII. pp. 437-439.

³ Pasquier, IV. pp. 303-305.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, VIII. pp. 8-11.

E. Daudet, *Louis XVIII et Décazes*, pp. 359-364.

Government for a time, but in the autumn of 1819 it was suppressed. This action on the part of the authorities was taken in consequence of the proceedings of certain committees which grew out of, or were more or less connected with, the society. The so-called *committee of action*, which counted among its members only the most anti-dynastic Liberals, was in the habit of meeting at La Fayette's house in the Rue d'Anjou. Through the instrumentality of Voyer d'Argenson relations were established with the Prince of Orange. The conspirators appear to have decided to renew the invitation made to him two years before. On this present occasion he was to enter France at the head of the Dutch-Belgian army, and declare Belgium united to France under the tricolour. The Prince is believed to have sent an officer to Paris to discuss the details of the plot. According to M. de Vaulabelle, his chief merit in the eyes of the Liberals lay in the fact that he was a Protestant. The enemies of the Bourbons declared always that the increasing power of the clergy constituted a serious menace to national institutions. Nevertheless, the project of conferring the sovereignty of their country upon a foreign Prince, who had fought under Wellington at Waterloo, was strangely inconsistent with all their avowed principles. Possibly on this account, possibly, also, because La Fayette may have been dissatisfied with the part in the affair assigned to him, the matter was not proceeded with. In the meantime, besides, rumours of the mischief which was brewing reached the ears of the King, who at once took steps to check the ambitious designs of his son.¹

Less mystery surrounds the proceedings of the celebrated *directing committee*, the secret inner council of the society of *the friends of the liberty of the Press*. It consisted mainly of Liberal journalists, who were responsible for organizing a regular system for opposing the official candidates at elections. For the first time, in the autumn of 1819, lists of persons for whom all lovers of liberty were invited to vote were presented to the electors in the columns of the newspapers and upon cards distributed in public places. The Royalists also prepared for the electoral struggle. "Save the Monarchy in spite of the Government" was their watchword, to which they added the proviso "sooner a Jacobin than a Ministerialist."²

The elections for a renewal of a fifth of the Chamber, which began on September 11th, were watched with the greatest

¹ Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, IV. pp. 443-446.

² Weil, *Elections legislatives*, pp. 88-90.

Nettement, *Histoire*, V. pp. 153, 157-158.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, IV. pp. 452-453.

interest all over Europe. To the surprise of Décazes they resulted in an overwhelming victory for the Liberals. Eighteen Royalist and six Ministerial seats were lost, whilst the Liberals returned from the contest with their party augmented by twenty-eight new members. In a Chamber of only two hundred and fifty-seven Deputies the Left had now ninety representatives. This startling revolution in the state of parties, in the first instance, however, caused less excitement than the news of the return of the regicide Grégoire by the electoral college of the Isère. Strictly speaking this designation should not have been applied to this heretofore constitutional Bishop and member of the Convention. He had been absent from Paris at the time of the King's trial, and only upon a subsequent occasion had he signified his approval of his condemnation. He had been long forgotten by the old men, and was unknown to the rising generation. Unquestionably, in dragging him from his obscure retreat at Auteuil, the *directing committee* had made a great mistake. The Royalist papers, with difficulty concealing their intense satisfaction, declared that this scandal must necessitate the repeal of the electoral law of 1817. Yet despite their affected consternation the Abbé Grégoire owed his seat to the Royalists. Finding, as a result of the first ballot, that the chances of their candidate were hopeless, the Royalist electors at Grenoble had unhesitatingly given their votes to this ex-member of the Convention.¹

The Royal Family was at dinner at the Tuileries, when the news was received of the Abbé Grégoire's election. Since the alterations effected the year before in his command of the National Guards, Monsieur had scarcely addressed a word to his brother. But he now broke his long silence. "You see, sir," he exclaimed, "to what lengths they are prepared to go." "I do, indeed," answered Louis, "and I intend to take steps to put an end to their proceedings." In point of fact neither the King nor Décazes was disposed to attach undue importance to Grégoire's election. Both appear to have realized, from the first, that the Ultras were fully as much to blame for it as the Liberals. The result of the election, however, was not the less disquieting on that account. It was clear that, were matters to be allowed to pursue their normal course, the Left would command an absolute majority in the Chamber within a year. At no distant date, therefore, Louis would have to select his Ministers from that party. But could the Government of the country be entrusted to the Left without grave danger to the Crown?

¹ Vulabellé, *Deux Restaurations*, IV. pp. 455-456.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, VIII. pp. 110-124, 134-135.

Was not the opposition of the extreme Liberals revolutionary? Were they not divided from the Constitutionalist and old Royalists upon fundamental differences? Both the King and his favourite Minister decided to postpone putting their loyalty to the test as long as possible.

In the first instance, Louis and Décazes appear to have considered that the mere substitution of Septennial Parliaments for the system of the *Rota* would suffice to meet the difficulty.¹ It was probable that a bill to this effect could be passed through the Chamber. Dessoles, the Baron Louis, and Gouvion-Saint-Cyr, however, declared at once their intention of resigning, were any proposal to be brought forward affecting the electoral law. Their attitude came as no surprise to Décazes. Already he was striving to induce Richelieu to resume his place at the head of the Government. The Duke would seem to have had an interview with the King on October 4th. But though he declared himself heartily in sympathy with the measure under consideration, he refused persistently to re-enter the Cabinet. At this juncture Décazes is believed to have sounded Villèle as to the possibility of an arrangement with the Royalists. Villèle, however, understood the temper of his followers too well to venture upon entering into negotiations with the object of their keenest aversion, and he, accordingly, made haste to rejoin his friend Corbière in the country. Meanwhile, Pasquier had consented to draw up a memorandum exposing the weak points in the existing electoral law. This was communicated to the press, and received so favourable a reception from the public as to encourage de Serre and Décazes to enlarge the scope of their bill.²

De Serre, in conjunction with Broglie and Guizot, now proceeded to draft a comprehensive measure of parliamentary reform. Their bill, to which they gave the name of Law on the Legislature, was to consist of fifty-one articles, and was to form a supplement to the Charter, some of the clauses of which it was to abrogate. At the same time Décazes made renewed efforts to overcome Richelieu's objection to returning to office.³ But on November 16th he received his answer to the letter which he had sent to him at The Hague. The Duke assured him that the bill met with his unqualified approval, and that he regarded all their former differences as ended, nevertheless, he must persist

¹ E. Daudet, *Louis XVIII et Décazes*, pp. 366-367. Nettement, *Histoire*, V. pp. 167-168.

² E. Daudet, *Louis XVIII et Décazes*, pp. 368-369. Viel Castel, *Histoire*, VIII. pp. 130-132. Nettement, *Histoire*, V. pp. 170-175.

³ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, VIII. pp. 155-159, 163-168.

in his intention of not returning to public life. It is a curious feature of this affair that, with the exception of de Serre, none of Décazes' colleagues in the Cabinet appear to have been in the secret of his negotiations. Dessoles, the President of the Council, had, by Louis' express desire, been kept in ignorance of all these transactions. But at a meeting of the Cabinet, on the day on which Richelieu's answer was received, de Serre announced the provisions of the bill he was drafting. Gouvion, the Baron Louis, and Dessoles thereupon dissented from the changes proposed in the electoral law. After a discussion of five hours' duration the three protesting Ministers handed in their portfolios.¹

Notwithstanding Richelieu's refusal to enter the Cabinet, a strong Government might have been formed could some of the Duke's Right Centre adherents have been induced to join it. In this direction, however, Décazes was successful only in obtaining the co-operation of Pasquier. Nor did his overtures to the Doctrinaires meet with response. Although the new project of law was the work of his especial friends, M. Royer Collard was not disposed to regard favourably any change in the electoral system. He had resigned recently the office of President of the Commission of Public Instruction on the ground of clerical interference with his department, and, since Décazes had been at the Home Office, points of difference had arisen between them. The services which he had rendered to the Bourbons in revolutionary days have been mentioned. He belonged to a good middle-class family, and had been educated on Jansenist principles which had left a stern impression on his character. He was a man of grave deportment, and was not without a certain dignified courtesy, though he was indifferent to the smaller amenities of life. To the consternation of courtiers he had on one occasion blown his nose noisily, with a huge bandana handkerchief, in the King's presence. Royer-Collard ranks among the finest speakers in the Chamber of the Restoration. To an even greater extent than most of his contemporaries he adhered to that academic style which the members of the Constituent Assembly had adopted. His speeches, indeed, resemble rather the lectures of a professor explaining or condemning a political doctrine, than the arguments which the modern parliamentary debater adduces to support or to denounce some measure under consideration. Despite his genuine independence of character the part of the critic had always

¹ Pasquier, IV. pp. 318-321.

E. Daudet, *Louis XVIII et Décazes*, p. 372.

Viel Castel, VIII. pp. 171-172.

more attractions for him than the responsibilities of office. Accordingly, when Décazes pressed him to enter his Cabinet, he hesitated, objected to serve with Pasquier, and finally refused altogether.¹ The Duc de Broglie showed an equal disinclination to join the Government. In his memoirs he explains that he could not be a member of a Cabinet which, at any moment, might be under the necessity of prosecuting his stepfather Voyer d'Argenson for high treason. Under these circumstances Décazes was forced to replace Dessoles, the Baron Louis, and Gouvion-Saint-Cyr, by Pasquier as Minister for Foreign Affairs, by Roy as Minister of Finance, and by General La Tour Maubourg, the Ambassador in London, as Minister of War. With the exception of Pasquier, his three new colleagues were scarcely men from whom he could expect much assistance in the embittered parliamentary struggle which was impending.²

Décazes was now at the head of a Cabinet formed to repeal the electoral law of 1817, the maintenance of which had been his watchword for the past three years. Had parliamentary government been founded upon the party system so anomalous a situation could not have arisen. Without doubt Décazes would gladly have made way for the Duc de Richelieu. But, in the face of his persistent refusals to accept the Presidency of the Council, he honestly deemed it his duty to attempt to carry out himself a measure which he regarded as indispensable to the safety of the crown. It is clear that his colleague, de Serre, scouted the notion of retirement, and impressed upon him constantly that, to stand aside at this juncture, would amount to a desertion of the Royal cause.³ Yet it was evident that no alteration of the electoral law could be effected without the co-operation of the Royalists, and it is strange that he should not have seen that Décazes was the greatest obstacle to any alliance with the Right. Louis would seem to have realized more clearly the difficulties and dangers which the future had in store. On November 20th, the day on which the formation of the new Cabinet was made public, he expressed in one of the notes, which he delighted to write to his favourite Minister, his doubts and apprehensions. "The King read the *Moniteur* with joy, your father signed the ordinance with fear. You know the esteem of the former, the tenderness of the latter for you, the confidence in you of both. They shall never fail you. But the cheerfulness of your Uncle (Monsieur) and of the

¹ Thureau Dangin, *Le parti libéral*, pp. 80-83.

² Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. pp. 200-201.

Broglie, *Souvenirs*, II. pp. 85, 108-109.

³ E. Daudet, *Louis XVIII et Décazes*, p. 370.

Duchesse d'Angoulême make me wonder whether we have acted wisely." ¹

When the Chambers met on November 29th the alterations which it was proposed to make in the electoral laws were foreshadowed in the King's speech. The Liberals listened to this announcement in stony silence. They were not to be mollified by the recall of numerous political exiles, nor by a further restoration of Peerages forfeited in 1815. Décazes soon discovered that by these two measures he had exasperated the Royalists, and had not won the gratitude of the Left.² In the early days of the Session the attention of the Chamber was concentrated exclusively upon the question of the admission of the Abbé Grégoire. Without unduly straining a legal point he might have been prevented from taking his seat, upon the ground that, in the case of the Isère, the law had not been complied with, which prescribed that half of the Deputies returned by an electoral college must be domiciled within the department. But to have invalidated his election upon a technical objection, would have deprived the Royalists of the pleasure of expelling him as a person unfit to be admitted to the Chamber. Finally, however, after an embittered discussion, a simple decree of exclusion was passed by a good majority.³

The great Doctrinaire measure for remodelling the legislature had had to be abandoned, in consequence of Richelieu's refusal to join the Government. In the Duke's absence a less ambitious scheme had to be devised. It was not, however, an easy matter to draft a bill which should act as an effectual check upon the Liberals, and at the same time avoid creating a second *chambre introuvable*. Owing to the difficulty of devising a measure which should fulfil these two conditions, Décazes was unable to introduce his bill at the beginning of the Session. The most favourable moment for bringing it forward was thus allowed to escape. The Liberals took advantage of this delay to organize petitions on a gigantic scale in favour of the existing electoral law.⁴ The Royalist papers, which for the last two months had left Décazes in peace, attacked him with renewed violence.⁵ The difficulties of his situation were seriously increased by the illness of de

¹ E. Daudet, *Louis XVIII et Décazes*, p. 376.

² Viel Castel, *Histoire*, VIII. pp. 178-183, 187-191.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, V. pp. 79-80.

³ Broglie, *Souvenirs*, II. pp. 89-90, 101-102.

Pasquier, IV. pp. 325-327.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 329-331.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, VIII. pp. 216-219, 267-269.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, V. pp. 89-90.

⁵ E. Daudet, *Louis XVIII et Décazes*, p. 397.

Serre. During this winter the symptoms manifested themselves of the pulmonary disease which was to prove fatal to him a few years later. At first hopes were entertained that he would be able to resume his work before long. But towards the end of January the doctors insisted upon his departure for Nice. Moreover, Décazes himself was, at this juncture, prostrated with a severe attack of bronchitis. This combination of adverse circumstances appears to have shaken his confidence. Pasquier was deputed to make further efforts to overcome Richelieu's resistance to resuming his place at the head of the Government. But the Duke remained inflexible, and Louis refused absolutely to entertain the proposal that Décazes should retire in favour of Lainé. "He could bear to see his Elie supplanted by a Richelieu, but not by a Lainé!"¹

The Duke consented, however, to preside over a committee which Louis at last decided to appoint to assist Ministers to draw up their electoral bill. After much deliberation it was resolved to adopt that portion of de Serre's project of law which provided for a separate representation for urban and country districts. Seats on the committee had been offered to both Villèle and to Corbière, but they had declined to take part in the discussions. They agreed, however, to consider the ministerial proposals provided that Jules de Polignac and Mathieu de Montmorency were allowed to take part in the conference, and that Décazes should not be present. The support of the Royalists was too necessary to the Government to permit of the rejection of any terms, however humiliating. Pasquier, in consequence, met the representatives of the Right, and contrived to arrange an understanding. Monsieur was not to oppose the bill, and Villèle and his friends declared themselves satisfied with the principle which it embodied.²

On the evening of *Dimanche gras*, Sunday, February 13th, whilst society was making the most of the last days of the Carnival, Pasquier was anxiously discussing with Décazes the electoral bill, which was to be introduced into the Lower Chamber on the morrow. Suddenly a police officer burst in upon them with the news that the Due de Berri had been stabbed.³ In

¹ Pasquier, IV. pp. 333-334.

E. Daudet, *Louis XVIII et Décazes*, p. 392.

² Pasquier, IV. pp. 331-335.

E. Daudet, *Louis XVIII et Décazes*, pp. 397-398.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, VIII. pp. 268-274.

Nettement, *Histoire*, V. pp. 228-243.

³ Pasquier, IV. p. 336.

E. Daudet, *Louis XVIII et Décazes*, p. 401.

company with the Duchess he had attended a special performance at the Opera. During the interval preceding the last act of *Les noces de Gamache*, she had expressed a wish to return home. The Duke, accordingly, directed that her carriage should be brought up to the door in the Rue Rameau, known as the *entrée des Princes*. The Opera House, at this time, was situated upon the west side of the Rue de Richelieu, between the Rue Sainte-Anne and the Rue Rameau. Whilst the Duc de Berri, accompanied by the Comte de Mesnard and the Comte de Clermont-Bodève, was assisting Her Royal Highness into her carriage, a man, coming from the direction of the Rue de Richelieu, rushed at him and plunged a knife into his body. "He has struck me," said the Duke, and then sinking backwards exclaimed, "I am stabbed." After a short chase the murderer, who offered little resistance, was captured. Meanwhile, the Duc de Berri had been transported into the antechamber of the box he had just quitted, and from there into the manager's office, where doctors were speedily in attendance upon him. Messengers hurriedly despatched soon brought to the spot Monsieur, the Duc and the Duchesse d'Angoulême, the Duc d'Orléans, besides many courtiers and great officers of State.¹

When Pasquier and Décazes arrived they found the Duke lying upon a bed surrounded by his family. The doctors had just completed their first examination of his wound. Close at hand, bound, and under a strong escort, stood the assassin, a saddler's workman of the name of Louvel. Monsieur came forward at once to discuss with Décazes the propriety of sending for the King. They decided that he must be told, but both agreed that his presence at the Opera House was inadvisable for the moment. The etiquette, the Comte d'Artois pointed out, which would have to be observed upon his arrival might interfere seriously with the movements of the surgeons. Monsieur spoke like a Bourbon. In his eyes not even the imminence of death could justify any relaxation of the ceremony inseparable from the King's presence. Décazes hurried off to the Tuileries. Louis, who had retired for the night, agreed to await further news before proceeding to his nephew's bedside. Décazes returned forthwith to the Opera House, taking with him his own doctor, Dubois. He was too absorbed to notice either the repulsion with which the Duchesse de Berri shrank from him, or the looks of aversion upon the faces of those around her. When Dubois expressed a fear that the knife might have been poisoned, he promptly stepped up to the prisoner and, in a whisper, asked

¹ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, VIII. pp. 275-283.
Nettement, *Histoire*, V. pp. 243-260.

him whether that were the case. This conversation between the Minister and the murderer evoked an indignant murmur from those present. The next day it was said in the Faubourg-Saint-Germain that Décazes had been heard to whisper words of advice and encouragement to his accomplice.¹

The Duc de Berri was sinking fast. From the first he had been under no illusions as to the fatal nature of the wounds. After receiving the consolations of the Church, he desired that all present should be told that he asked pardon for the scandals which his irregular life had occasioned. To his wife he confided his wish to see for the last time two of his natural children, who were living with their mother in Paris. Not much is known about the person in question, a Mrs. Brown,² whose connection with the Duke dated from the days of the emigration in London. In compliance with his request the two little girls were sent for, and, in their presence, their dying father adjured his wife never to forget their existence. In later years both married, one the Prince de Lucingue and the other the Comte de Charrette. About five o'clock, when it was evident that the end was at hand, the clatter of horses' hoofs in the street outside announced the arrival of the King with a strong escort. The Duke, who was perfectly conscious, besought His Majesty to spare the murderer's life. These were almost his last words. Soon afterwards he asked to be turned upon his side, and expired quietly.

Of the Duc de Berri it may be said that nothing in his life so well became him as his way of quitting it. When the Royal Family departed from the Opera House at daybreak, their only consolation lay in a piece of news which had been whispered from ear to ear during the terrible hours of the night. All hope of the perpetuation of the elder branch need not yet be abandoned—the Duchesse de Berri had announced that she was *enceinte*.

A few hours later, when the opening formalities of the sitting had been completed in the Lower Chamber, M. Clausel de Coussergues ascended the tribune and proposed that the Comte Décazes should be arraigned as accessory to the murder of the Duc de Berri. Although Clausel regained his seat amidst a general cry of disapprobation, and although Villèle and the more clear-headed Royalists condemned his action, the party was none the less resolved to encompass the downfall of Décazes.

¹ E. Daudet, *Louis XVIII et Décazes*, pp. 402–403. Pasquier, IV. pp. 337–338.

² For particulars about her see Duchesse de Gontaut, *Mémoires*, p. 187, also *Les enfants du Duc de Berri*, par Le Vicomte de Reiset, who disposes of the story that the Duke was married to Mrs. Brown.

"I have seen the knife," wrote Charles Nodier, the next day in the *Journal des Débats*. "It is a Liberal doctrine." This idea, that Décazes by his encouragement of Liberalism had rendered himself morally responsible for Bouvel's crime, was entertained by men who would have scouted the notion that he had actually participated in the affair. But in Ultra-Royalist circles Clausel's accusation let loose the flood of hatred which had been gathering for the past four years. In the *salons* of the Faubourg-Saint-Germain the violence of the language recalled the worst days of 1815, and at the Café de Valois the officers of the Guards indulged in bloodthirsty threats against the favourite.¹

During the course of the day several Ministerial Councils were held. Bouvel's statements and the investigations of the police made it clear that the crime was the isolated act of a savage and ignorant man, who for years past had been brooding over the wrongs under which he imagined his country to be suffering. Nevertheless, it was decided to reimpose extraordinary measures, which Louis suggested should be of "Draconian severity." Bills were accordingly hastily drafted to re-establish the censorship of the press and to suspend individual liberty. Without doubt these projects of law had been drawn up in the hope of propitiating the Royalists. But the next day, February 15th, when they were introduced simultaneously into both Chambers along with the electoral bill, it was seen that this expectation would not be fulfilled. The Royalists expressed their approval of the measures in principle, but declared that never would they consent to confer additional powers upon a Minister in whom they had no confidence. Décazes, moreover, realized bitterly that in the Upper Chamber most of those Peers, who owed their seats to him, had now joined the ranks of his opponents. In the Lower House he had to face not only the hostility of the Right and the Left, but to be prepared for the defection of the Left Centre Ministerialists, who under the lead of Royer-Collard, announced their intention of opposing the electoral bill.²

Décazes could not depend upon the wholehearted support of the members of his Cabinet. Pasquier, though present in the Chamber when Clausel had preferred his charge against his

¹ Villèle, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 339-340.

E. Daudet, *Louis XVIII et Décazes*, pp. 412-413.

Nettement, *Histoire*, V. pp. 259-260.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, VIII. pp. 297-298.

² Pasquier, IV. pp. 338-340, 347-350.

E. Daudet, *Louis XVIII et Décazes*, pp. 422-423.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, VIII. pp. 283-284.

Nettement, *Histoire*, V. pp. 276-277.

absent colleague, had not seen fit to say a word in his defence. On the 16th he had even ventured to suggest to the King that, were the President of the Council to resign, both Portal and himself would be ready to follow his example. Louis, however, received this communication so coldly that he did not dare to pursue the subject. Décazes could not doubt that his fellow Ministers regarded his retirement as the simplest and best solution of the present difficulty. In the first instance he had himself been disposed to take this view of the situation, but the King's reluctance to part with him, and his indignation at the conduct of the Royalists had prompted him to continue the struggle. In face, however, of the deadlock in both Chambers, he was fain to confess to Louis that his position was no longer tenable.¹

In the meantime, the Ultra-Royalists were preparing to resort to violence. Neither they nor the extreme Liberals had much faith in constitutional methods. On February 14th, the Baron de Vitrolles appears to have been the only person admitted to intrude upon Monsieur's grief. In his memoirs he has left no record of what took place between them. But, if the account of his visit be true which he gave to M. de Vaulabelle, their conversation would seem to have turned chiefly upon the necessity of Monsieur's marriage in the interests of the dynasty. Should the Duchesse de Berri's hopes prove vain, Vitrolles appears to have regarded the Duchesse de Lucques, the ex-Queen of Etruria, as an eligible second wife for Monsieur. She was a daughter of Charles IV and the sister of Ferdinand VII, the reigning King of Spain, and, most important of all, she had a son at this time twenty years of age. This young man, a descendant of Louis XIV, could be brought to France, where he would act as an effectual barrier between the Duc d'Orléans and the throne. Were the last representative of the elder branch to die without a son, it would be a simple matter for the Guards to place the crown upon his head. Vitrolles, besides, and this part of the story is more easy to believe, was at pains to excite Monsieur's wrath against Décazes. Before departing he seems to have asked for a few words in writing from His Royal Highness to enable him to gain admission, at all hours, to the Duc de Bellune, commanding the Royal Guards. Monsieur declined to comply with his request, but appears to have given him leave to use his name with the Marshal.²

¹ Pasquier, IV. pp. 352-353.

E. Daudet, *Louis XVIII et Décazes*, pp. 406-407.

Nettement, *Histoire*, V. pp. 264-266.

² Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, V. pp. 105-107.

Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 289-290 (note).

Pasquier, IV. pp. 350-351.

There are strong grounds for supposing that Vitrolles and his friends were hatching a plot somewhat of the nature of the "waterside conspiracy." This accounts for his desire to obtain a written authority which he could show to the Duc de Bellune. The conspirators appear to have harboured the design of forcibly imposing a Royalist Cabinet, presided over by Talleyrand, upon Louis. Inasmuch, however, as the Right was in a hopeless minority, this scheme would have necessitated the dissolution of the Chamber and the abrogation of the electoral law by a Royal ordinance. Talleyrand would seem to have been a party to this plan. In his anxiety to play once more a part in public affairs, he would have allied himself, probably, with any party which seemed likely to emerge triumphant from the crisis. Calculating, presumably, that the consternation created by the Duc de Berri's murder would react in favour of the Royalists, he appears to have decided to cast in his lot with them. But Villèle's persistent refusal to enter into any combination with him deprived this scheme of all chance of success.¹ In the meantime, the denunciations of Décazes in the *Drapeau blanc* and other Royalist papers increased in violence. A rumour, widely current on February 17th, that he had agreed to withdraw the electoral law and had thus secured the support of the Liberals, drove his opponents to madness. So threatening, indeed, was the demeanour of the Gardes-du-Corps that Louis ordered them to be confined to their quarters.

Décazes, however, was not to be frightened into resigning. When informed that he could not, without grave danger, accompany his fellow-Ministers on a visit of condolence to Monsieur, his only answer had been to drive forthwith to the Pavillon de Marsan. Without doubt he was justified in treating as idle threats most of the reports which reached him. But, when Mathieu de Montmorency warned him that his life was in serious peril, he had doubtless good reasons for bidding him beware. The cool-headed Pasquier is of opinion that, had the crisis been prolonged, the fate of Marshal d'Ancre² would assuredly have overtaken him.³ But Louis' fortitude was breaking down.

¹ Villèle, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 341-342.

Thureau Dangin, *Royalistes et Républicains*, p. 200.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, VIII. pp. 305-306.

Nettement, *Histoire*, V. pp. 270-276.

² Comte della Penna Concini, Maréchal d'Ancre, an Italian adventurer and favourite of Marie de Medici, widow of Henri IV. and mother of Louis XIII, assassinated April 24, 1617, by a party of Gardes-du-Corps commanded by the Baron de Vitry, who acted *par ordre du roi*.

³ Pasquier, IV. p. 352.

E. Daudet, *Louis XVIII. et Décazes*, pp. 414-419.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, VIII. pp. 314-318.

Already, on the evening of the 16th, he had had a painful scene with his family, in the course of which the Duchesse d'Angoulême is said to have thrown herself at his feet and to have implored him to dismiss Décazes, and so prevent the commission of a great crime. Though he did not comply at once, their entreaties were not without effect. On the morning of February 18th several field-officers of the Guards called upon Vitrolles. They told him that the reign of M. Décazes could not be allowed to continue, and asked whether Monsieur had any orders to give them. Vitrolles, according to his own story, hurried off to the Pavillon de Marsan and entreated Monsieur to try again to induce the King to part from his favourite Minister. The Comte d'Artois, accordingly, made a second appeal to his brother. On this occasion he appears to have experienced little difficulty in overcoming his faltering resolution. Louis consented not only to dismiss Décazes, but urged Monsieur to use his best endeavours to persuade Richelieu to take his place.¹

In the hour of his triumph Monsieur was fortunately more inclined to listen to Villèle's advice than to the counsels of Vitrolles or other advocates of a *coup d'état*. Villèle was of opinion that his party should be satisfied, for the present, with the substitution of Richelieu for Décazes. The Duke could never carry through the electoral bill without the support of the Royalists. He could, therefore, no longer afford to ignore them, and, once an electoral bill favourable to their party should have been passed into law, the future would be in their hands. When their prospects were so bright, when nothing was required but the exercise of a little patience, it would be a terrible blunder to resort to unconstitutional methods. Monsieur agreed, and despatched Jules de Polignac to interview the Duc de Richelieu, who was unwell and confined to his house. But he was as little disposed to listen to the solicitations of Polignac as he had been to those of Décazes. Never again, he assured him, would he place himself in the odious position of having to thwart constantly the wishes of Monsieur. A few hours later, however, Monsieur himself arrived. He implored him to lay aside his fear that, in the future, he would work against him. "As one gentleman to another" he promised to support him faithfully, and begged to be considered as his chief lieutenant. Richelieu bowed, and signified that he had no further objections to urge, the King might dispose of him as he saw fit. On February 21st, the *Moniteur* announced that Décazes was to be replaced, as President of the Council, by Richelieu, and

¹ Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, V. pp. 107-110.
E. Daudet, *Louis XVIII et Décazes*, pp. 426-433.
Viel Castel, *Histoire*, VIII. pp. 318-320.

as Minister of the Interior by de Serre, who was to be succeeded as Keeper of the Seals by Portalis.¹

The Gazette which announced Décazes' retirement from the Government, contained also the news that he was appointed Ambassador to the Court of St. James, and that the King had conferred upon him a dukedom. By these marks of favour Louis sought to testify publicly his appreciation of his services. He appears to have hoped that until the moment should arrive for his departure for England, Décazes would be able to stay in Paris, and that he might still continue to enjoy, for a time, the pleasure of his society. Richelieu, however, dispelled this illusion. He adjured the King to insist upon his favourite's retirement to the country. So long as he remained in Paris he would be suspected of exercising an occult influence over the Government. As a member of the House of Peers no power could have prevented Décazes from attending the sittings of that Assembly. Nevertheless, he complied reluctantly with the Duke's request, and departed from the capital. From this moment history is no more concerned with him. Louis parted from his friend and intimate companion of the past four years with deep distress. Before many months were past, however, another influence was to enter into his life, which was to prove an effectual obstacle to the renewal of their affectionate relations. The Royalist papers celebrated the fall of the once all-powerful Minister with indecent ecstasy. "He has slipped up in blood," wrote Chateaubriand, in one of the last numbers of the *Conservateur*.²

¹ Vanlabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, V. p. 111.
E. Daudet, *Louis XVIII et Décazes*, pp. 434-435.
Pasquier, IV. pp. 353-354.
Viel Castel, *Histoire*, VIII. pp. 324-325.
² E. Daudet, *Louis XVIII et Décazes*, pp. 436-439.
Viel Castel, *Histoire*, VIII. pp. 332-335.

CHAPTER XII

THE TRIUMPH OF REACTION

FOR the first time in the history of the Restoration the forces of reaction had proved strong enough to overthrow a Minister. The change of policy upon which the Government now embarked was not, however, a consequence of the fall of Décazes. When compelled to retire he had already brought forward those measures which Richelieu was destined to carry out. But his removal had a marked effect upon the old King. Deprived of the stimulating companionship of his favourite Minister, he relapsed into indolence and, before long, fell under a pernicious influence. Although a very general commiseration was felt for the Royal Family in their grief, and although the Duc de Berri's fortitude in the last hour of his life had earned for him the respect of the people, Richelieu was confronted by many disquieting symptoms upon his second advent to power. Early in January a military revolution had broken out in Spain, the successful progress of which was watched with sympathy and approval by the Liberals and Bonapartists. Rumours that the *Carlsbad decrees* were to be extended to France was exciting uneasiness, especially among the students at the Universities. These unfavourable conditions, however, only quickened Richelieu's resolve to proceed with the bills to impose the censorship, suspend individual liberty, and to alter the electoral system.¹

Richelieu, upon taking office, at once put himself into communication with Villèle and Corbière. Both the two leading members of the Right promised him their assistance, and undertook to do all in their power to gain for him the support of their party. The Royalists feared that Richelieu might have entered into a secret compact with Décazes to retire in his favour, whenever the King might deem it safe to recall him. Villèle himself appears to have entertained this suspicion, but to have been

¹ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, VIII. pp. 390-420.

Nettement, *Histoire*, V. p. 287.

Thureau Dangin, *Le parti libéral*, pp. 234-235.

reassured as he came to know the Duke better.¹ On February 28th the debate upon the censorship was opened in the House of Peers. For the next five weeks the attention of both Chambers was wholly occupied with the discussion of this measure and of the bill to suspend individual liberty. The Royalists, who now supported the Government, had, whilst they had been in opposition, always denounced legislation of this kind. Villèle, however, defended their attitude by pointing out that, in proposing to grant to Ministers whom they trusted powers which they had been unwilling to confer upon their predecessors, they were acting consistently. The Liberals in reply referred bitterly to the past of some of the members of the Government. Was Pasquier, a former Imperial prefect of police, a man who could be expected to use with moderation the arbitrary powers which they were now asked to confer upon him? asked Benjamin Constant indignantly.²

These animated debates in the Lower Chamber gave General Foy, the newly elected member for Peronne, his first opportunity of displaying his abilities. Maximilien Sébastien Foy stands out conspicuously among the Liberals of the Restoration. He had served in most of the great campaigns of the Republic and the Empire. In revolutionary days some unflattering remarks which he had passed upon the men in power in Paris had been reported to Joseph Lebon, the commissary of the convention at Cambrai. The fall of Robespierre, however, had opened the doors of his prison and had saved him from the guillotine. Three years later he had employed the brief leisure, afforded him by the peace of Campo Formio, in studying law and history at Strasburg under the celebrated Koch. In the Pyrenees in 1813 he had given proof that he possessed military qualities of a high order. Although he regarded Bonaparte's return from Elba as a calamity, he had tendered his services for the defence of his country during the Hundred Days. At Waterloo he had commanded a division and sustained his fifteenth wound. General Foy was in his forty-fifth year when, in 1819, he entered the Chamber, where a short but brilliant parliamentary career awaited him. He was a strong Liberal of the type of Casimir Périer. No evidence has been adduced to show that he was concerned in any of the plots, in which many of his political friends were implicated between the years 1819 and 1823. His speeches, abounding in classical metaphors, are rather expositions of impassioned rhetoric than the flights of true eloquence. Moreover, like most of the

¹ Villèle, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 349-350, 355, 368.

² Pasquier, IV. pp. 365-369.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, V. pp. 118-120.

members of his party, he was devoured by a ceaseless craving for popular applause.¹

Despite the vigorous opposition of both groups of the Left, the Government carried their measures. The opposition, however, succeeded in introducing some amendments into the original proposals. The censorship was only to be imposed for one year, and important restrictions were placed upon the powers which the bill to suspend individual liberty conceded to Ministers.² The violence of the language used by both sides in the course of these debates led to many stormy scenes. An entry in Villèle's diary, under the date of March 13th, suggests that Richelieu, at this time, had serious thoughts of dispensing with parliamentary sanction to his measures. He would appear to have considered the propriety of advising the King to dissolve the Chamber and to impose the censorship, suspend individual liberty, and alter the electoral law by Royal ordinance. Had such a course been adopted, Villèle thinks that the command of the troops would have been given to Marshal Soult, who had recently returned from exile. It may be presumed, however, that the grave dangers to the Monarchy, which Villèle perceived in a *coup d'état* of this description, induced Richelieu to abandon his plan, upon maturer reflection.³

Violent as the opposition had been to the passing of these two bills, the Government was well aware that still fiercer resistance would be offered to the new electoral law. The experience of the past three years had shown that a large proportion of country electors were too indifferent to parliamentary affairs to go to the trouble and expense of visiting the chief town of their department in order to record their vote. In consequence, mainly of their abstention, the preponderance of political power had passed into the hands of some 60,000 town residents, paying from 300 to 500 francs in taxes, and whose annual incomes might, therefore, be estimated at something between £80 and £100. De Serre and Décazes had sought to remedy this state of affairs by devising some scheme whereby all classes and interests should be more truly represented. At the same time, however, they proposed to maintain the system of direct election. The Right, on the other hand, wished to see conditions established as they existed prior to 1817. Richelieu, accordingly, decided to with-

¹ *Grande Encyclopédie*, Foy (Maximilien Sebastien).

Thureau Dangin, *Le parti libéral*, pp. 133-137.

² Pasquier, IV. pp. 365-373.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, V. pp. 120-126.

Nettement, *Histoire*, V. pp. 293-330.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, VIII. pp. 369-389.

³ Villèle, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 376-377.

draw Décazes' bill, which was under consideration by the committee appointed to examine it, and to substitute for it one more in harmony with Royalist views. The right of the Government to recall a project of law which had been sent into committee, and to bring forward in its place another one, differing from it in many essential particulars, was hotly contested by the opposition. Nevertheless a new Ministerial bill was introduced, and a new committee was selected to report upon it.¹

Under the terms of Richelieu's bill all qualified taxpayers were to be members of a *collège d'arrondissement*. But, in addition, there was to be a departmental college composed of the most heavily taxed inhabitants, equal in number to one-fifth of the whole body of electors in the department. The final selection of the candidates, chosen in the first instance by the *collèges d'arrondissement*, was to rest with these superior colleges. In short, some 80,000 persons were to be dispossessed of the right, conceded to them by the law of 1817, of directly electing their representatives, in favour of about twelve or fifteen thousand land-owners and rich men. In a country with parliamentary traditions, or in which the representative system was in harmony with the temperament of the people, no Minister would have ventured to introduce a law involving so great a disturbance of the balance of political power. But few Frenchmen felt any enthusiasm for the parliamentary form of government, and many regarded it with contempt, notwithstanding that the Deputies under the Restoration were unpaid, and that corrupt professional politicians had not yet made their appearance in the Chamber. Except in Paris very little general interest was taken in the bill. The Liberals, however, who knew that the future of their party was at stake, were prepared to resort to any means to obtain its rejection. The Doctrinaires and Left Centre men were as bitterly opposed to it as the most advanced members of the Left. The law of 1817, which placed the preponderance of political power in the hands of the middle-classes, was their ideal electoral system.²

On May 13th the debate began, and was extended over ten sittings of the Lower Chamber. On the side of the Government notable speeches were delivered by Pasquier, Lainé, and La Bourdonnaye. Unlike the two former, La Bourdonnaye had always been a determined opponent of the law of 1817, and he was not, therefore, under the necessity of explaining his change of views. In support of the ministerial proposals he propounded that once highly esteemed doctrine of "a stake in the country,"

¹ Pasquier, IV. pp. 374-376.

² Weil, *Élections législatives*, pp. 91, 92, 97.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, VIII. pp. 467-469.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, V. p. 128.

which modern democratic theories have now superseded. Among the opposition speakers General Foy pleaded eloquently for the maintenance of direct election. Royer-Collard described the bill as an attempt to destroy the equality of voting power for which the Charter had provided, and as a device of the counter-revolutionary party for restoring class privileges.¹ On May 26th the general discussion was closed, and each clause of the bill was taken into consideration separately. At this stage, when the first and most important article concerning the composition of the electoral colleges was before the Chamber, two amendments were moved and, upon the question as to which of them should be given priority of discussion, the Government was defeated by one vote. M. de Chauvelin, a Liberal Deputy, who had been seriously ill, had been carried into the Chamber upon a chair, just in time to take part in the division. Ever since the beginning of the debate a crowd, largely composed of students, had been in the habit of assembling round the Palais-Bourbon. The appearance of Chauvelin in his chair provoked a tremendous outburst of cheers and, from this moment, a number of youths constituted themselves into his bodyguard, and made a practice of escorting him every day to and from the Chamber.²

The Government, meanwhile, had received a valuable reinforcement in the person of de Serre, who had returned from Nice in improved health. The amendment of M. Camille Jordan, the Doctrinaire, for which the opposition had succeeded in obtaining priority of discussion, was in the nature of a compromise between the law of 1817 and the ministerial proposals. The chances of carrying the bill in its original shape appeared so doubtful that Richelieu and de Serre would probably have accepted the amendment, but for their fear of for ever alienating the Royalists. They were, therefore, compelled to strain every nerve to defeat it. During the next twenty-four hours bribes are said to have been offered to five Liberal members. Pasquier, who must have been in the secret of these transactions, talks of "pressure having been brought to bear upon any Deputies who were regarded as amenable to certain influences." On June 1st, when the result of the division was declared, the Camille Jordan amendment was found to have been rejected by ten votes.³

It was now the turn of the Royalists to triumph. The next

¹ Pasquier, IV. p. 405.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, VIII. pp. 506-518.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, V. pp. 132-136.

² Pasquier, IV. pp. 409-410.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, VIII. pp. 547-548.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, V. p. 144.

³ Pasquier, IV. pp. 411-412.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, VIII. pp. 554-555.

day, when Chauvelin and his escort made their appearance, the usual cries of *Vive la Charte!* were drowned by shouts of *Vive le Roi!* At the same time a formidable body of men armed with bludgeons, unmistakably officers of the Guards in plain clothes, scattered the "Liberal youth of the schools" in all directions. On the following day, June 3rd, although orders had been sent to the Duc de Mouchy to confine officers and men to their barracks, the riot was resumed, and, in the course of the afternoon, a student named Lallemand was killed by a sentry on duty in the Tuileries gardens. When the Chamber met the next day, the Liberals complained bitterly of the interference and insults to which they had been subjected in the neighbourhood of the Palais-Bourbon. Laffitte read a letter from the father of the student who had been shot. Manuel, La Fayette and other members of the extreme group strove, by the violence of their language, to rouse the passions of the people. Meanwhile the riot upon the Place Louis XV was assuming so serious an aspect that two squadrons of cavalry were set in motion against the crowd. It was an anxious moment for the authorities; the troops, however, obeyed orders and dispersed the people. On June 6th the body of Lallemand was escorted to the grave by hundreds of students dressed in deep mourning. The ceremony passed off quietly, but in the evening the disturbances were renewed. A charge of cavalry, however, put the rioters to flight, and enabled the police to arrest some of the ringleaders.¹

The Government now decided to occupy the Place Louis XV and the approaches to the Chamber with troops. The demonstrators were, in consequence, driven on to the boulevards, where several collisions with the police and soldiers occurred. This change of scene brought a new and dangerous element into the disturbances. The well-to-do classes had, up to this time, not regarded the riots in a serious light. On the contrary, crowds of well-dressed people were in the habit of watching, with great amusement from the terrace of the Tuileries, the turbulent demonstration round the Chamber. But in the rioting upon the boulevards, above the cries of *vive la charte*, the war-cry of the students, arose the ominous shouts, "Remember our brothers of Manchester!" and "To the Tuileries!" The working men, it was clear, were beginning to respond to the incitations of demagogues and agitators.²

¹ Pasquier, IV. pp. 414-423.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, VIII. pp. 558-597.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, V. pp. 149-160.

² Villèle, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 380, 382-385.

Pasquier, IV. pp. 424-425.

Nettement, *Histoire*, V. pp. 414-415.

The Doctrinaires and Left Centre Liberals feared the Ultra-Royalists much, but they dreaded the people more. The prospect that the Faubourgs would intervene, were the crisis to be prolonged, filled them with alarm. Terrified by the attempts of Manuel and La Fayette to inflame the passions of the mob, the moderate members of the opposition determined to come to terms with the Government.¹ Neither Richelieu nor de Serre were disposed to be exacting. A solution to the difficulty was found in a proposal, known as the Boin amendment, which, whilst preserving the principle of direct election, provided an effectual counterpoise to the democratic spirit of the small taxpayer. The Chamber was to consist of 430 Deputies, 258 of whom were to be elected directly by the *collèges d'arrondissement* composed of all qualified taxpayers, and 172 by the departmental colleges, which were to be made up of the most heavily taxed inhabitants, equal in number to one-quarter of the whole body of electors in the department. The members of these superior colleges were, moreover, to have the right of voting in their *collèges d'arrondissement*. Hence the system obtained the name of *law of the double vote*. The Government having accepted this amendment, the Chamber divided upon it, on June 9th, when it was carried by 186 votes to 65. Three days later, although La Bourdonnaye and a few members of the extreme Royalist group voted with the opposition, the bill amended in this fashion was passed by a majority of 60.²

During the stormiest period of the debates in the Lower Chamber the Peers had been sitting in judgment upon Louvel, the murderer of the Duc de Berri. On June 6th he was condemned to death, and, on the following day, the sentence was carried out upon the Place de Grève. Despite the excited state of the town, his execution passed off quietly.³ When the electoral bill came before the Hereditary Chamber it was opposed by Broglie, Barante, and the Liberal Peers, but, on June 28th, it was passed into law by a majority of 85.⁴ The agitation against it, which had been fomented by the extreme wing of the Liberal party, soon died away, and the town quickly resumed its normal aspect. Before the Chambers were prorogued, however, the Doctrinaires who held official positions were dismissed from their posts. Their opposition had been so pronounced that Richelieu con-

¹ Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. p. 228.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, V. pp. 157-158.

² Pasquier, IV. pp. 426-427.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, V. pp. 165-170.

Nettement, *Histoire*, V. pp. 433-434.

³ Pasquier, IV. p. 406.

⁴ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, VIII. pp. 619-624.

sidered it impossible to allow them to retain their appointments. It devolved upon de Serre, the Keeper of the Seals, to make this decision known to his former friends. In the case of Camille Jordan no compensation was proposed, but both Royer-Collard and Guizot were offered the salaries of honorary Councillors of State, which, however, they declined to accept. Three months earlier, on April 7th, Laffitte had been dismissed from the post of Governor of the Bank of France. The Liberals retaliated by organizing a national subscription to assist the victims of the new press law. Some of the members of this association were prosecuted, but the Government refused to include in the proceedings those Deputies who had joined the society, and who loudly demanded to be placed upon their trial.¹ The imposition of the censorship terminated the existence of several newspapers, notably that of the *Conservateur* which Chateaubriand, who was a determined advocate of a free press, decided should cease to appear.²

Although the disturbances in Paris had been easily suppressed, the state of affairs generally was not altogether satisfactory. Two neighbouring countries, both ruled over by members of the House of Bourbon, had been the scene of successful revolutions. In Spain, Riègo and Quiroga had compelled Ferdinand VII to accept the Constitution of 1812. In July the Neapolitan army, under General Guglielmo Pèpé, had raised the tricolour of the Carbonari and had imposed upon King Ferdinand IV the Spanish Constitution. The Baron Mounier, a former private secretary of Bonaparte, but now a sincere Royalist and an intimate friend of Richelieu, was at the head of the French police. During the electoral riots he had always contrived to obtain accurate information about the plans of the Liberals. He had at his disposal a valuable spy in the person of a certain Tiriot, a former Imperial officer whom his comrades trusted implicitly. Décazes had employed him with great success in reporting upon the proceedings of the Bonapartists at Brussels. In the spring of 1820, upon his return to Paris, Tiriot had been initiated into all the plots of the disaffected. Moreover, he was in very friendly relations with an ex-Captain Duvergier, whom La Fayette regarded with so much affection that he habitually addressed him as his son. The existence of much disaffection in the army was thus revealed to the Government, and the elimination of a

¹ Pasquier, IV. pp. 379-380, 431-437.

Crousaz-Crétet, *Richelieu*, p. 368.

Nettement, *Histoire*, V. pp. 441-443.

² Chateaubriand, *Mémoires* (nouvelle édition), IV. pp. 164-165.

Nettement, *Histoire*, V. pp. 331-332.

large number of officers was, in consequence, decided upon. In the meanwhile, however, Richelieu proposed that the Duc d'Angoulême should make a tour of inspection in the eastern departments, where some of the garrisons were believed to be in an especially unsatisfactory condition.¹

On April 28th, the day after the Duc d'Angoulême's departure from Paris, a bag of gunpowder was exploded close to the Duchesse de Berri's apartments in the Tuileries. Both perpetrators of this outrage, one of whom was a former sergeant in the army, were arrested and brought to trial. The death sentences which were passed upon them were, however, commuted to penal servitude for life, upon the intercession of Her Royal Highness. The explosion, the criminals appear to have hoped, would have brought about her premature confinement.² The Duke was absent about a month, and, in the opinion of Pasquier, his tour had an excellent effect. It had been marked, nevertheless, by several disagreeable incidents. At Grenoble the students adopted an almost hostile attitude, and trustworthy information reached the police that some half-pay officers had formed a plot to waylay him in the woods near Dole, upon the Swiss frontier.³

Up to this point the police had been invariably forewarned, and had always outwitted the conspirators. But, during the riots in Paris, Duvergier, the confidant of La Fayette and the friend of Tiriôt the spy, was arrested. Before his rooms were searched, however, a woman, with whom he was upon intimate terms, succeeded in destroying his papers, among them being documents which would have incriminated La Fayette. This person was not taken into custody, but she was interrogated by Anglés, the prefect of police, in so clumsy a fashion that she went away with the full knowledge that her friend Duvergier had been betrayed by his comrade Tiriôt. Henceforward this man could no longer be of any service to the police.⁴ Owing in a great measure to this blunder, which deprived the authorities of a most valuable source of information, a number of half-pay officers were enabled to hatch a dangerous plot without the knowledge of the police.

In 1820 an establishment known as the *Bazar français* existed at No. 11 Rue Cadet. The manager, the ex-Colonel Sauset, and most of the persons employed upon the premises, were former officers or non-commissioned officers of the Imperial army. Some legitimate business appears to have been carried on, but

¹ Pasquier, IV. pp. 391-394, 396.

² *Ibid.*, p. 400.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 397-399.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 423-424.

it was afterwards proved that a large band of conspirators used the place at their headquarters.¹ In addition to Colonel Sauset himself, the chief persons concerned in this affair were Colonel Fabvier, that heretofore staff officer of Marmont, who had been dismissed from the army in consequence of the pamphlet which he had published upon the events at Lyons in 1817; Nantil, a captain upon the active list, who was deeply in debt; Maziau, a former lieutenant-colonel of the Imperial Guard; Dumoulin, a glove manufacturer at Grenoble, ruined by speculation, who had proved his devotion to Bonaparte during the Hundred Days; Caron, a half-pay officer, and Major Bérard, who commanded a battalion of the *Légion du Nord*.² A number of officers and non-commissioned officers quartered at Cambrai, Amiens, Vitry, Metz, and other towns in the eastern departments, had been enrolled, and communications had been established with regiments quartered at Rennes and Nantes. The emissaries, who kept up relations between the conspirators in Paris and their friends in the country, passed as commercial travellers and contrived to baffle the vigilance of the police. The ringleaders appear to have considered that the Government was too strong to be attacked successfully in Paris, and to have hoped to attain their ends by organizing simultaneous risings in outlying garrison towns. Without doubt, their plans were modelled upon those of the Spanish and Neapolitan revolutionists, who had begun their operations at points remote from their respective capitals. Laffitte, La Fayette, Tarayre, Manuel, Corcelles, Voyer d'Argenson, and probably other Liberal Deputies were cognizant of the plot. Pasquier is convinced that the great expenses, which the extended nature of the conspiracy involved, were almost entirely defrayed by Laffitte.³

Before their preparations had been completed Nantil appears to have persuaded the conspirators to alter their plan. In his opinion the central Government could be overthrown only by the outbreak of a revolution in Paris. Both he and Bérard were quartered in the capital, and felt certain that numerous officers and non-commissioned officers of the Paris garrison could be induced to join the plot. Recruits, Nantil affirmed, could be obtained even in regiments of the Guard. He suggested, furthermore, that uniforms of the National Guard should be provided for the students, who could be employed side by side with the regular troops. He

¹ E. Guillon, *Complots sous la Restauration*, pp. 115-116.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, V. pp. 183-184.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, IX. p. 68.

² Marmont, *Mémoires*, VII. pp. 273-274.

³ Pasquier, IV. p. 445.

appears to have had an interview with La Fayette and to have converted him to his views. The night of August 10th was fixed upon for the rising.¹

It is not clear what form of government the conspirators proposed to set up, had their attempt succeeded. Marmont declares that the movement was purely Republican. The selection of August 10th certainly lends some colour to this contention, nevertheless it was, doubtless, correct only in so far as La Fayette, Voyer d'Argenson and the students were concerned. Manuel is believed to have been in favour of bestowing the crown either upon the Duc d'Orléans or the Prince of Orange. General Tarayre, on the other hand, supported the claims of Napoleon II. All the soldiers, however, appear to have agreed that the name of the Emperor or of his son would have to be invoked, in order to bring about the defection of the troops. Finally, it was resolved that a Provisional Government, presided over by La Fayette, should be set up at Vincennes, and that the tricolour should be regarded as the rallying-point of the conspirators.² Fruitless attempts were made to induce some well-known general to place himself at the head of the movement. Defrance, in actual command of the first military district, Maison, the governor of Paris, Bachelu, Pajol and other officers of high rank were approached, but all of them appear to have declined to commit themselves openly. In other respects Nantil's expectations seem to have been confirmed, numerous officers and non-commissioned officers of the Paris garrison entered readily into the plot.³

As the moment for action approached the Liberal Deputies left Paris. The departure of Corcelles for Lyons, and of Voyer d'Argenson for his iron-works upon the Rhine, may have been in accordance with the plan of the conspirators. The reasons for La Fayette's visit to La Grange, his country seat, at this juncture, are not apparent. It has been said that he feared to attract the attention of the police by remaining in Paris out of season. The disappearance of the Deputies, and Nantil's inability to enlist the services of a distinguished general officer, so depressed the plotters at the *Bazar français*, that they decided

¹ E. Guillon, *Complots sous la Restauration*, pp. 117-118.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, IX. pp. 179-180.

Pasquier, IV. p. 443.

² Marmont, *Mémoires*, VII. p. 272.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, V. pp. 186-187, 189-190.

E. Guillon, *Complots sous la Restauration*, pp. 119-120.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, IX. pp. 74-75.

³ Marmont, *Mémoires*, VII. p. 275.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, IX. p. 73.

to postpone the date of their rising. But on August 17th Dumoulin and Nantil sent a message to La Fayette asking whether they could count upon his support. Their emissary brought back the promise that he would be at his post. Satisfied with this assurance, they decided to strike their blow on the night of August 19th-20th.¹

The conspirators had missed their opportunity. Already the police were keenly upon the alert. On August 15th two sergeants of the Guard made a confession to the chief staff officer of their corps. On the following day three officers of the *Légion du Nord* gave further information to the authorities. The Government, in the first instance, decided to allow the affair to proceed, in order to capture red-handed as large a number as possible of culprits. In the meantime Marmont, commanding the Guard Corps, had been warned by the two original informers that the rising would take place during the night of August 19th.² In the afternoon of that day a Cabinet Council, attended by several high military and police officers, was held at Richelieu's house. To Pasquier's indignation, Marmont announced that he had already ordered the posts at the Tuileries to be doubled, and had warned the troops at Courbevoie, Versailles, and Vincennes to hold themselves in readiness to march to Paris at a moment's notice. It was impossible to doubt that the conspirators would receive timely information of these precautions and would take to flight. Marmont was bitterly reproached with having by his precipitate action allowed the conspirators to escape. Pasquier suspects that he was anxious to save Fabvier, who had served upon his staff for several years. It is possible that Marmont may not have acted in good faith; nevertheless, it is clear, from an account of the affair which Richelieu sent to de Serre, that he at least approved of the Marshal's timely precautions. In his opinion to have adopted Pasquier's plan, and to have allowed the tricolour to be unfurled in the streets, in the hope of making important captures, would have been too dangerous an expedient.³

Pasquier's previsions were realized completely. Nantil, duly warned, baffled the vigilance of the police agent set to watch

¹ *Nettement, Histoire*, V. p. 462.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, V. p. 191.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, IX. p. 81.

² Marmont, *Mémoires*, VII. p. 268.

Pasquier, IV. pp. 442-443.

E. Guillon, *Complots sous la Restauration*, p. 121.

³ Marmont, *Mémoires*, VII. p. 227.

Pasquier, IV. pp. 446-451.

Crousaz-Crétet, *Richelieu*, p. 374.

him, and escaped. Many of the conspirators, however, including Colonel Fabvier, were arrested. During the night the disaffected regiments were despatched to distant garrison towns. Whilst on the march, the officers and non-commissioned officers implicated in the plot were arrested quietly and conveyed back to Paris. An attempt on the part of some of the ringleaders, who were still at large, to bring about the revolt of the garrison at Vitry, was denounced by Bérard who, yielding to the entreaties of his wife, made a confession to General Montélegier. One hundred and thirty-eight persons were taken into custody within a short space of time. The *Moniteur* of August 20th announced the discovery of the plot and, on the following day, published the news that the prisoners would be tried by the Peers.¹

The members of *La Fayette's committee*, as it was sometimes called, would not appear to have been the only persons in the secret of the conspiracy at the *Bazar français*. A number of disaffected generals, says Pasquier, forming what was known as the *Rovigo committee*, were prepared to take advantage of the projected rising, should it meet with success. In 1815, Savary, Duc de Rovigo, had been condemned to death *in contumaciam*, but, in 1819, he had returned to France and had been acquitted by a second Court Martial. Elated at this result, he seems to have expected that the Royal Government would employ him forthwith in the army, and to have been greatly disappointed when he was informed that his wish could not be complied with. As the time drew near for the conspirators at the *Bazar français* to strike their blow, he and other prominent Bonapartists availed themselves of the opportunity, which the marriage of Marshal Davout's daughter afforded them, of meeting at Savigny, the Marshal's house near Paris, without exciting suspicion. Soon after the discovery of the plot Savary paid a visit to Pasquier, for the purpose, as Pasquier had reason to believe afterwards, of betraying the secrets of the conference at Savigny, had he received any encouragement to speak. But at the time the real object of his visit did not occur to him, and he allowed, in consequence, this opportunity to pass of probing to the bottom of the conspiracy.²

Towards the end of June the return of Décazes to Paris created some excitement in political circles, and among the members of the *corps diplomatique*. The fears were soon dispelled, however, that his arrival portended some new development. Louis received him cordially and wrote personally to

¹ Marmont, *Mémoires*, VII. p. 278.

E. Guillon, *Complots sous la Restauration*, pp. 122-124.

² Pasquier, IV. pp. 457, 460-462.

George IV to recommend him to him. But he never for a moment appears to have entertained the idea of restoring him to his post of favourite. After a stay of a fortnight in Paris Décazes departed for London. Without doubt, it was not political reasons alone which prompted the King to part with him so readily. A new influence had entered into his life which, although it had not yet acquired the strength which it was soon to assume, was still sufficiently powerful to make this second separation from Décazes an easy matter.¹

The date of Louis XVIII's first connection with Madame du Cayla is uncertain. Her ascendancy over him must have been well established in the autumn of 1820, as it had come to the ears of Sir Charles Stuart and, on November 9th, was mentioned by him in a letter to Castlereagh. Zoé Talon, Comtesse du Cayla, was at this time thirty-six years of age. Her father, in 1789, had filled the post of *avocat-général* to the Châtelet, in which capacity it had devolved upon him to investigate the mysterious affair of the Marquis de Favras, a case in which Louis XVIII, then the Comte de Provence, is believed to have been implicated. Talon, who was afterwards a secret Royalist agent, is supposed to have contrived to avoid compromising Monsieur in these proceedings. The disappearance of the Favras *dossier* lends some colour to this story. The secret of Madame du Cayla's influence over the old King has often been attributed to her possession of important documents connected with this affair. Moreover, under the Empire she had been on very intimate terms with Savary de Rovigo, the Minister of Police, and may have acquired from him a knowledge of other secrets. But however much she may have been assisted by her possession of compromising information, it is clear that her first introduction to Louis was the result of an intrigue evolved in certain clerical circles of the Faubourg-Saint-Germain.²

In the early years of the Restoration Madame du Cayla formed a friendship with Sosthènes de La Rochefoucauld, the future Duc de Doudeauville, and the son-in-law of Matthieu de Montmorency. Little is known of her husband, the Comte du Cayla, who is described by Frénilly³ as a person of boorish habits. Some time about the year 1818 he appears to have embarked upon litigation with his wife, in order to deprive her of the custody of

¹ Pasquier, IV. p. 428.

Crousaz-Crétet, *Richelieu*, pp. 364-365.

Villèle, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 401, 403, 405-406, 410.

² *Correspondence of Castlereagh* (edited by his brother), IV. p. 329.

Pasquier, V. p. 374.

Grande Encyclopédie, Comtesse du Cayla and Favras, Marquis de.

³ Frénilly, *Souvenirs*, p. 450.

her boy, Ugolin, whose striking resemblance to Savary is noted both by Pasquier and by Madame de Boigne. Madame du Cayla was determined not to deliver up her child, and she and Sosthènes, accordingly, took steps to conceal him from his putative father.¹

The three directors of the Congregation of the Rue du Bac, the Pères Delpuits, Legris-Duval, and Ronsin, had all been connected with that branch of the La Rochefoucauld family, of which the Duc de Doudeauville was the head. When, in 1814, Legris-Duval handed over to the Père Ronsin the control of the Congregation, he had returned to the room in the Duc de Doudeauville's house, in the Rue de Varennes, which he had occupied in the days when he had been Sosthènes' tutor.² His ascendancy over his former pupil was complete, and his assistance was unhesitatingly invoked on Madame du Cayla's behalf. At the instance of Sosthènes he appears to have consulted a certain Abbé Liautard, who conducted a fashionable school, afterwards known as the Collège Stanislas, in the Rue Notre Dame-des-Champs.³ Soon afterwards, on January 18th, 1819, Legris-Duval died. The Abbé Liautard, however, took charge of Madame du Cayla's child, and concealed him in the neighbourhood of Orléans.⁴ In the many houses of the Faubourg-Saint-Germain in which this crafty priest was a welcome guest, he had always proclaimed the necessity of counteracting the irreligious influence over the King of Décazes, the Liberal and the Freemason. In these Ultra-Royalist circles his proposal was loudly applauded of confiding to the heretofore mistress of Savary, the executioner of the Duc d'Enghien, the task of inspiring Louis with better principles.

As the guardian of her child the Abbé Liautard had a strong hold over Madame du Cayla, who was a woman very fitted to attract Louis' attention. There is no reason to suppose that she showed any reluctance to play the part which he proposed to assign to her.⁵ Her first interview with the King appears to have taken place whilst Décazes was still in high favour. She came, as was not unusual in such circumstances, to implore his good offices in the legal proceedings, which were pending between herself and her husband. The fact that she was Talon's daughter can hardly have failed to interest him. Nevertheless, it would seem that she made no serious impression upon him. After the

¹ Pasquier, V. p. 373.

Madame de Boigne, *Mémoires*, I. p. 287.

² Geoffroy de Grandmaison, *La Congrégation*, p. 128.

³ Abbé Denys, *Mémoires de Liautard*, p. 51.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 92-94.

⁵ See, with regard to this intrigue, Abbé Denys, *Mémoires de Liautard*, and La Rochefoucauld, *Mémoires*, 1837, Vol. II.

fall of Décazes, however, Louis began to look forward to her visits with increasing pleasure. He had never been able to exist without an intimate companion, and Madame du Cayla, skilfully tutored by Liautard, amused and interested him greatly. The secret of her frequent and prolonged visits to the Tuileries was so well kept, that Richelieu himself was for a long time in ignorance of the new influence which had entered into Louis' life. When at last he became aware of the state of affairs he disdained to ingratiate himself with the favourite, or to seek to combat her ascendancy.¹

In the course of the next four years Madame du Cayla received many valuable presents and large sums of money from the old King. Yet their friendship, it must be supposed, was platonic. According to the gossip of the day Louis found amusement in inhaling a pinch of snuff from her well-rounded shoulders.² It is probable, however, that her influence over him is to be ascribed rather to her intellectual than to her physical attractions. Though she had no depth of knowledge she was bright, clever, and an appreciative listener. Louis had always been fond of writing, and prided himself upon his epistolary skill. Madame du Cayla, aided doubtless by Liautard, quickly acquired the art of composing witty notes in answer to the letters of her Royal admirer.

The intimacy of Louis XVIII with Madame du Cayla is something more than a scandalous episode in the history of the Restoration. She was a very ordinary adventuress, but she was also the instrument of the extreme clerical and Royalist party. It was the policy of those who inspired her to undo the work of Décazes, and to win over the King to the views of Monsieur and of the Faubourg-Saint-Germain. These objects were in a great measure attained. Louis was by nature indolent, and his health was daily growing worse. Not one of his Ministers was personally sympathetic to him, and he was, in consequence, the more readily disposed to neglect the routine of business for the company of a congenial and fascinating companion. As Louis became less accessible, and as he ceased to occupy himself with affairs of State, so did the importance and power of Monsieur increase. The new electoral law promised to make the Royalists the dominant party in the Chamber. By means of Madame du Cayla they purposed to exercise an influence over the King, who had always shown himself so hostile to their aspirations. With-

¹ Pasquier, IV. pp. 374-375.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, V. pp. 112.

Madame de Boigne, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 72-73.

² Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, III. p. 365.

C. Greville, *Journals, Reign of George IV and William IV* (1st edition), I. pp. 71, 214-215; II. p. 306.

out doubt Louis never really changed his opinion about his brother or the Ultra-Royalists. So long, however, as nothing too dangerous was asked of him, he found it very pleasant to live at peace with his family, and to fritter away his declining years in the company of an agreeable woman, who knew how to amuse and flatter him.¹

In the month which followed the discovery of the plot at the *Bazar français*, on September 29th, a son was born to the Duchesse de Berri. The event was made the occasion of great public rejoicings. The *cordons bleu* was conferred upon thirty-one great personages, numerous debtors were released from prison, and remissions of sentences were accorded freely to convicted criminals. It was decided that the infant Prince, whom the Royalists in their enthusiasm named the "child of miracle," and whom the Papal Nuncio designated as the "child of Europe," should take the title of the Duc de Bordeaux. He is better known, however, by that of the Comte de Chambord, a name which he bore during the years of exile, in which nearly the whole of his life was destined to be spent. His birth was attended by some rather peculiar circumstances. It was an invariable custom to appoint two high officers of State to act as witnesses to the coming into the world of a child who might some day be King of France. After careful consideration, Richelieu selected for this duty Marshal the Duc de Coigny and Marshal Suchet, Duc d'Albuféra—the first a representative of the old, and the second of the new nobility. To ensure their presence at the critical moment lodgings in the Tuileries were assigned to them.²

On the evening of September 28th the Duchesse de Berri had retired for the night as usual. So little did the Duc de Coigny expect that his presence would be required before the morning that, despite his eighty years, he had stolen out and had rejoined clandestinely the young wife whom he had recently married.³ Nevertheless, soon after midnight, the Duchess called for assistance, but before her attendants could reach her bedside, the child had been born. Conscious of the supreme importance of obtaining the testimony of independent witnesses, Her Royal Highness, who retained her presence of mind, bade them call in some persons unconnected with the Royal household. A National Guard and a soldier on duty at the palace were brought into her room. With a splendid disregard for all considerations of modesty, when dynastic interests were at stake, she invited them

¹ Crousaz-Crétet, *Richelieu*, pp. 467-468.

² Pasquier, IV. pp. 464-466.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, V. pp. 194-195.

³ Pasquier, IV. pp. 463-464 (note).

to note and to be prepared to certify to the existence of the navel string. The King and other members of the Royal family, on receipt of the news, hurried to the spot. All present observed with much interest the demeanour of the Duc d'Orléans. He is said to have been unable to hide his disappointment, and before departing to have solemnly adjured Marshal Suchet to tell him whether the Duchesse de Berri was the mother of the child before them. Suchet had been among the earliest arrivals, and, at the Duchess' request, had made a close investigation. He was consequently in a position to return in emphatic language an affirmative answer to the Duc d'Orléans' question. His testimony, along with the reports of the *accoucheurs* and other witnesses, were published at full length in the *Moniteur*.¹ "Between the account of the Duchesse de Berri's confinement and the details of the Queen of England's trial, the papers were quite unfit to be left about," wrote Madame de Boigne.² It is difficult to believe that anybody could have entertained the idea seriously that anything in the nature of a substitution had taken place. It was perhaps doubtful wisdom, therefore, to draw so much attention to every trivial circumstance which had attended the birth of the young Prince.

The autumn elections of 1820 were the first to take place under the new law. In addition to the annual renewal of a fifth of the Chamber, the 172 Deputies, to be chosen by the newly created departmental colleges, would have to be elected. Pasquier and several other members of the Cabinet, under these circumstances, declared in favour of the dissolution of the Chamber and a general election. Richelieu, however, was of a different opinion, and his will prevailed. Yet, despite the less democratic conditions which the new law had created, he was filled with grave misgivings. With few exceptions he chose the presidents of the electoral colleges from among the members of the Royalist party, in order to make manifest the alliance between the Government and the Right, and, as the critical moment approached, he had recourse to an expedient little in accord with the principles of parliamentary government. Some ten days before the assembly of the *collèges d'arrondissement*, which had been convened for November 4th, the King was induced to issue an electoral address. In this proclamation, drawn up in turgid language by Pasquier, His Majesty adjured his loyal subjects to support the Government candidates.

¹ Duchesse de Gontaut, *Mémoires*, pp. 217-225.

Cabanés, *Cabinet secret de l'histoire*, 2me series, "Naissance du Duc de Bordeaux."

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, IX. pp. 93-99.

² Madame de Boigne, *Mémoires*, III. p. 56.

Richelieu's fears proved groundless. No more than fifteen or sixteen Liberals figured amongst the 172 Deputies elected by the departmental colleges, while the *collèges d'arrondissement* returned only seventeen members of the Left as against thirty-one Royalists. Unquestionably the new electoral law was in the main responsible for these results. But the frank co-operation of all sections of Royalists against the Liberals was a new and important factor in the situation. Moreover, the small number of Liberals returned by the *collèges d'arrondissement* proved incontestably that the large majority of middle-class electors had no sympathy with the revolutionary tendencies of La Fayette, Manuel, and Voyer d'Argenson.¹ The state of parties was thus completely revolutionized. In the previous session the Liberals had been able to command about 110 votes in a Chamber of some 250 Deputies, but now, in an Assembly of 430 members, they could muster no more than seventy or eighty representatives. The Right and Right Centre combined could outnumber the Left and Left Centre in the proportion of three to one. It was soon evident, however, that it would be a difficult matter to preserve the unity of the Royalist party. Among the newly elected members were many men who had been excluded from parliamentary life ever since the dissolution of the *Chambre introuvable*. The majority of them were full of resentment for Richelieu, and rebelled at the notion of supporting him. General Donnadieu, the new member for Arles, was, however, by far the most violent and rancorous of these dissident Royalists. A coarse and virulent attack which he had made recently upon the Duc de Richelieu had procured for him a detention of some weeks in the military prison of the Abbaye. In his new character of a representative of the people he could be dealt with no longer in this summary fashion. He returned to Paris, accordingly, resolved to be revenged for the indignity to which he had been subjected.²

The extreme Royalists at once made clear their hostile intentions towards the Government by deserting the recognized meeting-place of their party, at M. Piet's house, and by establishing their headquarters in the *salon* of M. de Vaublanc, the former Minister of the Interior of the *Chambre introuvable*. Here they resolved to oppose the Government vigorously. At M. Piet's, however, Villèle and the majority of the members of the party agreed to support Richelieu, but the opinion was freely

¹ Pasquier, IV. pp. 469-470.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, IX. pp. 135-136.

² Vaublanc, *Deux Restaurations*, V. pp. 195-196.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, IX. pp. 142-146.

expressed that, in view of their numerical strength, the Royalists should be represented in the Cabinet. The Duke was prepared to admit the justice of their claim, and, as he was unwilling to part with any of his colleagues, proposed to increase the number of the members of his Cabinet. Delicate and complicated negotiations ensued. Villèle, who was obviously the most suitable man to represent his party at the Council, refused to enter the Government except in company with his friend Corbière. Richelieu, however, was not disposed to do more than to appoint the scholarly but disagreeable Breton lawyer to a post in the administration which did not carry with it a seat in the Cabinet. At this juncture Chateaubriand claims to have suggested the solution to the difficulty. For some time past Madame de Montcalm, Richelieu's sister, had been trying to effect a reconciliation between her brother and Chateaubriand. She had given him to understand that the Government would gladly appoint him to some high diplomatic post abroad. This prospect attracted him greatly, nevertheless he declared that he could not accept any offer of the kind with dignity, unless some of his political friends were to join the Government. From this moment, however, he exerted the full force of his influence with his party to bring about the desired combination. After much discussion, and after several proposals had been rejected, the compromise, which Chateaubriand asserts that he imagined, was accepted. Corbière was to be president of the commission of public instruction, and both he and Villèle were to enter the Cabinet as Ministers without portfolios. Richelieu supplemented this arrangement by deciding that a seat on the Council should be given to Dainé under the same conditions, and that Chateaubriand should go as Ambassador to the Prussian Court.¹ In the meantime Villèle had succeeded in breaking up the meetings in Vaublanc's *salon*, and had induced the dissident group to work in harmony with the larger section of the Royalists, on the understanding that the party as a whole should be suitably represented in the Cabinet.²

These arrangements were concluded only on the eve of the day fixed for the opening of the Parliament. The Session, which began on December 19th, 1820, and which concluded on July 31st, 1821, despite its great length, was responsible for no important legislation. Nevertheless, on many occasions the debates were stormy and exciting. The Liberals, who the year before had looked upon the triumph of their party as assured, had seen

¹ Villèle, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 404-405, 407, 426-429.

Pasquier, IV. pp. 62-67.

Chateaubriand, *Mémoires*, nouvelle édition, IV. pp. 169-171.

² Villèle, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 419-426.

victory snatched from their grasp. The new electoral law had made their prospects as gloomy as they had been bright formerly. In the previous month of November important changes were effected in the army. A number of officers of notoriously Bonapartist and Liberal sympathies were removed from the active list. But, at the same time, some very popular measures were initiated. The departmental legions were abolished, and the old numbers and the regimental system were restored. Not less welcome was the decision to substitute for the white the blue uniform, which was associated with the Republican and Imperial wars.¹ But Richelieu's attempts to break down the practice, which reserved all posts at Court for members of the old noble families, met with small success. On the occasion of General de Lauriston's appointment to the Ministry of the King's Household, an office which had remained vacant since the days of M. de Blacas, the Duke persuaded Louis to announce by Royal ordinance that he proposed to admit a larger number of his subjects to duties about his Court. General Rapp, for many years an aide-de-camp of Bonaparte, was, accordingly, appointed to a post of Chamberlain, and minor offices were conferred upon several generals of the Empire. But the opposition of the Faubourg-Saint-Germain to these measures, and Louis' lukewarm attitude towards them, neutralized their good effect.²

The Liberals were not to be mollified by Richelieu's good intentions. They were never at a loss for a pretext for declaiming against the arbitrary and reactionary measures of the Government. During the earlier part of the Session, the Chamber had often to consider the petitions of officers who had been removed from their regiments. The discussion of their grievances would degenerate as a rule into a series of violent recriminations between Foy, Chauvelin, or Manuel on the one side, and Royalists, such as Sesmaisons, Dupl  sis de Gren  dan or Castelbajac on the other. At the sitting of February 7th, when some claims from officers who had served under Joseph Bonaparte at Naples and in Spain were under consideration, an unusually tumultuous scene took place. General Foy employed the words "glorious tricolour," and, notwithstanding the protesting shouts of the Right, repeated them. From this moment the subject of the debate was forgotten amidst the bitter taunts which the rival parties hurled at each other, as they denounced or defended the principles which the flag represented.³

¹ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, IX. pp. 114-118.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 108-112.

Crousaz-Cr  t  t, *Richelieu*, pp. 372, 379.

³ Pasquier, V. pp. 97-107.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, V. pp. 249-273.

A distinguished authority has pointed out that there is "grave danger when the lines of cleavage of the parties coincide with those between the different social classes in the community. One side is likely to believe that the other is shaking the foundations of society, and passions are kindled like those that blaze in civil war."¹ It mattered little what subject was before the Chamber, the real question which divided the Liberals and the Royalists was always present. It was the perpetual conflict between the Revolution and the counter-Revolution, the contest between the middle classes which had gained, and the old privileged *noblesse* which had lost by the Revolution. On March 1st the House was concerned merely with defining the boundaries of the new electoral districts. Nevertheless, Manuel found an opportunity of alluding to the *Terror of 1815*, and Foy of denouncing aristocracies. On May 23rd the general discussion began of a Ministerial bill to compensate a number of persons who had been deprived, under the terms of the treaty of 1814, of the pensions accorded to them by Bonaparte. M. Dupl  sis de Gr  n  dan, reading from the list, asked indignantly whether General Lamarque, who had fought against the King's troops in La Vend  e, or General Hulin, who had presided at the Duc d'Enghien's Court Martial, were the kind of men to be given compensation. The defiant replies of La Fayette, Foy, and Casimir P  rier, replete with allusions to Coblenz and the emigration, infuriated their opponents, but were hardly conducive to the interests of the persons upon whose behalf they were supposed to be pleading. The Government, indeed, was finally compelled to yield to the insistence of the Royalists and to allow the bill to be amended, so as to grant much less favourable conditions to the dispossessed officers.²

Amidst this furious strife of parties the Government fared badly. Richelieu hated the democratic tendencies of the Liberals, but he was determined never to adopt the reactionary policy of the Royalists. Under these conditions Ministers were as often the object of the fierce indictments of the Right, as of the scathing denunciations of the Left. On January 8th, General Donnadieu made a personal attack on Richelieu in the Chamber, and a few days later addressed some insulting remarks to him in the Tuileries garden. In consequence of his conduct his name was placed upon the retired list of the army. Incredible as it may appear, the sympathies of the Faubourg-Saint-Germain in this affair were wholly upon the side of General Donnadieu.³ A

¹ A. L. Lowell, *The Government of England*, I. p. 439.

² Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, V. pp. 286-302.

³ Crousaz-Cr  tet, *Richelieu*, p. 420.

Nettement, *Histoire*, V. pp. 527-529.

fortnight later, on January 27th, an event occurred which increased the embarrassments of the Government. About four o'clock in the afternoon an explosion, which caused considerable damage, but no loss of life, took place in the Tuileries, near the apartments of the King and of Madame. In both Houses it was resolved that a deputation should wait upon His Majesty to congratulate him upon his escape. The terms in which the address from the Lower Chamber should be drawn up gave rise to an animated debate. The members of the extreme Royalist group wished to cast upon the pernicious doctrines of the Liberals the responsibility for the outrage, and, at the same time, to express their disapproval of the measures taken by the Government for the protection of the King. Camille Jordan in a fine speech—the last he was ever to deliver—deprecated the party spirit which the Royalists had introduced into the debate, and expressed his conviction that the explosion had been planned by unscrupulous politicians with the object of throwing the blame for it upon their opponents. After much difficulty, Villèle and Corbière obtained the consent of their followers to the excision of the paragraph which conveyed a censure upon the Government.

Two circumstances had attracted the attention of those charged with the investigation of the affair—the astounding audacity of the criminals who had penetrated into the interior of the palace, and the position of the barrel of gunpowder, which seemed to indicate an intention of causing alarm rather than of destroying life. This was the view of the case which Louis from the first adopted. A few days later, however, the Duchesse de Berri produced a paper, which she stated she had found upon her table. It contained a threat that the attempt of January 27th would be repeated. The enquiries of the police threw suspicion upon an Italian woman in Her Royal Highness' service. Her demeanour, when questioned, strengthened the impression that she was implicated in the affair. Suddenly, however, when there appeared to be every reason to think that the police were upon the right scent, Richelieu gave orders that the investigations were to be discontinued, and that absolute silence was to be observed about the whole matter.

The Duchesse de Berri's confessor had informed Monsieur that Her Royal Highness had herself written the letter of warning. Her only object had been to stimulate the zeal of those whose business it was to discover the perpetrators of the outrage near the King's apartments. Hearing that an innocent person was suspected she had decided to communicate, without delay, the facts of the case to Monsieur. Nothing more has ever come to light in connection with this matter. It is very improbable that

the Duchesse de Berri was alone concerned in the affair, but if other persons were implicated in it their names, says Pasquier, have never been disclosed. For many weeks afterwards Ministers had to listen in silence whilst the Royalists denounced from the tribune the incompetence, apathy, and even treachery which had made it possible for the authors of an attempt upon the King's life to go unpunished.¹

In the spring of 1821, the course of events in Italy was watched with the keenest interest by the rival parties in the French Chamber. The successful revolutions of the previous year in Spain and at Naples were the subject, in the autumn, of a conference of the Powers. After assembling at Troppau,² the Sovereigns agreed to adjourn to Baybach, for the convenience of Ferdinand, King of the Two Sicilies, who was invited to take part in the deliberations. Meanwhile, the armaments of Austria and the movements of her troops were clear indications of her intention to restore absolutism at Naples. But the Liberals believed in the brave words of the Neapolitan constitutionalists, and cheered loudly when General Foy declared from the tribune that the Austrians would find their graves in the Abruzzi. A few days later it was the turn of the Royalists to exult. At the mere sight of the white uniforms, General Pèpé's army had fled in wild disorder, leaving the road to Naples open. But the news from the other extremity of the Peninsula, which followed rapidly, raised the drooping spirits of the Liberals.³

For some time past the Carbonari had been actively propagating their revolutionary doctrines in Piedmont. On March 10th, the rout of Pèpé three days earlier being still unknown, the garrison of Alessandria raised the tricolour to the cry of "The Spanish Constitution and war with Austria!" On the 12th, a revolution broke out at Turin, where the King Victor Emmanuel, anxious to avoid bloodshed and reluctant to break faith with Austria, abdicated in favour of his brother Carlo Felice, who was for the moment at Modena. In the meantime, Prince Carlo Alberto di Carignano, the heir-apparent, was declared Regent. Carlo Alberto was believed to be in sympathy with the movement, and is said to have given the revolutionary leaders assurances of his support.⁴ Upon receipt of the news of the outbreak in Piedmont, the Sovereigns hastily brought their deliberations at Baybach to a close. The situation was critical. The

¹ Pasquier, V. pp. 88-97.

² These conferences are dealt with in Chap. XIV., *Chateaubriand's War*.

³ Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, V. pp. 282-284.

⁴ *Cambridge Modern History*, X. pp. 113-117.

Austrian army had moved southwards, and the garrisons in Northern Italy were weak. The King of Prussia and his Ministers hurried back to Berlin, fearful that the revolution would spread to Germany. The Tsar promised assistance, and ordered a concentration of his troops upon the Galician frontier.

The news from Italy caused the greatest excitement in France. At Grenoble the report of Louis XVIII's abdication was circulated, and both there and at Lyons insurrectionary movements were attempted. In each town, however, the military commander and the prefect showed great firmness and soon restored order. At a Cabinet Council in Paris, Ministers reviewed the situation calmly. The behaviour of the troops was reported to be satisfactory. The censorship removed all fears of indiscretion on the part of the press. The seditious language indulged in by the extreme Liberals in the Chamber constituted, however, a grave danger. It was resolved, in consequence, to prorogue the Parliament for three months, should matters assume a more serious complexion. The Royalists, however, were not to be reassured by the firm demeanour of the Government. Monsieur is said to have secretly advised the King to recall D cazes, so convinced was he that only by concessions to the Liberals could a revolution be averted. In the Faubourg-Saint-Germain the most alarming rumours were current. Between the 19th and 23rd March a fall of ten francs was recorded in the *rente*, a state of affairs due almost entirely to the Royalists, who could not be prevented from sacrificing their securities.¹ Before long, however, news of a very different character was received from Italy. To the consternation of the revolutionary leaders, Carlo Alberto obeyed the orders transmitted to him by Carlo Felice, and quitted Turin. Intelligence of P p 's disaster increased the depression of the Piedmontese patriots. In the meantime, General Bubna, the Austrian commanding general at Milan, was preparing for action. Concentrating rapidly as many of his own troops as possible, and acting in concert with the loyal Piedmontese, he crossed the Ticino on April 8th, and on the 10th disposed of the revolutionaries of Northern Italy at Novaro, as effectually as Frimont, of the Neapolitan Constitutionalists, at Ri ti. On the following day the Provisional Government at Turin was dissolved, and on the 12th Bubna himself entered Alessandria.

The restoration of absolutism in Piedmont and at Naples, and the apparent determination of the despotic Sovereigns to check the spread of constitutionalism, delighted the Royalists.

¹ Pasquier, V. pp. 173-174.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, IX. pp. 474-482.

Their triumph was as insolent as a few weeks before their terror had been abject. La Bourdonnaye, Castelbajac, Bouville, Delalot, Donnadieu, and other members of the group, which about this time came to be known as the *pointe*, constantly opposed the Government.¹ They complained, and dissatisfaction upon this score was not confined to the extreme section, that too little was done for the Royalists. Villèle and Corbière being without portfolios, and, therefore, without Ministerial patronage, could do nothing to remedy this grievance. At a Cabinet Council, at the end of June, Corbière expressed the sentiments of his party by boldly asking for the dismissal of eight or ten prefects, and the appointment of the same number of his friends in their place. Richelieu's curt refusal to entertain his suggestion increased the discontent of the Royalists at a moment when their support was much needed.² The Government was very anxious to reimpose the censorship of the Press for another year. The opposition of the Liberals to such a measure was a foregone conclusion, and it could, therefore, be carried only with the assistance of the Right. But the Royalists made it clear that they intended to treat the proposal as a vote of confidence in the Government. Despite all the efforts of Pasquier and de Serre, the censorship was sanctioned only until the third month of the next Session. In order to defeat the Ministerial proposals a considerable number of Royalists voted with the opposition.³

Villèle had done nothing to assist the Government in the matter of the censorship, and there was every reason to apprehend that he and Corbière intended to retire from the Cabinet. Richelieu, however, was anxious to avoid a rupture, and was prepared to make concessions in order to preserve his alliance with the Right. The Royalists wished to see Villèle at the Home Office, on account of the immense patronage which the post would place at his disposal. This solution of the difficulty, Richelieu discovered, would entail the retirement of Mounier from the direction of the police, and, after discussing the matter with some of his colleagues, he refused to entertain the proposal.⁴ At last, on July 13th, Villèle announced the lowest terms which his party would be prepared to accept. Portfolios were to be given to Corbière and himself and Marshal Victor, Duc de Bellune, was to be Minister of War.⁵ Chateaubriand, who had returned

¹ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, IX. pp. 546-550.

² Chateaubriand, *Mémoires*, nouvelle édition, IV. p. 211.

Pasquier, V. pp. 239-240.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 241-246.

Crousaz-Crétet, *Richelieu*, p. 458.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, X. pp. 179-209.

⁴ Pasquier, V. pp. 255-271.

⁵ Villèle, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 443-444.

from Berlin in order to be present at the baptism of the Duc de Bordeaux on May 1st, was again actively concerned in the negotiations which ensued.¹ Though he had been reinstated to the Privy Council, a mark of the King's forgiveness, which he had been very anxious to obtain, he did not, on that account, consider himself as under any obligation to Richelieu. He now declared that unless satisfaction were to be given to the demands of his friends, he should refuse to return to Berlin. For the next fortnight fruitless attempts were made to arrive at an agreement. The insistence of the Royalists that La Tour-Maubourg should retire at once, in order to make room for the Duc de Bellune, appears, finally, to have exhausted the Duke's patience. MM. de Villèle and Corbière having no portfolios to surrender simply left Paris, and a few days later, on July 13th, Chateaubriand sent in his resignation.

During the greater part of this summer, the Peers had been engaged in trying the persons concerned in the plot at the *Bazar français*. The several military revolutions which had taken place in neighbouring countries, rendered it highly desirable that prompt and striking examples should be made of the culprits. But soldiers and civilians had been jointly concerned in this affair, and it would not have been legal to have arraigned the military prisoners before a Court which was not competent to try their accomplices. In view, however, of the importance of meting out swift justice to the soldiers, the Government might, perhaps, have been well advised had it abandoned the proceedings against the civilians. But the authorities appear to have been afraid of incurring the reproach of having hurried on the proceedings, in order to conceal the machinations of their secret agents. The Liberals, at this time, invariably attributed every act of treason brought to light by the police to the instigations of *agents provocateurs*. The Government, says Pasquier, decided to send the accused for trial before the Peers, in order that no one, however exalted his rank might be, should escape the just penalty of his offence. If that were the expectation of Ministers, it was strangely to be falsified by the event.²

The Marquis de Sémonville, the Grand Referendary of the Chamber of Peers, was a type of man often to be met with under unstable governments. He had contrived to pass safely, and in the enjoyment of good appointments, through almost the whole period from the Revolution to the Restoration. His reputation for political foresight stood so high that the King told Pasquier,

¹ Chateaubriand, *Mémoires*, nouvelle édition, IV. pp. 223-225.

² Pasquier, IV. pp. 453-455.

Nettement, *Histoire*, V. pp. 467-468.

upon one occasion, that he had felt convinced during the Hundred Days that Bonaparte's position must be very insecure, upon hearing that M. de Sémonville had taken no steps to enter into relations with him. At this time he is believed to have regarded the ultimate triumph of the Liberals as certain, and to have thought it not improbable that the Duc d'Orléans might be King before long. He, therefore, regretted deeply his share in the condemnation of Marshal Ney, and was resolved to atone for it by doing all in his power to avoid implicating any Deputies or officers of rank in the present proceedings.¹

The preliminary enquiry lasted for four months, and was conducted by the Chancellor Dambray, over whom Sémonville had great influence. Four Peers had been appointed to assist him, Pastoret, Generals Rapp and Digeon, and Sémonville himself. These proceedings resulted in forty-one of the accused, including Colonel Fabvier, one of the ringleaders, being set at liberty. The commissioners, moreover, refused to adopt the conclusions of Jacquinet, the crown prosecutor, that presumptions of guilty complicity existed with regard to La Fayette and several Deputies, as well as in respect of Savary de Rovigo and eleven general officers. Jacquinet, in consequence, retired from the case, and was replaced by Peyronnet, the member for the Cher, whose political career may be said to have dated from this trial.² It is not surprising that, after a preliminary enquiry conducted in this spirit, the public proceedings, which began on May 7th, should have presented a certain character of unreality. The Peers must have felt, on many occasions, that important facts were being concealed from them, and that the thirty-one persons arraigned before them were but the minor actors in the conspiracy. These circumstances, doubtless, account for the very light sentences pronounced on July 16th. The severest punishment inflicted did not exceed a term of five years' imprisonment. The Royalists were justly indignant at this result, and a widespread impression was created that the leniency of the Peers was due to the fact that the plot was in a great measure the work of the police.³

The autumn elections of 1821 were another triumph for the Right. Of the eighty-seven seats in dispute fifty-seven were won by Royalists, twenty by Ministerialists, and ten only by the Liberals. The *pointus* returned elated to Paris, and fully determined to overthrow the Government. But, after several

¹ Pasquier, V. pp. 73-75.

² E. Guillon, *Complots sous la Restauration*, pp. 126-127.

Pasquier, V. pp. 76-78.

³ Marmont, *Mémoires*, VII. p. 279.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, V. p. 302.

stormy discussions in M. Piet's *salon*, La Bourdonnaye, the leader of the extreme group, saw that he must abandon all hope of inducing Villèle and the moderate men to declare war upon the Cabinet.¹ Baffled in this direction, he forthwith determined to enter into negotiations with the Liberals. His overtures were favourably received, and it was resolved that both wings of the Chamber should combine, in order to procure the insertion of an expression of want of confidence in Ministers into the address in reply to the King's speech. Both Liberals and Royalists were dissatisfied with Richelieu's foreign policy. La Bourdonnaye and his friends complained of a reluctance on the part of the Government to adhere to the principles of the Holy Alliance, whilst the Liberals lamented that not a finger had been raised to assist the cause of liberty abroad. To serve their present purpose, however, both parties were content to ignore these fundamental differences.²

Assisted by the Liberals, the Royalists contrived to obtain a majority of seats upon the committee which was to draw up the address. When it was submitted to the Chamber, on November 26th, it was found to contain the following sentence: "We congratulate you, sir, upon your continued good relations with foreign Powers, in the firm confidence that peace has not been purchased at the expense of sacrifices incompatible with the national honour and the dignity of the Crown." These words were capable of an interpretation very disrespectful to the King. La Bourdonnaye and Delalot, fearing that this circumstance might deprive them of the votes of many Royalists upon whose support they had counted, decided to approach M. Royer-Collard in order to procure the help of the Doctrinaires and Left Centre Liberals. The readiness with which the Left had entered into an alliance with the Ultra-Royalists is capable of explanation. The members of the anti-dynastic section of the party were preparing a series of military plots, and the hour for putting them into execution was approaching. The advent to power of the Royalists would alarm public opinion, they considered, and assist their designs. Needless to say, M. Royer-Collard was innocent of any complicity in these revolutionary schemes. Nevertheless, he entered readily into a coalition, which could result only in placing at the head of affairs the men whose reactionary views, he had always declared, constituted the gravest danger to the Monarchy.³

¹ Villèle, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 450, 452, 460-461.

² Pasquier, V. pp. 390-394.

Crousaz-Crétet, *Richelieu*, p. 481.

³ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, X. pp. 343-345.

Thureau Dangin, *Le parti libéral*, pp. 167-169.

The address in the terms proposed by the committee was carried by a large majority. Louis' first impulse had been to refuse to receive it. But at a Council, at which he himself presided, it was decided that the President and his two secretaries should be admitted into his presence. Accordingly, on November 30th, Louis took from the hands of M. Ravez, the President of the Chamber, the address, and placing it upon his table, informed him that he knew what it contained. After referring briefly to the less important passages, he proceeded to censure in dignified language the conduct of those responsible for the offensive sentence. "In days of exile and persecution," said he severely, "I upheld the honour of my name and of my country. I am indignant to think that upon my throne I should be supposed to have sacrificed either the honour of the nation or the dignity of the crown. I try to believe that many of those who have voted this address have done so without weighing fully the meaning of its expressions."¹

Ever since the retirement of Villèle and Corbière from the Cabinet, most of Richelieu's colleagues had looked upon the Government as doomed. The Duke, though not as a rule a sanguine man, did not on this occasion share their gloomy forebodings. He had no personal quarrel with Villèle, and hoped before long to be able again to utilize his services. Moreover, he was confident that in the last resort he had but to remind Monsieur of his promise, for him to exercise all his influence with the Royalists to bring them back into line with the Ministerialists.² Even after the defeat of the Government upon the question of the address, he did not despair. The King's message of rebuke to the Chamber had not been without effect. The more moderate Royalists began to think that they had acted too hastily. Villèle seems to have regarded a reconstruction of the Cabinet as necessary, but to have wished to see Richelieu retain the Presidency of the Council. Monsieur and the Court, however, were resolved to drive the Duke from office, and the persons behind Madame du Cayla were equally determined to bring about his downfall.³

The lull which succeeded the storm caused by the debate upon the address was of brief duration. General Donnadieu published a scurrilous attack upon Richelieu, some allusions which it contained raising a strong suspicion that he must have derived his information from the Court. In the Chamber, Castelbajac in-

¹ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, X. pp. 356-358.

² Pasquier, V. p. 270.

Villèle, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 446-447.

³ Pasquier, V. pp. 395-406.

Crousaz-Crétet, *Richelieu*, pp. 482-484.

Villèle, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 471-473.

veighed furiously against Pasquier, whilst the composition of the committee, to consider the Ministerial bill to impose the censorship for a further period, showed that the alliance between the Royalists and Liberals still subsisted. Richelieu was now driven to his last retrenchments. Louis, when he discussed the situation with him, had referred pointedly to the invariable custom of British Ministers to retire when they could no longer command a majority. But before deciding finally, the Duke resolved to appeal to Monsieur. When admitted to his presence he assured him that it was within his power to clear away all his difficulties, and reminded him of his promise made two years before. "Really, my dear Duke," said Monsieur, "you take things too literally. Besides, at that time, you must remember, we were in an awkward fix." Richelieu looked him in the face, and, turning upon his heel, left the room in most uncourtierlike fashion.

A quarter of an hour later, Richelieu, who was much distressed, related the story of his interview with Monsieur to Pasquier. Both agreed that the struggle could not be prolonged. This decision came as a relief to the members of his Cabinet. On the following day, December 12th, Richelieu tendered his resignation and that of his colleagues to the King. Louis merely remarked that he had acted properly.¹

Monsieur, the next morning, sent for Villèle and Corbière, and informed them that they would be members of the new Government. Richelieu, he told them, had suggested that M. de Blacas, the Ambassador at Rome, should be President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs. Monsieur and Villèle both agreed, however, that his long absence from France constituted an insuperable objection to such an arrangement. Without doubt, also, it occurred to them that Blacas, a former favourite, might prove a rival to Madame du Cayla, with whose conduct Monsieur was thoroughly satisfied. Villèle had none of Richelieu's fastidiousness, and was ready to ingratiate Madame du Cayla by all means in his power. During the next twenty-four hours he had several interviews with her friend, Sosthènes de La Rochefoucauld, and received some useful hints. On December 14th matters were finally arranged. Mathieu de Montmorency, Sosthènes' father-in-law, was to be Minister for Foreign Affairs, Villèle of Finance, Bellune of War, Clermont Tonnerre of Marine, Corbière of the Interior, and Peyronnet Keeper of the Seals. The only member of Richelieu's Government to retain his post was Lauriston, the Minister of the King's Household.²

¹ Pasquier, V. pp. 406-410.

² Villèle, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 282-285.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, X. pp. 393-394.

La Rochefoucauld, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 50-64.

The Duc de Richelieu retired heartbroken, and convinced that, but for the intrigues of Monsieur, his hopes would have been fulfilled of uniting into one party all the true friends of the Monarchy. Lauriston is believed to have related the circumstances of his interview with Monsieur to the King. "What would you have?" said Louis. "He conspired against Louis XVI, he conspired against me, some day he will conspire against himself."¹ Monsieur, however, only accelerated the downfall of Richelieu. Ever since his return to public life his position had been a false one. He had been striving to govern with the support of a party, the policy of which differed in essential particulars from his own. He could discern clearly that any attempt to re-establish the old *régime* must end in disaster. The electoral law, for which he was responsible, had saved the Royalists from political extinction, and he appears to have thought that they would relinquish, from gratitude, aspirations which they had never laid aside, even when their fortunes were at their lowest ebb. His plan of forming a monarchical and dynastic party, the watchword of which was to be the maintenance of the institutions of modern France, may not have been impracticable, but to have carried it out successfully greater knowledge of men and sterner qualities were required than he possessed. The Duc de Richelieu will always be remembered as a great gentleman who, upon all occasions, placed the welfare of his country before the interests of his class. When, a few months later, on May 18th, 1822, he died very suddenly, Talleyrand, his enemy, declared that his premature death should be regarded as a public calamity. But Monsieur and his friends were less generous. No member of the Royal Family was present at his funeral, and the Grand Almoner availed himself of an absurd pretext for declining to officiate at the service.²

¹ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, X. p. 391.

² Pasquier, V. pp. 415-418.

CHAPTER XIII

THE SECRET SOCIETIES

THE advent to power of a Royalist Government brought the two parties of the Revolution and the counter-Revolution face to face. In the struggle, which now entered upon its final stage, the action of the secret societies must be considered side by side with the fight waged in the open daylight of the Chamber. A brief account has already been given of the Congregation of the Rue du Bac. The existence of the central society, and of the numerous branches in provincial towns all over France has never been denied. But as regards the real character of the association the widest divergence of opinion prevails. According to M. Geoffroy de Grandmaison, the historian of the Congregation, the work carried out by the society was of a purely religious and charitable nature. Its enemies, however, and Liberal writers generally, supported unquestionably by the weight of contemporary opinion, describe it as an organization the objects of which were mainly political. If the list, published by M. de Grandmaison, contains the whole of the names of the affiliated it must be admitted that fewer great personages and prominent politicians belonged to it than its adversaries have pretended.¹ It has been suggested, however, that the society may have been divided into two branches—a religious side, the Congregation proper, and a political side, the existence of which may have been unknown to most of the religious associates.² It is not improbable that a fairly correct appreciation of the state of affairs may be contained in this surmise.

In Grandmaison's work the organization and the daily routine of the Congregation is described at length. Only the names, however, of the presidents or prefects who were appointed annually are of any general interest. Thus it would appear that in 1816 M. de Lavau (prefect of police from 1821 to 1827), in 1818 Mathieu de Montmorency, in 1820 Jules de Polignac, and

¹ Geoffroy de Grandmaison, *La Congrégation*, Paris, 1889.

² Viel Castel, *Histoire*, X. pp. 269–275.

in 1824 and 1827 Eugène de Montmorency respectively officiated as prefects of the association. *Cor unum et anima una* was the device of the society, but it was supposed that secret signs existed, by means of which the affiliated could recognize their fellow associates.¹

In 1814, unlike the rulers of Austria, Spain, and the Italian States, the restored Monarchy did not sanction officially the return of the Jesuits to France. For some time past, however, the members of the association of the *Pères de la foi* had been carrying on the "traditions of the Society of Jesus." Indeed, Napoleon was not very hostile to them. The Père Ronsin, the celebrated director of the Congregation of the Rue du Bac during nearly the whole period of the Restoration, was himself received into the Society of Jesus by the Père de Clorivière on July 23rd, 1814. Soon after the second Restoration the Jesuits appear to have openly established their headquarters at Montrouge,² on the outskirts of Paris. Here, according to public rumour, some of the Père Ronsin's most promising disciples, and various persons of rank, underwent an initiation and were admitted as members of the order, becoming *Jesuits of the short robe*, as it is termed in France. It must be stated, however, that it has always been denied that the rules of the Society provided for a lay affiliation of this description.³

Meanwhile, by means of the establishment in the Rue du Bac and kindred organizations all over France, the Jesuits were rapidly acquiring great influence. About the year 1820, indeed, these institutions had assumed so widespread a development that numerous Bishops set the seal of their approval upon them by affiliating themselves to the Congregation.⁴ The activity of the missionaries has been described in a previous chapter. In addition to their crusades, and to the formation of about sixty branch establishments of the association in country towns, the Congregation was responsible for a society, which soon became very notorious. The *société des bonnes études*, the headquarters of which were at No. 11 Rue des Fossés Saint-Jacques, was founded, according to M. de Grandmaison, in 1823. It would appear to have existed, however, in some form or another at an

¹ Geoffroy de Grandmaison, *La Congrégation*, pp. 152-157, 343-347, 161.

Thureau Dangin, *Le parti libéral*, pp. 359-362.

² Geoffroy de Grandmaison, *La Congrégation*, p. 135.

Montlosier, *Mémoire à consulter*, p. 24.

³ Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, V. pp. 346-347.

Madame de Boigne, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 85-86.

Encyclopædia Britannica, "Jesuits."

⁴ Geoffroy de Grandmaison, *La Congrégation*, p. 177.

earlier date. Mathieu de Montmorency and afterwards the Duc de Rivière presided over the institution which professed to provide a place of meeting for young men desirous of discussing philosophical and historical subjects.¹ The lectures were well attended and proved very successful. It was soon whispered abroad, however, that the speakers had seldom any good to say about existing political institutions. Moreover, were a person to bring forward for debate any genuinely philosophical questions, he would be given to understand quickly that such topics were not appreciated either by the noble president or by those who had organized the society.

Despite all assertions to the contrary, it is impossible to doubt that the institution had been started only in order to enable the priests to gain an ascendancy over young men of the middle classes, about to enter the Civil Service or the learned professions. Though the equalitarian idea had taken a firm hold of the French people, there were still persons to whom the prospect of meeting men of a superior social condition to themselves offered an irresistible attraction. Many youths, moreover, who were perhaps impervious to vulgar considerations of this kind, may not have been insensible to the advantages to be derived from making the acquaintance of important persons who might be of service to them in their future careers. On this point the Baron de Frénilly is very explicit. He mentions that in 1816 he invested £80 in two shares in the institution, and that by the time a Royalist Government had risen to power the establishment had become "a nursery for candidates for the civil service and the magistracy."² *La Société Catholiques des bons livres* and *la bibliothèque Catholique*, two societies for the publication of irreproachable books were harmless manifestations of the activity of the congregation. But the plan of founding a military branch of the association, to be called *La Congrégation de Notre Dame des Victoires*, was abandoned in consequence of the Duc d'Angoulême's dislike to the idea.³

Had the priests been actuated only by the desire to combat unbelief by all means in their power, no great exception need have been taken to their conduct in resorting to worldly devices to attain their ends. But their designs went much further, and aimed at nothing short of the restoration to the Church of the power which it had enjoyed before the Revolution. Their views

¹ Geoffroy de Grandmaison, *La Congrégation*, pp. 215-216, 368-370. Frénilly, *Souvenirs*, p. 403.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, V. pp. 337-338.

² Frénilly, *Souvenirs*, p. 404.

³ Geoffroy de Grandmaison, *La Congrégation*, pp. 219, 286-289.

as to how the Government should be conducted can be ascertained without listening to the violent accusations hurled against them by anti-clerical writers. Reference has already been made to the Abbé Liautard, and to the part which he played in bringing Madame du Cayla to the King's notice. It is immaterial whether he was a Jesuit or whether he was directly connected with the Congregation. His intimate relations with the Père Ronsin, the Abbé Rauzan, Egris-Duval, and other prominent members of the "priest party" were notorious. Moreover, as the director of the College Stanislas, the most fashionable educational establishment in Paris, he was a person of importance in the society of the Faubourg-Saint-Germain. The Abbé Denys, at the end of his panegyric of Liautard, has made public a certain essay which he evidently regards as the masterpiece of his hero. It is entitled *The Throne and the Altar*, and appears to have been compiled originally for submission to Monsieur. A very few extracts from it will be sufficient to make clear his views upon modern institutions. That curse of society, the public press, he would wish to see abolished without delay. A Government paper, edited by the chief of police, to contain a relation of any recent events of importance, a record of the variations of the temperature, and the current price of wheat, coffee, and sugar should meet all reasonable requirements. At the same time the writings of Rousseau, Voltaire and other distinctly bad works should be bought up and destroyed. But upon books which need only be classed as "indifferent," it might be sufficient to impose a tax.¹

It would be absurd to suppose that the whole of the clergy were in sympathy with the extreme views of the "Fenelon of these days," as Liautard's admirers have named him. It is, nevertheless, certain that his opinions fairly represented those of an important section. Doubtless there were many who, like the Père Rosaven, of the Society of Jesus, could see that men were no longer to be coerced into religion, and that the methods of their colleagues could only defeat their own object.² But the French clergy, like other institutions, were fated to suffer for the excesses of their more violent members. The Royalist Government which dates from December 15th, 1821, has always been accused of having subordinated its policy to the wishes of the "priest party." Mathieu de Montmorency, the Minister for Foreign affairs, Franchet d'Esperey, the director, and Lavau, the prefect of police, were certainly among the most zealous members of the Congregation. Henceforward, the fatal suspicion grew apace

¹ Abbé Denys, *Mémoires de l'Abbé Liautard*, pp. 318-326.

² Thureau Dangin, *Le parti libéral*, pp. 343-350.

Abbé Denys, *Mémoires de l'Abbé Liautard*, p. 51.

that the Court, the Government, and all the great departments of the State were secretly dominated by a party bitterly hostile to the free institutions of the country.

At the time when the occult influence exercised by the Congregation was beginning to attract universal attention, the activity of the Liberal secret societies was at its height. Modern Freemasonry had been introduced into France in the early years of the eighteenth century by Derwentwater, Ramsay, and other Jacobites with the object of helping the cause of the Stuarts.¹ Thus, by a strange irony of fate, the association, the members of which the Pope has excommunicated, and which has been regarded as the worst enemy to Hereditary Sovereignty, was formed originally for the purpose of upholding the legitimist principle, and of extending the power of the Roman Catholic Church. It would be beyond the scope of this volume to trace the rapid evolution of Freemasonry, or to discuss its connection with the Rosicrucians and Illuminati of Germany. The Grand Orient, which quickly absorbed all the masonic lodges in France, was constituted in 1772 under the Grand Mastership of the Duc de Chartres, the celebrated *Egalité*.² By this time the philosophical doctrines of the day had taken complete possession of continental Freemasons who had fallen under the ban of the Roman Catholic Church. The rapid spread of masonry among the French aristocracy was a significant sign of the times. Initiation in some form or another, according to the Père Deschamps, was extended to women. The Duchesse de Bourbon, *Egalité's* sister, the Duchesse de Chartres, Madame de Genlis, and the Princesse de Lamballe were among those admitted to the order. The last-named Princess, he says, presided over the lodge of the *contrat social*, the members of which were in the habit of meeting dressed in blouses and sabots to dance and to imitate popular diversions.³

The enormous power wielded for a time by the Duc d'Orléans was due, without doubt, in a measure to his office of Grand Master of the Grand Orient. Mirabeau, Talleyrand, Lauzun, and most of the prominent men in the early days of the Revolution were Freemasons. Nevertheless, the influence of the society on the later development of events was inconsiderable.⁴ The mysterious circumstances surrounding the retreat of the Prussians after Valmy and Dumouriez's negotiations with Ferdinand of

¹ C. W. Heckethorn, *Secret Societies*, II. p. 54.

² Père Deschamps, *Sociétés Secrètes*, I. p. liii.

³ Père Deschamps, *Sociétés Secrètes*, II. pp. 9-14.

⁴ C. W. Heckethorn, *Secret Societies*, II. pp. 55-66.

Johnson, *Napoleonic Empire in Southern Italy and rise of Secret Societies*, II. p. 29.

Brunswick have been ascribed, however, by some people to the fact that both generals were masons.¹ The order was encouraged by Napoleon, who may have thought that the freedom of discussion enjoyed in the lodges was a necessary outlet for the repressed political energies of the people. In 1812, no less than one thousand and eighty-nine lodges existed in France, among which the army was responsible for sixty-nine. Cambacérès, the Arch-Chancellor, was the chief dignitary of the Grand Orient, and every lodge established within the Empire was compelled to pay him toll. The annual income, which he thus derived from masonry, is stated by Mr. Heckethorn to have amounted to two million francs. Napoleon considered evidently that the obvious dangers of the lodges, which existed in many regiments of his armies of occupation, were counterbalanced by the means which they afforded him of tightening his grasp upon the countries which he had overrun. Gradually, however, the Freemasons who had shown abject servility to him in his earlier years began to turn from him. Their indifference, though it may not have contributed to his downfall, probably facilitated the establishment of the Monarchy.²

Under the Restoration, Freemasonry was regarded with the greatest dislike and suspicion by the Royalists. The clergy denounced the order with unmeasured violence, and hoped to see it proscribed. According to the Père Deschamps the family of Eouvel, the murderer of the Duc de Berri, received a pension from the lodge to which Décazes belonged. The insinuation is worth repeating only as an example of the accusations which were levelled against masonry.³ Though traces were found of the participation of a lodge, composed chiefly of students and entitled the *Friends of Truth*, both in the electoral riots and in the plot of August 1820, Freemasonry proper had little direct share in the revolutionary movements in France under the Restoration. At the same time it is true, doubtless, that it materially contributed to the rapid diffusion of Carbonarism.⁴

The association of Carbonari, or charcoal burners, is said to have sprung from a secret society in the French army of occupation in Italy, some time about the year 1809. It developed rapidly, and could before long count among its members most of the Italian Liberals and patriots. The revolutions at Naples and in Piedmont, in 1820 and 1821, were the result of the spread

¹ C. W. Heckethorn, *Secret Societies*, II. pp. 62-67.

Père Deschamps, *Sociétés Secrètes*, II. pp. 164-167.

² Père Deschamps, *Sociétés Secrètes*, II. pp. 196-197.

³ *Ibid.*, I. pp. liii, 160; II. pp. 229-230.

⁴ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, IX. p. 70.

Père Deschamps, *Sociétés Secrètes*, II. p. 230.

of Carbonarism.¹ It was introduced into France by a student of the name of Dugied, a member of the masonic lodge of the *Friends of Truth*, who had fled to Italy after the discovery of the plot at the *Bazar français*. On his return to Paris, early in 1821, he brought back with him the statutes of the society to which he had been affiliated during his stay at Naples. These he communicated to some of his friends, who saw that, simplified to suit the ideas of their countrymen, they might serve as a means of uniting into one powerful organization all the enemies of the Monarchy.²

It was decided to discard the ritual and ceremony which had appealed to the Italian imagination. A candidate was only to be sworn to secrecy, and to be required to keep at his abode a musket and fifty cartridges. The lodges, or *Vendite*, were to be of three kinds, ordinary, central, and the supreme or head *Vendita*. Though the first organizers of French Carbonarism were all obscure men, they were able to communicate with La Fayette who, together with his son George, readily agreed to join the society. Besides the two La Fayettes, Koechlin, a rich manufacturer of Mülhausen, the journalists Cauchois-Demaire and Scheffer, the Liberal Deputies Manuel, Corcelles, Voyer d'Argenson, Generals Thiard and Demarçay are among those who composed the head *Vendita*.³ Thus constituted Carbonarism was to work for the expulsion of the Bourbons, and to win for the people the right of selecting the form of Government which they preferred. Members were enrolled so rapidly, that before the end of the year 1821 lodges had been established in nearly every large town in France.

As no attempt had been made to affiliate members of the labouring classes, it was lawyers, journalists, professional men, and students who swelled the ranks of the Carbonari. However strongly imbued with revolutionary theories they may have been, the idea of sallying out with their muskets and their fifty cartridges to meet the Royal Guard was physically repugnant to the majority of them. But monarchies are not to be overturned without recourse to violence, and Carbonarism had to look to the half-pay officers and their discontented comrades upon the active list for its means of action.⁴ Frequent reference has been made to the grievances of the officers of the old Imperial army. Gouvion-Saint-Cyr, when he had been Minister

¹ Johnson, *Napoleonic Empire in Southern Italy and rise of Secret Societies*, II. p. 33.

² Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, V. pp. 360-362.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, X. pp. 258-261.

³ E. Charavay, *Le Général La Fayette*, p. 418.

⁴ E. Guillon, *Complots sous la Restauration*, p. 147.

of War, had reinstated in their regiments many of those whom Clarke, his predecessor, had deprived of their employment. The experiment had not been very successful. Both Richelieu and La-Tour Maubourg, in the autumn of 1821, had found it necessary to relegate once more to civil life a number of officers whose opinions were contaminating their comrades. The loss of their employment and the consequent deprivation of the greater part of the pay, which was generally their only means of support, was not the full extent of the troubles of the men who were thus treated. Beset by spies, compelled to live at their native towns, and unable to make the shortest journey without the permission of the police, some of the more intelligent of them sought to escape from the vexatious restrictions to which they were subjected by embarking upon civil pursuits. But the authorities, far from encouraging them to adopt any occupation which put an end to a dangerous state of idleness, announced promptly that any retired officer who accepted civil employment would forfeit his pension.¹

The hard fate of Napoleon's *braves* under the Monarchy has been a theme for novelists and dramatists. Balzac, in the odious person of Philippe Brideau, has depicted their worst characteristics.² They were conspicuous figures in their tightly-buttoned frock-coats and broad-brimmed hats, often shabby, but always cocked aggressively. The moustache, which they were careful to preserve to distinguish them from the Royalist officers, and the stick which they carried attached to the wrist by a leather thong, like a cavalry sabre, everywhere proclaimed their former calling. In Paris, the café Montansier and the café Remblin, in the Palais Royal, were their favourite haunts. The news of Napoleon's death, on May 5th, 1821, at St. Helena, had not created any great sensation in France. Madame de Boigne relates that the newsvendors under her windows shouting, "Death of Napoleon Bonaparte and his last words to General Bertrand," attracted little attention. The absence of eulogistic articles upon the deceased Emperor in the papers may be ascribed, doubtless, to the censorship. At the same time, however, it is not improbable that his death may have been regarded as an opportune occurrence by many Bonapartists. For the last two or three years they had been busily engaged in creating the Napoleonic legend.³ In this endeavour they were only following the example of the Royalists who were constantly extolling Henri IV as the brave soldier and the gallant lover, always solicitous for the welfare of

¹ E. Guillon, *Complots sous la Restauration*, pp. 23-32, 43-50.

² Balzac, *Scènes de la vie de Province, la rabouilleuse*.

³ Madame de Boigne, *Mémoires*, III. p. 68.

E. Guillon, *Complots sous la Restauration*, pp. 136-139.

the common folk. The Emperor, whom the Bonapartists depicted, bore infinitely less resemblance to the real man than did the King of the Royalist songs and story-books to the true Henri IV. Their Napoleon was portrayed in his plain grey great-coat, chatting with his soldiers round the bivouac fire, or making plans for the happiness of his people, which he was prevented from putting into execution only by the hostility of the allied sovereigns, and the intrigues of perfidious Albion.¹

In their attempts to present Napoleon under the most pleasing aspect, the Bonapartists were assisted by the most popular songwriter of modern France. Béranger had been a refractory conscript under the Empire, and, in *Le roi d'Yvetot*, had extolled the happiness of living under a peace-loving King. Nevertheless, from the earliest days of the Restoration, he had begun to ridicule the pretensions of the old nobility, satirize the clergy, and lament the fallen greatness of France. *Le vieux Sergent* (1815) and *Le vieux Drapeau* (1820) were but thinly veiled incitations to rebellion. A complete edition of his poems, which was produced in 1821, and which contained some of his hitherto unpublished songs, was seized by the police. Béranger's trial, which began on December 8th, 1821, and which resulted in a sentence of three months' imprisonment, excited universal interest, and added still further to his popularity.² Paul Louis Courier was another writer who, though he cannot be described as a Bonapartist, nevertheless rendered important service to the party. As an officer in the Imperial army he had been a grumbler, who had seldom missed an opportunity of neglecting his duties. Yet at the Restoration the man who had depicted always the worst side of war, and who had laughed at the military spirit, was to be seen, like Béranger, in the character of a worshipper of national glory. Though he had been born in easy circumstances and was an accomplished Greek scholar, he loved to describe himself in his pamphlets as a vine-dresser, and affected to speak from the standpoint of a man of the people. Faithful to the part which he had assumed, he rarely dealt with the great controversial questions of the day. But his attacks were not the less dangerous upon that account. The tyranny of some prefect, the ridiculous pretensions of a local magnate, the wastefulness of

¹ Thureau Dangin, *Le parti libéral*, pp. 151-158.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 60-67.

E. Guillon, *Complots sous la Restauration*, pp. 57-58.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, X. pp. 397-401.

Cf. *Le champ d'asile*, 1818; *Le Marquis de Carabas*, 1818; *La Marquise de Pretintaille*; *Les adieux à la gloire*, 1820; *Lettres d'un petit roi à un petit duc*, 1821; *Les missionnaires*, 1819; *Les reverends pères*, 1819; *L'agent provocateur*.

Courts, and above all the fanaticism and interfering habits of the clergy were subjects which redoubled in the minds of his readers their terror of a return to the old *régime*.¹

There had always been Liberals who had feared that were the Monarchy to be overthrown, Napoleon would by some means or another contrive to return to France. His death, therefore, by allaying this apprehension, rendered easier the fusion of all parties hostile to the reigning dynasty. Carbonarism, at this juncture, seemed to provide the very organization which was required for uniting into one vast association the enemies of the restored Monarchy. Many half-pay and retired officers were easily induced to affiliate themselves to the society. The majority of them had preserved relations with their former corps, and lodges by their agency were thus established in several regiments.

Napoleon himself had never been able to eradicate completely from his army the Jacobinical leaven, for which its republican origin was responsible. In addition to the military masonic lodges, or rather, in some measure, as a consequence of them, other societies sprang into existence. The Philadelphians, who were probably Republicans, but who were certainly anti-Imperialists, belong to this order of association. Their importance was, however, very small, and any celebrity which they can lay claim to rests entirely upon Charles Nodier's fantastic account of their legendary chief, Colonel Oudet, who he insinuates was butchered by Napoleon's orders on the night of the battle of Wagram. According to the same authority General Malet was a Philadelphian, and owed to this fact the success which, for a few hours, attended his conspiracy in 1812. Recent investigations, however, have failed to discover any trace of the participation of the society in that extraordinary affair. Nevertheless, the existence cannot be disputed of this and other secret societies in the Imperial army, the members of which aimed at the overthrow of the Napoleonic despotism. The revolutions in Portugal, Spain, and Italy, in 1820-21 may be ascribed mainly to the influence of political associations, such as the Carbonari, formed in imitation of those which existed in the French armies of occupation.²

The symptoms of disaffection among the officers in active employment, which at times manifested themselves openly under

¹ Thureau Dangin, *Le parti libéral*, pp. 47-60.

² E. Guillon, *Complots sous le Consulat et l'Empire*, pp. 192-197.

P. M. Desmarest, *Quinze ans de haute police* (Paris, 1900), pp. lxxv, 269-272.

Johnson, *Napoleonic Empire in Southern Italy and rise of Secret Societies*, II. p. 29.

C. Nodier, *Sociétés Secrètes de l'armée* (Paris, 1815).

H. Douzille, *Histoire de la conspiration du General Malet*.

the Restoration, were the natural legacy of the revolutions through which the country had passed. But certain grievances existed, foremost among them being the idea that men of humble extraction must always be at a disadvantage, in the matter of promotion, with their comrades of noble birth. The conduct and the language of many officers of aristocratic descent was often calculated to encourage this notion, and to intensify the evils of class distinctions among members of the same profession. Thus Armand Carrel, a formidable enemy of the Bourbons, who was fated to be killed in a Journalist's duel by Emile de Girardin, is said never to have forgotten the sneering remarks passed by General d'Albignac upon his father's humble calling.¹ The inroads of clericalism into the army were a further cause of disunion and of discontent. The evil must have been a very real one, if Marshal Marmont's statement be true that the confidential reports upon officers, sent in by the regimental chaplain, carried greater weight with the authorities than those furnished by inspecting Generals.²

Among the Carbonari were nearly all the men who had taken part in the great plot of August 19th, 1820. It was, accordingly, resolved to renew the attempt which had miscarried upon that occasion. This plan, a simultaneous revolt of the troops in a number of different garrison towns, was approved of by La Fayette and the members of the *head vendita*. In the eastern departments, Carbonarism had taken root quickly. Most of the inhabitants of the frontier provinces were Bonapartists, and, moreover, Koechlin and Voyer d'Argenson, who were affiliated to the *head vendita*, were the owners of important foundries in these districts. A lodge was formed in the 29th Regiment quartered at Belfort and Neu-Brisach. The retired general, Dermoncourt, was confident that his old corps, the 7th Chasseurs, stationed at Colmar, would follow his lead, and officers and non-commissioned officers belonging to the Artillery at Strasburg and to the Engineers at Metz entered into the conspiracy. It was decided that the movement should begin by a rising of the garrisons of Belfort and Neu-Brisach. The revolted troops were to raise the tricolour and to effect their junction at Colmar, where a Provisional Government was to be set up consisting of La Fayette, Voyer d'Argenson, and Koechlin. Similar outbreaks were to take place at Metz, Strasburg, and Mulhausen. In the meantime a revolution of the same kind would have broken out at Marseilles and Toulon, in conjunc-

¹ Thureau Dangin, *Le parti libéral*, pp. 566-567.

² Marmont, *Mémoires*, VIII. pp. 7-8.

E. Guillon, *Complots sous la Restauration*, pp. 39-40.

Cf. C. Rousset, *Le Marquis de Clermont-Tonnerre*, pp. 311-315.

tion with which Corcelle, the Deputy and an energetic Carbonaro, was preparing a rising at Lyons. Thus, if all went well, the conspirators might expect that the whole of the East of France would be in a state of rebellion within a few days of the first outbreak.¹

It was decided that the rising at Belfort and Neu-Brisach should take place during the night of December 29th-30th. But, as had happened in Paris eighteen months before, neither La Fayette nor the other prominent Liberals, upon whose presence at the scene of action the conspirators had counted, gave any sign of life.² The movement was postponed in consequence, and fresh plans were discussed. Finally, it was resolved that the attempt at Belfort only should be made during the night of January 1st. Up to this point the authorities would not appear to have had the faintest suspicion of the mischief which was hatching. At the evening roll-call the sergeants, who were doubtless emboldened by the fact that no officers lived in the barracks of the 29th, warned the men to be prepared for a call to arms during the night. After carrying out this measure of doubtful wisdom they adjourned to drink success to the plot, whilst the officers of the battalion who were in the conspiracy and a number of their comrades on half-pay met for the same purpose at a neighbouring hotel. In the meantime, the attention of a non-commissioned officer, who that evening had returned from furlough, had been attracted by the unusual stir in the barrack-rooms. He appears to have reported the unaccountable activity which he had observed to his captain, who in his turn communicated the news to the Colonel, the Chevalier de Toustain. The officer in question, who was also the commandant of the fortress, guessing the truth, at once ordered the gates to be closed, and all suspicious persons to be arrested. But the conspirators had taken alarm already, and most of them succeeded in effecting their escape, despite M. de Toustain's determined efforts to apprehend them.

On this same day, January 1st, La Fayette started for Colmar, accompanied by his son and by an old servant, whom he is said to have warned that the expedition they were engaged upon was one "in which a man might very well lose his head." Manuel and Colonel Fabvier followed them at a prudent distance. On the road they were greeted by the news that the plot was discovered, and that the chief conspirators were either in flight or in custody. Judging under these circumstances that it would be dangerous and useless to prosecute their journey further, they

¹ E. Guillon, *Complots sous le Restauration*, pp. 156-158.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 159-164.

returned home, La Fayette to disarm suspicion making a brief stay at the house of a friend who lived in the neighbourhood.¹

Carbonari lodges existed in most of the chief towns in the Rhone valley, and one had been formed in a regiment at Marseilles. But the news of the discovery of the Belfort plot put an end to the revolutionary preparations which were in progress. Under the pretext of enlisting volunteers to assist the Greeks in their struggle for independence, Captain Vallé, an ex-Imperial officer, had been recruiting actively for Carbonarism. With this object, on January 7th, 1822, he entertained a number of half-pay and retired officers at a tavern at Toulon.² After inveighing against the pretensions of the nobles and the growing power of the clergy, he read out to his audience the statutes of the Carbonari. It happened that on this day the local papers contained the news of the affair at Belfort. The coincidence struck one of the company as suspicious. Denouncing Vallé as an *agent provocateur* he sent for the commissary of police. Upon the appearance of that official, the unfortunate man attempted to destroy his papers. They were, however, pieced together, and furnished sufficient evidence to bring him to the scaffold on 16th June, 1822, as a member of a secret society which aimed at the overthrow of the Government.³

These abortive military insurrections, in the eastern provinces, are remembered chiefly for the very questionable methods to which the authorities resorted in order to entrap Lieutenant-Colonel Caron. This former officer of the Imperial Guard had been implicated in the plot at the *Bazar français*. Notwithstanding that he had been acquitted by the Peers, the Minister of War deprived him of his retired pay. After his trial, Caron went to reside at Colmar where, in conjunction with another ex-officer named Roger, who kept a riding-school, he formed the plan of rescuing the prisoners who were in confinement for alleged participation in the Belfort plot. In pursuance of this object he sought the assistance of a sergeant of the 46th Regiment, quartered at Colmar, who professed the most violent hatred for the Bourbons. The man listened sympathetically, but betrayed the Colonel's intentions to the authorities. Acting under instructions from their superior officers,⁴ several sergeants of other regiments now entered into communication with both

¹ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XI. pp. 443-444.

E. Charavay, *Le Général La Fayette*, pp. 422-423.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XI. pp. 438-439, 444-445.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 444-447.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 102-103.

⁴ E. Guillon, *Complots sous la Restauration*, pp. 167-170.

Pasquier, V. pp. 432-434.

Caron and Roger. A plan was arranged between them for the delivery of their friends who were in prison at Mulhausen, and, probably, for bringing about a revolt of the troops in the district.

On July 22nd, 1822, a squadron of cavalry rode out of Colmar, under the command of a sergeant, but with several officers dressed as privates in the ranks. Outside the town Caron was waiting, and directly the detachment appeared he placed himself at its head. At a convenient spot a little farther on, he put on his old uniform of the Imperial Guard and addressed the men. His speech ended with the words "*Vive Napoleon II!*" which were repeated with apparent enthusiasm by the soldiers. Shortly afterwards a second body of cavalry, coming from the direction of Neu-Brisach and led by Roger, was met with. Both parties shouted "*Vive Napoleon II!*" and continued their march together. These cries were taken up afresh at each village which they passed through. At Battenheim, seven miles from Mulhausen, Caron called a halt and treated the men to drink, bidding the innkeeper observe that they were no longer the soldiers of the King. Thereupon the officers, who were secretly directing the affair, considered that the comedy might be brought to a close. At their signal Caron and Roger were seized, and the next day both squadrons returned in triumph to Colmar with their two prisoners.¹

The indignation at the trap which had been laid for the two retired officers found expression in Liberal pamphlets, petitions, and interpellations in the Chamber. So general was the commiseration which was felt for them that it was doubtful whether a jury could be found to convict. The difficulty was overcome by M. de Peyronnet, the Keeper of the Seals, who enacted that the case fell within the law of the 4th Nivose of the year IV, which provided for the trial by military courts of civilians charged with attempting to seduce soldiers from their duty by offers of money or of drink.² Whereas such of the Belfort conspirators as had been secured appeared before the civil tribunal at Colmar, and escaped with light terms of imprisonment, Caron, who in pursuance of the Ministerial decision had been arraigned before a Court Martial at Strasburg, was shot in the ditch of one of the forts on October 1st. The death sentence passed upon Roger by the assize court of the Moselle was, however, commuted to one of penal servitude for twenty years.³

At the same time as the projected risings in the East and South a revolutionary movement had been planned to take

¹ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XI. pp. 178-184.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 201-202.

³ E. Guillon, *Complots sous la Restauration*, pp. 165-166, 172-173.

place in the West. In this direction a secret society known as the *Knights of Liberty* already existed. The association had been formed originally in Paris, under the First Restoration, by a certain Grandmesnil, a retired army surgeon. After the Hundred Days he retired to Saumur, where, about the year 1820, he appears to have begun to recruit afresh for his society.¹ He found little difficulty in enrolling half-pay officers, small landowners, and purchasers of national property resident in the valley of the Loire. Accordingly, when the first Carbonari penetrated into these regions they found an association already formed, the members of which were eager to enter into a close alliance with them. In the autumn of 1820 the officers who were then undergoing their course of training at the Cavalry School at Saumur, had displayed their Royalist sentiments by demonstrating against Benjamin Constant, and by driving him from the town. But the next year the officers and non-commissioned officers who succeeded them had either joined their regiments, or had been promoted under the Liberal régime of Gouvion-Saint-Cyr.² Many of the new-comers were imbued with a strong democratic spirit. One of their number, Lieutenant Delon, a Freemason, was thus enabled to induce some of them to affiliate themselves to the society of the *Knights of Liberty* and to the Carbonari lodges in the district. The intention of the conspirators to bring about a rising, which was to coincide with the military insurrections in the East, was, however, by chance revealed to the authorities. In their endeavours to extinguish a fire, which had broken out accidentally during the night of December 19th, several officers and sergeants were crushed by the fall of a wall. Some papers which were found upon their persons confirmed the information, which the commandant had already received, as to the existence of a secret society in the school. Prompt measures were taken, and, though Delon succeeded in escaping, about thirty non-commissioned officers were placed in arrest.³

This action on the part of the authorities compelled the conspirators to postpone the execution of their plans, but it did not dishearten them. Grandmesnil, Gauchais, Caffé, and the other leading members of the league of the *Knights of Liberty*, were anxious to identify some well-known general with their movement. With this object, the ex-Major Gauchais was despatched to Paris. Hopes had been entertained that Pajol, the son-in-law of Marshal Oudinot, would come forward. But as he showed reluctance to embark upon the undertaking, they were fain to be

¹ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, X. pp. 261-264.

² E. Guillon, *Complots sous la Restauration*, pp. 141-144.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 158-159.

content to accept the services of General Berton, who proposed himself. This former officer had commanded a cavalry brigade in the Waterloo campaign. He had never been employed under the Restored Monarchy, and, in 1815, had been imprisoned as a suspect for several months. He was a person upon whom the police had constantly kept watch. Their reports describe him as a great talker at the café Bemblin and as a constant visitor at Corréard's library, in the Palais Royal, which was practically a Jacobin Club.¹

Berton is said to have been a good officer. Events were to prove, however, that he had none of the qualities required for a revolutionary leader. At a council of war held at Saumur, on February 17th, at which the General and forty-two delegates from the lodges and committees in the neighbouring towns were present, a plan of operations was drawn up. It was decided that the first blow should be struck at Thouars, where a Provisional Government was to be proclaimed and the tricolour hoisted.² Berton, at the head of the insurgents, would then march upon Saumur and, assisted by confederates in the cavalry school and in the garrison, seize the castle with its stores of arms and ammunition. It was reckoned that within three days of these events six departments, at least, would be in open rebellion.

On Sunday, February 24th, 1822, at daybreak, on the Place Saint-Médard at Thouars, General Berton, in full uniform, announced the downfall of the Bourbons and the establishment in Paris of a Provisional Government, consisting of Generals de La Fayette, Foy, and Demarçay, and MM. Benjamin Constant, de Kératry, and Voyer d'Argenson. The five or six *gendarmes* who constituted the police force of the town, were overcome without difficulty, and the civil officials were ordered to relinquish their posts. Much precious time was wasted, however, and it was not till midday that Berton and about fifteen of the chief conspirators on horseback, followed by a rabble of some one hundred and thirty persons and preceded by an old soldier bearing the tricolour, started for Saumur. Their hopes were not realized that the people would flock to their standard in the villages through which they passed. Saumur, where their confederates had expected them much earlier, was not reached till the evening. The authorities were on the alert, the drawbridge was up, the gates were closed, and there were no signs of assistance from their well-wishers within the town. Instead of at once forcing his way in, as the more determined of the conspirators

¹ E. Guillon, *Complots sous la Restauration*, pp. 178-179.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 181-184.

Pasquier, V. pp. 424-431.

entreated him, Berton talked of avoiding bloodshed, and began to parley with the prefect.¹ Something in the nature of an armistice appears to have been concluded, but, before daybreak, Berton gave the order to retreat, whereupon his followers, who were already melting away, dispersed in all directions. In the course of the next few days the troops, who had been hurried into the district, secured the greater number of them. Berton himself, however, and several of the ringleaders succeeded in reaching the coast at La Rochelle.

The conspirators, not without reason, laid all the blame for the failure of their enterprise upon Berton's weakness and indecision. Determined to make a last attempt to retrieve his reputation, he refused to embark while there was yet time. In the 45th Regiment, which had just arrived at La Rochelle from Paris, existed a Carbonari lodge. The general contrived to meet the members of it at a tavern in a neighbouring village, on March 11th, and the possibilities of bringing about a rising at La Rochelle itself were discussed. But shortly afterwards most of the non-commissioned officers who had been present at the interview were placed in arrest, and two battalions, upon the assistance of which he had counted, were removed to another garrison. Berton, thereupon, fled to Rochefort, and then made his way back to the neighbourhood of Saumur.² In the meantime, ten of the non-commissioned officers of the cavalry school at Saumur, whose affiliation to the secret league of the *Knights of Liberty* had been discovered in the previous December, had appeared before a court martial at Tours. Two of their number, Coudert and Sirejean, were condemned to death. The Court of Revision, however, annulled the proceedings, on account of an irregularity, and directed that they should be tried again. On this second occasion, Sirejean only was found guilty of the major charge of conspiracy. His extreme youth—he was but twenty-one—his good looks, and his hitherto irreproachable conduct marked him out as an object for general sympathy. The ladies of Tours appealed to Madame Recamier to use all her influence with Mathieu de Montmorency on behalf of the condemned man. But her efforts were unavailing. Louis considered that, under the circumstances, he would not be justified in exercising his prerogative to pardon. On May 2nd, 1822, Sirejean underwent his sentence before the assembled garrison of Tours.³

After the court martial at Tours, the Government broke up the cavalry school and withdrew from Saumur nearly the whole

¹ E. Guillon, *Complots sous la Restauration*, pp. 184–188.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 189–190.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 195–197.

of the troops. Only one regiment, the Carbineers of Monsieur, remained in the town. Though the fidelity of this corps was supposed to be above reproach, Grandmesnil and some of his fellow-conspirators, who were still at large, were informed that it contained a Carbonari lodge. Undeterred by previous failures, they determined to attempt a fresh insurrection. Before taking action, however, Grandmesnil and a certain Baudrillet proceeded to Paris, where on two occasions they appear to have had interviews with La Fayette, who urged them to persevere. A sergeant of the Carbineers at Saumur, Woelfeld by name, assured them that the co-operation of his comrades in any revolutionary movement could be depended upon. This man, who if he had gone through the form of affiliating himself to Carbonarism had acted only under instructions from his superiors, was taken to see Berton, who was hiding in the vicinity of the town. A second interview was arranged, upon which occasion Woelfeld was to be accompanied by some of his comrades to discuss the details of the plot. The appointment was duly kept on June 17th. At the general's invitation the party sat down to partake of refreshment. Presently, however, at a signal from Woelfeld, the sergeants sprang to their feet, and covering Berton with their double-barrelled guns secured him, and two of his friends, with the ropes with which they had come provided.¹

On August 26th, 1822, General Berton and thirty-nine of his accomplices were arraigned at Poitiers. The violent language of Mangin, the leading counsel for the prosecution, and his bitter references to the participation of La Fayette and other Liberal Deputies in the treasonable designs of the prisoners, were the feature of the trial. On September 11th, the chief conspirators were sentenced to death. Three weeks later, on October 5th, Berton suffered at Poitiers. But Caffé, the surgeon and the friend of Benjamin Constant, who was to have been guillotined at the same time, eluded the executioner by committing suicide. Two other of the condemned men were beheaded at Thouars on the 7th.²

The celebrated case of the four sergeants of La Rochelle concludes the melancholy story of the military plots. In 1821 the 45th Regiment was stationed in the students' quarter in Paris. Among the non-commissioned officers was a sergeant, named Bories, who had fought at Waterloo. Sympathetic writers have described him as a man of studious habits and of a blameless private life. That he was better educated and of a more serious

¹ E. Guillon, *Complots sous la Restauration*, pp. 191-194.
Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XI. pp. 171-175.

² E. Guillon, *Complots sous la Restauration*, pp. 196-207.

disposition than the majority of his comrades may be taken for granted. At the same time he was dissatisfied, being convinced that under a more democratic *régime* he would have received the promotion to the commissioned ranks, to which he considered that he was entitled. The atmosphere of the Latin quarter, in which the barracks were situated, was dangerous to a man in this frame of mind. Bories appears to have acquired an intimacy with a group of students and to have joined their Masonic lodge.¹ Soon afterwards he was initiated to Carbonarism, and set himself to recruit for the society among his fellow-sergeants. A lodge was thus formed in the 45th, to which the majority of the non-commissioned officers had been affiliated, before the end of the year.²

In the early days of January, 1822, the regiment was ordered to move to La Rochelle. Before leaving Paris, however, Bories was admitted to an interview with La Fayette,³ and was provided with cards of a particular pattern to enable him to communicate with the *good cousins* all over France. A meeting also took place between the civilian delegates of a central lodge, known as that of *Washington*, and some of the sergeants of the 45th at the *Roi Clovis*, a tavern in the Rue Descartes. The gathering was of a festive character. The toast of *the Republic* and the *Constitution of 1791* was drunk enthusiastically, and flattering allusions were made to the part played by the army in the Spanish Revolution. At the close of the entertainment, the civilian delegates gave each sergeant a dagger of a peculiar shape, and handed over to Bories a sum of money for distribution among his comrades.⁴ This last proceeding sheds an interesting light upon the methods of the Carbonari.

The regiment quitted Paris on January 22nd. On the march Bories, who was aware that an insurrection was about to break out at Saumur, made some highly compromising overtures to a Sergeant Choulet, who is said to have been a spy of the Colonel, the Marquis de Toustain. A regiment of Swiss Infantry was quartered at Orléans, where the 45th spent a night. The incorporation of these foreign corps into the army was resented by the Liberals as a practice which savoured of the old *régime*. After a dinner, which he had given to several of his fellow sergeants, Bories became involved in a tavern brawl with some of these Swiss soldiers and was placed under arrest. But at Poitiers, a few days later, he was released, and billeted at the house of

¹ Nettement, *Histoire*, VI. p. 33.

² E. Guillon, *Complots sous la Restauration*, pp. 221-222.

³ E. Charavay, *Le Général La Fayette*, p. 426.

⁴ Nettement, *Histoire*, VI. pp. 18-19 (note).

E. Guillon, *Complots sous la Restauration*, p. 223.

a retired officer. To this person, who was probably in the pay of the police, and who led him on by affecting very hostile sentiments towards the Government, Bories made some unguarded admissions. When the regiment arrived at La Rochelle, on February 14th, he was incarcerated at once in the civil prison of the town.¹

The Comte Despinos, who commanded the district, had been a general of the Empire. He is said to have been employed in Bonaparte's secret police. Frénilly² speaks of him as a collector of works of art and as a judge of pictures. In 1815 and 1816, when in command of the first military division in Paris, he had displayed his zeal for the Royal cause by a merciless severity towards his old comrades of the Imperial army. The activity of the secret societies within his new district had not escaped his vigilance. No sooner, accordingly, was he in possession of Colonel de Toustain's report than he sent for Bories to Nantes in order personally to examine him. But despite the skill in such matters, which he is said to have acquired in Napoleon's secret service, he was unable to extract anything of importance from his prisoner.³

In the meantime, Berton, as already related, had arrived at La Rochelle and had had an interview with the Carbonari of the 45th in the neighbourhood of the town. In the absence of Bories, three sergeants, Pommier, Goubin, and Raoulx had assumed the chief direction of the lodge. But two or three days after the meeting, on March 11th, at which Berton had been present, Pommier and Goubin were placed under arrest. This measure appears to have been taken because, contrary to orders, they had been seen in plain clothes in the town. But to one, at least, of the conspirators, it carried the conviction that their relations with the notorious Berton, for whom the police were hunting in all directions, must be known to the authorities. Unable to bear the suspense any longer, a sergeant named Goupillon, on March 19th, disclosed the existence of the lodge to the colonel. That night all the members of it in barracks were made prisoners, and the daggers, which had been distributed at the *Roi Clovis* in Paris, were discovered hidden in a mattress.⁴

¹ *Causes politiques célèbres du XIX. siècle, Paris, 1827, Procès de Bories et autres*, pp. 17-19.

Nettement, *Histoire*, VI. pp. 33-37.

E. Guillon, *Complots sous la Restauration*, pp. 223-225.

² *Ibid.*, p. 214.

Frénilly, *Souvenirs*, pp. 394, 461, 472.

³ E. Guillon, *Complots sous la Restauration*, pp. 215-217, 225.

⁴ *Causes célèbres du XIX. siècle Procès de Bories et autres*, p. 19-20.

E. Guillon, *Complots sous la Restauration*, pp. 226-228.

Nettement, *Histoire*, VI. pp. 37-40

The news brought Despinois in haste to La Rochelle. To this general officer both Pommier and Goubin made a full confession, which embraced the story of the connection of their regimental lodge with the central *vendita*, the *Washington*, in Paris. At their trial they asserted that Despinois had visited them alone in their cells, and had won their confidence by declaring that he himself was a Carbonaro. Their statement may not have been true, nevertheless the general's refusal to give evidence, on the plea that his duties would detain him at Nantes, points to a strong disinclination to answer questions about some of his proceedings. In the meantime, however, he had enabled the police to arrest the civilian delegates who had been present at the meeting at the *Roi Clovis*.¹

The trial of the twenty-five accused began in Paris on August 21st. Though the lawyer, Barradère, was described in the *acte d'accusation* as the chief conspirator, all interest was centred upon the four non-commissioned officers, Bories, Pommier, Goubin, and Raoulx. Bories, who was unquestionably a man of great force of character, quickly regained his ascendancy over his weaker comrades, and induced them to retract their confessions. The existence of an association of some kind in the regiment could not be denied, but an attempt was made to show that it had no political character, and was merely a friendly society. The defence is said to have been conducted tamely. Yet Merilhau, who was counsel for Bories, was not only a distinguished advocate, but was himself affiliated to the head *vendita*. In other cases, besides, the interests of the accused were confided to Carbonari members of the Paris bar. Marchangy, to whom this trial was to bring celebrity, prosecuted. In the opinion of Prince Metternich his speech was so full of admirable sentiments as to deserve to be placed upon the table at the approaching congress at Verona. Availing himself to the full extent of the latitude which the law permitted, Marchangy drew a fantastic picture of Carbonarism, to the mysterious influence of which he ascribed all the recent revolutionary movements in Europe. But, though he omitted neither point nor insinuation which could tell against the prisoners, his finest flights of rhetoric were reserved for the condemnation of their absent chiefs. "Those lords of the head *vendita*, those aristocrats of anarchy, who bade their subordinates go forth to tempt the hazards of an insurrection, whilst they cowered in the safe recesses of their committees." ²

¹ E. Guillon, *Complots sous la Restauration*, pp. 229-230.

Causes célèbres du XIX. siècle Procès de Bories et autres, p. 37.

² E. Guillon, *Complots sous la Restauration*, pp. 231-245.

Causes célèbres du XIX. siècle Procès de Bories et autres.

Nettement, *Histoire*, VI. pp. 171-182. Pasquier, V. pp. 431-432.

On September 5th, after an impartial summing-up by Montmerqué, the president, the jury withdrew. When they returned, after an absence of four hours, night had set in. A fitful candle-light lit up in ghastly fashion, against the dark background of the Court, the faces of the accused. Amid a breathless silence the foreman, the Baron Trouvé, an ardent Royalist and a former editor of the *Conservateur*, announced the verdict. Bories, Pommier, Goubin, and Raoulx only were declared guilty of the capital charge of conspiracy. Of the other prisoners a few were acquitted, and others were convicted on minor counts. At midnight formal sentence of death was passed upon the four sergeants.¹ Whilst the Carbonari were discussing in their lodges plans for rescuing the condemned men, it was conveyed to them that the head jailer of Bicêtre would accept a bribe of 70,000 francs, to allow the prisoners to escape. The sum demanded was raised among them. But, as their agents were in the act of paying over a first instalment of the money, they were arrested. The plot is said to have been revealed to the authorities by the prison chaplain. The whole affair, however, from its inception may very possibly have been arranged by the police. On the day fixed for their execution, the four men would have to perform that double journey, which Victor Hugo² has described so poignantly, from Bicêtre to the Conciergerie and from the Conciergerie to the Place de Grève. The *good cousins* in Paris were more numerous than the troops of the garrison. Their society had been organized with a view to fighting. Every member of it was bound to possess a musket and ammunition. The possibility of effecting the rescue of their comrades by force, at some point along the road, was considered. On September 21st, mingled with the dense crowd upon the quays and upon the Place de Grève, were many Carbonari who saw the four sergeants pass to their doom between a double rank of soldiers. They are said to have been ready for action, and to have been waiting only for a signal which never came.³

¹ Nettement, *Histoire*, VI. pp. 182-185.

E. Charavay, *Le général La Fayette*, p. 426.

Causes célèbres du XIX. siècle Procès de Bories et autres, pp. 83-85.

² V. Hugo, *Le dernier jour d'un condamné*.

³ E. Guillon, *Complots sous la Restauration*, pp. 246-249.

CHAPTER XIV

CHATEAUBRIAND'S WAR

FROM the earliest days of its formation the pre-eminence of Villèle in the new Cabinet had been admitted by his colleagues. His first step had been to withdraw the bill of censorship, which the former Government had introduced, and to bring forward in its place two laws for the better control of the newspapers. According to the first of these all offences connected with the periodical press were no longer to be referred to a jury, but were to be dealt with by the magistrates of the Royal Courts. Under the terms of the second bill these same Courts might suspend for one month any newspaper, the general tone of which was disrespectful to religion or tended to impair the King's authority or to endanger the public peace. A repetition of any of these offences was to involve the suppression of the paper altogether. In addition, when the Chambers were not sitting, a discretionary power of imposing the censorship was conceded to Ministers. But this restriction, if resorted to, was in all cases to be removed one month before the opening of the Parliament. Despite the resistance of the Liberals of all shades of opinion, both measures were carried successfully. In the Upper Chamber, where the opposition to them was very keen, the speech of Talleyrand, in which he denounced the two Government bills as a direct infraction of the Charter, proved the feature of the debate. On May 1st, directly the Budget had been voted, the King declared the session closed.¹

Hitherto every government had been obliged, at the beginning of the Session, to ask the Chambers to vote a provisional grant of supplies to meet current expenses. In order to put an end to this system, known as that of the *douzièmes provisoires*, Villèle, with the King's consent, proposed to hold two sessions and to bring forward two budgets in the course of the year.² Before the Parliament could meet again, however, the annual displacement

¹ Villèle, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 10-13.
Pasquier, V. pp. 420-423.

² Villèle, *Mémoires*, III. p. 15.

of a fifth of its members would have to take place. The *collèges d'arrondissement* were accordingly convened for May 9th, and the departmental colleges for May 16th. These elections proved less favourable to the Royalists than those of the two previous years. This was the case especially in Paris, where ten opposition candidates were successful and two ministerialists only. In the country the Eiberals were less fortunate; nevertheless, out of the eighty-six deputies returned, thirty-two belonged to their party.¹

This second Session, in which the budget for the year 1823 was voted, lasted from June 4th till August 17th. Though the business transacted was almost entirely financial, the opposition upon several occasions was enabled to subject to severe criticism the Government policy with regard to the state of affairs in Spain and to the conspirators at home. The trap which had been laid for Caron at Colmar, the decision to send him for trial before a Court Martial, and the means adopted for securing the ex-General Berton were indignantly inveighed against by Foy and Benjamin Constant.² On August 1st the publication of the *acte d'accusation*, drawn up by Mangin the *procureur général* of the Royal Court at Poitiers, against Berton and his accomplices caused an immense sensation. Five Deputies, Benjamin Constant, Foy, La Fayette, Laffitte, and Voyer d'Argenson were described as implicated in the plot. This charge, which was unfounded in respect of Foy and Constant, and, probably, also in the case of Laffitte, afforded them an opportunity of protesting violently, and of suggesting that the whole conspiracy had been contrived by the police. When the excitement was at its height La Fayette ascended the tribune. His position was very different from that of his colleagues; Mangin's allegations, untrue as far as they were concerned, were justified as regards him. Nevertheless, with an imperturbable assurance he demanded that the charges made against him should be investigated publicly. In reply Villèle contended that the enquiry, for which the Eiberals asked, was unnecessary. Amidst derisive shouts from the Left he assured the Chamber that, should the complicity of any member in the conspiracies be disclosed, proceedings against him would be instituted at once. The next day, August 3rd, M. de Saint-Aulaire, Decazes' father-in-law, moved that Mangin should be called to the bar of the Chamber to answer for his allegations against certain Deputies.³ The proposal was sup-

¹ Pasquier, V. pp. 427-428.

² Nettement, *Histoire*, VI. pp. 147-149.

³ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XI. pp. 232-255.

Nettement, *Histoire*, VI. pp. 157-166.

Pasquier, V. pp. 428-430.

ported by Royer-Collard, but on August 5th it was rejected on a division by a substantial majority.

The Government was in a difficult position with regard to these Deputies about whose complicity in the military plots there could be no moral doubt. Despite Villèle's brave words in the Chamber, he probably shrank from prosecuting them. Owing to the skilful manner in which Carbonarism had been organized, it would not have been easy to establish legally the connection between the *head vendita* and the central and ordinary lodges. The difficulty had been increased by the loyal silence generally maintained by those of the convicted Carbonari who, perhaps, might have furnished evidence against their chiefs. But had the Government been in possession of the strongest proofs of the guilt of the Deputies, it was by no means certain that a conviction would have been obtained. A decision to prosecute must have involved a state trial in the Upper Chamber. The circumspect dispositions and the Liberal leanings of many of the Peers, and, especially of those created at the instance of Décazes in 1819, rendered it improbable that they would bring in a verdict against so prominent a person as La Fayette. The result of the proceedings in the Upper Chamber, instituted by the Richelieu Government against the comparatively obscure conspirators of the *Bazar français*, was hardly of a nature to encourage the authorities to repeat the experiment.

The Royalist Government has been reproached for the number of death sentences which were carried out during the year 1822, and for its general methods in dealing with the conspiracies. Without doubt the conduct of the authorities in employing soldiers upon the most repugnant of police duties, and in publicly rewarding them for their skill as *agents provocateurs*, is deserving of the severest condemnation. On the other hand, the grave conditions prevailing at home and abroad would appear to have justified the eleven executions¹ which actually took place. It was evident that the merciful treatment, extended to the conspirators of the *Bazar français* in the previous year, had served only to encourage the disaffected to persevere with their plots. The affiliation of the French malcontents to the same secret societies which had been so prominent in the revolutions in Spain and Italy made the situation doubly dangerous. But the best excuse for the stern measures to which the Government resorted is to be found in the complete success which attended

¹ Ex-Captain Vallè, at Toulon; Sergeant Sirejean, at Tours; ex-Lieut. Colonel Caron, at Strasburg; ex-General Berton and two accomplices at Poitiers and Thouars; four Sergeants of La Rochelle, in Paris; Maillard, at Pau.

them. The execution of the four sergeants of La Rochelle was the deathblow to Carbonarism in France.

Throughout the two short Sessions of 1822, Villèle successfully contrived to prevent any serious disunion among his followers. The conspiracies themselves, and the suspicion that several prominent Liberals had been concerned in them helped to preserve the unity of the Royalist party.¹ But anxious as he was to avoid any quarrel with the "*pointus*," he was by no means disposed to comply with all their demands. He neither responded to Chateaubriand's repeated hints that La Bourdonnaye was to be placated by an embassy and a Peerage for his son, nor would he listen to Vitrolles' appeal to be readmitted to the Council of State. General Donnadieu, however, was replaced upon the active list of the army, and appointments were found for Castelbajac and other members of the group.² But in a more important direction Villèle displayed less firmness. In his anxiety to remain upon good terms with Madame du Cayla and to please Monsieur, he was easily induced to defer to the wishes of the clerical party. By the nomination, on June 5th, 1822, of Frayssinous, Bishop of Hermopolis, to the post of Grand Master of the University, a position which took the place of that of president of the commission of public instruction, all the educational establishments in France were given over to the control of an ecclesiastic.

Frayssinous held less extreme views than many of his colleagues; nevertheless, the effect of this appointment was soon felt. Before the end of the year the *École normale*, the training school for teachers and professors, had been abolished, the learned Bacy, a distinguished oriental scholar, who was suspected of Jansenist leanings, had been driven from the council of public instruction, and Guizot had been forced to discontinue his lectures on modern history. The great Royalist success at the autumn elections was followed by further concessions to the clerical party.³

Of the eighty-six Deputies returned to the Chamber in November, 1822, seven only were members of the opposition. The Liberals pretended to ascribe this result to the unfair pressure brought to bear upon the electors by the agents of the Government. It is true, probably, that the prefects to a greater extent than usual threatened public *employés* of all kinds with dis-

¹ Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. p. 246.

² Villèle, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 19-25.

Pasquier, V. pp. 468-470.

³ Le Abbé Denys, *Mémoires de l'Abbé Liautard*, p. 120.

Pasquier, V. pp. 464-465, 470.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XI. pp. 91-98.

missal should they venture to vote for an opposition candidate. It is not disputed that the secrecy of the ballot was frequently violated, in the case of minor officials, that their superiors might ascertain whether their orders had been obeyed. It is generally admitted that the voting registers were often drawn up unfairly. But, though the action of the prefects may have decided the result of a few elections, it was incapable of effecting the wholesale defeat of the candidates of the Left.¹ The true causes of the Liberal disaster lay in the conduct of certain prominent members of the party. The country was prosperous, and the people, generally, were well contented. Under these circumstances there was no disposition to sympathize with the contrivers of an abortive insurrection. The recklessness of La Fayette and his friends had completely discredited the party. Thinking men saw clearly that, despite their vaunted love of liberty, they had no compunctions about exposing their country to the hazards of a military revolution.² La Fayette's own experiences show that this was the view which was widely entertained. Though he was afterwards successful at Meaux, in his own neighbourhood, he was defeated when he presented himself to his old electors in the department of the Sarthe. Marchangy, on the other hand, who had prosecuted the sergeants of La Rochelle, and who had denounced so bitterly the instigators of their treason, was returned simultaneously by the electoral colleges of two different departments.³ The success of the Ministerial candidates throughout the country was the more remarkable, because business circles were much disturbed by the fear that the Government was about to embark upon hostilities against Spain.⁴

The Spanish revolution was brought to a successful conclusion when, on March 7th, 1820, Ferdinand VII was compelled to accept the Constitution of 1812. The outbreak began, under the leadership of Colonel Quiroga and Major Riègo, among the troops waiting to be embarked at Cadiz for the revolted colonies in South America. The tyrannical rule of the King and his *camarilla*, the disordered state of the finances, and, among the half-starved soldiers themselves, a loathing for the colonial expedition upon which they were to be employed, were the causes of the rebellion. The course of the revolution was attended with little bloodshed, and its triumph was marked, at first, by no excesses.⁵ Louis XVIII and the Duc de Richelieu, much as they

¹ Pasquier, V. pp. 466-467.

² Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. pp. 234-235.

³ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XI. pp. 376-383.

⁴ Villele, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 213, 220.

⁵ *Cambridge Modern History*, X. pp. 215-218.

deplored the event, and greatly as they apprehended the consequences which might arise from the example of a successful military revolution, were resolutely opposed to armed intervention. But the Duke had no confidence in a one-Chamber Constitution closely modelled upon that of 1791. Foreseeing difficulties, he proposed to send M. de la Tour du Pin to Madrid to suggest certain modifications of the Constitution and to act as the King's adviser. Montmorency-Laval, the French ambassador, was ill-fitted to mediate between Ferdinand and his subjects by reason of his notoriously friendly relations with the King's old counsellors. The plan was abandoned, however, in consequence of the protests of Sir Charles Stuart in Paris and of the action of Henry Wellesley at Madrid. In their eyes the mission of La Tour du Pin was but an attempt to obtain that preponderating voice in Spanish affairs which it was the British policy to oppose. The future position of the revolted Spanish colonies was already attracting the attention of European statesmen. If, as appeared probable, the mother country should prove unequal to the task of subduing them, the British Government was determined that they should not be taken possession of by any other continental Power.¹

The Tsar Alexander was filled with indignation at the course of events in Spain. His Liberal ideas, which were waning already at Aix-la-Chapelle, had received further shocks from the murder of Kotzebue and of the Duc de Berri. He now proposed a conference, and offered to place his army at the disposal of the Powers. This was a remedy which had no attractions for Metternich, who regarded the march of a Russian army through Austrian territory as an even greater evil than the triumph of the popular party in Spain. The revolution at Naples in the following July, and the imposition by the Carbonari of the Spanish Constitution upon King Ferdinand IV, was a different matter. It was a state of affairs which menaced Austrian interests in Italy, and which could not be allowed to endure. There existed, moreover, a secret clause in the treaty of June 12th, 1815, between Austria and Naples, which forbade the introduction by the Neapolitan Government of constitutional changes other than those sanctioned in the Austrian dominions.² Metternich, accordingly, proposed to intervene, and proceeded to mobilize an army. But, whilst thus purposing to make the Italian question an exclusively Austrian affair, he was anxious, at all costs, to preserve the intimate alliance of the Powers. Alarmed by the

¹ Pasquier, IV. pp. 491-495.

Crousaz-Crétet, *Richelieu*, pp. 325-386.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 388-396.

prospect that these military operations would lead to a further subjugation of Italy by Austria, Richelieu joined with Russia in pressing for a conference to consider the situation. The British policy was defined by Castlereagh in a reply to Metternich's suggestion that the Allied Sovereigns should refuse to recognize the Neapolitan Government, and should support Austria's action in overthrowing it. This attitude which he proposed that the Powers should adopt would, in his opinion, render the assembly of a conference unnecessary. But Castlereagh explained that the English Government could not enter into any hostile combination against Naples. If Austria considered that her position were injuriously affected by the changes which had taken place, she might adopt whatever measures she deemed best to protect her interests. Under these circumstances Metternich felt that he must defer to the wishes of France and Russia and agree to a conference.

In the seven months which elapsed between the opening of the conference at Troppau, on October 20th, 1820, and its dissolution at Laibach, on May 12th, 1821, Metternich scored two notable successes. As has already been related, Austrian bayonets quickly restored absolutism at Naples, and a few weeks later scattered the Piedmontese revolutionaries at Novaro. The recollection of the secret treaty of January 3rd, 1815, between England, France, and Austria, still ranked in the mind of the Tsar. Nevertheless, at Troppau, Metternich contrived to gain a complete ascendancy over him. The news which reached Alexander, as he was starting from Warsaw for the conference, that a serious revolt had broken out in one of the regiments of his Guard, made him all the more disposed to enter into the Austrian system. Metternich now assured him constantly that he regarded the Holy Alliance as the greatest conception of the century.¹ The flattered autocrat, admitting in return that many of his views had been mistaken, promised to be guided in the future by the man who had appreciated so correctly the dangerous condition of Europe. Metternich, availing himself of the Tsar's friendly dispositions, tried to instil into him a distrust of France. Paris, he maintained, must still be looked upon as the fountain from which flowed the stream of Jacobinical doctrines which threatened danger to every State. The successive French Governments since 1815 had shown a lamentable weakness in dealing with the evil. No great dependence ought, in consequence, to be placed upon her statesmen. These often repeated

¹ *Cambridge Modern History*, X. pp. 23-31.
Crousaz-Crétet, *Richelieu*, pp. 401-414, 429-448.
Pasquier, V. pp. 4-12.

words of warning were not without effect upon the mind of Alexander.

Despite Metternich's skill, the conference disclosed the existence of a serious divergence of views between the three autocratic and the two constitutional Powers. To neither the famous preliminary protocol of November 19th, 1820, nor to the principles contained in the circular despatches, issued by the three despotic Powers at the close of the proceedings on May 12th, 1821, could the assent of England and France be obtained. In these documents the doctrine was set forth into which the pious declarations of the Holy Alliance had resolved themselves. "States in which the form of Government had been altered by a revolution were to be excluded from the Alliance. . . . When such an alteration threatens the safety of any other country the erring State shall be brought back into the bosom of the Alliance by force of arms if peaceful persuasion shall have proved ineffectual."¹

The assembly of the Powers, which France had sought to bring about in order to circumscribe Austrian action in Italy, had not fulfilled the expectations of her statesmen. Though Austria had acquired no actual extension of territory, her armies were spread over the Peninsula from Piedmont to Naples. France, as a constitutional country, had deemed it wise to follow the example of England, and to be represented at the conference by Ministers without plenary powers. But, whereas England could view with comparative indifference an extension of Austrian influence in Italy, the national and dynastic policy of France was opposed to it. The situation of the two constitutional States differed in another important particular. In his instructions to his half-brother, Lord Stewart, the British Ambassador at Vienna and the representative of England at Troppau and at Raibach, Castlereagh prescribed a line of conduct without regard as to whether it might be displeasing to the autocratic sovereigns. Richelieu, however, though he was prepared only in a limited degree to adopt the views of the despotic Powers, was very anxious to avoid offending the Tsar. The impossibility of reconciling these two objects accounts, in a great measure, for the vacillating attitude of Caraman and La Ferronnays, the representatives of France. But Caraman, who was Ambassador at Vienna, had been completely subjugated by Metternich, and would disclose to him his most secret instructions.² Pasquier, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, further complains that at this time French diplomacy was equally badly served in London, where Décazes

¹ Pasquier, V. pp. 32-40, 108-134.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 20-24, 17-19, 41-46.

was a mere puppet in the hands of Castlereagh. As a result of the conference, France found herself upon less cordial terms with Russia and in no better relations with England, whilst Austria had pursued her course in spite of her.

Before the Sovereigns quitted Laibach the news arrived of the incursion into Moldavia of Prince Ypsilanti, a Greek officer in the Russian service, and of the rising against the Turks of the population of the Morea. In retaliation for the awful atrocities upon the Mussulmans perpetrated by the insurgents, Gregorios, the Patriarch of Constantinople, and two of his Bishops were hanged, by the Sultan's orders, on April 22nd, 1821. A few days later their bodies were dragged through the streets by a Jewish rabble and flung into the Bosphorus. These events sent a thrill of indignation through Russia, but at Laibach Metternich succeeded in keeping the fury of the Tsar within bounds. He contrived to persuade him that the Greek insurrection was part of the great Jacobinical plot, and was directly connected with the revolutions in Spain and Italy. Upon his return to St. Petersburg, however, he found it almost impossible to resist the general cry for war. Indeed, Nesselrode and himself were said to be the only Russians who thought of peace. The sympathy of his subjects for their co-religionists was too strong to be ignored. Alexander hesitated.¹ Count Strogonoff, the Russian Ambassador, having failed to obtain an answer to his demands for satisfaction and for guarantees that further attacks upon Christians should cease, asked for his passports, and left Constantinople with all the members of his legation. A Russian army was concentrated upon the frontier of the Principalities. War appeared to be inevitable.

In the meantime, Austria and England, to both of whom the preservation of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire was of supreme importance, strained every nerve to avert the outbreak of hostilities. In face of the attitude of these two Powers, Alexander turned to De Ferronays, the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, and explained to him that in spite of his sincere desire for peace, he foresaw that he would be driven to make war. Prussia, in that event, would be in no situation to intervene, but the hostility of Austria and England might be anticipated. The former Power, however, would remain quiet were she threatened by a French army in Italy or upon the Rhine. He proposed an alliance, which should be proclaimed publicly, and in return "let France extend her compasses between Gibraltar

¹ Crousaz-Crétet, *Richelieu*, pp. 444-448.

Pasquier, V. pp. 307-330.

Cambridge Modern History, X. pp. 30-31, 178-183.

and the Dardanelles, select any points in the Mediterranean, which she would like to possess, and he would assist her to obtain them by all means in his power.”¹

The first secretary of the legation was at once despatched to Paris with an account of this conversation. Richelieu received the news very coolly. The information which reached him from Vienna respecting the Russian mobilization hardly coincided with the warlike sentiments expressed to La Ferronnays. Nobody better than he understood the fickle character of Alexander. The Tsar was bound to the European system of Metternich by solemn promises made at Raibach. Would he be able to escape from them? Was it not more likely that he would draw back after France had committed herself? Russia had little to fear from a naval war, but French commerce was at the mercy of the English fleet. These were some of the points which Richelieu impressed upon Pasquier, who was instructed to warn La Ferronnays to exercise the utmost reserve and caution.

In October, 1821, whilst the question of peace or war in the East was still trembling in the balance, George IV, accompanied by Lord Londonderry (Castlereagh), paid a visit to Hanover. Metternich soon afterwards arrived, in compliance with the urgent request of the British Minister for Foreign Affairs. In the course of the week which they were enabled to spend together, the Eastern question was fully considered, and joint measures for preserving the peace were concerted. They had hoped that Count Lieven, the Russian Ambassador in London, who was on a visit to St. Petersburg, would have been present to join in their discussions. Though George, to facilitate the arrangement, prolonged his stay for several more days than he had intended, Lieven arrived only on the eve of his departure, and too late to take part in the deliberations. The interests of Prussia were watched by Bülow, but France was not invited to send a representative. The undermining of the influence over the Tsar of the Greek Capodistrias, undoubtedly, occupied a place in Metternich's plans for averting war.² Pasquier asserts that the two Ministers, moreover, resolved to set in motion forces at their command in the Liberal party and at the Pavillon de Marsan, in order to encompass the downfall of the Duc de Richelieu. This information, according to the same authority, was transmitted to the Foreign Office by M. de Moustier, the French Minister at Hanover, who was not only upon terms of great

¹ Pasquier, V. 333-334.

² F.O. 45 Continent, Hanover. Marquis of Londonderry (drafts) September and October, 1821.

F.O. 45 Continent, Hanover. To Marquis of Londonderry, September to November, 1821.

intimacy with Princess Metternich, but enjoyed, in addition, the confidence of her husband.¹

At a Cabinet Council in Paris on October 27th, 1821, it was decided to mobilize an army corps and a fleet at Toulon. In view of the threatening aspect of affairs, it was felt to be necessary for France to show that she was a force with which the Powers must reckon. Six weeks later, however, the Government was overthrown by the Liberal and Royalist coalition. A consummation for which, in Pasquier's opinion, the Hanover deliberations were largely responsible. The Royalist Ministry, formed on December 15th, was little inclined to show practical sympathy for the schismatic Greeks, but was strongly disposed to favour the cause of the clerical and reactionary party in Spain.²

The course of Constitutional Government in Spain had failed to fulfil the promise of its early days. The anti-clerical policy of the Cortes, the suppression of the Jesuits, and the confiscation of the property of the religious communities, ranged strong forces upon the side of reaction. Moreover, the Assembly itself was soon dominated by the power of the Clubs, the patriotic and the political societies framed upon French revolutionary models. The insurrection of the troops at Cadiz and in other towns had been prepared in the masonic lodges, which were numerous all over the country. But after the successful termination of the rebellion, Riègo and the extreme Liberals founded a new society. The *Communeros*, as they were called, were organized in imitation of Freemasons, though they were opposed to their aims and objects. The moderate Liberals, under the name of *afrancesados*, also formed themselves into a league. Towards the year 1822, some members of this party, who desired the reform of the Constitution, enrolled themselves in a secret society, and became known as the *anilleros*, from the ring which was their symbol. With the arrival of many fugitives from Italy, and, later on, from France, Carbonari lodges sprang into existence. In the *cafés* and public places the fiery rhetoric of the Club orators, and the *tragala*,³ a song of the character of the *Ça ira*, recalled in

¹ Pasquier, V. pp. 348-354.

² Viel Castel, *Histoire*, X. pp. 298-302.

³ *Tragala*—Swallow it, i.e., the Constitution.

“Swallow it
Thou slave,
Thou who lovest not
The Constitution;
They say that the King loves not
Free men,
Let him go
To rule over slaves,
Swallow it,
Swallow it” etc., etc.

ominous fashion the scenes in revolutionary Paris thirty years earlier.¹

The quarrels of the Liberals were the King's opportunity. He had accepted the Constitution only because the defection of the army deprived him of all means of resisting its imposition. But he never ceased to intrigue against it, and to implore secretly the Powers to come to his assistance. In the autumn of 1820, he made an unconstitutional attempt to remove the captain-general of Madrid, and to nominate a reactionary general, Carvajal, in his place. He was forced to annul the appointment, however, and, upon his first appearance in public, was grossly insulted by the mob. In the meantime, the clergy resisted the execution of the ecclesiastical laws, and armed bands of absolutists began to appear in Catalonia and Navarre. The disturbances became more serious the following year. At Madrid, on May 4th, 1821, Vinuesa, a priest, who had been sentenced to the galleys for participation in a counter-revolutionary plot, was dragged from prison and despatched by the mob with hammers. In Spain these instruments were to acquire the sinister reputation which in Paris had been associated with *la lanterne*.² To add to the distracted state of the country, a formidable outbreak of yellow fever spread from the coast into the interior. The French Government, in consequence, forbade all communication with Spain, and, to enforce their regulation, established military posts along the whole length of the frontier—the famous *cordon sanitaire*, which was soon to be used for another purpose. By the end of the year 1821, the guerilla operations of the bands in the North had assumed the dimensions of a civil war, carried out with equal barbarity by both sides.³

No sooner was it formed than the Royalist Government had to consider the disturbed state of affairs upon the southern frontiers. When hard pressed the combatants of the Army of the Faith, as the Spanish absolutists were called, would take refuge upon French territory. Villèle himself favoured the continuance of the policy of the Duc de Richelieu, and advocated an attitude of strict neutrality.⁴ Mathieu de Montmorency, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, was an active member of the Congregation, and a man of almost fanatical religious convictions. Louis, with his usual good sense, had foreseen the difficulties which his appointment might create, and had consented to it only with reluctance.

¹ *Cambridge Modern History*, X. pp. 214-224.

² Pasquier, V. pp. 281-291.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 300-301.

⁴ Madame de Boigne, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 100-109.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, X. p. 394.

Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. p. 249.

Montmorency now urged upon his colleagues the necessity of supporting the Spanish absolutists, and suggested that arms and money should be secretly conveyed to them. It was explained to him that, so long as the King maintained his ambassador at Madrid, it would be inconsistent with his honour and his dignity to adopt such a course.¹ Nevertheless, when soon afterwards a consignment of war material for the Spanish guerillas was seized by the French authorities upon the frontier, its despatch was found to have been connived at both by Montmorency and by Franchet, the director of the police and a former prefect of the Congregation. The matter would appear to have been hushed up, however, upon Montmorency promising not to repeat his offence.² As the summer went on the situation in Spain increased in seriousness. The absolutists seized the town of La Seo de Urgel, in Catalonia, where they established a "Supreme Regency of Spain, during the captivity of Ferdinand VII." On July 7th, four battalions of Guards attempted an insurrection, but were beaten off by the National Militia and by the townspeople of Madrid.³ Though the King declined to attempt to save the lives of the men implicated in this affair, there can be little doubt that he secretly encouraged them. In consequence of these events the Ambassadors of France, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, considering, or pretending to consider, that Ferdinand's life was in danger, intimated to the Government that "the relations of Spain with all Europe would depend upon the treatment of his Catholic Majesty and his family."⁴

Upon the fall of the Richelieu Ministry, Décazes had retired from the Embassy in London, and had been succeeded by Chateaubriand. The great writer made no secret of the joy which he experienced in thus revisiting, as the Ambassador of the Most Christian King, the city in which he had wandered hungry and half clad in the days of the emigration. His memoirs, however, afford evidence that this pleasure was short-lived. His vanity was flattered by an invitation to Royal Lodge, and by an evening spent with George IV and Lady Cunningham. But this visit evoked also the philosophical reflection that the position of a Royal mistress was no longer what it had been. At Almack's he found amusement only in a study of the dandies. After a short experience of London life, he declared that the galleys were to be preferred to it. When they separated at Laibach, the

¹ Villèle, *Mémoires*, II. p. 477.

² *Ibid.*, III. p. 33.

Nettement, *Histoire*, VI. pp. 226-229.

³ Pasquier, V. pp. 439-441.

Cambridge Modern History, X. p. 225.

⁴ Nettement, *Histoire*, VIII. pp. 125-128.

Sovereigns had decided to meet again in the following year, either at Florence or Verona. Chateaubriand was anxious above all things to represent his country at the approaching Congress. He constantly expressed this wish in his letters to Villèle and to Montmorency.¹ It has been suggested that he was actuated by no deeper motive than a desire to escape from London for a time.²

Chateaubriand has never been regarded as a practical statesman, either by his contemporaries or by posterity. His childish vanity and his readiness to take offence were alone sufficient to unfit him for the conduct of public affairs. But his letters and his despatches, both from Berlin and from London, prove that he could often discern correctly the trend of national aspirations. As a devoted Royalist he saw with grief and apprehension that the Bourbons had failed to acquire the affections of the people. In his opinion the success of the great Revolution had been due to the unpopularity of the Monarchy, which had fallen in public esteem owing to the military disasters of the eighteenth century. The iron rule of Bonaparte had been borne because his victories flattered the national vanity. From this he deduced that his countrymen cared nothing for freedom, and much for military glory.³ As a patriotic Frenchman, moreover, Chateaubriand resented the diplomatic rebuffs of the past two years, and chafed at the secondary position to which he considered that his country had been relegated. If France was to be respected she must show that she was strong. Londonderry had told him plainly that the French Government could not assemble an army without danger. But he disbelieved him. At the first note of war the *émigré* and the Bonapartist would forget their differences. Once unfurled upon the battlefield, the Bourbon flag would be national.⁴

It was not till the end of August that Chateaubriand received the welcome news that he, Caraman, and La Ferronnays were to proceed as Ministers Plenipotentiary to the Congress. "The Kings assemble in Italy, Lord Londonderry cuts his throat in London, and we start for Verona."⁵ With these words he exultingly sets forth the story of how the Spanish war was brought about. It had been arranged that a preliminary conference should be held at Vienna before the opening of the Congress.

¹ Chateaubriand, *Mémoires*, nouvelle édition, IV. pp. 239-240, 244-245, 250, 257-258, 267.

Pasquier, V. pp. 444-445.

Mme. de Boigne, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 97-98.

Villèle, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 27-29, 30-31, 33-34.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XI. pp. 423-430.

² Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. pp. 250-251.

³ Chateaubriand, *Congrès de Verone*, I. pp. 100-101.

⁴ Chateaubriand, *Mémoires*, nouvelle édition, IV. p. 236.

⁵ Chateaubriand, *Congrès de Verone*, I. p. 64.

On August 31st, Montmorency started from Paris for the Austrian capital. His instructions prescribed that he was to go to Verona only should the Duke of Wellington, who was to take the place of Lord Londonderry, proceed there. The Congress would be concerned with Eastern, Italian, and Spanish affairs, besides minor points connected with piracy and the slave trade. British and Austrian diplomacy had been successful in averting any immediate danger of Russian intervention in the Greek insurrection. Capodistrias had been dismissed, and Nesselrode, with whom Metternich had a good understanding, was to accompany Alexander to Vienna. Under these circumstances it was probable that the Eastern difficulty would be kept in the background. As regards Italy, the only important question to be settled was the duration of the Austrian occupation of the States which had risen in rebellion. Spanish affairs, however, were more complicated, and it was soon evident that their adjustment would occupy most of the sittings of the Congress.¹

Both the King and Villèle had grave misgivings as to the wisdom of allowing Montmorency to proceed to Vienna. Before he started, Louis informed him that he proposed to raise Villèle to the position of President of the Council. The news dispelled his hopes that the post would be reserved for him, and it was not without some secret satisfaction that the King imparted it to him. In writing to his colleague, to express his disapprobation, Montmorency insisted that the appointment could properly be conferred only upon a Peer. "Pitt himself had never been President of the Council," he adduced as an argument in support of his contention. The statement, though correct, was without bearing upon the case, and showed merely that he was ignorant of the constitution of the English Cabinet.²

Montmorency's instructions, though not very precise, laid down clearly enough the general principles which were to guide his conduct at Vienna. He was to beware of making the Spanish question unnecessarily prominent. He was to intimate that France was well prepared to safeguard her own interests and to protect her frontiers. Were the question to be raised of the passage of any foreign army through French territory, he was to declare unhesitatingly that it could not be entertained. Under no circumstances was he to commit himself beyond enquiring what the attitude of the Powers would be, should the French Government be forced to declare war upon Spain. Montmorency was no match for the astute diplomatists assembled at

¹ Chateaubriand, *Congrès de Verone*, 1. p. 74.

² Villèle, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 50-52.

C. Rousset, *Le Marquis de Clermont-Tonnerre*, pp. 215-216, 219-220.

Vienna, who were not long in ascertaining that he was in favour of intervention.¹ They were satisfied, however, that Villèle held the contrary opinion, and the news that he had been created President of the Council strengthened the impression that the peace party would prevail. The pacific intentions ascribed to the French Government met with Metternich's secret approval. He had no wish to further the development of French influence beyond the Pyrenees. But the determination of the Tsar and his Ministers, Nesselrode, Pozzo di Borgo, and Tatischeff, to overthrow the new Spanish *régime* placed him in a difficult position. The principle that all Governments bred of a revolution must be destroyed was the basis of his system. He was averse to explaining to Alexander his reasons for not wishing to apply it to Spain. He was reduced, in consequence, to creating obstacles to the policy of intervention. To the Tsar he expressed doubts as to whether the French army, tainted as it was with Jacobinical doctrines, was a proper instrument to employ against a successful revolution. Alexander, however, announced that under these circumstances he must arrange for the passage of a Russian army through Germany. This was a solution of the question which Metternich could not entertain. But, as he preferred not to object to it himself, he insinuated to Montmorency that the Tsar's proposals might be inspired by sinister designs against France. Alexander was hurt that his disinterested offers of assistance should excite alarm; nevertheless, he promised Montmorency and La Ferronnays that he should defer scrupulously to the wishes of the French Government in the matter.²

In the meantime, no basis for negotiation upon Spanish affairs could be found, and the Sovereigns were impatient to leave Vienna. The absence of the Duke of Wellington, whose departure from England had been delayed by illness, rendered impossible any final arrangement. In consequence of his state of health Wellington reached Paris only on September 20th. In so far as Spain was concerned, his instructions from Canning, who had succeeded Londonderry at the Foreign Office, prescribed "a rigid abstinence from interference in the affairs of that country." As regards her revolted colonies, he was to intimate that the question of the recognition of their independence *de jure* would call for decision before long. In Paris Wellington had an interview with Louis, and discussed the situation at length with Villèle. The result of their conversation

¹ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XI. pp. 437-445.
Pasquier, V. pp. 442-443.

² Villèle, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 78-92.
Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XI. pp. 447-449.

was satisfactory to both statesmen. Wellington carried away with him a very favourable impression of Villèle's abilities, and the conviction that his intentions were sincerely pacific. At the same time Villèle's resolve to resist the growing demand of his party for intervention was fortified by the knowledge that the British Plenipotentiary was instructed to press upon the Powers the expediency of leaving Spain to herself. His hopes, moreover, that the general situation in that country would improve were strengthened by the information that Sir William A'Court was to be despatched to Madrid to advise the Spanish Government to consent to certain necessary modifications of the Constitution.¹

When Wellington reached Vienna in the last days of September, both the Tsar and the King of Prussia were upon the point of starting upon a visit to the King of Bavaria. The Duke had an interview with Alexander, who expressed to him his determination to overthrow the revolutionary *régime* in Spain. It was decided, however, that more formal discussions upon the subject should be reserved for Verona. Wellington, accordingly, prepared to proceed there, and Montmorency, having acquainted Villèle with the Duke's intention, was instructed to follow his example.² Never since the Congress of Vienna had so many crowned heads been gathered together in the same town. The Emperors of Russia and Austria, the Kings of Prussia, Sardinia, and Naples, the Grand Duke of Tuscany, the Duke of Modena, the Empress of Austria, Marie Louise, the reigning Duchess of Parma and ex-Empress of the French, the Queen of Sardinia and her daughters, besides innumerable courtiers, secretaries, diplomatists, and ministers assembled at Verona during the first three weeks of October.³ On the 14th, preceding Montmorency by two days,⁴ Chateaubriand arrived. He brought with him instructions, in which were repeated in more precise terms the injunctions already given to Montmorency. Above all things, the French plenipotentiaries were to avoid figuring before the Congress in the character of reporters (*rapporteurs*) upon Spanish affairs.⁵

At the suggestion of Metternich it was decided to precede the formal sittings of the Congress by confidential discussions between the chief plenipotentiaries. On October 20th, accordingly,

¹ *Despatches and Correspondence of Duke of Wellington*, I. pp. 284-294, Wellington to Canning, September 21st, 1822.

Villèle, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 59-68.

Pasquier, V. pp. 445-446.

² *Despatches and Correspondence of Duke of Wellington*, I. pp. 319-322, 343-348. Wellington to Canning, Vienna, October 4th, 1822.

³ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XI. pp. 467-471.

⁴ Chateaubriand, *Congrès de Verone*, I. pp. 102-104.

⁵ Villèle, *Mémoires*, III. p. 105.

Montmorency, Wellington, Nesselrode, and Bernstorff met at Metternich's house. Montmorency opened the proceedings by reading out a memorandum upon Spanish affairs. The uncompromising attitude adopted by the Government at Madrid, and the provocative acts directed against France made the continued maintenance of peace improbable. Under the circumstances, therefore, he wished to know (1) Whether, in the event of the King of France deciding to recall his Ambassador from Madrid, the allied Powers would pursue the same course? (2) Should war ensue between France and Spain, what moral support would the Sovereigns be prepared to offer her? (3) Could France count upon material assistance should she be compelled to ask for it? Montmorency's communication was received with approval, alone Wellington by his silence signified his disapprobation.¹

In thus denouncing Spain to the Powers, Montmorency was exceeding the spirit of his instructions. His action would appear to have been taken without previous consultation with Chateaubriand or the other French plenipotentiaries. The announcement in the *Moniteur* of October 1st that the no longer required *cordon sanitaire* would be converted into an army of observation upon the Spanish frontier, may have encouraged him to hope that more warlike counsels prevailed in Paris. Doubtless, also, he knew that his party was striving to drive the Government into war.² But, under any circumstances, his view of the situation was so opposed to that of Villèle, that it must have been almost impossible for him to have conformed to the true meaning of his instructions. Villèle was desirous, above all things, of making the Spanish question exclusively the affair of France. It must be for her alone to judge of the necessity for war, and to decide when her armies should advance. She must not lay herself open to the imputation of having embarked upon hostilities at the bidding of the Holy Alliance. Montmorency, however, like many of his party, believed that the best interests of the Church, the Bourbon Monarchy, and the aristocracy would be served by the destruction of the anti-clerical and revolutionary *régime* at Madrid. He was comparatively indifferent as to the means whereby that end could be attained. It was not in his philosophy to understand the national policy of Villèle.³

The answers to Montmorency's questions were not delivered as

¹ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XI. pp. 470-480.

Despatches and Correspondence of Duke of Wellington, I. pp. 403-404.

Villèle, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 138-144.

² *Despatches and Correspondence of Duke of Wellington*, I. pp. 407-408, C. Stuart Canning.

Chateaubriand, *Congrès de Verone*, I. pp. 104-113.

³ La Rochefoucauld, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 76-82.

quickly as he had expected. The Tsar and his Ministers alone displayed any enthusiasm. Alexander at once declared that he would march 150,000 men into Piedmont, to be ready to protect France, should the Jacobins take advantage of the absence of her army, or to embark at Genoa were their presence in Spain to become necessary. Montmorency, at first, would appear to have seen little to object to in this plan. Wellington and Metternich, however, convinced him that it would be highly injurious to French interests, and, in consequence of their representations, he induced Alexander to abandon its execution for the present.¹ On October 31st, at the first formal meeting of the Congress, the answers of the four Courts, which had been the subject of much confidential discussion, were read out by Metternich. As regards their Ministers at Madrid, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, would act in the same manner as France. They would tender her the moral support for which she asked. Material assistance would be given, but the nature of it and the mode of giving it would require to be specified by treaty. Wellington's reply was of a different kind. On behalf of Great Britain he stated that, "having no knowledge of the cause of dispute, he could give no answer to any of the questions."²

The next few days were spent in futile attempts to bring Wellington into line with the continental Powers, and in discussing the mode in which the decisions of the Sovereigns should be signified to the Spanish Government. These delays exasperated Alexander, who was, besides, deeply annoyed at the attitude of Great Britain. On November 8th he informed Montmorency that he fully intended to break off diplomatic relations with Spain, should no satisfactory reply be returned to the note which his Ambassador was to present at Madrid.³ The same day Montmorency would appear to have assembled the French plenipotentiaries, and to have asked for their opinions upon the situation. Both La Ferronnays and Chateaubriand expressed themselves in favour of intervention, the last-named declaring emphatically that Villèle would be powerless to resist the unanimous demand of his party for war. Caraman, on the other hand, dissented mildly from the views of his colleagues. The details of this conference were kept strictly secret, and no account of them seems to have been transmitted to Villèle.⁴

¹ *Despatches and Correspondence of Duke of Wellington*, I. pp. 457-460. Villèle, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 141-166.

² *Despatches and Correspondence of Duke of Wellington*, I. pp. 496-505. Villèle, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 177-182.

³ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XI. pp. 502-503.

⁴ Pasquier, V. p. 458.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XI. pp. 506-508.

During the remainder of his stay at Verona, Montmorency was occupied in preparing, in conjunction with the Ministers of Russia, Austria, and Prussia, the despatches which were to be sent to the Ambassadors of the four Courts at Madrid. They were to be instructed to ask for their passports should satisfaction to their demands be refused. In addition, a treaty was drawn up, under the terms of which assistance was promised to France, should she require it. All these matters were finally settled at the formal sittings of the Congress on November 9th, 18th, and 19th, at none of which, however, would the Duke of Wellington consent to be present.¹ On November 21st Montmorency started for Paris armed with the *procès verbal* defining the *casus fœderis*, and with copies of the instructions which the three continental Sovereigns proposed to send to their representatives at Madrid. He was not without misgivings that the King would decline to ratify the measures to which he had given his assent.²

Whilst Montmorency was upon his return journey, a report reached Paris from La Garde, the Ambassador at Madrid, that Great Britain was upon the point of concluding a treaty with Spain. Villèle at once instructed Marcellus, the *chargé d'affaires* in London, to ask Canning for an explanation. In forwarding a copy of his despatch to the French plenipotentiaries at Verona, he apprised them that, if the facts were as stated, the matter must be regarded as so unfriendly an act as to constitute a case for war. They were to ascertain, in consequence, what support France might expect to receive from the Powers. The storm was dispelled, however, by the prompt denial of Mr. Canning that any treaty existed with, or had been proposed to Spain. "It would appear as though your affairs were managed by cornets of Hussars," was Metternich's comment to La Ferronnays, upon receipt of Wellington's assurance that the French Government had been misinformed. During this month of November the situation of the Spanish Royalists underwent a serious change for the worse. Mina, the celebrated partizan chief of the War of Independence, routed the Army of the Faith, and forced the militant absolutists and the Regents of Urgel to take refuge upon French territory.³

Villèle greeted Montmorency upon his arrival with the news

¹ Villèle, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 194-208.

Despatches and Correspondence of Duke of Wellington, I. pp. 555-557. Wellington to Canning, 19 November, 1822, pp. 557-559. Memorandum by Duke of Wellington.

² Villèle, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 222-230.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 240-247.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XI. pp. 550-553.

that the King had been pleased to reward his services with a dukedom. But when he heard a full account of the final measures which had been concerted at Verona, he made no secret of his extreme dissatisfaction. The notes of the three autocratic Sovereigns contained positive demands for the abolition of the Spanish Constitution. The Government at Madrid could adopt no other course than to refuse to comply with them, and a rupture of diplomatic relations would be inevitable. Montmorency, subject to the King's approval, had undertaken that France should send a similar note, and should give like instructions to her Minister at Madrid. But were she to break off official intercourse with her neighbour, the step could be followed only by a declaration of war. The initiative, however, would not have been hers, the conflict would have been forced upon her by the Powers of the Holy Alliance.¹ Villèle's objections to Montmorency's plan were not shared by all the members of the Government. Rumours were noised abroad of serious dissensions in the Cabinet. The Royalist papers furiously attacked the President of the Council. The friends of Monsieur supported Montmorency. On the other hand, strange to say, the party behind Madame du Cayla inclined rather to the side of Villèle. At a Cabinet Council on December 5th his will prevailed. The plenipotentiaries at Verona were instructed to request that the despatch of the notes of the three Powers should be postponed.²

When Montmorency left Verona, La Ferronnays and Caraman agreed to consider Chateaubriand as the chief French plenipotentiary. It was one of the ironies of the situation that Villèle should have imagined that by sending him to the Congress he had imposed a salutary check upon Montmorency's too warlike inclinations.³ Upon his arrival at Verona he was generally regarded as Villèle's representative. Metternich, moreover, suspected him of Liberal leanings, and laughingly declared that his pockets overflowed with paper constitutions, whilst Alexander eyed him askance as a mischievous supporter of the freedom of the press. It was reserved, however, for the Empress of Austria to inflict upon him the worst affront. He, a French Minister Plenipotentiary, overheard himself described by her as "M. de Chateaubriand, the author." In consequence of these slights, he maintained during the first six weeks of his stay at Verona an attitude of sulky reserve. But, after the departure of Montmorency, Metternich sought him out, and addressed him always

¹ Pasquier, V. pp. 455-456.

² La Rochefoucauld, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 81-83.

Villèle, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 270-273.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XI. pp. 600-604.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 436-437.

in the most flattering terms. The Tsar also began to take more notice of him. Chateaubriand was easily mollified, and could, moreover, truthfully assure the autocrat that he was a determined champion of the policy of intervention.¹

In his own account of his proceedings Chateaubriand takes a childish pride in insisting upon the skill with which he deceived the President of the Council. As early as October 31st he had falsely stated in a letter to Villèle that the continental Powers, one and all, were resolved upon hostilities with Spain. He admits that he constantly minimized the dangers of a campaign in the Peninsula in order to lure him into war. On December 11th, when he received directions from Paris to ask that the despatch of the notes of the three Powers might be delayed, the Congress was engaged with Italian affairs.² In writing to Villèle the following day Chateaubriand informed him of his prompt return to Paris, and of the unalterable determination of the three Powers to send off their instructions to Madrid.³ Metternich by this time was reconciled to the idea of French intervention in Spain. He would appear to have reasoned that if the Spanish revolutionary Government were not overthrown, the Tsar, in his disappointment, would interfere actively in Eastern affairs. Of two evils, accordingly, he chose the lesser one. It was desirable, however, to deprive France of the initiative in the affair. Provided that she could be made to appear to have acted only in compliance with the will of the Allied Powers, she could acquire little prestige from her military operations.⁴

Upon his journey home Wellington made a second stay in Paris. He was instructed by Canning to offer the mediation of Great Britain in the quarrel between France and Spain. From his conversations with M. de Villèle the Duke gathered the impression that the chief obstacle to a peaceful settlement lay in the difficulty in which the Government was placed, of arresting its military preparations whilst its demand were still unsatisfied. But a slight modification of the Spanish Constitution, which should have the appearance of having been made in a conciliatory spirit, would suffice to enable Villèle to break up the army of observation. On December 20th, when he set out for England, Wellington was full of hope that British diplomacy would prove equal to

¹ Chateaubriand, *Le Congrès de Verone*, I. pp. 214-224.

Pasquier, V. pp. 454-458.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XI. pp. 474-475.

² Chateaubriand, *Le Congrès de Verone*, I. p. 173.

Villèle, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 169, 230-235.

³ *Ibid.*, II. pp. 265-266.

⁴ *Despatches and Correspondence of Duke of Wellington*, I. pp. 555-557.

Villèle, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 258-260.

extracting the required concessions from the Spanish Government.¹

The return of Chateaubriand and the news that the three Powers would persist in their policy towards Spain, intensified the difference of opinion which existed between Villèle and Montmorency. The President of the Council was prepared to sanction the despatch of a strongly worded note to Madrid, but upon the distinct understanding that the withdrawal of the Ministers of the three Powers should not entail the recall of the French Ambassador. Montmorency, however, contended that he had pledged himself at the Congress that France would follow the example of her Allies. Both Ministers attended the Council on December 25th with their resignations written out. The King declared himself in agreement with Villèle. Montmorency accordingly handed in his portfolio, and retired from the Cabinet.² His last official act was to acquaint the Duke of Wellington that his offer of mediation must be declined.³

Pending the appointment of Montmorency's successor, Villèle assumed the direction of Foreign Affairs. He at once sent off a despatch to La Garde, at Madrid, which he was instructed to communicate to San Miguel, the Spanish Foreign Minister. The language used by Villèle was moderate in tone, but his note none the less contained a distinct menace. The Spanish Government was given to understand clearly that His Majesty had no present intention of withdrawing his troops from the frontier. Moreover, unless the situation were to improve, he would be compelled to recall his legation, and "to resort to more efficacious measures for obtaining guarantees." The majority of the Royalists were very displeased at Montmorency's retirement. Villèle could not afford to ignore their sentiments. In order to placate his party, he had no scruples about violating diplomatic usages by publishing his despatch in the *Moniteur*, before its contents should have been made known to the Spanish Government. It was not sufficient, however, to show that he intended to deal firmly with the Spanish question; a successor to Montmorency must be found of whom the Royalists would approve. In addition, Villèle was anxious that the Powers should not see in the appointment of the new Minister any indication of an intention to abandon the line of policy which the French plenipotentiaries had followed

¹ *Despatches and Correspondence of Duke of Wellington*, I. pp. 625-628, 659-660.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XII. p. 8.

² Villèle, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 272-277.

La Rochefoucauld, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 85-86.

³ *Despatches and Correspondence of Duke of Wellington*, I. p. 667.
Montmorency to Duke of Wellington, 24 December, 1822.

at Verona. M. de Chateaubriand appeared to be pre-eminently qualified to fulfil both conditions. He was a distinguished and popular member of the Royalist party, and had represented his country at the Congress. Villèle, besides, had every reason to suppose that he held moderate views upon Spanish affairs.¹

Whilst the struggle was raging between Villèle and Montmorency, Chateaubriand had kept in the background as much as possible. He had long coveted the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs, but when it was offered to him he went through the form of declining it. He feared that his party would look upon his conduct unfavourably, were he to take Montmorency's place, and then adopt the very policy which had brought about his friend's retirement. Nevertheless, during the next twenty-four hours he went through an agony of apprehension lest his decision should be regarded as irrevocable. But on December 27th he was sent for by the King, and was enabled to inform Villèle that he would accept office in deference to His Majesty's desire.²

Chateaubriand was condemned to inaction in his new position, until it should be known in what spirit the Spanish Government would receive Villèle's communication of December 25th. On January 16th San Miguel's reply reached Paris. La Garde, in transmitting it, announced that the Russian, Austrian, and Prussian Ambassadors had asked for their passports, and were preparing to quit Madrid. The Spanish Minister's answer, couched in firm and dignified language, conveyed his unalterable resolve to brook no foreign interference in internal affairs. A Cabinet Council was convened for the 18th to consider the next move of the French Government. Information had been received that British diplomacy was making a last effort to avert hostilities. Fitzroy Somerset, whose eminent services in the Peninsular War entitled him to a position in the eyes of Spanish patriots second only to that of Wellington, had been despatched to counsel the Government at Madrid to adopt a more conciliatory attitude. In view of the possibility of his mission accomplishing the desired result, Villèle recommended strongly that no final step should be taken for the present. But he stood alone in his opinion. Chateaubriand, throwing off the mask, urged the immediate recall of the French Ambassador. Villèle was powerless

¹ Pasquier, V. pp. 460-461.

Villèle, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 278-279.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XII. pp. 18-19.

² Chateaubriand, *Congrès de Verone*, I. pp. 235-240.

Pasquier, V. pp. 462-463.

Villèle, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 283-286.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XII. pp. 20-29.

La Rochefoucauld, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 87-90.

to resist this unanimous demand for war. That same day Chateaubriand instructed La Garde to ask for his papers and to leave Madrid.¹

On January 28th, 1823, the Chambers met. The King's speech dispelled the last hopes of the peace party. In a voice weak from ill-health, but which was perfectly distinct, Louis made his momentous announcement: "I have tried to assure the security of my people and to save Spain herself from the worst of misfortunes. All my efforts have been blindly repulsed. I have ordered the recall of my Ambassador. A hundred thousand Frenchmen, commanded by a Prince of my own family, by one whom my heart delights to regard as my son, are ready to march, invoking the God of Saint Louis to preserve the throne of Spain for a grandson of Henri IV." His Majesty's last words were drowned by the frenzied cheers of the Royalists, who had begun to manifest their delight so soon as the recall of the French Minister had been announced.²

In the country generally the war was exceedingly unpopular. Upon the last two occasions upon which it had been attempted, intervention in Spain had been attended with disastrous consequences. The *rente*, which had been steadily declining for the past two months, fell another three francs to seventy-six, upon the King's speech. The fear was entertained not only that the campaign might prove long and costly, but that serious complications with England might ensue. Apprehensions upon this score, however, were to some extent allayed by the pacific character of King George IV's speech at the opening of Parliament on February 4th.³ To the Liberals the idea of armed intervention in Spain, for the purpose of restoring absolutism and clericalism, was profoundly distasteful. This feeling was reflected in the language of the opposition speakers in both Chambers in the debate upon the address.

On February 10th Villèle asked for an extraordinary grant of one hundred million francs for military purposes. On the 24th, Martignac, the reporter of the committee, presented conclusions favourable to the adoption of the proposal, and the general discussion began. As had been the case in the debate upon the reply to the King's speech, the Government was attacked from two different quarters. The Liberals denounced intervention as a monstrous attempt to destroy the independence of a nation, and accused Ministers of carrying out submissively the behests of the allied Sovereigns. La Bourdonnaye and the *pointus*, on the other

¹ Pasquier, V. pp. 464, 472-480.

² Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XII. pp. 75-77.

³ M. B. Copefigue, *Récit des opérations*, Paris, 1823, pp. 25-26.

hand, though they announced that they should not refuse to vote supplies, censured Villèle for his lukewarm support of the great principles of the Holy Alliance. Chateaubriand's first appearance in the tribune of the Lower Chamber was awaited eagerly. The arguments which he adduced to justify an attack upon Spain were weak, but they were clothed in the striking language of which he was a master. He confidently asserted that the advantages of the war would far outbalance the risks which it must entail. France would regain her high place among the nations, and her children would be reconciled in the camps of her armies. "The King has entrusted his flag to captains who have triumphed under different colours. They will show it the road to victory; it has never strayed from the path of honour."¹ As Chateaubriand concluded, the enthusiasm of the Royalists broke loose. The cheers and applause continued long after he had returned to his seat, where he was overwhelmed with the congratulations of his friends.

After one or two unimportant members had spoken, Manuel ascended the tribune—Manuel, the incarnation of the Revolution, whose participation could not be doubted in all the treason of the past four years. A quiver of indignation thrilled the crowded benches of the Right. The Royalists with few exceptions had suffered cruelly in their families and in their fortunes during the emigration. The prospect of war with Jacobins and revolutionaries aroused their fiercest passions. They were not men to be insensible to the intoxicating influence of power. As though unconscious of the angry faces round him, Manuel proceeded to unfold his arguments. The advocates of intervention would do well to be careful. The Stuarts, he contended, had met their fate because they had invoked the assistance of the foreigner against their own people. Regardless of the rising storm of protests, he compared the situation of Ferdinand to that of Louis XVI. "The dangers which threatened the Royal Family became serious only when revolutionary France was compelled to defend herself by other means . . ." A howl of fury drowned the words which followed. The Royalists, wildly gesticulating, sprang to their feet. "He is defending the regicides," "Turn him out," "Drag him from the tribune,"² and other cries assailed him. In despair of restoring order, Ravez, the President, suspended the sitting for an hour. But when business

¹ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XII. pp. 118-127, 158-164, 168-196.

Pasquier, V. pp. 487-489.

Nettement, *Histoire*, VI. pp. 411-412.

² Pasquier, V. pp. 489-491.

Nettement, *Histoire*, VI. pp. 413-418.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XII. pp. 197-211.

was resumed, Manuel was still refused a hearing. Finally, amidst the general uproar, the President adjourned the Chamber.

The next day, February 27th, La Bourdonnaye moved that M. Manuel, the member for La Vendée, should be expelled the Chamber. In the course of the discussion which followed, he was heard in his own defence. His attitude of insolent defiance drove the Royalists to madness. A committee was appointed to consider La Bourdonnaye's motion. With a cynical disregard for the ordinary rules of justice, only the most extreme Royalists were elected to serve upon it. La Bourdonnaye himself, moreover, was chosen for the office of reporter. On the 1st of March he announced to the chamber that his Committee had concluded unanimously in favour of Manuel's expulsion. The next three days were occupied with the general discussion of the proposal. It was a remarkable feature of the affair that no Minister spoke during the whole course of the proceedings.¹ The leadership of the party would appear to have passed to La Bourdonnaye, for the time being. The Royalists listened with impatience to the impassioned protests of Foy and other Liberals. But the efforts of Royer-Collard² to recall them to reason were not altogether fruitless. The famous Doctrinaire was heard always to the best advantage when the debate involved a question of principles. Violence, he admitted, was a factor which could not be ignored in politics. When the people attempted it, it was known as an insurrection. When Governments employed it against a foreign State, it was called intervention. When it was resorted to against the people, it was spoken of as a *coup d'Etat*. That was the name which should be applied to the measure which they were asked to adopt against M. Manuel. Starting from this premise, he argued that the whole system of representative government would be rendered impossible were parliamentary majorities thus to abuse their power. Hyde de Neuville was a fiery Ultra-Royalist, but he was not deaf to reason. He proposed, accordingly, an amendment whereby suspension for the remainder of the Session was to be substituted for expulsion. Thus modified, La Bourdonnaye's motion was carried.³

The next day, March 5th, Manuel resumed his place in the Chamber. As he refused to obey the President's order to withdraw, a detachment of the National Guard was sent for, and the officer in command was instructed to remove him. Amidst intense excitement the citizen soldiers marched in. Foy and La Fayette

¹ Pasquier, V. pp. 491-492.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XII. pp. 213-223.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 248-253.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 253-254, 260-262.

harangued them. A sergeant, a linen-draper named Mercier, when ordered to lay hands upon Manuel, declined to obey. "The National Guard has covered itself with glory," roared La Fayette, whilst the Left applauded loudly. Their triumph was of brief duration.¹ Silently a troop of regular soldiers—*gendarmes*—surrounded the Liberal benches. When his men were in position, Colonel the Vicomte de Foucault three times summoned Manuel to leave his seat. Finding that words were of no avail, he bade a sergeant and two men eject him. Seizing Manuel by the collar, they hustled him out of the building. The Left rose in a body and followed him. Later on the party resolved to attend no further sittings of the Chamber during the Session, as a protest against the act of violence committed upon one of their number.²

The comparative indifference with which the public heard of these proceedings well exemplifies the small respect which was entertained for the Parliamentary system. Some half-hearted attempts to riot were made outside the Chamber. For a short time the picture of Mercier, who had been dismissed from his legion of the National Guard, was exhibited in the shop windows. Crowds, for a few nights, assembled to cheer round Manuel's house. The expelled member and the insubordinate linen-draper, however, were popular heroes, rather because they had defied authority than for any other reason. Neither the arbitrary manner in which a chosen representative of the people had been treated, nor the invasion of the Chamber by an armed force, evoked any deep feeling of national indignation.³

On the day after the meeting of the Chambers the list was published of the generals and officers who were to be employed with the army of operations. The supreme command of the expedition was assigned to the Duc d'Angoulême. The four *corps d'armées* and the *corps de reserve* into which the field force of 100,000 men was divided, were commanded respectively by Oudinot, Molitor, Hohenlohe, Moncey, and Bourdesoulle. The honoured names of d'Autichamp and La Rochejacquelein figured, among the generals to command divisions, alongside those of Canuel and Donnadieu.⁴ The Royalists had little fault to find with the majority of the officers selected. Alone the appointment of General Guilleminot to the post of Chief of the Staff met with their disapproval. The Duc d'Angoulême at this time rather affected Liberal opinions, and would sometimes shock his inti-

¹ Pasquier, V. pp. 493-494.

² Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XII. pp. 264-275.

³ Pasquier, V. pp. 494-495.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XII. pp. 275-277.

Nettement, *Histoire*, IV. pp. 440-441.

⁴ M. B. Capestre, *Récit des opérations*, Paris, 1823, pp. 44-45.

mates by declaring that he liked Décazes and detested the old nobility. Guilleminot was a very capable officer with considerable experience of staff duties. To the Duke, who did not wish to be overshadowed by a Marshal of European reputation, his comparative obscurity was a further recommendation. The Royalists, however, were not inclined to forget that he had served upon the Headquarter Staff at Waterloo. Their candidate was the Duc de Bellune, the Minister for War, and an intrigue was set on foot to substitute him for Guilleminot.¹

In the meantime, the revolutionaries in France were not idle. The concentration of a large army at the foot of the Pyrennees was an opportunity not to be missed for bringing about a general rising of the troops—a *Quirogade*, as it was called at the time. To prepare the ground treasonable manifestos and seditious pamphlets were circulated in the cantonments. Copies of the song, in which Béranger was not ashamed to invite the soldiers “to face about,” were distributed freely.² The proclamation of Paul Louis Courier, skilfully designed to appeal to the feelings of the rank and file, was surreptitiously introduced into the camps. “Soldiers,” it ran, “you are about to enter Spain to restore the old *régime*. But, my friends, do you know of what the old *régime* consists? It means taxation for the people and black bread and the lash for the soldier. The lash and black bread, that is the old *régime*, so far as you are concerned. . . . Soldiers, march on, and when you have won the victory, the nobles will be promoted, and you will get the stick. . . . Go on, enter Spain, drums beating, at the bidding of the foreign Powers. . . . Hurrah for the lash, long live the stick; no advancement for the rank and file, promotion only for the nobles. When the expedition is over you will receive in full the arrears of floggings due to you since 1789.”³

Spain, at this time, was the favourite place of refuge for the Italian and French Carbonari. The police reported that, not only were many of those who had fled to England setting out for Spanish ports, but that suspicious characters were leaving Paris for the southern frontier. The ex-Colonel Fabvier was the most active organizer of the attempt which it was proposed to make

¹ Camille Rousset, *Le Marquis de Clermont-Tonnerre*, pp. 259–261. Pasquier, V. 482, 496–498.

² Thureau Dangin, *Le parti libéral*, pp. 178–182.

E. Guillon, *Complots sous la Restauration*, pp. 269–271, 280.

“Brav’ soldats v’là l’ord’ du jour,

Point de victoire,

Ou n’y a point de gloire.

Brav’ soldats v’là l’ord’ du jour,

Gard à vous! Demi-tour.”

³ Thureau Dangin, *Le parti libéral*, p. 180.

to seduce from their allegiance the troops composing the army of invasion. He was not only in close communication with his fellow-conspirators in Spain, but is said to have established secret relations with certain senior officers of the Duc d'Angoulême's army. The statement has been denied that disaffection existed in high places.¹ It is a fact, nevertheless, that Fabvier was able to remain for a fortnight, unmolested at a village in the very centre of the French cantonments. At a later date, Armand Carrel, who was actively concerned in this treason, wrote some instructive remarks about the affair. It was a delusion, he says, to have supposed that the moment was ripe for a *pronunciamento*. The soldier was not discontented. Few, moreover, among the rank and file had served under the Empire. The young officers were eager to take part in a campaign and to obtain promotion. Most of the seniors had experienced, at some time or another, the straitened circumstances incidental to half-pay, and had no thoughts beyond "the daily bread attaching to their epaulettes." Old generals of the Republic and the Empire would talk of the white flag and Henri IV with the enthusiasm of former *émigrés* of ancient lineage.²

On March 15th, the Duc d'Angoulême left Paris for the army. No sooner had he started than steps were taken to replace Guilleminot, his Chief of the Staff, by Marshal Victor, Duc de Bellune, the Minister of War. Villèle rightly regarded the Marshal as an inefficient administrator, and was dissatisfied with his preparations for the campaign. Bellune had served in Spain, and was anxious to be appointed to the field army. By gratifying his desire, Villèle saw his way to ridding his Cabinet of a useless member, and to pleasing his party. Accordingly, he obtained the King's sanction to Bellune's appointment as Chief of the Staff to the army of operations, and to the transference of the portfolio of War to General Digeon, during the Marshal's absence. He was determined, however, to prevent if possible Bellune's resumption of his Ministerial duties at the close of the campaign.³ The Duc d'Angoulême, once confronted with the accomplished fact, would offer, Villèle appears to have hoped, no serious objections to Guilleminot's supersession. There was, however, a darker side to the intrigue, of which the President of the Council may have been ignorant. In order to ensure the Duke's consent to the proposed substitution, the idea was conceived of discrediting General Guilleminot. There can be little doubt as to the quarter from which these crafty counsels were inspired. To

¹ E. Guillon, *Complots sous la Restauration*, pp. 227-281.

² Thureau Dangin, *Le parti libéral*, p. 184.

³ Pasquier, V. pp. 500-502.

carry out the plan successfully, the active co-operation of high police officials was required. Both Franchet, the director, and Davau, the prefect of police, were zealous members of the famous Jesuitical institution, the Congregation of the Rue du Bac.¹

Some time about the middle of March a large trunk was transmitted from Paris to Bayonne, addressed to Captain de Lostende, aide-de-camp to General Guilleminot. The *diligence* which conveyed it carried also several persons upon whom the police had set a watch. At a few hours' distance from Paris these men were arrested, and the luggage and the effects of the travellers were examined. The box addressed to Lostende was opened, and in it were discovered four suits of uniform, with Imperial buttons, eagles, and other suspicious objects. Orders to arrest Lostende and to send him to Paris were despatched to Bayonne. Pasquier asserts that he can positively affirm that this whole affair had been organized by the police, and he mentions the names of the two commissaries and their subordinate agent who were actually concerned in it.² Villèle wrote, at once, to the Duc d'Angoulême, who was inspecting at Toulouse, to inform him that, in consequence of what had taken place, the Cabinet, with the King's approval, had resolved to replace Guilleminot by the Duc de Bellune. That officer, however, was not to regard his supersession as an imputation upon his character. His removal had been decided upon only because it was felt that the suspicion attaching to his aide-de-camp would render impossible his position as Chief of the Staff.³

The Duc d'Angoulême's force of character had been underestimated. He curtly replied to Villèle that he was proceeding to Bayonne to enquire into matters, and that sooner than consent to the unfair treatment of one of his officers, he should resign the command of the army. His firm attitude at once put an end to the intrigue. Bellune's appointment was cancelled, and the Duke was urged to open the campaign with as little delay as possible.⁴ Upon his arrival at the army headquarters at Bayonne, on March 30th, His Royal Highness found everything in disorder. The Duc de Bellune had arrived with a letter of service appointing him Chief of the Staff. Guilleminot was indignant at his supersession and at the arrest of his aide-de-camp.⁵

¹ C. Rousset, *Le Marquis de Clermont-Tonnerre*, pp. 226-227.

Madame de Boigne, *Mémoires*, III. p. 116.

² Pasquier, V. pp. 502-503.

E. Guillon, *Complots sous la Restauration*, pp. 232-234.

³ Villèle, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 289-291.

⁴ *Ibid.*, III. pp. 293-294.

⁵ On April 20th the examining magistrate dismissed the charge against Lostende, who resumed his duties upon the staff with a step in rank. In the following October a person named Vieux, who may have been a secret

Reports poured in from corps commanders of a total lack of transport and stores of all kinds. The Duke at once informed Bellune that he should not recognize his appointment until an answer to his representations upon the subject should have been received from Paris.¹ In the meantime every effort must be made to place the army in a position to begin the campaign. With regard to the inadequacy of the preparations, for which his department was responsible, Bellune could only say that his orders had not been carried out. At this juncture Ouvrard, the speculator and the famous army contractor of the Napoleonic wars, appeared upon the scene. For some time past this remarkable man had turned his attention to Spanish affairs. He had constituted himself the banker of the Regency of Urgel, and had visited Verona to try to induce the Powers to guarantee a loan to the Spanish absolutists. His secret means of intelligence had satisfied him that the arrangements of the war department, for beginning the campaign at the end of March, would break down, and he had laid his plans accordingly.²

Ouvrard now undertook to furnish the army with everything required for an immediate advance, and to continue punctually to supply its wants during the campaign in Spain. He stipulated, however, that his estimated expenses should be paid to him in advance at the beginning of each month, and that the whole of the stores accumulated in the magazines upon the frontier should be placed at his disposal. The efforts of the revolutionaries to tamper with the fidelity of the troops would be thwarted effectually by a rapid forward movement. To the Duc d'Angoulême and to Guilleminot it appeared that only by placing themselves in Ouvrard's hands could their difficulties be surmounted.³ On April 5th his terms were accepted. It was a curious feature of the affair that the agreement was signed by Victor Ouvrard, the contractor's nephew. This formality was rendered necessary by the fact that the man who undertook to supply the French army was an undischarged bankrupt. All difficulties now disappeared as if by magic. On the morning of April 7th the advanced guards crossed the Bidassoa, and in the evening the Duc d'Angoulême's headquarters were established upon Spanish territory.⁴

agent of the police, was sentenced, *par contumace*, to two years' imprisonment for sending off the box to Lostende.

¹ Villèle, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 295, 296-300, 303-308.

² *Despatches and Correspondence of Duke of Wellington*, I. p. 612.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XI. pp. 558-560.

Pasquier, V. pp. 498-499.

Madame de Boigne, *Mémoires*, III. p. 115.

³ Villèle, *Mémoires*, III. p. 324.

⁴ Pasquier, V. pp. 504-505.

On the day preceding the general advance of the army an affair of considerable political significance took place in the outpost line. A band of about one hundred and fifty revolutionaries, under the ex-Colonel Fabvier, mostly men who like himself had been concerned in the military plots, appeared upon the left bank of the Bidassoa. They were dressed in the uniform of *chasseurs* and grenadiers of the old Imperial Guard, and one of them carried the tricolour. At the point at which they showed themselves, a French regiment of infantry and a battery of artillery had been posted to defend the passage of the river, which was fordable at low tide. The revolutionaries shouted to their compatriots upon the right bank, waved their flag, and sang the *Marseillaise*. The news of what was occurring brought to the spot General Vallin, the brigadier, a soldier of Waterloo. After a brief moment of hesitation, he ordered the guns to open fire. At the second discharge the flag-bearer was killed and others of the band were struck down. Before an infantry detachment could cross the river to attack them, Fabvier's people had fled,¹ leaving some twelve of their number lying dead or badly wounded upon the ground. The significance of the event was fully realized in Paris. Upon his return, General Vallin was thanked by the King in person for his "whiff of grape-shot" upon the banks of the Bidassoa. Before the campaign had begun, the chief object of the war had been attained. French soldiers, commanded by a Waterloo officer, had fired upon the tricolour.²

In a country admirably adapted to guerilla operations, a form of warfare in which the Spaniards excelled, the resistance of the people was more to be dreaded than that of the regular army. The anarchy which had resulted from the proclamation of the Constitution had alienated the sympathies of that large section of the educated and well-to-do classes which, in the first instance, had welcomed the revolution. The people were not interested in political questions, but they listened to their priests, who, with few exceptions, were the sworn friends of absolute monarchy. The Liberals realized, without doubt, that they had the support only of a minority of the population. They seem to have assumed, however, that the same methods would prevail in the Royal as in the French Imperial armies. They hoped, in consequence, that the irritation set up by high-handed exactions, and the unrestrained marauding of the invaders would bring the people to their side. The Duc d'Angoulême and General Guilleminot appear to have understood the situation.³ By their actions, and

¹ E. Guillon, *Complots sous la Restauration*, pp. 286-291. Villèle, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 317-319.

² Thureau Dangin, *Le parti libéral*, pp. 183, 186-187.

³ Villèle, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 291-293.

by their proclamations they made it clear that they intended not to make war upon the Spanish people, but to overthrow a faction.

The favourable terms which Ouvrard obtained, and the suspicion that certain officers had an interest in recommending their adoption, were to furnish the opposition with a weapon with which to attack the Government. Villèle, however, though he loyally refused to shelter himself behind the Duc d'Angoulême, always disapproved of the arrangement. The predicament has been explained in which the Duke and his staff were placed owing to the insufficient preparations of the war department. Under these circumstances the propriety of entering into such an agreement with a man of Ouvrard's reputation must be judged mainly by the result. If this criterion be accepted then the Duke and his advisers must be held to have acted wisely. Ouvrard loyally carried out his part of the bargain. During the march of the army from the Pyrenees to Cadiz, men and horses were in all respects abundantly supplied, and strict discipline was maintained.¹ At the news, which Ouvrard's agents disseminated throughout the country, that food and provender, promptly delivered, would be generously paid for on the spot, farmers and peasants flocked to the French camps with provisions of every kind.² In the towns, the invaders were received with enthusiasm, and acclaimed as deliverers. When the columns entered the defiles of the Somma Sierra, veterans saw only a few shepherds gazing at them with indifference, where in 1808 riflemen had contested every yard of the ascent.³

On May 23rd, the Duc d'Angoulême entered Madrid, and received an enthusiastic welcome from the inhabitants. The Cortes, before the French armies crossed the frontier, had compelled Ferdinand to follow them to Seville. Whilst a strong French column was sent in pursuit, operations were prosecuted vigorously against Morillo, in Galicia, Ballasteros, in Andalusia, and Mina, in Catalonia. By the Duke's wish a Council of Regency was set up in Madrid, the five members of it, with the Duc de l'Infantado as President, being chosen by the Grand Councils of Castille and of the Indies. So soon as this had been accomplished, M. de Talaru was accredited to the new government as Ambassador, and the three continental Powers likewise sent their repre-

¹ Villele, *Mémoires*, III. p. 316.

Camille Rousset, *Le Marquis de Clermont-Tonnerre*, pp. 279-282.

Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. p. 287.

Chateaubriand, *Congrès de Verone*, I. p. 391.

² G. J. Ouvrard, *Mémoires*, I. pp. 309-313.

Pasquier, V. pp. 507-510.

³ G. J. Ouvrard, *Mémoires*, II. p. 70.

sentatives.¹ The Duc d'Angoulême had entered Spain without definite instructions as to the *régime* he was to establish in the place of the one he was to overthrow. He was reluctant that absolute power should be conferred again upon Ferdinand, but further than this he would not appear to have held very decided views. Once the Regency had been set up, however, he found that the direction of affairs had passed from his hands completely. All the acts of the Cortes, since 1820, were declared null and void, and an era of violent reaction was inaugurated. Hundreds of Constitutionalists were cast into prison, and outrages of every description were perpetrated.² The Ministers of the three Powers, in their anxiety to counteract French influence, secretly encouraged the Regents to disregard the Duke's counsels of moderation. It is by no means certain, indeed, that Talaru, an Ultra-Royalist, supported him very loyally.³

Upon the approach of the French the Cortes fled from Seville to Cadiz, dragging along with them the indignant Ferdinand. In consequence of his refusals to accompany them they declared him deposed until he should arrive at Cadiz, and appointed a Council of Regency for the duration of the journey. As a protest against this action upon the part of the Cortes, Sir William A'Court, who had hitherto remained with Ferdinand, withdrew to Gibraltar. Continuing the pursuit, General Bourdesoulle arrived outside Cadiz on June 24th, and a strict blockade of the town, both by sea and land, was established. Ouvrard, who had shown great ability in negotiations of the kind, was empowered to buy the King's release from the members of the Cortes. It was soon evident, however, that this could be effected only by force. The Duc d'Angoulême, accordingly, was instructed from Paris to press the siege vigorously. In the meantime, the French were practically complete masters of the country. Morillo capitulated in Galicia, on July 10th, and Ballastros, in Andalusia, was preparing to follow his example. Alone, Mina, in Catalonia, continued to baffle Marshal Moncey.⁴ In the last days of July, the Duc d'Angoulême, with reinforcements for the blockading army, set out for Cadiz. His last illusions were gone as to the possibility of improving the condition of Spain. France would have to be satisfied with possessing once again an army.⁵

¹ The correspondence between the Duc d'Angoulême and Villèle is contained in the latter half of Vol. III. and in Vol. IV. of Villèle's *Mémoires*.

² Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XII. pp. 530-609.

Pasquier, V. pp. 511-512.

³ Nettement, *Histoire*, VI. pp. 542-543.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 523-524.

Cambridge Modern History, X. pp. 227-228.

⁵ Villèle, *Mémoires*, IV. pp. 279-282.

Discouraged as he was, the Duke made a last attempt at Andujar, half-way between Madrid and Cadiz, to put an end to anarchy, and to restrain within bounds the fury of the absolutists. On August 8th, he issued the document which was to be known as the proclamation of Andujar. In future, the Spanish authorities were to make no arrests without the permission of the French military commanders, who were instructed to release all persons who had been imprisoned without cause. In addition, a strict supervision was to be exercised over journalists and newspapers. This announcement was received with indignation by the Regents, and their protests were supported by the Ministers of the three Powers. In Paris, the Royalists were equally enraged, and their newspapers strongly condemned the proclamation. In face of this chorus of disapproval from his party, Villèle was constrained to inform the Duke that the King and his Ministers considered that his action was a violation of his promise not to interfere in internal affairs. He was compelled, in consequence of this remonstrance, to communicate fresh instructions to his lieutenants, which reduced to a dead letter his merciful enactment of August 8th. In setting up the Regency, the Duke had made a grievous mistake. Once established, he was obliged, not only to sit helpless whilst measures of which he disapproved were put into execution, but the imposition of conditions upon Ferdinand after his release were rendered doubly difficult.¹

Upon the Duc d'Angoulême's arrival outside Cadiz, on August 16th, it was decided to direct operations against the fortified isthmus, known as the Trocadero, which protected the inner harbour. In addition to its other defences, a cutting eighty yards broad had been made, in which the water was nearly five feet deep, even at low tide. On August 19th, the first approaches were dug, and on the 24th the second parallel was established within fifty yards of the cutting. On the 30th, the isthmus was heavily bombarded. The cessation of the fire in the afternoon, however, was construed as a victory by the besieged. That night the town was illuminated, and the success was celebrated by balls and festivities. But whilst the Spaniards were dancing, French columns were moving silently to their prescribed stations. At half-past two, at low tide, the signal was given. Wading through the cutting, under a heavy fire, the French bore down all opposition. By nine o'clock the isthmus and the forts were in

¹ Pasquier, V. pp. 516-520.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XII. pp. 612-624.

Nettement, *Histoire*, VI. pp. 548-553.

G. J. Ouvrard, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 159-160, 178-180.

their possession.¹ In the foremost ranks of the assailants the tall figure had been conspicuous of Carlo Alberto, the future King of Sardinia, a volunteer in the service of France. Thus he made his *amende honorable* to the Powers for his Liberalism at Turin two years before. But it was with no thought of politics that a deputation of private soldiers waited upon him, when the fight was over, to present him with the woollen epaulettes of a comrade who had fallen, and to proclaim him a grenadier of France.²

The loss of the Trocadero and a growing spirit of disaffection among their troops warned the Cortes that the end was approaching. On September 3rd, General Alava, who had attempted to enter into negotiations with the Duc d'Angoulême, was informed that Ferdinand must be set at liberty before any proposals for a cessation of hostilities could be entertained.³ The French commander likewise declined to accept the proffered mediation of Sir William A'Court.⁴ In other parts of the country the cause of the Constitutionalists fared no better. Pampeluna capitulated to Lauriston, and Mina's bands were broken up. Quiroga fled to England, and Riègo, whose followers had been dispersed, was dragged into the camp of General Latour-Foissac by the peasantry. He was claimed, however, by the Regency, upon the plea that he had not been captured by French troops. To accede to this demand was to consign him to certain death. But the Duc d'Angoulême, after ascertaining the views of his Government upon the subject, felt constrained to consent to transfer him to the Spanish authorities.⁵

In the meantime, the siege of Cadiz was pushed on vigorously. On September 20th, the fort of Santi-Petri capitulated after a bombardment of two hours from the fleet. The ships could now close in and rain shells into the town. The Duke, it was evident, was preparing to deliver the final assault. On the 28th the Cortes met, voted the restoration of absolute power to Ferdinand, and declared him free to proceed to the French headquarters to negotiate the surrender of Cadiz. The King prepared to set out at once, but his departure was opposed by the National Militia, who demanded from him the promise of a general pardon and of other concessions. Their attitude was so menacing that he deemed it expedient to issue a proclamation, according to which, "of his own free will, and upon his Royal word," he undertook

¹ Viel Castel, XII. pp. 628-632.

² M. B. Capefigue, *Récit des opérations*, Paris, 1823, p. 235.

³ Villèle, *Mémoires*, IV. p. 365.

Ibid., pp. 334-335, 381.

⁵ Nettement, *Histoire*, VI. p. 503.

Villèle, *Mémoires*, IV. p. 423.

to give the required assurances.¹ On October 1st, Ferdinand, accompanied by his Queen and by the other members of his family, went on board the Royal barge in triumph to the thunder of a salute from all the guns of the fortress. Upon his arrival at the French headquarters "a splendid spectacle was witnessed at the extremity of Europe. A grandson of Louis XIV dropped upon one knee and offered his sword to another grandson of the great King."²

The next day, at a private interview, the Duc d'Angoulême sought to convince Ferdinand of the necessity of consenting to certain needful reforms. The result of his conversation confirmed his gloomiest anticipations. Shouts of "Long live our absolute King!" from the rabble under the windows gave Ferdinand an excuse for talking about "bowing to the will of his people."³ Two days later, on October 4th, he made manifest the worthlessness of his promises at Cadiz. By a Royal Proclamation he confirmed all the acts of the Regency, and added to them still harsher decrees against supporters of the Constitution.⁴ His confessor, Saez, he placed at the head of his Ministry, and established *juntas de la fé*, councils with objects corresponding to those of the Inquisition. Utterly disgusted, the Duc d'Angoulême was anxious only to shake the dust of Spain from his feet as quickly as possible. Already, before the fall of Cadiz, he had resigned to Talara the entire management of political affairs.⁵ It had been decided to leave behind an army of 33,000 men to occupy Madrid, Cadiz, and other towns of importance. So soon as arrangements had been concluded in connection with these matters, he set out upon his homeward journey. To Ferdinand's offer to bestow upon him the title of Prince of the Trocadero, he returned a cold refusal.⁶ After a brief stay at Madrid, which he quitted before the King's state entry, the Duke started for the French frontier on November 4th. Three days after his departure Riègo was hanged upon gallows fifty feet high, to the savage delight of the people, who less than a year before had worshipped him as a hero.⁷

¹ Villèle, *Mémoires*, IV. pp. 406, 413.

Nettement, *Histoire*, VI. pp. 562, 564-565.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XII. pp. 648-655.

² Chateaubriand, *Congrès de Vérone*, I. p. 398.

³ Villèle, *Mémoires*, IV. p. 438.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XII. pp. 650-658.

⁴ *Cambridge Modern History*, X. p. 229.

⁵ Villèle, *Mémoires*, IV. p. 382.

⁶ *Ibid.*, IV. p. 460.

⁷ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XII. pp. 663-664.

E. Guillon, *Complots sous la Restauration*, p. 319.

CHAPTER XV

LA CHAMBRE RETROUVÉE

ON December 2nd the Duc d'Angoulême, at the head of a detachment of his troops, entered Paris and was accorded an enthusiastic welcome. The Government was anxious to render as imposing as possible this return home of the victorious Royal army. Ceremonies, however, were never to the Duke's taste and, in this instance, he conceived that the circumstances hardly justified the magnitude of the preparations. "*Ils nous font faire une fameuse don quichotterie,*" he exclaimed in disgust to his staff as he mounted his horse at the Porte Maillot.¹

French intervention had not improved the condition of Spain. It had substituted merely the contemptible despotism of Ferdinand for the anarchical *régime* of the Cortes. Already it was plain that France would derive no material advantages from the war. Despite the blood and treasure which she had expended, no increase of influence in the Peninsula was to accrue to her. Nor were her dreams to be fulfilled of acquiring dominions beyond the seas. Canning was preparing to recognize the independence of the revolted Spanish colonies, and to make good his words that, if France had Spain, it should be "Spain without the Indies." Moreover, President Monroe was about to issue the famous message which was to become the cornerstone of his country's policy, and was to shatter Chateaubriand's hopes of founding a Bourbon Monarchy upon the continent of South America.²

But, if France gained no national benefits from her action against Spain, the war was productive of important results from a dynastic point of view. The Bourbons proved to the world at large and to the disaffected at home that they possessed an army, upon the fidelity of which they could depend.³ The last hopes of the Liberals of overturning the Monarchy by a military revolution

¹ Pasquier, V. p. 536.

² Monroe's Message to Congress, December 2nd, 1823.

Chateaubriand, *Congrès de Verone*, I. p. 358; II. pp. 251, 304, 425-426.

³ Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. pp. 257-258.

vanished in the smoke of Vallin's guns upon the Bidassoa. This good effect, however, was to be neutralized by the folly of the Royalists themselves. Provided only that the soldiers were upon their side, they believed that they could impose their will upon their countrymen. Henceforward, strong in the conviction that the forces of the revolution were spent, they were to drive Villèle along the path of reaction with consequences fatal to the *régime*.

The recollection of Bellune's attempt to substitute himself for Guilleminot as Chief of the Staff rankled in the mind of the Duc d'Angoulême. Upon several occasions there had been friction between the headquarters of the army of operations and the department of war. Before the close of the campaign the Duke in his displeasure announced that, sooner than meet the Marshal, he should not return to Paris. The resignation of the Minister of War had been obtained, accordingly, upon October 18th. It was a measure of which Villèle personally approved, but he knew that it must bring down upon him the displeasure of his party. On account of the many *coteries*, the sympathies and prejudices of which had to be considered, the selection of his successor was not an easy matter. Choice was made finally of the Baron de Damas,¹ who was in command of a division of the expeditionary force. Chateaubriand appears to have advocated his appointment, under the impression that the Duc d'Angoulême would be gratified by the selection of one of his officers. His expectations, however, were falsified by the event. The Duke was astounded, and made no secret of his displeasure at the elevation of a man who was in no way qualified for ministerial rank.² Chateaubriand, at this time, was very anxious to remove any soreness which His Royal Highness might feel at having been compelled to modify the proclamation of Andujar. But all his attempts to enter into private communication with him were repulsed, and the Duke informed Villèle that he had no intention of embarking upon a correspondence with anyone except him.³

Chateaubriand's prodigious conceit was increased by the success of the Spanish adventure. Villèle, who must have regretted bitterly having admitted him into the Cabinet, kept a watchful eye upon him. Notwithstanding that Lalot and La Bourdonnaye were now his declared enemies, Chateaubriand, who was upon very friendly terms with them, was striving to bring them into the Government. Villèle had grave doubts,

¹ Villèle, *Mémoires*, IV. pp. 465.

La Rochefoucauld, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 98-99.

² Villèle, *Mémoires*, IV. pp. 505, 510-512.

Pasquier, V. pp. 534-536.

³ Villèle, *Mémoires*, IV. pp. 479-480.

indeed, whether his gifted colleague was not scheming to supplant him altogether, and was not proposing to assume the direction of affairs. His suspicions upon this point may possibly have been justified. A man who could write seriously that he had done in six months what Napoleon had failed to accomplish in six years, might very well aspire to supersede M. de Villèle.¹ The relations of the two Ministers were further embittered by considerations of personal jealousy. Chateaubriand and Montmorency, but not the President of the Council, were decorated by the Tsar. The ribbon of the Russian order was blue, a circumstance which intensified Villèle's irritation, as it gave to his colleague the appearance of having been invested with the *ordon bleu*. Louis appears to have shared the indignation of his First Minister, and, to console him, created him a Knight of the Holy Ghost. Chateaubriand thereupon complained so loudly that, on January 7th, he also received the coveted distinction.²

In another direction Villèle had to combat an intrigue. Lauriston, the Minister of the King's Household, stood high in Madame du Cayla's estimation by reason of the readiness with which he disbursed the sums required for the presents which Louis not unfrequently made her.³ To the general indignation he was created a Marshal of France, and sent to the seat of war in command of the second *corps de reserve*. Upon the fall of Bellune, Sosthènes de La Rochefoucauld and the favourite conceived the plan of transferring Lauriston to the War Office, and of replacing him, as Minister of the Household, by Sosthènes' father, the Duc de Doudeauville. At the same time the King was to be induced to dismiss Corbière, and to transmit to Sosthènes himself the portfolio of the Home Department. The sands of Louis' life were running out rapidly. At all hours he would sink into a heavy sleep from which it was impossible to rouse him. Villèle, nevertheless, contrived to persuade him of the unwisdom of such a step, and, by explaining to Madame du Cayla that he should oppose her plan with all his power, succeeded in inducing her to abandon it.⁴

Though the war had not fulfilled the expectations of the Government in all respects, its success, from a purely military point of view, was regarded by the public as a brilliant vindication of the Ministerial policy. The gloomy predictions of the Liberals

¹ Chateaubriand, *Mémoires*, nouvelle édition, IV. p. 285.

² Pasquier, V. pp. 546-547.

Nettement, *Histoire*, VI. pp. 582-585.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 538.

Madame de Boigne, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 135-137.

⁴ La Rochefoucauld, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 112-116.

Nettement, *Histoire*, VI. pp. 580-583.

were scornfully derided now that events had falsified them so completely. Popular opinion was entirely upon the side of the triumphant Royalists. It was Villèle's opportunity for carrying out those measures which his party had so much at heart. In the first instance he proposed to abolish the system of an annual displacement of a fifth of the Chamber and to bring in a Septennial Act. Though Chateaubriand spoke in favour of quinquennial parliaments, and Clermont-Tonnerre had doubts about the wisdom of increasing the power of the elective assembly, Villèle easily induced the Cabinet to adopt his views. It was decided that the existing Chamber should be dissolved, and that a general election should take place. No anxiety, it was agreed, need be entertained as to the result, the moment was singularly favourable for an appeal to the country.¹

On December 25th the Chamber was dissolved by a Royal Ordinance, and February 25th and March 6th, 1824, were named for the meeting of the electoral colleges. The Royalist victory was overwhelming. Nineteen Liberals only were returned. Prominent members of the party, such as La Fayette, Voyer d'Argenson, Dupont, Chauvelin, Georges de La Fayette, and Saint-Aulaire were defeated, whilst Manuel was not even brought forward as a candidate.² When the Chambers met, on March 23rd, the Lower House presented a strange appearance. Many of the Royalists, unable to find accommodation upon the benches of the Right, were driven to migrate to the Left, and to occupy the empty seats of their former opponents. The Liberal rout, however, as Villèle foresaw, constituted a danger by reason of its very completeness. He would have seen gladly the opposition more numerous. "Strong, it would have held us together; weak, it will divide us," were his words to Frénilly.³

The chief measures of legislation for consideration during the coming Session were made known in the King's speech. Bills were to be brought in to remodel the system of renewing the Chamber, and to reduce the interest of the public debt, an operation which was "to close the last wounds of the Revolution." The announcement contained in this sentence was eagerly awaited. It meant that the Government proposed to indemnify the *émigrés* for their confiscated estates. Villèle, realizing the inexpediency of raising by taxation the sum required for this purpose, now saw his way to obtaining it without imposing fresh burdens upon the people. Despite the war, the finances

¹ C. Rousset, *Le Marquis de Clermont-Tonnerre*, p. 231.

Nettement, *Histoire*, VI. p. 598-601.

Frénilly, *Souvenirs*, pp. 482-483.

² Thureau Dangin, *Le parti libéral*, pp. 187-189.

³ Frénilly, *Souvenirs*, pp. 488-499.

of the State were in a prosperous condition.¹ On March 5th, 1824, the Government 5 per cent stock stood at 104. On April 5th Villèle introduced a bill to reduce the interest upon it from 5 to 4 per cent. Holders of stock were to have the choice of being bought out at par or of receiving 3 per cent bonds at 75 francs, which was the equivalent of converting 5 into 4 per cent.²

Throughout the country, but especially in Paris, where the *rente* was chiefly held, the bill was very unpopular. At the time comparatively few people could realize that the measure was sound and proper. The right of the State to reduce its liabilities would scarcely appear to have been admitted. The most ignorant, however, could understand that any income which they derived from investments in Government stock was to be lessened. Women of all classes, notes Villèle, were especially exasperated. In the upper ranks of society they talked of putting down their carriages or of sending away their cooks, whilst those in a lower station of life indignantly protested against any diminution of the fruits of their hardly earned savings. No language was too strong to condemn the Minister who had conceived so monstrous a plan.³

The Liberals were not slow to utilize for their own ends the unpopularity of the new law. Besides criticizing adversely the proposed conversion itself, the fact was emphasized that this contemplated spoliation of the stockholders was to be carried out for the benefit of the survivors of a privileged aristocracy.⁴ The general discussion began on April 24th and on May 4th the bill was passed in the Lower Chamber by 238 votes to 145.⁵ This large number of blackballs, deposited in the ballot box, far surpassed expectations. The Royalist opposition, the counter-opposition, as it was called, was gaining strength. La Bourdonnaye, the leader of this group, and Casimir Perier, one of the few survivors of the Liberal disaster at the elections, had been the most determined opponents to the proposed law. Villèle at once carried his bill up to the Peers, who, after an animated debate, lasting from May 24th to June 3rd, threw it out by a majority of thirty-four.

Notwithstanding that the bench of Bishops had been strengthened since Villèle had assumed office, and that twenty-seven new Peers had been created by the ordinance which dissolved the elective assembly, the spirit of the Upper Chamber was very

¹ Villèle, *Mémoires*, V. p. 15.

² Pasquier, V. pp. 550-553.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VII. pp. 24-27.

³ Villèle, *Mémoires*, V. pp. 8-9.

⁴ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XIII. pp. 197-198.

⁵ Villèle, *Mémoires*, V. pp. 16-20.

different from that of the Lower House.¹ A considerable number of the Peers were former generals and officials of the Empire. Men such as Pasquier or Mollien who, though strong Constitutional Royalists, had no sympathy with the pretensions of the *émigré* party. The Deputies had been elected under the influence of the revulsion of feeling which had swept over the country at the conclusion of the Spanish war. The overwhelming Royalist majority in the Lower House was the reflection merely of this fleeting burst of sentiment.² Without doubt the Hereditary Chamber represented far more accurately the real opinion of the best part of the nation. Personal considerations, however, were responsible mainly for the attitude adopted by the members of the two Chambers towards the proposed conversion of the *rente*. The majority of the Deputies were landed proprietors, few of them were holders of stock. Most of them, moreover, belonged to old aristocratic families and hoped to receive compensation for the property confiscated under the emigration laws. Many Peers had forfeited their estates during the Revolution, but the fortunes of a very large number of them were invested in Government securities. Nearly all of them, besides, lived in Paris,³ and were, in consequence, more directly influenced by the general outcry against the proposed reduction of interest.

In Villèle's opinion two intrigues were largely responsible for the rejection of his bill. The clerical section of the party wished to see Montmorency once again a member of the Government. Villèle, in fact, was given to understand clearly that most of the opposition would cease were a seat in the Cabinet to be found for the former Minister for Foreign Affairs.⁴ The behaviour of Chateaubriand was a more serious matter. When the measure was under discussion round the Council table he displayed no hostility to it. In society he affected always a lofty disregard for financial matters. Villèle, nevertheless, felt sure that he was working against him. During the most critical period of the debate in the Chamber of Peers he maintained a suspicious silence.⁵ But Quèlen, the Archbishop of Paris, was his friend, and his speech was the death-blow to the bill.⁶ Three days later, on Whit Sunday, June 6th, when Chateaubriand arrived at the Pavillon de Marsan to pay his respects to Monsieur, his secretary

¹ Pasquier, V. p. 546.

² Thureau Dangin, *Le parti libéral*, pp. 281, 295-296.

³ Vulabellé, *Deux Restaurations*, VII. pp. 37-38.

⁴ Villèle, *Mémoires*, V. pp. 34-35, 64, 70-72.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Vulabellé, *Deux Restaurations*, VII. 57.

Frénilly, *Souvenirs*, pp. 493-494.

Villèle, *Mémoires*, V. p. 40.

handed him an envelope. It contained a curt note from Villèle, enclosing the copy of an ordinance signed by the King, which declared "the President of our Council provisionally entrusted with the portfolio of Foreign Affairs in place of the Vicomte de Chateaubriand."¹

Villèle asserts that the King decided to dismiss Chateaubriand in this summary fashion without previous consultation with him. In the evening of the day on which the bill was thrown out, Louis expressed doubts about Chateaubriand's good faith. Villèle himself also discussed the matter with some of his colleagues. But no definite steps were decided upon. On Whit Sunday morning, however, Louis sent for him and, telling him that his suspicions were now confirmed, bade him prepare upon the spot the ordinance which, half an hour later, was handed to Chateaubriand.² Allusion has already been made to the strained relations which existed between the two Ministers. It cannot be doubted that, for some time past, Villèle had been waiting his opportunity to procure the dismissal of this dangerous member of his Cabinet.

Chateaubriand boasts that the Spanish war was but the initial move in his great scheme for restoring France to her former position in Europe. A colonial Empire had yet to be founded in South America, and the French frontiers to be extended to the left bank of the Rhine. Villèle had served in the navy, and knew the folly of embarking upon a conflict with Great Britain. Equally unattractive was the prospect of the great war which any infraction of the treaties of 1815 would entail.³ Both Marmont and Frénilly, however, mention a story which, if true, may account for the very unceremonious manner in which Chateaubriand was treated. Madame Boni de Castellane, to whom he was paying marked attentions, had invested in a loan to the Spanish Cortes a large sum of money, the proceeds of an estate which she had sold recently. This she had done upon the advice of Chateaubriand,⁴ who considered that Ferdinand, after the war, would be obliged to assume responsibility for the liabilities incurred by the revolutionary Government. One of his first acts, however, after his release from Cadiz, was to repudiate all loans contracted by the Cortes. In order to save his friend from ruin Chateaubriand directed Talaru at Madrid to press the King to acknowledge the debt. His instructions were carried out so

¹ Chateaubriand, *Mémoires*, nouvelle édition, IV. p. 286. Pasquier, V. pp. 558-560.

² Villèle, *Mémoires*, V. pp. 39-40.

³ Chateaubriand, *Congrès de Verone*, I. p. 358. Villèle, *Mémoires*, V. p. 155.

⁴ Marmont, *Mémoires*, VII. p. 292. Frénilly, *Souvenirs*, pp. 494-495.

thoroughly that Ferdinand wrote privately to Louis to complain of the annoyance to which he was subjected by his Ambassador. This episode, according to Frénily and Marmont, was the real reason of Chateaubriand's dismissal. Two hours after receiving Villèle's communication, with rage in his heart, he left the Foreign Office. The next day he began that implacable campaign in the *Journal des Débats*, which was to be the chief feature of "the systematic opposition" to the Government upon which he at once embarked.¹

With his Septennial Act Villèle was more fortunate. Introduced into the Upper Chamber at the same time as the proposal to convert the *rente* was brought before the Chamber of Deputies, it was passed by the Peers on May 7th by 117 votes to 67. In its passage through the elective assembly it was opposed by Royer-Collard in a speech of remarkable brilliancy. The system of representation, he contended, was thoroughly defective. The interference of the central Government with the electoral machinery was fatal to the free exercise of the suffrage. Ministers might almost be said to appoint Deputies to the Chamber. Annual partial elections, however, were a slight check upon this abuse. Septennial Parliaments, on the other hand, would aggravate the evil. The proposed alteration would increase the power of the Chamber, but it would encroach upon the Royal Prerogative. The same line of argument was the next day developed by General Foy. The Liberal speeches, indeed, were characterized by moderation and a strong Monarchical spirit. On June 8th² the Act was passed by 292 votes to 87.

Two measures, however, brought forward as concessions to the clerical section of the party, were defeated. The first was a proposal, which the Peers had adjourned during the previous Session, to authorize the Crown to grant permission for the establishment of convents. Pasquier was giving expression only to the general opinion when he pointed out to his fellow-legislators that, were they to abandon their right with regard to the nuns, they could not logically refuse to act in the same manner towards male religious communities. Though he forebore to mention them by name, his allusion to the Jesuits was understood. The proposal was negatived by 85 votes to 83.³

The second clerical measure to which the Peers were asked to give their consent took the form of a bill, introduced by the Comte de Peyronnet, the Keeper of the Seals, to assimilate the penalties for thefts from Churches, or other recognized places of

¹ Chateaubriand, *Mémoires*, nouvelle édition, IV. pp. 287-293.

² Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XIII. pp. 409-460.

³ Pasquier, V. pp. 538-539, 562-563.

public worship, to those in force for robberies from inhabited dwelling-houses. It should be understood that at that time burglary, if committed by two or more persons, was, under aggravated circumstances, punishable by death and, under less serious conditions, by penal servitude for life. The Bishops, however, and the clerical party were not satisfied. They wished the word sacrilege to be introduced into the proposed law. "Was it right, moreover," asked the Bishop of Troyes, "to place our tabernacles¹ upon the same footing as the articles of furniture to be found in the churches of other religions?"² But the Peers set their faces resolutely against all amendments of this nature. The bill, strictly in the form in which it had been presented, was passed on May 1st by 137 votes to 11. In this simple shape, however, it was unacceptable to the clerical Lower Chamber, and Peyronnet, accordingly, withdrew it on June 5th.³

On August 4th the Chambers were prorogued. The last three weeks of the Session were occupied mainly with the discussion of the Budget. Some awkward questions were asked upon the subject of the war expenses, which amounted to about ten million sterling. Villèle, indeed, deemed it advisable to appoint a commission to report upon the contract with Ouvrard, which was the chief object of criticism.⁴ La Bourdonnaye also denounced the employment of secret service money for the purchase of newspapers. The transactions to which he referred had been exposed recently in the Law Courts. After the conclusion of the war the attitude of the press generally became very hostile to the Government, several of the Royalist papers having embraced the politics of the counter-opposition. To put an end to these attacks Villèle, Corbière, and Peyronnet decided to exercise vigorously against the Liberal press the powers which the laws of 1822 had conferred upon them, and, at the same time, to buy up the Royalist newspapers. The management of this delicate business was entrusted to Sosthènes de La Rochefoucauld. Money was supplied by Monsieur and by Corbière from the secret service funds of the Home Office. The *Tablettes universelles*, *Drapeau blanc*, and *Oriflamme* were purchased for twelve, seven, and eight thousand pounds respectively.⁵ Difficulties, however, were encountered in the case of *La Quotidienne*. The paper was divided into twelve shares, of which four

¹ The place in which the consecrated elements of the Eucharist are kept in Roman Catholic churches.

² Vulaballe, *Deux Restaurations*, VII. p. 60.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XIII. pp. 233-253. *

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 254-256.

⁴ Pasquier, V. pp. 563-565.

⁵ Vulaballe, *Deux Restaurations*, VII. pp. 65-69.

belonged to the editor, M. Michaud, who refused to come to terms. But Sosthènes, having succeeded in buying the interests of the two other proprietors, considered that he could be ignored. The purchased shares were made over to two nominees of the Minister of the Interior, a new editor was appointed, and, when Michaud protested, he was ejected from his office by the commissary of police. Michaud, however, who held his post under an agreement with his co-proprietors, took his case into the Royal Courts and obtained a verdict. The proceedings brought to light all Sosthènes' transactions, and caused a great scandal.

The Ministerial discomfiture was not confined to this affair. Under the law of 1822 a prosecution for "evil tendencies" had been instituted against the Liberal paper, the *Courrier français*. Influenced, doubtless, by the revelations elicited in the Michaud case, the magistrates of the Royal Courts, upon whose subservience the Government had counted with confidence, pronounced an acquittal.¹

A Royal ordinance of August 4th announced some important changes in the Cabinet. Chateaubriand's place at the Foreign Office was to be filled by Damas, who was to be replaced as Minister of War by Clermont-Tonnerre. Chabrol was appointed Minister of Marine and the Duc de Doudeauville Minister of the King's Household in the place of Marshal Lauriston, who was given the post of *Grand Veneur*, which had remained vacant since the death of the Duc de Richelieu.² Twelve days later, on August 16th, the Government reimposed the censorship of the press, under the provisions of the law of 1822. The alarming state of the King's health and the fear that Monsieur's accession might lead to disturbances, made advisable, says Villèle, this measure of precaution. Doubtless, also, the fact that a new reign was about to begin, in which clerical matters would assume an even increased importance, was responsible for the decision which was published on August 26th. A new Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs was created, and Frayssinous, Bishop *in partibus* of Hermopolis and Grand Master of the University, was appointed to it. Whilst a seat in the Cabinet was thus given to a high dignitary of the Church, two Archbishops and a Bishop were made Privy Councillors and admitted to the deliberations of the Council of State. One of these was M. Latil, Bishop of Autun, whose great influence over Monsieur dated from the death of Madame de Polastron in London in 1804.³

¹ Pasquier, V. pp. 566-568.

² Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XIII. p. 570.

³ Pasquier, V. p. 549; VI. pp. 1-7.

The King's condition in the last days of August was desperate. His head, Villèle relates, would sometimes fall forward and strike violently against his writing-table. But, though his face was often cut and bruised by the violence of the blow, he persistently refused to allow his head to be supported by a cushion. To the very last he was true to his principle that a "King of France might die, but must never be ill." On his Saint's day, despite the agony which standing caused him, he insisted upon receiving the usual deputations, and his answer to the address of the prefect of Paris could not have been delivered better had he been in perfect health.¹ On September 7th, to the amazement of all who were in the secret of his dying condition, he held a reception of the diplomatic body. In these last days of his life the possibility was often present in his thoughts that both Monsieur and his son might die before the Duc de Bordeaux should reach man's estate. "In that case always remember," said he to Villèle, "the mother must be Regent. Though she be unpopular, and though she may inspire little confidence, no one else can have the same interest in the well-being of her son and in seeing him ascend the throne."²

Louis had always adhered scrupulously to the outward forms of religion. It was believed, however, that he was still imbued with the scepticism which had been fashionable in his younger days. The members of the Royal Family and the persons about them were much disturbed by the fear that he might die without having received the consolations of the Church. But neither Monsieur nor the Duchesse d'Angoulême dared to speak to him upon the subject. In this difficulty they appealed to Madame du Cayla to persuade him to send for his confessor. This mission she performed successfully, and, according to the general belief, came away not empty-handed from her pious errand. That same day she is said to have converted into money an order for eight hundred thousand francs, upon which Louis' signature was so illegible that even the obliging Duc de Doudeauville had grave doubts about passing it.³ On September 13th the King's critical condition was for the first time officially made public, and the *Bourse* and the theatres were ordered to be closed. At four o'clock in the morning of the 16th Louis XVIII expired, surrounded by his family and the great officers of State.⁴ According to precedent, directly the doctors announced that he had ceased

¹ Villèle, *Mémoires*, V. pp. 110-112.

² *Ibid.*, p. 113.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 114-116.

Mdme. de Boigne, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 154-155.

⁴ Nettement, *Histoire*, VI. pp. 776-783.



CHARLES X.

to breathe, everybody but Monsieur went into the adjoining room. Hitherto, as a King's daughter, Madame had always taken precedence of her husband. From the time of her release from the Temple she had shared with her uncle all the trials of the emigration. Her grief at losing him was very genuine, nevertheless she did not forget that, from the moment of his death, etiquette prescribed for her a different procedure. In the midst of her tears she paused upon the threshold, and bade *M. le Dauphin* pass through in front of her. After an interval of a minute or two an officer of the Household, throwing open again the doors, announced "The King," as Charles X came out of the chamber of death.¹

Following the custom of previous reigns, that same evening the whole of the Royal Family withdrew to Saint-Cloud, where the next day Charles received the diplomatic body and various deputations.² The new King's aversion to the Constitution was notorious, and his replies to these addresses were awaited with anxiety. They were most satisfactory, however, and in answering the representatives of the two Chambers he gave a definite assurance "that he should preserve the Charter, which as a subject he had sworn to maintain." Even before his brother's death he had intimated to Villèle that he should make no changes in the Ministry.³ He desired only that a place at the Council table should be given to the Dauphin (Duc d'Angoulême). On September 23rd Louis' body, followed by a large and respectful crowd, was conveyed to Saint-Denis, where it was to lie in state for a month. Four days later, on the 27th, the King made his formal entry into his capital. Though rain was falling heavily, the people assembled in large numbers and greeted him heartily. Charles was still a good-looking man and could smile genially. Contrasted with Louis, who could enter a carriage only with the utmost difficulty, his appearance upon a horse won universal approval. All the general officers living in Paris rode out to meet him. The crowd recognized with delight in the procession Excelmans, Lamarque, and other warriors who had been in exile or disgrace since 1815. The Royal decision to remove the censorship from the newspapers intensified the general satisfaction. On the 30th, on the day following the publication of this decree, Charles reviewed the National Guard. Under the influence of the delight caused by this popular measure his reception was even more enthusiastic than the one accorded him three days before. Far from beginning, as many had feared, with bloodshed

¹ Pasquier, VI. pp. 8-10 (note).

² Villèle, *Mémoires*, V. p. 116.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 112, 129.

and disorder, the new reign was inaugurated amidst a general outburst of loyalty.¹

Louis' funeral took place on October 25th. None of the ancient feudal customs were omitted which had been observed at the interment of former Kings. After the body had been lowered into the vault, the heralds one by one divested themselves of their coats-of-arms and caps, and, crying out, "The King is dead!" cast them down upon the coffin. Next, the Duc de Mortemart, the Duc de Luxembourg, the Duc de Grammont, and the Duc de Mouchy were called upon by name to bring forward the colours of the companies of Guards which they commanded. These, in turn, were thrown into the sepulchre. The *honours*² of the deceased—the crown, the sceptre, and the hand of justice were treated in like fashion. They were followed by the spurs, the helmet, the breastplate, the sword, the shield, and the gauntlets which Louis, most unwarlike of princes, was supposed to assume when he led forth his armies. As one by one they fell clanking down the stone steps into the vault beneath, the heralds set up their shout, "The King is dead, the King is dead!" The last homage was paid to the deceased Sovereign by the Grand-Chamberlain, the Prince de Talleyrand, who limped forward and lowered the standard of France over the coffin. Then the Grand Master of the Household, the Duc d'Uzès, dropped the point of his stick over the mouth of the vault, shouting thrice, "The King is dead," adding at the third time, "let us pray for his soul." After a few minutes of profound silence, he raised his stick once more and cried "Long live the King!" At the same moment the door of the sepulchre fell to with a crash, and the heralds took up the shout, "Long live King Charles, tenth of the name, by the Grace of God, King of France and Navarre, most Christian, most august, most powerful, our most honoured lord and good master, to whom God grant a very long and a very happy life! Let all shout Long live the King!" The drums beat and the trumpets sounded, whilst the cry was repeated by all present. Outside the Church the roar of cannon and the crash of musketry announced to the people that joy could now take the place of sorrow. They had lost Louis XVIII, but his brother Charles X reigned in his stead.

After the passing of the Septennial Act, Villèle had no longer

¹ Pasquier, VI. pp. 16-17.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VII. pp. 81-84.

Mdme. de Boigne, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 162-164.

Nettement, *Histoire*, VII. pp. 1-13.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XIV. pp. 9-11.

² Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VII. pp. 79-81.

Mdme. de Boigne, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 158-159.

to fear that his majority might be disturbed by annual partial elections. Nevertheless, the ranks of his followers were perceptibly thinned by the defection of disappointed place-hunters and other malcontents, who, ranging themselves behind La Bourdonnaye and Chateaubriand, constituted a counter-opposition and threatened danger. The Liberal and hostile Royalist papers, which followed the lead of Chateaubriand's organ, the *Journal des Débats*, were not mollified by the removal of the censorship. Affecting to attribute this measure wholly to the personal action of the King, they continued their attacks upon the Government. Villèle's relations with the Sovereign were upon a satisfactory footing, but he knew that in several directions powerful influences were at work to discredit him in Charles' opinion.¹

The new King had never shared his brother's distrust of Duc d'Orléans, and one of the first acts of his reign had been to raise him and all the members of his family to the rank of Royal Highnesses. This conciliatory attitude towards the head of the younger branch was warmly approved of by the Liberals.² But Charles' ephemeral popularity with this party did not survive the publication of the ordinance of December 2nd, 1824. By this decree fifty-five lieutenant-generals and one hundred and eleven major-generals were retired from the army, either because, having qualified for a pension they had not been employed since 1816, or, because, being entitled to a full pension, they had not been employed since 1823. Nearly all the persons thus treated were former officers of the Imperial army.³ The Royalist generals were not affected by the regulation, though in many cases they were older men, for the reason that their promotion dated, at the earliest, from 1814. The measure was one which for some time past Charles had wished to see carried out, and he alone must be held responsible for it. By this impolitic act the illusions were dispelled of those who had hoped that the new reign would inaugurate a policy of general reconciliation. In describing it as "the last cannon-shot of Waterloo," General Foy gave expression to the indignation which prevailed in all circles outside the society of the old Royalists.⁴

Villèle soon perceived that in the new reign questions of Court etiquette would assume at the Council the importance of matters of State. When, at Louis' funeral, the Master of the Ceremonies,

¹ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XIV. pp. 13-22.

² Nettement, *Histoire*, VII. pp. 9-10.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XIV. p. 7.

³ Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VII. pp. 87-88.

⁴ Pasquier, V. pp. 370-373; VI. pp. 19-21.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XIV. pp. 31-34.

C. Rousset, *La Marquis de Clermont-Tonnerre*, pp. 243, 247.

breaking his staff of office and throwing the pieces into the vault, had declared the King's Household dissolved, he records his regret that this announcement was a mere figure of speech. A numerous Court, besides being a centre of intrigue, furnished the enemies of the monarchy with an excellent excuse for inveighing against its extravagance.¹ On November 19th, a Royal ordinance named December 22nd for the opening of Parliament, and, on November 24th, the King indicated to Villèle the legislation which he wished to see carried out during the coming Session.² The four chief measures, the indemnity to the *émigrés*, the conversion of the *rente*, and laws to punish sacrilege and to regulate the establishment of convents were a repetition, merely, of those which had been withdrawn or rejected in the previous summer.

As regards the first two of these proposed laws, Villèle, warned by the experience of his former failure, adopted different tactics. He now determined to bring in the indemnity bill before the proposal to convert the *rente*. But he still adhered to his old plan of making the conversion pay for the interest upon the indemnity. It had been calculated that a *milliard* of francs—forty millions sterling—would be required to compensate the owners of forfeited estates. According to Villèle's scheme the payment of this sum was to be spread over the next five years. The claims of those who were to benefit under the act were to be met by an issue of 3 per cent government stock at 75. At the same time all holders of the old 5 per cent bonds were to be given the option of converting their holdings into the new 3 per cent stock at the price of issue. The operations of Messrs. Rothschild and the other bankers, whose assistance Villèle had invoked the year before, would tend to improve the position in the market of the new stock. Moreover, by utilizing the sinking fund exclusively for the redemption of the 3 per cent issue, he proposed to assist its rise in price. It might be assumed, under these conditions, that holders would avail themselves readily of their option to convert, and that the same result would be obtained as by the compulsory plan which had failed in the summer. If these provisions were realized, the Treasury would save, over the interest of the whole debt, the thirty million francs required to pay the interest upon the *milliard*—the forty millions sterling which would be added to it.³ A fall in prices, however, would imperil seriously the success of this conception.

¹ *Nettement, Histoire*, VII. p. 10.

Villèle, *Mémoires*, V. pp. 124-125.

² *Nettement, Histoire*, VII. pp. 13-14.

³ Pasquier, VI. pp. 26-29.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XIV. pp. 362-368.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VII. pp. 121-124.

M. de Martignac, who had performed the duties of political adviser to the Duc d'Angoulême during the Spanish war to Villèle's satisfaction, was entrusted with the task of introducing the indemnity bill into the Lower Chamber. After the Deputies had listened to his eloquent defence of the emigration, and to his explanation of the nature of the great act of conciliation, by which the King hoped to inaugurate his reign, a committee was appointed to consider the proposed law.¹ When, on February 17th, the general discussion began, a Liberal, M. de Girardin, pointed out that, out of a total of 430 Deputies, no less than 320 were members of the old privileged families. Inasmuch as nearly all of them were personally interested in the question before the Chamber, he suggested that they should withdraw, and take no part in the debate. The President, however, promptly ruled his objection out of order.² The circumstances being as Girardin had represented, it might have been supposed that the measure would have encountered hostility only from the very diminished Liberal party. It was soon evident, however, that it was to be subjected to severe criticisms by the Royalist opposition.

If the principle of the bill be considered impartially, it will be seen that there was much to be said in its favour. The saying of Machiavelli³ may be quoted that "a man will readily forget the loss of his father, but never that of his patrimony." The expediency cannot be questioned of a measure which was to put an end to the bitterest animosities which the Revolution had left behind. Moreover, it could be urged, with some show of reason, that the *émigrés* and their descendants would not alone benefit by the indemnity. Indirectly it would confer an advantage upon the actual possessors of the confiscated estates, by giving them a better title to their properties. Despite the clause in the Charter which guaranteed them against eviction, purchasers of land under the emigration laws had never felt altogether secure. Patrimonial estates still commanded in the market a higher price than property which had once been "national." But this distinction would cease once the dispossessed owners had received compensation.⁴

La Bourdonnaye and his friends, however, were resolved to deprive Villèle of the credit of having carried out a measure of reconciliation. Starting from the premise that all the acts of the revolutionary government were illegal, he argued that the *émigrés* must still be considered the rightful owners of their

¹ Nettement, *Histoire*, VII. pp. 106-107.
Pasquier, VI. p. 29.

² Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XIV. p. 183.

³ Machiavelli, *The Prince*.

⁴ Nettement, *Histoire*, VII. pp. 84-86.

estates. They were entitled, therefore, to expect restitution, not an indemnity. Clause IX of the Charter, guaranteeing the revolutionary land settlement, should, in his opinion, be regarded merely as a temporary measure of political expediency. The confiscated estates, in short, should be given back to their former owners, and the indemnity be paid to their present possessors.¹ M. Duplessis de Grénédan declared that the article of the Charter never could have been intended to refer to stolen property. General Foy, and more particularly Benjamin Constant, in able speeches denied the justice of the claims of the *émigrés* to compensation. But the Liberal cause was even better served by the violent language of the Royalist opposition. On March 15th, at the close of the debate, their threats and insults were bitterly recapitulated by General Foy. He begged the owners of national property to remember that their fathers had been described as scoundrels and robbers. "If an attempt were to be made to take from them by force property, which was theirs by law, he would have them recollect that they were twenty to one." Amidst the excitement caused by this violent harangue the House divided, and the bill was carried by 259 votes to 124.² From this result it was very evident that, under cover of the secrecy of the ballot, nearly all who were not pecuniarily interested in the indemnity must have voted against it, irrespective of party.³

The bill was at once carried up to the Higher Chamber, where on April 20th it was passed by a majority of 159 to 63. The Duc de Broglie, the Duc de Choiseul, and M.M. Molé and de Barante were among its chief opponents. Chateaubriand, whilst declaring his approval of the principle of compensation and his personal disinterestedness in the question, regretted that so excellent a measure should be connected directly with the hateful scheme to reduce the interest upon the *rente*.⁴ The bill dealing with this matter, of which the main provisions have been pointed out, had been passed by the Deputies by 237 votes to 119 on April 2nd, after a discussion of nine days' duration.⁵ In the Upper Chamber, likewise, though subjected to severe criticisms, it was carried, on April 27th, by a majority of 42. The Peers apparently considered that, now that the conversion was no longer to be compulsory, the bill had been shorn of its most

¹ *Nettement, Histoire*, VII. pp. 110-115.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VII. pp. 111-118.

² Pasquier, VI. pp. 30-32.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XIV. pp. 183-268.

³ Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VII. p. 121.

⁴ Pasquier, VI. p. 32.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XIV. pp. 278-283.

⁵ Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VII. pp. 121-125.

objectionable feature. Villèle, moreover, gave them to understand that the Government regarded the conversion as a necessary complement to the indemnity law. The personal influence which the King exerted in favour of the bill was another factor in the situation.¹

The bill to indemnify the *émigrés* was the most important measure of Villèle's administration. The settlement of claims which was begun forthwith was the cause of much complaint and discontent. The large proprietors and any persons who had influence at Court are said to have been treated over-generously at the expense of the more obscure claimants. The Duc d'Orléans for his own share, received fourteen millions of francs. Among private individuals, the Liberal Peers, who had opposed the measure, the Duc de Choiseul, and the Duc de La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt accepted over a million each. The name of La Fayette figured opposite a sum of nearly five hundred thousand francs.² Another class of person had every reason to be grateful. From this time forward the distinction disappeared between patrimonial and heretofore national property. As an attempt "to close the last wounds of the Revolution," the bill was not altogether a failure. But the more important end was not attained of reconciling all classes of the nation. On the contrary, the fierce debates in the Lower Chamber intensified the recollections of past differences. In the words of General Foy the extreme Royalists deliberately converted an act of reparation into an instrument of hatred and revenge.³

It was from the Peers only that opposition was to be apprehended to the two clerical measures which figured in the legislative programme of the Session. The bill to regulate the establishment of convents differed little from the one which they had rejected the year before. But a clause had been inserted to prevent a nun from bequeathing more than a quarter of her fortune to a religious community. This, in the eyes of many of the Peers, removed one of the great objections to the bill. It was still proposed, however, that the legislature should divest itself in favour of the Crown of the power to regulate the development of these establishments. This was a clause which the Peers insisted upon amending, and, to the King's indignation, passed the bill only when it had been shorn of this all-important provision.⁴

¹ Pasquier, VI. p. 33.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XIV, 389-400.

Mme. de Boigne, *Mémoires*, III. p. 182-185.

² Nettement, *Histoire*, VII. pp. 143-144.

³ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XIV. pp. 299-303.

Pasquier, VI. pp. 33-34.

⁴ Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VII. pp. 95-98.

Villèle, *Mémoires*, V. pp. 157-159.

The bill to punish the crime of sacrilege, which the Peers took into consideration on February 10th, attracted widespread interest. Unlike the measure which they had passed in the previous Session, this offence now figured by name in the new law, and was described as the profanation of the consecrated Host and of sacred vessels. For the first of these crimes it was proposed to impose the punishment of parricides, and for the second the ordinary form of capital punishment. The chief opponents of the bill were Molé, Lanjuinais, Pasquier, Broglie, and Chateaubriand. If they were to pass a measure of this kind, contended the Duc de Broglie, they must before long enact that the tongue of the blasphemer should be torn out with hot pincers. The most remarkable speech delivered in support of the Ministerial proposals was that of M. de Bonald, the Christian philosopher. After refuting, as unwarranted, the charge of undue severity which was brought against the bill, he concluded with the pronouncement that "to punish the sacrilegious person with death was, after all, but to send him before his natural judge." As they listened to these words from the lips of a man, who in his private life was of a singularly mild disposition, it seemed to many present that the spirit of the Inquisition hovered over their deliberations.¹

In the last Session the ecclesiastical Peers had abstained from voting upon the law to punish thefts from Churches, because the measure involved a possible application of the death penalty. This year, however, Cardinal de La Fare announced that they intended to adopt a different procedure. "After mature consideration," he said, "the ecclesiastical Peers have recognized that, though the Church forbids them to act in the capacity of judges, no reason exists to prevent them from taking part, as the members of a legislative assembly, in the framing of all kinds of laws." It is probable that, but for the intervention of the bench of Bishops, an amendment would have passed to substitute penal servitude for the death penalty in cases of profanation.² In the result, however, the opponents of the bill were successful only in obtaining that an *amende honorable* outside the Church, in which the crime had been committed, should take the place of the mutilation prescribed for parricides prior to their execution. But a clause was introduced which provided that the offence must have been perpetrated in public in order to fall within the meaning of the act. On February 18th, the bill was carried by 127 votes to 92, and, on the following April 15th, the Deputies passed it into law by a majority of 122. In the Lower Chamber

¹ Vulaballe, *Deux Restaurations*, VII. p. 95-103.

² Nettement, *Histoire*, VII. p. 73.

the eloquent speech, in which M. Royer-Collard opposed the principle of the new measure, was the feature of the debate.¹ No instance is recorded of a conviction under the law of sacrilege. The statute was found to have been made impossible of application by the provision that the offence must have been committed in public. But the introduction of a mediæval enactment of the kind had a disastrous effect upon public opinion. From this time forward the apprehension became general that the country was to be ruled by a Church, of which the chief dignitaries were striving to revive the barbarous edicts of the worst days of intolerance.²

But for the passing of the Budget by the Peers, the business of the Session was completed on May 20th, when the Chambers were prorogued to enable members to assist at the King's Coronation at Rheims. A sum of six million francs had been voted for the expenses of the ceremony. Some of the embellishments carried out furnish a good example of the taste of the period. The interior of the Cathedral, a beautiful specimen of Gothic architecture, was transformed for the occasion in imitation of a Greek temple.³

No coronation of a King of France had taken place since that of Louis XVI. Owing to the occupation of the country by the Allied Armies, during the early years of his reign, and to his physical infirmities, Louis XVIII had never been crowned. Since the days of Clovis Kings of France, at their coronation, had been anointed with a Holy oil brought down to Saint Rémi by a dove from heaven. The precious liquid had been preserved at Rheims in a phial known as the *sainte ampoule*. But, on October 6th, 1793, Ruhl, a representative of the people and a commissioner of the convention, had broken the bottle against the statue of Louis XV and scattered its contents. Shortly before Charles' coronation, however, it transpired that certain loyal persons had gathered up the pieces, as well as some drops of the inexhaustible ointment. This pleasing discovery was published in the *Moniteur*, on May 16th, when this announcement also appeared: "The Holy oil to be poured upon the head of Charles X will be the same as that which has anointed former Kings of France since the time of Clovis."⁴

On May 28th, Charles arrived in state at Rheims. The coronation oath had been framed for absolute, not for limited monarchy. Were the old wording to be maintained Charles would

¹ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XIV. pp. 123-163, 312-340.

² Nettement, *Histoire*, VII. pp. 81-83.

³ Pasquier, VI. p. 38.

⁴ Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VII. p. 139-140.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XIV. 506-507.

have to swear to preserve the ancient rights of the Church and to extirpate heresy—a declaration according ill with the religious toleration which the Constitution granted. It was believed that he was anxious to avoid any mention of the Charter, and it was suspected that the clergy encouraged him to take up this attitude. But at the great ceremony of the next day fears upon this point were set at rest. The most important part of the oath had been altered to suit modern conditions, and Charles, to the relief of many and to the indignation of a few, swore to govern according to the Constitutional Charter. It is said, however, that it was only at Rheims itself that Villèle succeeded in obtaining his consent to this necessary modification of the old phraseology.¹

In other particulars the ceremony was carried out in accordance strictly with ancient usage. Neither trouble nor expense had been spared to make the spectacle as imposing as possible.² The sovereigns were represented by ambassadors-extraordinary. The Emperor of Austria by Prince Esterhazy, the Tsar by Prince Wolkonski, the King of Prussia by General von Zastrow and George IV by the Duke of Northumberland. Deputations of members of both chambers, the presidents and procurators of the Royal Courts, mayors of the chief towns, prefects and other high officials, besides the fashionable world in large numbers were provided with seats in the Cathedral. The alteration in the wording of his coronation oath was not the only concession to which Charles had consented.³ The oldest of the Marshals, Moncey, Duc de Conegliano, bore the sword and officiated as Constable. The sceptre, the hand of justice, and the crown were carried by Soult, Duc de Dalmatie, Mortier, Duc de Treviso, and the Comte Jourdan, all of them soldiers of the Republic and the Empire. The ceremony, which began at eight and was not completed till past noon, consisted of three parts. After Latil, the Archbishop of Rheims had blessed it, the King was “armed” with the sword of Charlemagne. Next, prostrated before the altar, he was anointed with the holy oil, upon the head and, through holes prepared in his robes, between the shoulders, upon the right and left shoulder, upon the chest and upon both arms. Still kneeling, he then received from the Archbishop the sceptre in his right hand and the hand of justice in his left. Lastly, he was crowned with the great crown of Charlemagne and placed upon the throne. The cry *vivat rex in æternum* was taken up by all present to the strains of a triumphal music. Inside the Cathedral hundreds of

¹ Pasquier, VI. p. 39.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XIV. pp. 507–508.

² *Ibid.*, p. 509.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 510.

doves were let loose, whilst outside, to the blare of trumpets and the roar of guns, the heralds cast medals, struck to commemorate the occasion, among the crowd.¹

On the next day, May 30th, Charles held a chapter of the order of the Holy Ghost, the first ceremony of the kind which had taken place since the restoration of the Monarchy. In that part of his oath in which, as Grand Master of the order, he swore to observe its statutes, he had sanctioned the introduction of the words, "we reserve to ourselves the right of regulating the conditions of admission in accordance with the good of our service." The necessity was thus removed of showing the proofs of nobility which the old statutes required. Had the former conditions been maintained they would have rendered ineligible men like Monecy, Marmont, Oudinot, Lainé, Pasquier, Décazes, and Villèle, besides others upon whom Louis XVIII had conferred the blue ribbon.² As Chateaubriand knelt before him, Charles was observed to smile and to whisper. It was rumoured that he was forgiven and taken back to favour. This was the dearest wish of Chateaubriand's heart, but it was not to be fulfilled. According to his own account the King had sent him a gracious message by Quêlen, the Archbishop of Paris, for which he expected to be thanked upon this occasion. He was deeply offended at the silence with which his advances were received. But, says Chateaubriand, his lack of response was due only to his ignorance of the King's intentions. The cautious prelate had omitted to convey to him Charles' words for fear of offending M. de Villèle.³

Upon the completion of this ceremony Charles went to the hospital of Saint-Marcouf, where one hundred and twenty scrofulous patients had been collected. Upon the forehead of each he made, according to the ancient custom, the sign of the Cross with the words, "May God heal thee, the King touches thee."⁴ After a review of the troops Charles set out for Compiègne, on June 1st, and, on the 6th, returned to Paris in state. Besides the honours and promotions by which the occasion was celebrated, the sentences upon many criminals were remitted, political offenders and deserters were pardoned, and exiles were with few exceptions recalled. Court and private balls, popular festivities, banquets, gala performances at the Opera and the theatres enlivened the town during the next fortnight. But the attitude of the people was unsympathetic. The Coronation

¹ Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VII. pp. 143-147.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 149-152.

³ Chateaubriand, *Mémoires*, nouvelle édition, IV. pp. 310-311.

⁴ Pasquier, VI. p. 39.

with all its pomp had evoked, generally, no loyal enthusiasm. To many the ceremony had appeared symbolical only of the domination of the Church. In the eyes of a large number it was unseemly that their ruler should receive, upon his knees, the emblems of his office from the hands of a priest. It was remembered that Napoleon had taken his crown from the Pope and had himself placed it upon his head. In the streets on June 6th men repeated not the lines of Victor Hugo or Lamartine, but Béranger's satire, *The Coronation of Charles the Simple*.¹

Since the Liberal disaster at the elections of 1824 the few survivors of the party had observed a more circumspect behaviour. Already signs were plentiful that a strong reaction in their favour was setting in. The words of General Foy, "We are only twenty, but the country is behind us,"² were not far from the truth. The revolutionary language, in which the old Liberal party had indulged so freely, was now seldom heard. This change was to be ascribed to diminished numbers which rendered impossible a vigorous offensive, and to the fact that most of the avowedly anti-dynastic members had lost their seats. But another factor in the situation had arisen. The influence was beginning to be felt of a younger generation which had grown into manhood since the Restoration.³ M. Thureau Dangin, speaking of the year 1824, describes the appearance in the *salon* of Caffitte, the Liberal banker, of a young man who was beginning to attract attention. Very short of stature and wholly lacking in distinction, but with eyes so bright that they seemed to light up the spectacles which covered them. When he spoke a southern accent proclaimed him at once a native of Marseilles. Yet no observer could fail to be struck by the versatility of his brain. Passing from group to group, he appeared to discuss with equal facility politics with Manuel, finance with the Baron Louis, strategy with General Foy. In 1821 Adolphe Thiers, the young man in question, had arrived in Paris with his gifted compatriot Mignet. The "Academic laurels" which they had won at the University at Aix, and a letter of introduction to Manuel were their sole credentials.

Upon the recommendation of Manuel, Thiers was enrolled

¹ Frénilly, *Souvenirs*, p. 514.

Mdme. de Boigne, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 178-179.

Pasquier, VI. p. 40.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VII. pp. 153-155.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XIV. pp. 531-532.

Nettement, *Histoire*, VII. 196-201.

Thureau Dangin, *Le parti libéral*, p. 309.

² *Ibid.*, p. 303.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 191-201.

upon the staff of the *Constitutionnel*. In his new career fortune came to him rapidly. Before long he was in a position to leave his garret in the Passage Montesquieu and to assume the character of a man about town. In these days he frequented well-known fencing-rooms, drove a cabriolet, and was to be seen upon the steps of Tortoni. But his attempts to play the dandy were not very successful. Perhaps they were inspired only by a philosophic desire of gaining experience of all phases of life.¹ Unlike Manuel, he neither affiliated himself to secret societies nor participated in conspiracies. Yet he shared to the full extent his patron's hatred of the Bourbons. But he realized that their ends could be served, far more effectually under modern conditions, by the press. Thus, whilst he adopted the old strategy of the *Constitutionnel*, he devised new tactics. Under his influence the paper became irreproachable from a dynastic point of view. *Vive la Charte*, the watchword of the Liberals, is said to have been invented by him. A strictly lawful enunciation of this kind was reassuring to the peace-loving middle classes. At any moment, however, it might become an effective battle-cry against a Government suspected of harbouring designs against the Constitution.

It was not in the press alone that Thiers displayed his activity. Between the years 1823 and 1827 he published in ten volumes his *History of the Revolution*. Till then no serious writer had attempted to defend the terrorists. Thiers did not excuse the crimes of these men, but he sought to explain the forces which had urged them on. Great as their faults had been, they had defended always the revolutionary, the national cause. Appearing at a time when the Royalists were supposed to be preparing a counter-revolution, the effect of his book was magical. Sainte-Beuve has compared it to that of a second *Marseillaise*. After reading Thiers' great work every little shopkeeper felt with a glow of pride that he was the heir of the "immortal Revolution."²

In September, 1824, a literary and scientific periodical called *Le Globe* was started by a group of very young and talented men. The pecuniary guarantee which the law demanded from the proprietors of a political newspaper had not been forthcoming. *Le Globe*, in consequence, was debarred from the discussion of current political topics. But in a so-called historical article a writer could always introduce his ideas upon governments and institutions. The authorities, moreover, in the case of *Le Globe*, appear to have been indulgent. Some of the young men con-

¹ Thureau-Dangin, *La parti Norm.*, pp. 203-206.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 204-217.

nected with it, like Charles de Remusat, Duchâtel, Vivet, and Duvergier de Hauranne, the author at a later date of a parliamentary history of the Restoration, belonged to well-known families in the political and official world. But for the law which rendered them ineligible for election to the Chamber before the age of forty, they might have found an outlet for their energies in Parliament. Upon the staff and among the regular contributors were also several of the young professors of the *École normale*, such as Dubois, Jouffroy, Damiron, and Farcy, whom Frayssinous, Bishop of Hermopolis, had driven from their posts when he was appointed Grand Master of the University. In addition, occasional articles were furnished by Sainte-Beuve and most of the rising literary men of the day.

The young men of *Le Globe* attached themselves to no particular political group. Perhaps the views of the majority of them approached most nearly to the Doctrinaire Liberalism of Broglie and Barante. But some of them had more advanced opinions, resembling those of Casimir Périer or General Foy. With Thiers and the school of the *Constitutionnel* they had nothing in common, except their hatred of the old Royalists. They were no respecters of the legitimist principle. On the other hand, however, they had no feelings of ingrained hostility to the reigning dynasty. Their allegiance was given to institutions, not to persons. They had no desire to see the Monarchy of the Bourbons overthrown, provided its continued maintenance should prove compatible with the development of the State upon modern lines. But they had small confidence in it, and faced the prospects of a revolution with equanimity. In religious matters they advocated toleration, and, to the indignation of the older school of Liberals, pleaded for freedom "even for the Jesuits." The rationalism of *Le Globe* was a decided advance upon the Voltairianism of the *Constitutionnel*. The older paper, however, had a large circulation, whilst *Le Globe* was appreciated only by a small circle of cultivated readers.¹

The issue of 3 per cent Government Stock, wherewith to compensate the *émigrés*, had not been followed by that rush to convert, upon the part of the holders of the old 5 per cents, which Villèle had expected. A general fall in prices began in July, and continued steadily despite large purchases of the new stock by the Government brokers. This decline was to be attributed, as Villèle soon discovered, to a crisis through which the London market was passing. Nevertheless, it made for him many fresh enemies among the shareholding classes. Moreover, the Royalist papers, controlled by Chateaubriand, and the Liberal

¹ Thureau Dangin, *Le parti libéral*, pp. 217-264.

press could now unite in a common outcry against the losses which the public had sustained owing to his miscalculations.¹ Chateaubriand recalls with pride this period of his campaign against M. de Villèle. "Young France," he says, "was entirely upon my side. . . . It was my second Spanish War."² At Court, all who were hostile to the President of the Council intrigued against him with renewed vigour.³ Charles had been greatly elated by the popularity which he had acquired in the first months of his reign. He was correspondingly depressed by the changed attitude of the people towards him. Villèle had every reason to fear that he would listen to those who told him that it was to be ascribed to the mistakes of his Minister.⁴

In the spring of 1824 La Fayette, discredited by the part which he had played in the military plots and rejected by the electors of his own district, went to America to seek the popularity which he prized so dearly. In the course of the year which he spent in the United States, even his insatiable love of applause was satisfied by the adulation and the hero-worship of which he was the object. His return journey was made in an American ship of war which had been placed at his disposal. The change which had come over public opinion during his absence was soon manifest. At Havre, where he landed, crowds collected under his windows, and acclaimed him as a "veteran of the cause of freedom." The next day a number of young men on horseback accompanied his carriage for several miles. At Rouen similar scenes were enacted.⁵ But these demonstrations sank into insignificance beside those which the funeral of General Foy called forth. For some time past his health had been failing, and on November 28th he died. Two days later his coffin was borne to the cemetery of the Père-Lachaise by a number of young men, who begged to be allowed to carry their hero to his last resting-place. Peers, Deputies, general officers, magistrates, and men of letters followed in procession. The carriage of the Duc d'Orléans figured conspicuously. The weather was cold and wet, nevertheless ten thousand persons walked behind the coffin from the Rue de la Chaussée d'Antin to the cemetery. Along the whole line of the boulevards the shops were shut and draped in black. At the Père-Lachaise thirty thousand people awaited the arrival of the procession. No scene to be compared

¹ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XV. pp. 1-5.

Villèle, *Mémoires*, V. pp. 183-185.

² Chateaubriand, *Mémoires*, nouvelle édition, IV. pp. 339, 343.

³ Nettement, *Histoire*, VII. pp. 263-266.

⁴ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XV. pp. 43-55.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

Nettement, *Histoire*, VII. pp. 231-232.

with it had been seen in Paris since the death of Mirabeau. At the conclusion of his speech by the graveside, Casimir Périer reminded his hearers that the general's services, upon the battlefield and in Parliament, had not enriched him. "But," he added, "his children belong to France, and she will adopt them." A million francs was collected within a short time. A national subscription of this magnitude was without precedent.¹ "This demonstration should provide ministers with a subject for serious reflection," wrote Chateaubriand. "The people have voted for the charter upon the coffin of a general as the Romans formerly voted for liberty in the Campus Martius."²

At a Cabinet Council held upon August 21st it had been decided to proceed against the *Courrier Français* and the *Constitutionnel* for "systematic attacks upon religion." In view of the state of public opinion, Villèle was not sanguine of obtaining a conviction, but the King considered that he was bound to take steps to stop the campaign against the clergy which was increasing in virulence.³ Under the terms of the law of 1822, upon a third conviction a paper might be suppressed altogether. The Liberals, therefore, regarded these prosecutions as an attempt upon the part of the Government to abolish gradually the opposition press. When press cases had been removed from the jurisdiction of the jury, Villèle believed that he could count implicitly upon the servility of the magistrates of the Royal Courts. He was speedily undeceived. But the independence which they displayed was not to be ascribed to the progress of Liberal ideas. On the contrary, it was a return to that old spirit of opposition to Rome and the Jesuits which had animated always the *Parlements* of the ancient régime. It was the secret ambition of the new magistrates to be thought to resemble their famous predecessors of the eighteenth century. The Liberal press realized quickly the importance of flattering these pretensions, and proclaimed that in the courage of a generous magistracy "lay the only hope of resisting successfully the designs of the clerical party." At the trial, counsel for the defence developed this idea. "The real question to be determined," said M. Dupin, "is whether the civil law or the power of the clergy is to be supreme."⁴

During the past year public attention had been absorbed by the question of the influence supposed to be exercised over the King and the Government by the Congregation and the Jesuits. The ultramontane doctrine, as set forth by Lamennais, increased

¹ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XV. pp. 8-11.

² Thureau Dangin, *Le parti libéral*, pp. 305-306.

³ Nettement, *Histoire*, VII. pp. 209-210.

⁴ Thureau Dangin, *Le parti libéral*, pp. 378-382.

the apprehensions aroused by the law of sacrilege and other evidences of the growing power of the Church. The trial of the *Constitutionnel* and the *Courrier Français*, which began on November 19th, excited universal interest.¹ Many of the incriminated articles in both papers contained little else but vulgar calumnies upon the clergy. Others, however, warned their readers of the existence all over the country of religious associations unauthorized by law, and denounced the ultramontane doctrine as a danger to the Gallican Church. The Court, holding that it was no abuse of the liberty of the press to discuss matters of this kind, pronounced an acquittal in the case of both papers. The verdict was received with frantic applause, and the magistrates were loudly cheered as they left the Court.²

In the last month of 1825 the Chanceries and Stock Exchanges of Europe were disturbed by the news of the sudden death at Taganrog, upon the Sea of Azov, of the Tsar at the age of forty-eight. Alexander was childless, and the Grand Duke Constantine had renounced his right to succeed. The accession of his younger brother Nicholas, however, was attended with grave disorders. The loyalty of Constantine and the firmness of the new Tsar defeated the plans of the conspirators. Nicholas was quite unknown outside Russia, and an expression of his views upon foreign affairs was eagerly awaited. At his first reception of the *corps diplomatique* he outlined to La Ferronnays the course which he intended to pursue. In future, Russian policy would be concerned with the defence of purely Russian interests. He did not propose to espouse the cause of the Greeks, but he was determined to obtain satisfaction from the Porte.³

Villèle's third Session was to begin on January 31st, 1826. Though a considerable number of Royalists had now joined the counter-opposition, he could count still upon a good majority. But the split in his party compelled him to yield more and more to the exigencies of the clerical group. This section clamoured loudly for drastic legislation with regard to the press. But Charles had not forgotten the popularity which he had acquired by revoking the censorship. Villèle, in consequence, was able to resist this demand. In another direction, however, he was less fortunate, and was driven to acquiesce to the drafting of a measure, against the promptings of his better judgment.⁴

In the opinion of many of the leading Royalists a law to check the division and sub-division of property was the natural com-

¹ Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VII. pp. 164-169.

² Pasquier, VI. pp. 47-49.

³ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XV. pp. 77-79.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 83-84.

plement to the indemnity bill. Jules de Polignac, who had succeeded Chateaubriand as Ambassador in London, was a strong advocate of this view. The political power and the influence of the English landed aristocracy filled him with astonishment. He could realize that the existence of a governing class of the same kind in France would strengthen the position of the Monarchy, and he believed that it could be created by a measure of legislation. Villèle also admired the English system, but he knew that it was the outcome of habits and institutions peculiar to the country. As he wrote to Polignac in 1824, the equal division of property was now a national custom in France. Though members of the old aristocracy might deplore it in theory, in practice few fathers of families were disposed to enrich their eldest sons at the expense of their younger children. He cited the case of the Comte de Kergorlay, who preferred to allow his Peerage to lapse, rather than to diminish his daughter's portion by endowing it.¹

In the King's speech, at the opening of the Session of 1826, the progressive division of properties was declared to be contrary to monarchical principles, and it was announced that a proposal would be brought before the Chambers "for preserving the patrimony of families." The bill which was thus foreshadowed was introduced into the Upper Chamber by M. de Peyronnet on February 10th. It was no daring attempt to abrogate those articles of the Code which dealt with the division of property. It was proposed merely that, in the event of a deceased person not having disposed by will of the *quotité disponible*² of his estate, that portion of it should pass, as a matter of right, to his eldest son. By a third clause in the bill it was to be made lawful in the future, to settle all or part of the *quotité disponible* upon the second generation. These provisions, however, were to apply only to landed estates taxed at not less than three hundred francs.³

Despite the very limited character of the changes which it was proposed to introduce into the Code, the bill evoked a storm of indignant protests. Petitions against it poured in from all parts of the country. The Liberal press denounced it as anti-social, and as an attempt to create afresh a privileged aristocracy. The *Constitutionnel* believed it to be an insidious device for filling convents and religious communities, and concluded that it must

¹ Villèle, *Mémoires*, V. pp. 130-132, 141-144.

Villèle à Polignac, 31 Octobre, 1824.

Pasquier, VI. pp. 7-8.

² That portion of the estate which the Code permitted the owner to dispose of as he saw fit.

³ Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VII. pp. 204-208.

have been inspired by the Jesuits. Chateaubriand's organ, the *Journal des Débats*, laughed to scorn the notion of forming an aristocracy out of small taxpayers. The opposition Royalist papers, whilst generally approving the principle of primogeniture and entails, blamed the Government for so framing their bill as to make it unpopular.¹ Though some of the abuse levelled at the proposed law may be set down to party spirit and personal jealousy of Villèle, it, undoubtedly, had bitter opponents in all sections of society. An establishment resembling an English club, the first of the kind in Paris, had been opened recently in the Rue de Grammont. It was frequented chiefly by persons of the upper classes and by foreign diplomatists. Yet so freely did some of these gentlemen inveigh against the bill that their club was closed by the police authorities.² As both the director and the prefect of police were active members of the Congregation, it may be assumed that places of the nature of the *cercle de la rue de Grammont* were unfavourably regarded by the clerical party. Limited as was the scope of the bill, the principle which it embodied was highly offensive to the great mass of Frenchmen. The mere mention of the word primogeniture recalled the most hated features of the old *régime*. The notion of enriching one son to the detriment of his brothers and sisters was a violation of that lasting legacy of the Revolution, the doctrine that all men are equal.

The general discussion of the bill began on March 28th, and was extended over ten sittings. Molé, Roy, Mollien, Daru, Lainé, and Pasquier assailed the Ministerial contention that the concentration of property conduced to agricultural prosperity and made for political stability. The task of defending the measure fell almost entirely upon M. de Peyronnet. His arguments, though developed with skill, were little in harmony with the sentiments of the majority of the Peers. The speech of the Duc de Broglie dealt the doomed bill its death-blow. The law which was under consideration, he impressed upon his hearers, was less a law than the declaration of a principle. It was an attempt to destroy the existing social fabric by the arbitrary creation of conditions of inequality. If it were passed, twenty other measures of the same kind would be brought forward. On April 8th the two clauses of the bill to re-establish primogeniture were thrown out by 120 votes to 94. The remaining paragraph, however, to sanction the entailing of land under certain circumstances was passed by a good majority. That night the

¹ Pasquier, VI. p. 57.

Nettement, *Histoire*, VII. pp. 289-293.

² Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XV. pp. 220-223.

town was illuminated, and joyful crowds paraded the streets. The next day the *Constitutionnel* drew a moving picture of "fathers upon their balconies surrounded by their children, returning thanks, with hands upraised to Heaven, that the peace of families was to remain unbroken." The popular manifestations were continued for several nights. But, on April 12th, Paris resumed her normal aspect. It was the anniversary of the day upon which, twelve years before, Charles, as the Comte d'Artois, had made his entry into the capital. The people were determined to afford no grounds for the supposition that their demonstrations of joy could be connected with that event.¹

The mutilated bill was carried to the Lower Chamber, where in due course it was passed into law. But the rejection by the Peers of its most important clauses was a heavy blow to the Government. The Deputies, during the early part of the Session, had been occupied in discussing the question of the independence of St. Domingo. In point of fact the sovereignty of the mother country over this colony existed in name only since the year 1794, when the Convention abolished slavery. The negroes had availed themselves of their freedom to drive out the white colonists and to proclaim a Republic. In 1801 Bonaparte sent General Leclerc, the husband of his sister Pauline, with 40,000 men to the island to restore French rule and to re-establish slavery. Toussaint-Louverture, the black general, was inveigled into Leclerc's camp and despatched to France, to die soon afterwards a prisoner in the fort of Joux, near Besançon. This act was the prelude to a savage war. In the pestilential swamps of the interior the French suffered terribly. Yellow fever broke out and claimed Leclerc among innumerable other victims. In November, 1803, Rochambeau, his successor, decided to abandon the island and to re-embark the remnants of his force. But the peace of Amiens was at an end, and the transports, with the seven or eight thousand survivors of the expedition on board, were compelled to surrender to the British fleet.²

Under the Restoration no government felt inclined to repeat the experiment of the First Consul. At various times, however, unsuccessful attempts were made to induce President Boyer to acknowledge the suzerainty of France. To put an end to this state of affairs Villèle advised the King to agree to recognize formally the independence of St. Domingo, in return for certain

¹ Pasquier, VI. pp. 57-58.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XV. pp. 270-285, 290-293.

Thureau Dangin, *Le parti libéral*, pp. 286-292.

² Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VII. pp. 195-199.

commercial advantages and the payment of an indemnity of one hundred and fifty millions of francs to the dispossessed French colonists. Accordingly, in May, 1825, the Baron de Mackau was sent in command of a French squadron to offer these terms to the President. After objecting to the amount of the compensation, Boyer, under the threat of a blockade, accepted the French proposals. The bill which was introduced, in consequence, at the beginning of the Session of 1826, was concerned only with the conditions under which the indemnity should be paid to the colonists.

In January, 1825, the British Government recognized the independence of Mexico, Colombia, and Buenos Ayres. The occasion is memorable for Canning's pronouncement that "he had called in the new world to redress the balance of the old"—words which the development of events have not yet justified. In face of the situation which was thus created, France could only lose by delaying to follow the example of England. But before taking this step Villèle hoped that Ferdinand would agree to recognize formally the altered state of his South American dependencies. The French acknowledgment, at this juncture, of the independence of St. Domingo was inspired, without doubt, by the desire to make Ferdinand's abandonment of the fiction of his sovereignty over the revolted Spanish colonies as little humiliating as possible. Villèle, moreover, had good grounds for hoping that the settlement of the question of St. Domingo would regain for the Government some of its lost popularity. The recognition of independence would placate the Liberals, and, under the conditions under which it was to be carried out, should be well received throughout the country.¹ The debate, nevertheless, in the Lower Chamber proved animated, owing to the attitude of the Royalist opposition. La Bourdonnaye and his friends selected their point of attack with skill. They were little concerned with the bill itself, but they had much to say about the constitutional principle which the whole question involved. In the first place, by entering into negotiations with a Republic sprung from the worst of revolutions, a rebellion of slaves, the Government had lowered the dignity of the Crown. Secondly, and this was the chief point, they contended that the consent of the Chambers must be obtained before a cession of territory could legally take place. It was not a matter, they submitted, which fell within the Royal Prerogative. These Ultra-Royalist upholders of the Constitution, however, were too few to do more than raise awkward questions. On March 20th

¹ Pasquier, VI. pp. 41-45.

Nettement, *Histoire*, VII. pp. 203-204

the bill was carried by 245 votes to 70. But the doubt, which had been expressed as to the ability of the negroes to meet the pecuniary engagements which had been forced upon them, were soon justified.¹

In the previous year the first Jubilee, which had taken place in the nineteenth century, had been celebrated with great pomp at Rome. This feast of the Church, at which indulgence is granted to pilgrims, is held usually once in every twenty-five years. Permission was given, however, for a repetition of the ceremony in France during the year 1826.² The papal encyclical which accorded this sanction denounced, at the same time, with great violence the pestilential doctrines for the propagation of which the press was responsible. On February 15th, 1826, the French Jubilee was opened at Notre Dame. During the next two months three general processions marched through the streets, in each of which Charles himself figured conspicuously. The fourth and last took place on May 3rd. The blessing of the foundation-stone of the statue of Louis XVI, which was to be erected upon the Place Louis XV,³ was the great feature of the ceremony. In pomp and magnificence it far surpassed those which had preceded it. The King and the members of the Royal Family, Cardinals, Bishops, and nearly 2000 minor ecclesiastics, Field-Mmarshals, generals, staff officers, Peers, Deputies, civil officials, magistrates walked in the procession.⁴ The roar of artillery announced their arrival at the Place Louis XV. The Archbishop of Paris ascended the steps of the great altar which had been set up. In a loud voice he three times called to Heaven for mercy and forgiveness. All present fell upon their knees. Close behind the King knelt the Grand Chamberlain, the Prince de Talleyrand. There were persons in the crowd who could remember his appearance when he had officiated at the Feast of the Federation in the Champs de Mars. After the foundation-stone which the King laid had been blessed, the procession reformed, to the thunder of the guns, and returned to Notre Dame along streets lined with troops.⁵

It was a strange spectacle for men to see who had lived through Republican and Imperial days. Charles was anxious to ascertain the effect which it had had upon the people, and he bade Villèle make enquiries of the police authorities. Villèle, however, had no need to consult the reports of detectives in order to furnish the

¹ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XV. pp. 156-198.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VII. pp. 199-204.

² Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XV. pp. 318-319.

³ Place de la Concorde.

⁴ But no member of the Orléans family.

⁵ Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VII. pp. 220-223.

required information. In the procession he had followed behind the King, and had been admirably placed to observe the demeanour of the crowd.¹ He knew already, and he conceived it to be his duty to tell His Majesty, that the effect of the ceremony had been deplorable. Bitter dislike of the prelates and higher clergy, pain and disgust that their Sovereign should be walking humbly in the midst of them, these were the impressions which he had noted upon the faces of the people. In the three previous processions Charles had been dressed in the uniform of a lieutenant-general. On this last occasion, however, he had put on a violet mourning cloak, out of respect to the memory of his brother, Louis XVI. But Bishops wear violet robes, and this coincidence gave rise to the story, which was widely believed by the working classes, that the King, who was affiliated already, it was said, to a secret religious society, had been made a Bishop. The procession was a penance which the Church had imposed upon him in atonement for the errors of his youth.² Had he flaunted in public with a mistress, complains M. Thureau Dangin, the people would have forgiven him, but they were indignant that he should take part in a great religious ceremony.³

After the acquittal of the *Courrier* and the *Constitutionnel* the clerical controversy became more acute. Just as certain inveterate enemies of the Monarchy concealed their hostility under an affected solicitude for the Charter, so at this time many Liberals suddenly displayed a suspicious affection for the Declaration of 1682 and the liberties of the Gallican Church. This section of the party declared always that it had no animosity to religion, but that it dreaded a theocracy. In violence of invective, however, the anti-clerical papers were surpassed by their opponents, the *Drapeau blanc* and the *Mémorial Catholique*, the chief organ of the ultramontane party.⁴ At this juncture the Liberals received valuable assistance from an unexpected quarter. The Comte de Montlosier appeared upon the scene. This country gentleman from Auvergne was seventy years of age. From the days of his youth he had displayed a strong taste for controversies of all kinds, and had shown that he could hit hard with the pen and with the sword. In the Revolution he had emigrated to Coblenz, after sitting in the Constituent Assembly, and had been run through the body in a desperate duel fought at night upon the banks of the Rhine. Under the Restoration he had obtained a certain celebrity as the exponent of highly conservative opinions,

¹ Villèle, *Mémoires*, V. pp. 205-206.

Nettement, *Histoire*, VII. pp. 335-337.

² Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VII. p. 224.

³ Thureau Dangin, *Le parti libéral*, pp. 353-354.

⁴ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XV. pp. 317-318.

which had earned for him the name of the "feudal publicist." He despised the Charter, advocated the personal rule of the Sovereign, believed in the necessity of a privileged aristocracy, hated the Liberals, and could see no difference between Royer-Collard and La Fayette.¹

About the year 1824, M. de Montlosier began to be disturbed by the appearance of a threefold peril, the Congregation, the Jesuits, and the ultramontane doctrine. In 1825 he wrote several articles in the papers denouncing these dangers, and promising further details upon the subject before long. In the following year, at the time of the celebration of the Jubilee, appeared the famous *Mémoire à Consulter*. It is a work of over three hundred pages which might have been condensed with advantage. Its object was to show that the ultramontane doctrine and the increasing interference of the clergy in secular matters constituted a danger to the State, to society, and to religion itself. That part of the book which dealt with the Jesuits and the Congregation created a prodigious sensation. By means of the last-named institution the disciples of Loyola, Montlosier contended, had contrived to establish their influence over all branches of the administration and all classes of society. The development of the Congregation had been enormous during the last few years. From one hundred to one hundred and fifty Deputies were affiliated to it, and it counted numerous members in all ranks of the army. In a lower sphere of society, it undertook to find places for domestic servants, by whose assistance a regular system of espionage was exercised over families. Montlosier asserted, in conclusion, that these evils could be terminated by simply putting into execution laws which had never been abrogated.²

Though Montlosier had spoken of many things as facts which must have been matters of pure conjecture, his *Mémoire* contained, undoubtedly, a strong element of truth. The state of public opinion at the time ensured its success. The first edition was exhausted in a week. The Government increased the author's popularity by depriving him of his pension. The effect of his warnings was heightened by the appearance, at this juncture, of a pamphlet by Lamennais, in which he went the length of maintaining that the Pope had the right to depose a reigning Sovereign.³ A statement, which the Government obtained and published from thirteen Bishops and Archbishops, that they adhered

¹ Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. pp. 282-283.

Thureau Dangin, *Le parti libéral*, pp. 386-390.

² Montlosier, *Mémoire à Consulter*, Paris, 1826.

³ *La Religion considérée dans les rapports avec l'ordre politique et civil*.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XV. pp. 323-328.

to the Declaration of 1682, in so far as the separation of the temporal from the spiritual power was concerned, passed almost unnoticed. The discussion of the Budget in the Lower Chamber increased the agitation. On May 25th M. Agier, a member of the Royalist opposition, when the ecclesiastical vote was under consideration, denounced the ultramontane doctrine and the existence of secret religious societies. Frayssinous, Bishop of Hermopolis, the Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs, replied. He would appear to have come to the conclusion, without previous consultation with Villèle, that he must take the House into his confidence. In three separate speeches, which he delivered in the course of the next few days, he made two important admissions. Whilst refuting the charges brought against the clergy of interference in secular matters and of ultramontane leanings, he acknowledged the existence both of the Congregation and of the Jesuits. But, after sketching the history of the establishment in the Rue du Bac, he affirmed positively that it was a purely religious institution, in no way connected with politics. With regard to the Jesuits, he stated that ever since the year 1800 they had begun to return to France. Their activities, however, were limited to the direction of seven small seminaries, each of which had been established with the permission of the Bishop of the diocese.¹

Frayssinous, however, was much mistaken in imagining that his frank admissions would have a calming effect. The truth of Montlosier's statements was now officially confirmed. The opposition wanted to know what steps the Government proposed to take. In the Upper Chamber a question from Lainé upon the subject of the Jesuits brought the Minister to the tribune.² Upon this occasion Frayssinous warmly defended the Society from the accusations which had been brought against it, and maintained that the toleration, which had been extended towards its members, need create no alarm. The close of the Session put an end to these discussions in the Chambers, but the question was debated with renewed ardour in the press. Montlosier, moreover, embodied the substance of his charges in a denunciation which he laid before the Royal Court. This tribunal, on August 18th, whilst holding that the existence in France of a "society known as that of Jesus" constituted an illegality, declared itself incompetent to interfere, the matter being one for the police to deal with.³

Public attention was now wholly engrossed with the clerical

¹ Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VII. pp. 233-245.

Nettement, *Histoire*, VII. pp. 364-380.

² Pasquier, VI. pp. 59-61.

³ Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VII. pp. 245-249.

question. In the drawing-room and in the workshop the conversation turned invariably upon the doings of the "priest party," the "black men," the Congregation and the Jesuits. The newspapers retailed stories of clerical intolerance, and devoted columns to controversies upon religious subjects. In the shop windows were displayed pictures of stout and unctuous *curés* along with caricatures of lean, fanatical priests busily engaged in burning the works of Voltaire. In these days a crowd, or any appearance of public excitement, denoted generally an attempt to interfere with the missionaries, or to gain forcible entrance into a church for the body of an actor, or of an officer killed in a duel. At the theatre, the pit would call for the production of *Tartuffe*,¹ and would express noisily a keen appreciation of those passages in which hypocrisy is unmasked.

In August the question of the Ouvrard contracts was settled at last. At each successive discussion of the Budget since the war the Liberals and, more particularly, the Royalist opposition, had insisted upon bringing forward this affair. In consequence of the report of a committee, appointed in 1824, to enquire into the corrupt dealings alleged against Ouvrard and other persons, the case had been deferred to the Royal Court. But, as two Peers, General Bourdessoulle and Guilleminot, were involved in the affair, the tribunal pronounced its incompetency to deal with the matter. The case was then taken before the Peers who, on August 3rd, 1826, declared that they absolved the generals and all public officials from any imputation of having taken bribes to favour the contracts. They recommended, however, that proceedings should be instituted against Ouvrard and five of his agents for attempted corruption. The termination of this affair was the one event, during the year 1826, to which Villèle could look back with any degree of satisfaction. The Royalists had brought about the Spanish war, and it had served their purpose well. Under the existing conditions of unpreparedness, the excellent discipline, which had been maintained throughout the campaign, would have been impossible but for the contract with Ouvrard. Yet extreme Royalists like La Bourdonnaye and his friends never allowed an opportunity to pass of casting suspicions upon the transaction, and of commenting invidiously upon its irregular character.²

The acute development of the clerical question increased seriously the disunion of the Royalists. Villèle's position was rendered still more difficult by Charles' complete disregard of

¹ Thureau Dangin, *Le parti libéral*, pp. 319-321, 368-369, 373-376.

² Pasquier, VI. pp. 61-62.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XV. pp. 560-570.

public opinion. According to the ancient custom, upon the completion of his sixth year, the Duc de Bordeaux was to pass from the hands of Madame de Gontaut into those of a governor. After hesitating between Mathieu de Montmorency and Jules de Polignac, both members of the Congregation, the King decided to appoint Montmorency to the post. But before he had taken up his duties he died on Good Friday, March 29th, 1826, whilst upon his knees in the Church of Saint Thomas-d'Aquin. Choice was then made of the Duc de Rivière who, in 1804, had been condemned to death along with Georges Cadoudal and other Royalist conspirators. In his case, however, the sentence had been commuted into one of imprisonment. Rivière was fully as much under the influence of the priests as either Polignac or Montmorency, but he was less well known. For this reason his appointment might have attracted little attention had not M. Tharin, Bishop of Strasburg, been nominated at the same time to the post of tutor to the young prince. During this year of the Jubilee the language used by many of the Bishops in their charges to their clergy had been most injudicious. But the prelate whom the King selected to instruct his grandson, the heir-presumptive to the throne, had, in addition, spoken of the Jesuits "as designed by Providence to replace the Monarchy upon a solid foundation." ¹

On July 9th, a few days after the prorogation of the Chambers, Charles bade Villèle prepare that severe press law for which the clerical party had been clamouring so loudly. On December 29th, accordingly, a fortnight after the opening of Parliament, M. de Peyronnet introduced a bill of this nature into the Lower Chamber. Its provisions were of a most stringent character. In addition to existing restrictions the periodical press was to be fettered by further regulations, any contravention of which was to be punished by fines and imprisonment of increased severity. A new and heavy tax was to be imposed upon every newspaper, and upon all books and pamphlets of less than eighty pages 8vo. Moreover, no work of any kind might appear before it had been examined by Government inspectors. "Your law can be summed up very briefly," shouted Casimir Périer, as Peyronnet concluded. "Printing is to be abolished in France and removed to Belgium." ²

With the exception of the feeble protests in its favour from the papers in the pay of the Government, the press of all shades of opinion unanimously condemned the bill. Chateaubriand called

¹ Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VII. pp. 252-256.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XV. pp. 352-354.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 619-620.

Nettement, *Histoire*, VII. pp. 429-437.

it the law of Vandalism, and this designation was for a short time generally applied to it. But it was reserved for M. de Peyronnet himself to inspire the name by which it was to be known ever afterwards. Very imprudently he caused an article to be inserted in the *Moniteur*, in which the new law was described as *a law of justice and of love*.¹ Even the clerical papers had not much to say in favour of the bill. The ultramontane *Mémorial Catholique* pronounced it unsatisfactory, and Lamennais spoke of it as a monument of tyranny and hypocrisy. The Academy, upon the motion of Lacretelle, the historian, resolved to present a petition to the King pointing out the injury to letters which the proposed law would cause. But Charles refused to receive the deputation, and three Academicians, Lacretelle, Michaud, the editor of the Royalist paper *La Quotidienne*, and Villemain who, with Chateaubriand had drawn up the petition, were dismissed from all public appointments. Not only was the best intelligence of the country thus arrayed against the bill, it evoked the liveliest indignation among the working men. The indemnity law, the laws of sacrilege, and of primogeniture had been very unpopular with the middle classes. But now compositors, printers, and thousands of labourers saw their means of livelihood placed in serious jeopardy by the action of the Government.²

In the meantime, the indefatigable Montlosier had presented his *denunciation* to the Peers in the form of a petition. His allegations were enquired into by a committee of members of the Upper House, presided over by Portalis, who was learned in clerical matters. In his report Portalis concluded that that part of Montlosier's accusations, which related to the establishment in France of a monastic order unauthorized by the King, "should be forwarded to the President of the Council." After a debate, extended over two sittings, the Chamber, on January 19th, by 113 votes to 73 adopted the recommendation of the committee.³ This decision was combated by the Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs, who voted with the minority. No action against the Jesuits resulted from it, but this resolution of the Peers, carried in the teeth of Ministerial opposition, served to weaken still further the position of the Government.

On February 7th, the reporter of the committee which had been considering the press bill delivered his conclusions. They were favourable to its adoption, but several amendments were suggested. From February 14th till March 12th the bill was the

¹ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XVI. pp. 103-108.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 114-117.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VII. pp. 266-273.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 288-290.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XVI. pp. 117-154.

subject of animated debates in the Lower Chamber. Notable speeches against it were delivered by Royer-Collard, Benjamin Constant, and La Bourdonnaye. The Government measure was defended ably by Villèle and by Peyronnet. The opposition succeeded in modifying the original proposals in a more Liberal spirit, but it was unable to obtain their complete rejection. On March 12th the bill, amended in several important particulars, was passed by 233 votes to 134. A week later, M. de Peyronnet carried it up to the Peers. The composition of the committee, which was thereupon selected to examine it, augured ill for its adoption. The labours of MM. Portalis, de Broglie, and their fellow-members were largely directed towards ascertaining the effect which the bill would have upon the printing industry. The nature of these enquiries soon convinced the Government that the prospects were slender of passing the measure into law. On April 17th, M. de Peyronnet declared the bill withdrawn. The news was received with intense delight all over France.¹ Paris and most of the chief towns were illuminated. Bands of working men marched through the streets of the capital cheering the Peers enthusiastically. The public manifestations of joy, indeed, surpassed those which had taken place, the year before, upon the occasion of the rejection of the law of primogeniture.

On the day preceding the withdrawal of the press bill, Charles was persuaded by Marshal Oudinot to hold a review of the National Guards. He gave this promise without previous consultation with Villèle. In view of the excited state of the capital, the King's intention, which had been announced in the *Moniteur*, caused his advisers the keenest anxiety. The question of counter-marching the parade was earnestly debated at several Cabinet councils. The opinion prevailed, however, that a change of plans would create a very unfavourable impression. On Sunday, April 29th, accordingly, 20,000 National Guards were drawn up in front of the *École militaire*. Three hundred thousand spectators are said to have been present in the Champs de Mars. At one o'clock, Charles, followed by a brilliant staff and accompanied by the Dauphin, the Duc d'Orléans, and his son the Duc de Chartres, proceeded to ride along the front of the legions. At first the cries *Vive le roi* were plentiful, though others of *Vive la Charte* were plainly to be heard. When His Majesty, however, was passing in front of the 7th Legion, a citizen soldier stepped from the ranks and shouted *à bas les Ministres*. "I came here," said the King, "to receive your homage, not your advice; re-

¹ Pasquier, VI. pp. 78-81.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VII. pp. 273-290, 294-295.
Nettement, *Histoire*, VII. pp. 463-508.

move that man." Charles' firm attitude made a good impression, and the ceremony was concluded without any repetition of this scene. On his return to the Tuileries the King expressed himself well pleased with his reception upon the whole, and informed Oudinot that he might communicate an expression of his satisfaction to the National Guards.

Charles, when he conveyed his approval to the Marshal, was unaware of what had taken place after his departure from the Champ de Mars. The carriage containing the Dauphine and the Duchesse de Berri had been greeted with hisses and with angry cries of *à bas les Jesuitesses*. Some of the legions, as they marched home, had to pass the Ministry of Finance in the Rue de Rivoli, the residence of Villèle, and the Ministry of Justice in the Place Vendôme, the abode of Peyronnet. Upon arriving opposite the houses of these two Ministers, the bands are reported to have stopped playing, and the men, unrestrained by their officers, to have shouted *à bas les Jesuites, à bas les Ministres*. That evening, whilst he was dining with Count Apponyi, the Austrian Ambassador, Villèle was sent for to the Tuileries. Charles was now better acquainted with the events of the day, and his Minister brought to his knowledge further incidents of which he was still ignorant. At the same time he urged upon the King the advisability of disbanding the whole of the National Guard of Paris. Charles bade him assemble his colleagues at once and ask their opinions. A Cabinet Council was convened forthwith at the Ministry of the Interior. Frayssinous, the Duc de Doudeauville, and Clermont-Tonnerre advocated that those legions only should be dissolved of which the behaviour had been particularly bad. But the more drastic remedy proposed by Villèle was adopted. The very next day the disbandment of the National Guard was announced in the *Moniteur*, and all posts occupied by the citizen soldiers were taken over by regular troops. The Duc de Doudeauville, the Minister of the King's Household, thereupon resigned his appointment.¹

The decision to disband the National Guard was one of the important steps of the Villèle Government. The semi-police and semi-military duties of this militia were not always popular with the citizens who had to perform them. The abolition of the force was none the less resented very bitterly. The officers were

¹ Nettement, *Histoire*, VII. pp. 508-519.

Villèle, *Mémoires*, V. pp. 266-267.

Pasquier, VI. pp. 81-84.

C. Rousset, *Le Marquise de Clermont-Tonnerre*, pp. 334-341.

Frénilly, *Souvenirs*, pp. 527-528.

Mdme. de Boigne, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 206-207.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VII. pp. 296-301.

drawn mostly from the well-to-do *bourgeoisie*. Many of them took great pride in their uniform and in their military rank. The dissolution of the legions was regarded as an insult to the whole of the middle classes. Many of the unpopular measures of the time were forced upon Villèle, but, for the determination with regard to the National Guard, he was wholly responsible. Yet he was a man who, as a rule, favoured gradual rather than violent methods. As a Royalist he disliked the National Guard on account of its revolutionary origin. Doubtless, also, as a former naval officer, the existence of an armed mob was peculiarly repugnant to him. The wholesale disbandment of the legions has generally been considered to have been a mistake. After the Revolution of 1830, it was said that that event could not have taken place had the National Guard been in existence. But the experience of 1848 hardly justifies the contention. The Liberal press inveighed bitterly against the suppression of the force, and the matter was the subject of heated discussions in the Chamber, where Villèle was attacked violently by Laffitte. But the disbandment was followed by no public disturbances. On May 6th, in a letter to Polignac, Villèle described the town as perfectly quiet. "The King can do anything he pleases," the Duc de Rivière, the Governor of the Duc de Bordeaux, is reported to have said.¹ Perhaps this over-confidence on the part of the King's advisers was the most serious consequence of the disbandment of the National Guard.

No important measure of legislation was brought forward after the withdrawal of the press bill. So soon as the Peers had passed the Budget, on June 22nd, the King declared the Session closed. Two days later the censorship was reimposed, and maintained henceforward with unprecedented rigour. The unpopularity of the Government at this time is strikingly exemplified by the situation of those papers, which Sosthènes de La Rochefoucauld had bought three years before, and which constituted the Ministerial organs. The circulation of the *Drapeau blanc*, *Pilote*, *Journal de Paris*, and *Gazette de France* had become so limited, that the large sums necessary to maintain them were felt to be wasted. Once they were deprived of their subsidies these papers one and all ceased to appear.² When the Deputies separated for the summer recess rumours were current of a dissolution at an early date. These reports were not unfounded. Villèle realized that he could not face another Session under existing conditions. In the Lower House his majority was dwindling, and in the Here-

¹ Villèle, *Mémoires*, V. pp. 271, 274-275.

E. Daudet, *Ministère Martignac*, p. 52.

² Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XVI. pp. 643-645.

ditary Chamber he was in a minority. He had against him the best intelligence of the country, as represented by the Academy, the magistracy, and the press, besides the middle classes in Paris and in most of the large towns. His relations with the King were excellent, but it was doubtful how long the Royal confidence in him would be proof against the intrigues of Polignac and others anxious to supplant him or to drive him from office.¹

The results of the six by-elections which had taken place during the year were not encouraging. In each case a member of the opposition had been successful. At Rouen, indeed, the Government candidate had obtained only thirty-seven votes.² Most of the prefects when consulted about the chances of a general election depicted the outlook in gloomy colours. A recent statute, which laid down the way in which the lists of electors were to be kept, had deprived these officials of some of their powers of fraudulently manipulating the registers in the interests of the ministerial candidate. Moreover, under the terms of the law of 1822, the censorship would have to be removed a month before the electoral colleges were convened. It was not alone, however, the future composition of the popular assembly which Villèle had to consider. In order to carry on his policy he must be in a position to command a majority in the Hereditary Chamber—a result which could be achieved only by the elevation to the Peerage of a goodly number of his staunchest supporters in the Lower House.³ Yet, notwithstanding the odds against him, Villèle was prepared to court the chances of a dissolution.

The imposition of the censorship proved ineffectual to arrest the attacks upon the Government. Two societies, *La société des amis de la liberté de la presse* and the more famous *Aide toi, le ciel t'aidera*, were formed for the dissemination of pamphlets. Peers, Deputies, and the opposition of all shades of opinion subscribed to them. Chateaubriand and Hyde de Neuville worked hand in hand with Guizot, Salvandy, and Kératry.⁴ Whilst the war of pamphlets was at its height Manuel died suddenly, on August 22nd, at Maisons, the house of Laffitte, near Paris. Ever since his expulsion from the Chamber in 1823 Manuel had disappeared from political life. At the elections of 1824 his party had regarded him as too compromising a person to put forward. For the last three years he had lived at Maisons as a pensioner of the Liberal banker. But at his funeral, on August 24th, it was to be

¹ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XVI. pp. 650-651.

² Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VII. p. 314.

³ Nettement, *Histoire*, VII. p. 551.

Pasquier, VII. pp. 92-93.

⁴ Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. p. 327.

Nettement, *Histoire*, VII. pp. 558-560.

seen that a great change had come over public opinion. The body was conveyed from Maisons to the Barrière des Martyrs, by Baffitte, La Fayette, Béranger, Thiers, and Mignet. At this point, where the funeral procession was to be formed, an enormous crowd collected. A number of students and other youths announced their intention of carrying the body. But a commissary of police interposed, forbade this mode of conveyance and insisted that the coffin must be replaced upon the hearse. In the meantime the traces had been cut and the horses removed. Regardless of the protests of the officials, the demonstrators proceeded to drag the car along with ropes. Soon, however, a squadron of cavalry appeared escorting a second hearse, upon which the police attempted to place the coffin. The mob resisted, the soldiers and *gendarmes* charged, and the tumult became serious. Baffitte addressed the officers, harangued the crowd, and at last succeeded in arranging a compromise. The horses were harnessed to the original car, and the procession proceeded amidst a constant uproar to the cemetery of Père-Lachaise. Speeches were delivered over the grave by Baffitte, La Fayette, Béranger, and lastly by Schonen, who used language of a distinctly revolutionary character. Two years before the funeral of General Foy had been made the occasion of a solemn protest against the reactionary policy of the Government. The attitude of the people round the coffin of Manuel, the Carbonaro, had a more serious significance. The demonstration on August 24th, 1827, was directed against the dynasty.¹

Soon after this affair, on September 9th, Charles started from Saint-Cloud to visit the camp at Saint-Omer. At Soissons, Laon, Saint-Quentin, Cambrai, Valenciennes, Douai, and at all the villages through which he passed, he received an enthusiastic welcome. Arriving at Saint-Omer, on the 9th, he witnessed the manœuvres of the troops during the next five days. Returning by way of Arras, Amiens, and Beauvais, he reached Saint-Cloud on the 20th. He was much gratified by the warmth of his reception at every stage of his journey. But above all he was impressed by the loyal spirit and the devotion of the troops. He carried away the firm conviction that come what might he could depend upon the fidelity of the army. Judged by the light of subsequent events it may have been unfortunate that Jules de Polignac accompanied him upon this occasion.² In Liberal circles, in Paris, the King's journey gave rise to the rumour that upon his

¹ Nettement, *Histoire*, VII. pp. 563-567.
 Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VII. pp. 306-311.

Thureau Dangin, *Le parti libéral*, pp. 309-312.

² Nettement, *Histoire*, VII. pp. 554-556.

arrival at the camp he intended to proclaim the abolition of the Charter and the restoration of the old *régime*.¹

Upon his return to Saint-Cloud, Charles discussed the question of a dissolution in all its bearings with Villèle and Corbière. The prefects, upon being again consulted, sent in reports of a rather more hopeful character, and declared that as time went on the situation would tend to grow worse. Yet so great was the unpopularity of the Government that Villèle's reasons for pressing for a dissolution are difficult to understand. Perhaps M. de Nettement's theory may be correct that he wished to see the Liberals obtain a representation more in harmony with the sentiments of the country, in order to compel the Royalists to unite in self-defence. On October 16th the matter was submitted to the whole Cabinet. MM. de Clermont-Tonnerre and de Chabrol opposed both the dissolution and the proposed large creation of Peers. The first-named, the Minister of War, suggested that the Government should regain its popularity by sending an expedition to Algiers.² The blockade, which had been established since June 15th, in consequence of the Dey's refusal to grant the satisfaction demanded for an insult offered to the French Consul, had proved ineffectual to overcome his obduracy. This alternative proposal, however, was not entertained, and Villèle was soon able to overcome the objections of his two colleagues, and to inform the King that the Cabinet was unanimously in favour of a dissolution.

The blockade of Algiers was not the only warlike undertaking which the Government had in hand at this juncture. The Greek insurgents had numerous sympathizers in France. The Liberals, the anti-clerics, and the Royalist followers of Chateaubriand were enthusiastic Phil-hellenists.³ Early in 1825 the intervention of Mehemet Ali of Egypt, and the despatch to the Morea of a well-equipped fleet and a highly trained army, under his son Ibrahim, appeared to have turned the scale hopelessly against the Christians. The defence of Missolonghi excited the admiration, and the barbarous methods of Ibrahim the indignation, of the civilized world. Canning, abandoning his policy of inaction, sought to arrive at an understanding with Russia, in order to put an end to the struggle. The negotiations, conducted by the Duke of Wellington, who had been sent to congratulate Nicholas upon his accession, resulted in the signing, on April 4th, 1826, of the Protocol of St. Petersburg. Under the terms of this instrument

¹ Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VII. pp. 311-312.

² Nettement, *Histoire*, VII, pp. 590-594.

C. Rousset, *Le Marquis de Clermont-Tonnerre*, pp. 346-351.

³ Pasquier, VI. pp. 52-53.

Great Britain was empowered to offer to the Porte a settlement of the question upon the basis of the establishment of Greece as a vassal State. But, as Canning shrank from bringing coercion to bear upon the Turk, and because Metternich was strongly opposed to intervention of any kind, the Protocol led to no effective action. In the meantime, on October 7th, 1826, Russia, by the Treaty of Akerman, obtained upon her own account the evacuation of the Principalities and a satisfactory settlement of her other demands. This arrangement, however, which averted the immediate danger of a Russo-Turkish war, in no way advanced the solution of the Greek question.

Villèle was constantly twitted by the opposition with having failed to reap advantages, either political or commercial, from the Spanish War. In the Greek question he was accused of having neglected French interests, and of having allowed Great Britain to come to a separate understanding with Russia.¹ In the hope of regaining some of the popularity which his domestic legislation had cost him, Villèle, in the autumn of 1826, suggested to Canning common action upon the basis of the Protocol. A conference opened in London in the spring of the following year, resulted in a treaty, signed on July 6th, 1827, between France, Great Britain, and Russia, by the terms of which the three signatory Powers undertook to procure the autonomy of Greece under the suzerainty of the Sultan. In certain secret articles, moreover, it was agreed that, in the last resort, force should be used to bring about a cessation of hostilities. Strong hopes were entertained, however, that a pacific blockade of the Morea would prove sufficient to bring Ibrahim to terms.

On October 20th, on the day on which Villèle had informed Charles that his Ministers were in favour of a dissolution, the ships of the three Powers were face to face with the Mussulman fleet in the Bay of Navarino. Codrington, the senior admiral, presented an ultimatum to Ibrahim, demanding a cessation of hostilities and the evacuation of the Morea. Immediate action was not contemplated, but the refusal of the Turks to remove some fireships led to an exchange of shots. The battle became general, and before nightfall the Turkish and Egyptian fleet had been destroyed completely.²

The news of the "untoward event" of Navarino reached Paris on November 8th, two days after the appearance in the *Moniteur* of three Royal ordinances. The first dissolved the Chamber of Deputies and convened the electoral colleges for the 17th and 24th of November. The second put an end to the censorship

¹ Pasquier, VI. p. 55.

² *Cambridge Modern History*, X. pp. 189-196.

of the press, and the third created seventy-six new Peers. The large majority of these were either supporters of the Government in the Lower Chamber, notorious for their strong clerical views, or large landed proprietors. Soult, Duc de Dalmatie, the only Marshal who was not a member of the Upper Chamber, figured among this large creation, and five prelates were added to the Bench of Bishops. The removal of the censorship was the signal for an attack of unprecedented violence upon the Government. Though it was recognized with joy that by the destruction of the Mussulman armada the independence of Greece had been achieved, Villèle gained no credit for his policy. By convening the electoral colleges so rapidly he had hoped to catch the opposition unprepared. But, despite the secrecy which had been observed, the dissolution came as no surprise. For some time past the *Société des amis de la liberté de la presse* and that of the *Aide toi, le ciel t'aidera*¹ had been making ready for the elections. The promulgation of the ordinances increased their activity. Chateaubriand published his *Dernier avis aux électeurs*.² The Royalist and Liberal opposition worked in complete harmony. The *Journal des Débats*, the *Constitutionnel*, and the *Courrier* recommended the same candidates to their readers. In their lists the names of Benjamin Constant, Casimir Périer, or La Fayette were to be seen alongside those of La Bourdonnaye, Hyde de Neuville, or Delalot.³

The *collèges d'arrondissement* met on November 17th. The next day it was known that in each of the eight colleges of the capital the Liberal candidate had been successful. News of like results was received from the departments. In hardly any case was a Ministerialist returned. On the evening of the 18th many quarters of the town were illuminated. Disorderly crowds armed with sticks and stones assembled, and, as the night wore on, the disturbance assumed a serious aspect. In the Rue Saint-Denis and in the neighbouring streets carts were overturned, paving-stones taken up, and barricades erected. The cry resounded, *des lampions, des lampions*—that ominous summons to the inhabitants to light up their windows, which they were to hear again upon many occasions. Police and troops arrived, opened fire, and carried the barricades at the point of the bayonet. The following night scenes of the same kind were witnessed. The Minister of War, in his instructions to the general officers com-

¹ Nettement, *Histoire*, VII. pp. 595-601.

Frénilly, *Souvenirs*, p. 357.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VII. pp. 319-322.

Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. pp. 326-328.

² Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XVII. pp. 52-53.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 69.

manding the troops, prescribed stern measures. The cavalry charged, volleys were fired, barricades were stormed. For the first time the crash of musketry was heard in the streets of Paris, since the 13th Vendémiaire of the year IV, when Barras had commissioned an obscure artillery officer to disperse the sections.

After this second night the disturbances were not repeated. It was said that they never could have taken place had not the police connived at them. The Government was suspected of having secretly encouraged the rioting, in the hope of instilling the electors with the fear that further Liberal victories would be followed by a revolution.¹ On November 24th, when the departmental colleges assembled, fewer Liberals were returned, but many Ministerial candidates were rejected. Among the unseated members was M. de Peyronnet himself, who was defeated both at Bourges and at Bordeaux. On the other hand, no less than seven electoral colleges selected M. Royer-Collard. By November 30th most of the results were known, and Villèle could estimate fairly accurately the composition of the new Chamber. The Ministerialist and Liberal party each numbered about 170, and the Royalist opposition some 80 members. Provided they would consent to act together, the Royalists had a majority. But Villèle had lost any hopes, which he may once have entertained, of such a consummation. On December 2nd he informed the King that he could not count upon a majority, and that the Cabinet was prepared to retire.

By the press and by the public the result of the elections was hailed as a defeat for the Government. The announcement was eagerly awaited that a new Ministry had been formed. But the King was reluctant to part with Villèle, and was at a loss to know what to do. At first he hoped that a partial reconstruction of the Cabinet would meet the situation. But Polignac, Rivière, and all the influence of the Court were opposed to the retention of Villèle. On December 6th Charles decided to entrust the task of forming a Cabinet to Talaru. Talaru, an Ultra-Royalist Peer and a former Ambassador at Madrid, understood the mechanism of party Government as little as the King himself. He disapproved of Villèle's policy, but he considered that Charles was not justified in "abandoning his Minister," as he expressed it. Talaru's refusal to form a Ministry, and the words of the Dauphine "that he would descend a step of his throne were he to desert M. de Villèle," induced the King to return to his plan of a partial renewal of the Cabinet. Peyronnet had been unseated, Corbière's

¹ Pasquier, VI. pp. 97-99.
 Vulabellé, *Deux Restaurations*, VII. pp. 322-330.
 Nettement, *Histoire*, VII. pp. 603-610.

health had given way, and Clermont-Tonnerre's clerical leanings made him odious to the army. The King had no objection to part with any of these three, and he began to hope that Villèle might contrive to replace them by persons acceptable to all sections of Royalists. But it was soon evident that nobody of any standing would associate his fortunes with so unpopular a Minister.¹

In the meantime, intrigues were hatched, and in society, in the political *salons*, and in the press every possible combination was put forward. The Faubourg-Saint-Germain and the Court favoured the formation of a purely Royalist Cabinet, to be presided over by Jules de Polignac, and in which La Bourdonnaye and Delalot were to have seats. In other circles some advocated the creation of a Government of the Centre under Talleyrand, who was to be supported by Lainé, Pasquier, and Roy. But another party hoped to see formed a mixed Liberal and Royalist Cabinet, which was to derive its chief strength from Chateaubriand, Delalot, Casimir Périer, and Sebastiani. Charles, though convinced at last that he must part with Villèle, regarded none of these combinations with favour. He hated Talleyrand, disliked Chateaubriand, and had been persuaded by Villèle that his friend Polignac had not the qualities necessary for high office. In this dilemma he turned to Chabrol, the Minister of Marine, who was agreeable to him personally, and invited him to form a government. The task proved arduous, and at one time Chabrol was upon the point of declaring his inability to carry it out. Charles would not hear of Chateaubriand or Pasquier, and the Dauphin objected to the Duc de Bellune. Not till January 3rd could a list be devised with which the King at last coldly pronounced himself satisfied. Even then a difficulty arose which threatened to unsettle everything. The new Ministers made their acceptance of office conditional upon Villèle's elevation to the Peerage, along with Peyronnet and Corbière. The former President of the Council, however, wished to remain a Deputy in order better to defend his former policy, which he knew would be attacked in the new Chamber. He yielded, nevertheless, to the King's persuasion.²

On January 5th, 1828, the *Moniteur* made public the names of the new Ministers. The Vicomte de Martignac was Minister of the Interior, the Comte de La Ferronnays Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Comte de Saint-Cricq Minister of Commerce and the

¹ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XVII. pp. 98-107.

Villèle, *Mémoires*, V. pp. 288-298.

Nettement, *Histoire*, VII. pp. 613-621.

² Villèle, *Mémoires*, V. pp. 299-310.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XVII. pp. 113-117, 124-126.

Nettement, *Histoire*, VII. pp. 616-628.

Colonies, the Vicomte Decaux Minister of War, and Portalis Keeper of the Seals. Chabrol, as in the former Government, was Minister of Marine, and Frayssinous, Bishop *in partibus* of Hermopolis, was still Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs, but the control of public instruction was no longer to form a department of his office. "You had become too unpopular," said the Dauphin to M. de Villèle when he came to take leave of him upon his retirement. "God grant, Sir, that it may be only I who have become unpopular," replied the fallen statesman.¹

¹ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XVII. p. 127.

CHAPTER XVI

AN INTERLUDE

M. DE VILLÈLE had remained in power for a longer period than any other Minister under the Restoration. During the whole time he had been in office the country had been prosperous, individual liberty had been respected, and the press, but for the imposition for a few months only of the censorship, had enjoyed a reasonable degree of freedom. Villèle's name may be associated justly with sound finance, and with wise measures of administrative reform. But, though he may have disapproved of them personally, he was responsible for those measures which have earned for the *Chambre retrouvée* its unfortunate reputation. Nevertheless, the immediate cause of his fall was not so much the apprehensions which his reactionary legislation excited, as the cabals and jealousies of his followers. He was himself to blame, however, for the quarrel with Chateaubriand. The presence of Chateaubriand in the Cabinet may have been incompatible with the development of a peaceful policy, but it was unwise to humiliate unnecessarily a man so powerful and so vindictive. Posterity has pronounced upon M. de Villèle the verdict that he sacrificed his personal conviction too much to considerations of party. Yet the Royalists, whose cause he served so faithfully, repaid him with disloyalty and ingratitude. When they coalesced with the Liberals to bring about his downfall they could not realize that they had driven from office the one man who, without violating the Constitution, was capable of governing in the interests of their party.¹ The new Ministry was without a President of the Council. Martignac, however, by whose name the Government has always been known, was, from the first, recognized as its chief. He was a lawyer by profession, and had acted as political adviser to the Duc d'Angoulême in Spain. Upon his return he had been appointed to a post in the administration, but had never sat in the Cabinet. He was possessed of considerable charm of manner, and was an excellent speaker.

¹ Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. pp. 233-234, 289.

Villèle had confided to him the task of introducing the bill to compensate the *émigrés*, and his speech upon that occasion had added greatly to his reputation. From its earliest days the Martignac Cabinet was confronted with a serious difficulty, inherent to the circumstances under which it had come into existence. In the winter of 1821, Villèle had been the leader of a victorious opposition. His rise to power had been in accordance with the natural working of the party system. The elections of 1827 had profoundly modified the composition of the Chamber. Not only a change of Ministers, but a complete change of policy was the proper outcome of the altered spirit of the electorate. Fraysinous and Chabrol, however, had occupied seats in the former Cabinet, and Martignac a place in the administration. Under these conditions the new ministry was regarded necessarily as a mere survival of M. de Villèle's Government.¹

Had the King given Martignac his loyal support, it is possible that his tact and his diplomacy might have enabled him to overcome this initial difficulty of the situation. But Charles had parted with Villèle and his colleagues against his will, and he now accepted their successors with reluctance. He was annoyed, moreover, at one of the first acts of his new Ministers. They had insisted, upon taking office, that both Franchet, the director, and Lavau, the prefect of police, the two members of the administration whose connection with the Congregation was notorious, should be removed from their posts. The King assented grudgingly, but the concession thus extorted from him indisposed him still more against Martignac and his fellow-Ministers.² He continued to communicate with Villèle and to consult him upon all occasions. Rumours of the influence still exercised by the former President of the Council were noised abroad and added to the difficulties of the Government. As is proved by Charles' correspondence with Villèle, the Cabinet had been in existence hardly a week before the members of it began to doubt seriously whether they would be able to command a majority in the coming Session. Chateaubriand had wished to see formed a Government composed of Liberals and of his own followers. No sooner was the Martignac Cabinet constituted than his organ, the *Journal des Débats*, opened fire upon it. Ministers felt too weak to withstand an attack from so dangerous a quarter, and they sought to impress upon the King the necessity of propitiating

¹ Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. pp. 329-334.

Pasquier, VI. pp. 103-105.

E. Daudet, *Ministère Martignac*, pp. 113-116.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XVII. pp. 178-183.

² Pasquier, VI. pp. 105-106.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XVII. p. 187.

Chateaubriand. But Charles would not listen to the notion of bringing him into the Government, nor was he much more favourably disposed towards Portalis or Pasquier, whose inclusion in the administration was suggested also. In his opinion, if his Ministers felt insecure, it was to the Right, not to the Centre or to the Left, that they should look for support.¹

Whilst Chateaubriand thus displayed his hostility, La Bourdonnaye, now that Villèle had been driven from office, showed a disposition to support the Government. The King signified that he would have no objection to admitting either him or Delalot into the Cabinet. But MM. Roy, Portalis, and de La Ferronnays were not prepared to enter into an alliance of this kind and, to avert a ministerial crisis, the negotiations were broken off which are believed to have begun with these two men.² It was one of the conditions under which Ministers had consented to take office that an enquiry should be instituted into the whole question of those establishments, known as small seminaries, which purported to exist only for the education of youths intended for the ecclesiastical profession. A commission was appointed, accordingly, the members of which represented very fairly all classes of opinions. Though it was a step directed against the Jesuits, Charles appears to have offered little objection to it. His interference in the matter appears to have been confined to the substitution of Mounier for Pasquier upon the commission. The director of police in the Richelieu administration he regarded, apparently, as more subject to his influence than Pasquier.³ The institution of this enquiry, and the nomination of Vatimesnil to the post of Grand Master of the University, constituted the most important acts of the Government before the opening of Parliament.⁴

The Chambers met on February 5th. As usual, the constitution of the *bureaux* in the Lower Chamber, and other preliminary measures afforded the first indications of the state of parties. Royalists and Liberals were so nicely balanced that a group of some thirty dissident Royalists, inspired by Chateaubriand and led in the Chamber itself by Agier, appeared to be masters of the situation.⁵ This state of affairs made an arrangement with Chateaubriand imperative. He had declared that he would never enter the Government except in the capacity of Minister

¹ Villèle, *Mémoires*, V. pp. 315-324.

E. Daudet, *Ministère Martignac*, pp. 125-130, 140-141.

² Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XVII. pp. 201-202.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 195-197.

Pasquier, VI. pp. 106-107.

⁴ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XVII. pp. 209-212.

⁵ E. Daudet, *Ministère Martignac*, p. 149.

for Foreign Affairs. He intimated, however, that he might be induced to go to Rome as Ambassador. Ministers were only too delighted to comply with this desire. Chateaubriand was, as was the case with him frequently, in sore straits for money. He was informed that not only would he be sent to Rome, but that 120,000 francs would be granted him in return for his past diplomatic services, and as a compensation for the loss of his salary as a Privy Councillor. At the same time the Government took into its pay the *Journal des Débats*, and made good to the proprietors the full arrears of the subsidy which they had forfeited in 1824 when, upon Chateaubriand's dismissal, they had begun their campaign against M. de Villèle. No less than five hundred thousand francs, of which Charles himself provided three, were expended in purchasing the support of this powerful paper.¹

The alliance with Chateaubriand was consolidated by less questionable methods. The intention of the Chamber to censure the conduct of the late Government in the address in reply to the King's speech made, it impossible for Chabrol and Frayssinous to remain in the Cabinet. Two portfolios were thus placed at the disposal of the Government. The King was in favour of replacing Chabrol by La Bourdonnaye. He demurred, however, and made conditions, thus enabling Ministers to obtain the Royal consent to the appointment of Hyde de Neuville to the vacant post of Minister of Marine.² Hyde de Neuville was of English descent, and in revolutionary and republican times had risked his life, upon many occasions, in the Royal cause. After numerous hairbreadth escapes from the police of the Directory and the Consulate he had sought refuge in America. Under the Restoration he had been one of the violent Ultra-Royalists of the *Chambre introuvable* and, after its dissolution, had been sent as Minister to the United States. Upon his return to political life in France he had become an enthusiastic follower of Chateaubriand. In 1828 he was a prominent member of the Agier group of dissident Royalists, and professed the strictly constitutional principles preached by Chateaubriand and the *Journal des Débats*.³ La Bourdonnaye, though he had made difficulties about accepting the appointment offered to him, was highly offended when it was

¹ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XVII. pp. 290-291.

Pasquier, VI. p. 107.

E. Daudet, *Ministère Martignac*, pp. 131-132.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 158-159.

³ Hyde de Neuville, *Mémoires*.

E. Daudet, *Recits des temps révolutionnaires. Le complot Coigny-Hyde de Neuville*.

G. Lenotre, *Vieux papiers vieilles maisons*, 2me série, pp. 189-191.

given to Hyde. Martignac and his colleagues were to discover before long that, if they had acquired the support of Chateaubriand, they had incurred the bitter enmity of La Bourdonnaye.¹

No difficulty was experienced in inducing Charles to allow Frayssinous to be succeeded by Feutrier, Bishop of Beauvais, a prelate of enlightened views. By all means in his power Martignac sought to prove his moderation. He hoped to rally round him the Constitutional Liberals and Royalists, and to form a great Centre party which should continue the policy of the Duc de Richelieu.² In pursuance of this aim he had persuaded Charles to nominate M. Royer-Collard to the Presidency of the Chamber. The Doctrinaire had not obtained the largest number of votes ; Martignac, nevertheless, recommended the King to appoint him, upon the ground that his election to the Chamber by seven different colleges gave him a claim superior to that of any other candidate.³ But the selection of Royer-Collard, which Martignac had advocated in order to please the Left Centre and Constitutional Liberals, was resented by a large number of Royalists. Moreover, their candidate, Ravez, who had been for ten years the President of the Chamber, considered himself ill-used and became the sworn enemy of the Government. His hostility was to prove a serious matter. The King liked him and had a high opinion of his judgment. About this time he appears to have taken the place of Villèle as one of Charles' secret and most trusted counsellors.⁴

The debate in the Lower Chamber upon the address in reply to the King's speech was animated. The determination of the Liberals and the Agier group to apply the words *deplorable system* to the policy of the late Government was opposed by the survivors of Villèle's party and by La Bourdonnaye. Martignac was in a difficult position. It was impossible for him to criticize severely measures with which he had personally been concerned. To have defended them would have been to depart from the line of policy which he intended to pursue. He confined himself to deprecating the employment of language unnecessarily harsh. On March 8th the insertion into the address of the paragraph under discussion was carried by a majority of fourteen votes. Everybody was perfectly aware that Charles would resent deeply any censure passed upon a policy which had had his constant approval. That night the wildest rumours were current. It was said that the Government had resigned, that the Chamber was

¹ Pasquier, VI. pp. 109-110.

² Thureau Dangin, *Le parti libéral*, pp. 400-401.

³ Vulabellé, *Deux Restaurations*, VII. p. 421.

⁴ Pasquier, VI. p. 108.

to be dissolved, and that M. de Villèle had been sent for by the King. In point of fact Charles was very angry. To Martignac and his fellow-Ministers, when they were admitted to his presence, he expressed his indignation, and threatened to refuse to receive the address. But on the following day to their astonishment he was in a different frame of mind. He now announced his intention of receiving the deputation in the usual manner, and of merely admonishing the members of it in the mildest language. The reasons which induced him to refrain from any strong expression of displeasure are unknown. It may be conjectured that, during the night, he had consulted his secret advisers, and that his changed attitude was the result of their counsels. There can be little doubt, however, that this affair quickened his resolve to seize the earliest opportunity of ridding himself of Ministers who were incapable of protecting him from what he considered was a disrespectful message from the Chamber.¹

The two chief measures which the Government proposed to bring forward during the Session were of a distinctly Liberal character. The first, introduced by Martignac on March 25th, was a bill to provide for the revision annually of the voting registers. The proposed law had been framed with the object of imposing a necessary check upon the powers which the prefects had so scandalously abused at elections during the past eight years. The subject involved matters of great public interest, and the discussion of the Ministerial proposals occupied the attention of the Chamber from April 28th till May 28th. For the first time for many years the Liberals gave their support to a Government bill. The Royalists, on the other hand, either opposed it altogether or sought to amend it. Martignac intervened upon several occasions with great effect in the debate, and, on May 28th, when the result of the division was made known, he was found to have carried his measure by a majority of 152. In the Upper Chamber the bill encountered opposition from the Peers created by M. de Villèle. On June 24th, nevertheless, it was passed by 159 votes to 83.²

In the meantime Ministers had come again into conflict with the King. On April 21st the Duc de Rivière, the Governor of the Duc de Bordeaux, had died, and upon his death-bed had recom-

¹ Pasquier, VI. pp. 110-111.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VII. pp. 422-424.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XVII. pp. 305-308.

E. Daudet, *Ministère Martignac*, pp. 164-168.

Villèle, *Mémoires*, V. pp. 325-328.

² E. Daudet, *Ministère Martignac*, pp. 171-176.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XVII. pp. 429-504.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VII. pp. 428-433.

mended the Baron de Damas to the King as his successor. But the objections to his appointment were great. He had been Minister for Foreign Affairs under the late Government, and was as closely connected with the *priest party* as Rivière himself. These two facts, however, which Ministers regarded as insuperable obstacles to his nomination were, in the King's eyes, strong recommendations in his favour. Charles, moreover, maintained stoutly that the question was a family matter, not an affair of State. Without further discussion with his Ministers, he selected the Baron de Damas, and his appointment to the post of Governor to the young Prince appeared in the Gazette of April 28th. The members of the Cabinet, thereupon, tendered their resignations. But they were content to withdraw them, upon the King's assurance that the choice of a Governor to the heir-presumptive to the throne was not a question about which he was bound to consult his Ministers.¹

The second measure by which Martignac hoped to conciliate moderate Royalist and Liberal opinion took the form of a law concerning the press. The Duc de Broglie had assisted in framing the bill, which contained none of the unpopular restrictions of the law of 1822. The Ministerial power of imposing the censorship was abolished, together with "preliminary authorization" and "offences of tendency." But the monetary guarantee demanded from political papers was now extended to periodicals of a non-political character, and it was not proposed to return to the provisions of the law of 1819 and to restore to the juries the trial of press cases. When the bill, on April 14th, was introduced by Portalis, it was received with applause from the Liberal benches. But the approval with which it had been greeted at first, quickly gave place to unqualified condemnation. The Liberal papers one and all denounced its concessions as illusory. Attempts were even made to show that it resembled Villèle's rejected press law of the year before. "All we shall have gained," said the *Courrier*, "is that we shall see a polite Corbière instead of a brutal Corbière, and a Jansenist Peyronnet instead of a Jesuitic Peyronnet." Language of this kind augured ill. Ministers were afraid that they were to be deprived of all Liberal support. On May 29th, when the general discussion began, the bill was attacked by both the Right and the Left. A large section of Royalists regarded it as a weak surrender to the revolutionary spirit, whilst the Liberals contended that the greater freedom,

¹ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XVII. pp. 381-384.

E. Daudet, *Ministère Martignac*, pp. 188-190.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VII. pp. 426-427.

Mdme. de Boigne, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 235-239.

which it appeared to confer upon the press, would be found to have no real existence. But, though Benjamin Constant and other members of the party criticized it adversely, they supported it grudgingly, after an amendment had been introduced to reduce the amount of the sum which daily newspapers were required to deposit. On June 19th the bill was carried in the Lower Chamber by a majority of 150. In the Upper House it was opposed by Villèle and Peyronnet. But upon this occasion many of the seventy-six Peers, created in the previous November, showed by voting for the bill that they did not consider themselves bound to support the man to whom they owed their elevation. On July 14th the measure was passed by 139 votes to 71.¹

Whilst the Deputies had been discussing the press bill, one of their number, M. Labbey de Pompières, a Liberal, had moved that a charge of high treason and malversation should be preferred against the members of the late Government. Martignac by all means in his power sought to block the motion or to obtain the adjournment of the House. But after a stormy sitting, on June 14th, it was resolved by a large majority to appoint a committee to report upon the charges. The Government, however, refused the communication of any documents and, under these conditions the enquiry was necessarily very incomplete. Nevertheless, on July 21st, M. Girod, member for the Ain, delivered the following conclusions. A majority of the nine members of the Committee considering that the toleration extended by the late Government to the Jesuits had been illegal, that the imposition of the censorship in 1824 and 1827 had been unnecessary, that improper circumstances had attended the arrest at Battenheim, in 1822, of the late Colonel Caron, that the creation of seventy-six Peers in 1827 had been prejudicial to the interests of the Crown and the nation, and that the conduct of the administration had been deserving of censure in connection with the riots on November 19th and 20th of the previous year, recommended that the Chamber should take steps to obtain fuller information upon these points. The Left, thereupon, brought forward and carried a motion to adjourn the discussion of the report till after the Budget. This, to all intents and purposes, meant to postpone the matter indefinitely. The object of the Liberals would thus appear to have been attained. By keeping these charges suspended over the heads of Villèle

¹ E. Daudet, *Ministère Martignac*, pp. 177-185.

Pasquier, VI. pp. 113-114.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VII. pp. 435-440.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XVII. pp. 591-637.

and his colleagues, they considered they had rendered impossible their return to office.¹ On August 2nd, Charles, who for some time past had ceased to correspond with Villèle, wrote to express his sympathy with him "in this dirty affair which has ended, however, as well as could be expected," and to bid him "depart in peace" for the country.²

It was not alone by the Liberal character of the measures brought before the Chamber that Ministers sought to convince the country that the reactionary policy of M. de Villèle was at an end. In his first month of office Martignac induced the King to forgive the three Academicians, Villemain, Michaud, and Baccrotte, and to restore to them the posts which they had lost the year before.³ Moreover, the interdict was removed which, under M. de Frayssinous, had driven Guizot and Cousin from the University. Their lecture-rooms at the Sorbonne, which they were once more allowed to re-enter, were thronged, not only by students, but by educated persons of all descriptions.⁴ The suppression of the *cabinet noir* is another measure for which the Martignac Government can claim credit. This secret branch of the Post Office, which existed for the purpose of opening letters, is supposed to have been instituted by Louis XIV. In his hands, and in those of Napoleon, it was doubtless a useful instrument of despotism. It afforded a constant source of amusement to Louis XV, from the insight which it gave him into the intrigues and love affairs of his subjects. According to the scandalous gossip of the day, Louis XVIII is said to have employed it for the same reason. At the time of its abolition its offices were situated in the basement of the Hôtel des Postes, and are said to have been provided with secret entrances. Thirty-two persons are supposed to have been employed upon these premises. Like the office of the public executioner the privilege of serving upon the staff of the *cabinet noir* appears to have been hereditary in certain families. The establishment under the Restoration cost the State three hundred and sixty thousand francs annually, till January 31st, 1828, when it was closed by order of M. Roy, Minister of Finance.⁵

But the promulgation of the decrees against the Jesuits was by

¹ Pasquier, VI. pp. 124-127.

Villèle, *Mémoires*, V. pp. 333-354.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VII. pp. 442-446, 456-459.

E. Daudet, *Ministère Martignac*, pp. 190-194.

² Villèle, *Mémoires*, V. pp. 364-365.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 316.

⁴ Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. pp. 335-337.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XVII. pp. 377-379.

H. Bulwer, *Life of Palmerston*, I. p. 358.

⁵ Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VII. pp. 433-435.

far the most celebrated measure of M. de Martignac's administration. The enquiries instituted by the commission, appointed in the month of January, had disclosed the existence, without legal authority of any kind, of some sixty establishments purporting to be seminaries for the education of young priests. In most cases these schools were controlled by the Jesuits, many of whom, besides, had been placed in charge of seminaries established with the sanction of the Bishop of the diocese. Upon receipt of this report Ministers, though by so doing they were exceeding the recommendations of the majority of the members of the commission, decided to adopt effectual measures to put an end to the state of affairs which it disclosed. Two ordinances were drawn up, according to the first of which a number of establishments, carried on by persons belonging to an "unauthorized religious community," were brought within the jurisdiction of the University. In another clause it was laid down that, in future, no person could take charge of any educational establishment, unless he were prepared to declare in writing that he was not a member of an unauthorized religious society. By the terms of the second ordinance the pupils in ecclesiastical schools were limited to 20,000 for the whole of France. The establishment of these institutions was to be regulated by the Crown, no day boarders were to be received, and all scholars, after the age of fourteen, were required to wear an ecclesiastical dress.

Ministers expected great opposition to the ordinances from the King, though they had been several times discussed in his presence. But their fears proved unfounded. After retaining them by him for three days, he returned them with his signature duly affixed. The explanation of Charles' conduct upon this occasion must again be a matter of conjecture. He is known to have consulted Frayssinous and, it may be presumed, that he had taken the advice of those secret counsellors by whose opinions all his acts connected with religious questions were regulated. The Père Ronsin, director of the Congregation, is said to have been chiefly responsible for Charles' decision. If this be so, it may be assumed that he regarded the decrees against his order as a necessary, but temporary, concession to public opinion.

The appearance of the ordinances of June 16th in the *Moniteur* was the signal for an outburst of indignation in the clerical press. Ministers soon discovered that it was an easier matter to obtain Charles' consent to their promulgation, than to compel the Bishops to carry them out. Many of these prelates were members of the proudest families of the old *noblesse*. The fact that Feutrier, Bishop of Beauvais, the Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs, was of obscure descent disposed them to be the more

insolent. The attitude of a large number of them is well illustrated by the reply of the Cardinal de Clermont-Tonnerre, Archbishop of Toulouse, to Feutrier, who asked for information about the seminaries within his diocese. "My Lord," wrote the Cardinal, "the motto of my family, granted to it in 1120, by Calixto II, is as follows : *Etiā si omnes ego non*. It is also that of my conscience. I have the honour to be, with the respectful consideration due to a Minister of the King . . ." Great opposition to the execution of the ordinances was offered by Quèlen, Archbishop of Paris. He also saw fit to write an insolent letter to Feutrier, which was communicated to the King at a Cabinet council. The King perused it with indignation and passed it to the Dauphin, who returned it with the comment, which savours terribly of the old *régime*, "that if he were King the Archbishop should sleep that night at Vincennes." Charles had already signified to the Cardinal de Clermont-Tonnerre that he must not present himself at Court, and a like expression of his displeasure was now conveyed to the Archbishop of Paris. In the meantime, the attitude of the prelacy threatened to render vain the publication of the decrees. In this difficulty it was decided to invoke the assistance of His Holiness. The conduct of the negotiations was entrusted by Portalis to Lasagni, a lawyer and a Genoese by birth, who had formerly been auditor to the Rota, an ecclesiastical tribunal at the papal court. The Pope, Leo XII, was favourably disposed towards the Jesuits, but he realized the folly of attempting to impose them forcibly upon the French people. He was induced to declare that the ordinances in no way infringed the rights of the episcopate. The Cardinal de Latil, whose zeal in the matter was stimulated by the satisfaction which it gave him to humiliate the Archbishop of Paris, was selected to communicate this pronouncement of His Holiness to his fellow-prelates. The intervention of the Pope put an end to the rebellion of the Bishops. Before the end of the year the provisions of the ordinances of June 16th had been carried out.¹ One of the results of these decrees appears to have been the dissolution of the Congregation of the Rue du Bac. As a matter of policy the director, the Père Ronsin, was enjoined by the General of the Jesuits to leave Paris.²

In foreign affairs the development of events after the Battle of Navarino had enabled the Government to shape its policy in

¹ Pasquier, VI. pp. 115-121.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VII. pp. 447-456.

E. Daudet, *Ministère Martignac*, pp. 195-208.

Mdme. de Boigne, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 237-238.

Chateaubriand, *Mémoires*, nouvelle édition, V. pp. 107-108.

² Geoffroy de Grandmaison, *La Congrégation*, p. 351.

accordance with popular sympathies. The refusal of France, Great Britain, and Russia, the three Powers concerned in the destruction of the Ottoman and Egyptian fleet, to grant the apology and the compensation which the Porte demanded, had been followed by fruitless negotiations, and finally by the recall of the Ambassadors of the three Courts. The Sultan, thereupon, declared null and void the Treaty of Akkerman, which he had recently concluded with Russia, and summoned the faithful to a holy war. Meanwhile, Canning, who had died on August 8th, 1827, had been succeeded as Prime Minister by Goderich, and, in January, 1828, by Wellington. The Duke, resolving to adhere steadfastly to the traditional Tory policy, despite the new situation which Canning's departure from it had created, refused to participate in any hostile action against Turkey. But the Russo-Turkish war, which it had been the aim of British diplomacy for the past seven years to avert, was now inevitable. On May 6th, 1828, a Russian army crossed the Pruth.

In the spring of the year the plenipotentiaries of the three Powers, signatory to the Treaty of July 6th, 1827, reassembled in London. To the French Government the integrity of the Turkish Empire was a matter of little consideration. The situation which had arisen was favourable for gaining popularity at home by striking a blow for the independence of Greece. France, accordingly, undertook to obtain by force of arms the evacuation of the Morea. Russia had no reason for opposing an intervention which would create a diversion in her favour, and Wellington raised no serious objections to it. The French proposal was accepted and embodied in the Protocol of London, signed on July 19th, 1828.¹ On May 21st the Deputies, and, on June 13th, the Peers, had voted the extraordinary grant of eighty million francs asked for by the Government for military purposes. After the signing of the Protocol preparations were pushed forward so rapidly that, by August 12th, an expeditionary force of 14,000 men under General Maison had been embarked at Toulon. This officer had remained faithful to the Bourbons during the Hundred Days. But his conduct at the time of the Paris plot, in August, 1820, had caused his loyalty to be questioned. Moreover, he had been a constant opponent of M. de Villèle's measures in the Chamber of Peers. Charles hesitated when his name was put forward by the Minister of War, and suggested that the command should be given to either Marmont or to Bourmont. He did not insist, however, and Maison was duly appointed. The sailing of the transports was delayed by contrary winds, and it was not till August 29th that they cast anchor in the Bay of Navarino.

¹ *Cambridge Modern History*, X. pp. 197-201.

Maison was greeted with the news that the object of the expedition had been attained. Sir Edward Codrington, under threat of a blockade of the Egyptian coast, had induced Mehemet Ali to sign a convention, on August 9th, which provided for the evacuation of the Morea by his troops. Nevertheless, the French army was disembarked. The most amicable relations were established with Ibrahim, and, before his final withdrawal, a grand review was held in his honour. Pending the settlement of its fate by the Powers, the country was occupied by the French expeditionary force.¹

At the time of the general elections of the year before, when the news was received of Royer-Collard's return by seven different electoral colleges, Marshal Soult is said to have exclaimed to the King, "There is no doubt about it, sir, the country is Left Centre." The result of some forty elections, which had since taken place, in consequence of the return of the same persons in two or more electoral districts, had swelled the ranks of the Liberal party and confirmed the truth of his words.² From the first days of its formation the Government, both in foreign and in domestic affairs, had shaped its policy uniformly in accordance with the temper of the electorate. Yet in the Chamber its position at the close of the Session was no stronger than it had been at the opening of the Parliament. Martignac's plan had broken down of moulding the constitutional Liberals and moderate Royalists into a Ministerial Centre party, which should command a majority over both extreme wings. The Liberals persisted in regarding him as a straggler from M. de Villèle's party, not as a Left Centre man. When it suited them they might vote for his measures, but they were at pains to make it clear that they owed no allegiance to the Government. To all attempts to entice them into the Ministerial camp they replied by closing their ranks, and by proclaiming the indissoluble alliance of the Left Centre and the Left.³

These popular measures, which failed to overcome the distrust of the Liberals, alienated many Royalists. Infuriated by the ordinances against the Jesuits, the old followers of M. de Villèle enrolled themselves under La Bourdonnaye, who was now a declared enemy of the Government. In the King's hearing courtiers muttered the words "Ministerial concessions." It was

¹ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XVIII. pp. 379-397.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VII. pp. 464-474.

² Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XVII. p. 103.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VII. pp. 424-426.

³ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XVIII. pp. 269-274.

Thureau Dangin, *Le parti libéral*, pp. 407-417.

E. Daudet, *Ministère Martignac*, p. 282.

a criticism to which he was particularly sensitive. His whole political philosophy was bound up in the conviction that his brother had lost his head through yielding to his Ministers and to popular clamour. He had always regarded Martignac and most of his colleagues as culpably weak ; he now began to look upon them as a positive danger to his throne. About this time the arrival of Polignac in Paris, and the many confidential interviews which the King accorded him, attracted much attention.¹

Throughout the country the ordinances against the Jesuits, and the trend of the legislation during the Session, had met with general approval. Ministers were anxious that Charles should make another tour through the provinces. It was suggested that, upon this occasion, he should inspect the cavalry camp at Lunéville and visit the eastern departments. He had agreeable recollections of his experiences of the year before, and he offered no objections. Leaving Saint-Cloud on August 31st he visited Meaux, Chalons-sur-Marne, Verdun, Metz, Saverne, Strasburg, Mulhausen, Colmar, Lunéville, and, upon his return journey, stayed at Nancy and Toul. In the districts through which he travelled Carbonarism had attracted many recruits, and they had always been regarded as disaffected. Nevertheless, he received everywhere an enthusiastic greeting. He was much gratified and touched by the loyalty of the country-people. His experiences at Strasburg and at the camp at Lunéville strengthened his belief in the unalterable fidelity of the army. On September 19th, when he returned to Saint-Cloud, after an absence of twenty days, he was in radiant spirits. But Ministers reaped none of the advantages, which they had hoped to derive, from his satisfaction. Far from attributing a large part of the success of his journey to their wise administration, he regarded the enthusiasm with which he had been greeted, as a proof only of his own popularity with his subjects. He missed no opportunity of impressing upon M. de Martignac, who accompanied him throughout his tour, that the year before, in M. de Villèle's time, his reception had been equally good. Whilst Charles had been making his triumphal progress through the eastern provinces, the Duchesse de Berri had been visiting the Pyrenees and the west country. In La Vendée she made a point of going over the battlefields of the civil war. Upon the *Champ des Mattes*, the scene of the death of Louis de La Rochefacquelein, in June, 1815, she was gratified by the sight of 15,000 old combatants of the Royal and Catholic armies, drawn up with their tattered flags to receive her. The Duchesse returned convinced that were the need for putting it to the proof

¹ E. Daudet, *Ministère Martignac*, p. 118.
Pasquier, VI. pp. 118, 121, 127-130.

to arise, the loyalty of the people of the west would be found to be as devoted as in the days when they had risen to defend their King and their religion.¹

Ministers were agreed that they must try to arrive at a better understanding with the King. The skill with which he would contrive to avoid answering a question upon a distasteful subject, was one of their greatest difficulties in dealing with him. They, accordingly, decided to draw up and lay before him a memorandum upon the situation. In this lengthy document, the work of Portalis, the necessity was insisted upon of adhering to the Liberal policy which had been pursued with excellent results during the past Session. Public opinion, moreover, demanded urgently that certain high officials should be removed from the posts to which they had been appointed by M. de Villèle. In conclusion it was pointed out that, should His Majesty propose to entrust the conduct of the Government to men holding the views of those he was now implored to dismiss, his present Ministers must inform him respectfully that a Cabinet so constituted could never command a majority in the Chamber. Were he to resort to a step of that kind the situation which would arise could be met only by a suspension of the Charter. But it was the painful duty of the members of his Government to impress upon him that such a course of action would mean ruin to himself and to his dynasty.

These strangely prophetic words of warning were very coldly received. The Dauphin remarked sarcastically that Ministers had been careful to dilate upon the merits of their own achievements. The removal of Franchet, Lavau, Frénilly, and a few other highly unpopular persons from active participation in the work of the Council of State, and the dismissal of four or five prefects were the sum total of the concessions to which Charles' consent could be obtained.² These measures, which excited the wrath of the Royalists, failed to satisfy the Liberals. In the ranks of their party were men like La Fayette, Schonen, and several *good cousins* of the dispersed Carbonari lodges. But with the exception of these persons the aims of the Liberals were constitutional, not revolutionary. None of their leading men at this time proposed to outstep the limits of a legitimate opposition. Benjamin Constant and other Liberal members for the eastern departments

¹ Pasquier, VI. pp. 141-143.

E. Daudet, *Ministère Martignac*, pp. 214-217.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XVIII. pp. 312-330.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VII. pp. 475-480, 484-486.

² Pasquier, VI. pp. 143-145.

E. Daudet, *Ministère Martignac*, pp. 219-225.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XVIII. pp. 340-349.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VII. pp. 480-484.

had made a point of being present with their electors, when the King had visited their districts in the autumn. At Troyes, Charles had found Casimir Périer awaiting him, and had conferred upon him the Legion of Honour. The Liberal Deputy had shown the King over his factories, and in the evening had danced a quadrille with the Dauphine. In after years he was to be reminded that his behaviour, when doing the honours of his workshops, had elicited from his Royal guest the remark: "Why, the man is a gentleman."¹ Inasmuch, however, as the Liberals filled some two hundred seats in a Chamber of four hundred and thirty members they had a right to demand that, in return for their support, places in the administration should be given to prominent men of their party. Ministers did not dispute the justice of their claim, and were not without hopes of inducing the King to consent to admit at least Casimir Périer into the Cabinet. But whilst negotiations with the leaders of the Left were in progress an event occurred which brought a new actor upon the scene.²

On January 2nd, 1829, when at work with the King, La Ferronnays, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, was taken seriously ill. The probability that his state of health would necessitate his resignation was the signal for intrigues to begin in all directions. Hyde de Neuville worked hard in the interests of Chateaubriand, and Rayneval, the French Minister at Berne, had influential supporters. Ministers, however, finally proposed to the King the Duc de Mortemart, the newly appointed Ambassador at St. Petersburg. The Duke, besides being the head of an old and illustrious family, was a sensible man of moderate views. But he was diffident about undertaking a task for which he had had no training, and Charles made no effort to overcome his reluctance. He had his own candidate, the Prince Jules de Polignac, his Ambassador at the Court of St. James. Villèle had always considered Polignac a dangerous rival, and had missed no opportunity of speaking disparagingly of his abilities in the Royal presence. His opinion carried great weight with the King, but, once his adverse influence was removed, he began to think that he had been mistaken in his judgment of his friend. La Ferronnays was, to a great extent, responsible for the different light in which he was now disposed to regard him.³

¹ "Mais il est né, cet homme-là."

Thureau Dangin, *Le parti libéral* (note), p. 428.

² Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VIII. pp. 1-5.

E. Daudet, *Ministère Martignac*, pp. 232-233.

Thureau Dangin, *Le parti libéral*, pp. 426-429.

³ E. Daudet, *Ministère Martignac*, pp. 233-235, 238-239.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XVIII. pp. 454-457.

In many ways La Ferronnays resembled the Duc de Richelieu. Both were *émigrés* who had laid aside the prejudices and animosities of their class. Both, in consequence, were detested by the society of the Faubourg-Saint-Germain. Both, moreover, had incurred the displeasure of the Royal Family on account of their independence of character.¹ La Ferronnays esteemed it always a great drawback that the Cabinet contained no member who was a personal friend of the King. He liked Jules de Polignac, and, doubtless, failed to realize the potentialities of mischief which he represented. He conceived that he might act as the intermediary between his colleagues and the King, were he to be appointed to the post of Minister of the Household, which was vacant since the resignation of the Duc de Doudeauville. With this end in view he had been at pains to praise Polignac upon all occasions, and to draw Charles' attention to any passages in his despatches which were deserving of notice. It was an easy matter to influence him in favour of a man to whom he was deeply attached. When the question arose of finding a successor to La Ferronnays his thoughts immediately turned to London, and he bade Portalis instruct Polignac to come to Paris without delay.² At the same time he disclosed his plan for giving to the Cabinet that new element of strength which it required. Polignac should be Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Ravez of the Interior, in the place of Martignac, for whom a less important post might be found. But Portalis made it clear that were his colleague to be removed from the office, the duties of which he had carried out with distinguished success, he himself would be obliged to tender his resignation to His Majesty. The sudden appearance of Polignac, he pointed out moreover, would give rise to all sorts of conjectures,³ and would seriously endanger the position of the Government on the eve of the opening of Parliament. The next day Charles proposed a new combination. Portalis himself was to be Foreign Minister and President of the Council, Ravez replacing him as Keeper of the Seals, whilst Polignac was to be merely Minister of the Household. But to his surprise and great displeasure Portalis refused to be won over by this tempting offer. He declared unhesitatingly that in no circumstances could he remain a member of the Cabinet were M. de Polignac to enter it.³

Ravez had not the smallest desire to exchange the safe post of President of the Royal Court at Bordeaux for the perilous honour of a seat in the Cabinet. Pleading his judicial duties as an excuse, he declared his inability to make the journey to Paris.

¹ E. Daudet, *Ministère Martignac*, pp. 83-90.

² Pasquier, VI. pp. 128-130, 140.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 151-153.

But Polignac lost no time in obeying the summons which he had received. It was said, at the time, that he brought with him some sort of a letter of recommendation from the Duke of Wellington. This was, however, absolutely denied by the Duke. He would appear to have hurried off to see Wellington immediately upon receipt of Portalis' message. The English papers, the next day, alluded to him in flattering terms, and gave it to be understood that he had gone to take up a high post in the Government. It is possible that the Duke may have tried to influence indirectly the King in his favour.¹ War was raging in the East, and serious international complications might arise at any moment. He may have thought that Polignac, who was married to a Scotch woman² and who, both in a private and in an official capacity, had been much in England, would be better disposed towards Great Britain than La Ferronnays, who had been for so long at St. Petersburg.

A consultation with Mortemart, who was about to start for Russia, was the reason officially given for Polignac's return. But a note which he wrote to Portalis upon his arrival was delivered to the Comte Pourtalès, who lived next door to the Ministry of Justice in the Place Vendôme. The contents of this letter, which were soon public property, appear to have disclosed the real object of his visit, and to have raised the wholly unfounded suspicion in the minds of Ministers that their colleague was secretly plotting against them.³ The Liberal papers cried out at once that Polignac, the agent of Wellington, the champion of absolutism and of the Congregation, was to be called to office.⁴ Finding that his entry into the existing Cabinet was impossible, Polignac tried in all directions to form a Ministry of his own. With this object he appears to have knocked at every door. He sent flattering offers to Pasquier, and begged him to select whatever position might attract him most. The friends of Chateaubriand were approached, and Lainé, Portal, Molé, and Royer-Collard were in vain solicited to co-operate. In his excursions into the Liberal camp he went the length of sounding Casimir Périer and Daffitte, and, more extraordinary still, began futile negotiations with Décazes. In all the combinations which he devised Martig-

¹ *Despatches and Correspondence of Duke of Wellington*, VI. pp. 34-36.

Walpole, *History*, III. pp. 174, 175.

H. Bulwer, *Life of Palmerston*, I. p. 330.

Pasquier, VI. pp. 147-148, 155, 179.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XVIII. pp. 461-463.

E. Daudet, *Ministère Martignac*, pp. 239-240.

² Miss Campbell, whom he had married in 1819.

³ Pasquier, VI. pp. 153-154.

Polignac, *Études historiques*, pp. 217-218.

⁴ Nettement, *Histoire*, VIII, p. 209.

nac appears to have been the only person with whom he expressed any disinclination to be associated. In the King's circle, at this time, it was the fashion to deride his abilities and to speak of him as *la jolie serinette*, a name which Charles himself sometimes applied to him.¹ But in the next eighteen months Polignac must have changed his opinion with regard to him. When he was lying in prison, upon a charge of high treason and the mob of Paris was calling fiercely for his blood, it was to Martignac that he turned in his distress, and entrusted him with his defence before the Peers.

Polignac's frantic efforts were unavailing. No serious politician, to whatever party he might belong, believed, for one moment in his ability to form a Cabinet which could enlist the support of a majority of the Chamber. Despite the secrecy which he had observed, more or less correct reports of his negotiations were spread abroad. The Chambers were to meet on January 27th, all sorts of rumours were in circulation, and Ministers at last lost patience. They intimated to the King that, if they were to remain in office, Polignac must be ordered back to London. Charles complied, and decided that the portfolio of Foreign Affairs should be confided provisionally to Portalis. But, on February 5th, before taking his departure, Polignac saw fit in the debate upon the address in the House of Peers to assert his unalterable fidelity to the Charter, and to attempt to refute the statements which had been made about him in the papers. This public declaration of his principles, far from having a reassuring effect, raised a strong suspicion that it had been delivered in order to pave the way to his assumption of office at an early date.² It is in this speech that he is sometimes described as having said that "his children were taught to read out of the Charter."³

Charles, when Polignac came to take leave of him, gave him permission to return at the end of the Session. He appears to have decided that his attempts to rid himself of his Ministers had been premature, and that his plans would have to be postponed to a more favourable occasion. The opportunity for which he sought soon presented itself. The highly centralized system of communal and departmental administration still subsisted in the exact shape in which it had been created by Napoleon. The King chose his Ministers, Ministers appointed prefects, and the prefects in their turn selected the Mayors and the members of de-

¹ Pasquier, VI. pp. 155-157.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XVIII. pp. 464-467.

² Pasquier, VI. p. 157.

E. Daudet, *Ministère Martignac*, pp. 247-248.

Nettement, *Histoire*, VIII. pp. 212-214.

³ Mdme. de Boigne, *Mémoires*, III. p. 221.

partmental and municipal councils. The abolition of the Imperial system of nomination by government officials, and the establishment of the principle of election to district councils by qualified taxpayers, was to be the chief legislative measure of the Session. The Ministerial proposals, into the complicated details of which it is unnecessary to enter, were embodied in two bills which were introduced by Martignac into the Lower Chamber on February 9th.¹

These projected reforms were an important step in the direction of local self-government. As such they should have commanded the whole-hearted support of the Left. But the negotiations and the intrigues of Polignac, and the continued exclusion from the Ministry of any member of their party, made the Liberals suspicious. They were prepared to admit that the opinions and the prejudices of the King could not be ignored entirely. The ordinances against the Jesuits and the chief measures of the past Session showed, however, that his resistance could be overcome. If, therefore, Ministers should fail to satisfy their party, the Liberals were strongly disposed to think that it was because they would not, rather than because they could not. The Royalists had often advocated the decentralization of departmental administration. But their papers denounced the extension of the elective system to communal and municipal councils as a dangerous concession to the revolutionary spirit.² Martignac knew that he must be prepared for the opposition of the extreme Right, under La Bourdonnaye, but he reckoned confidently upon the support of the moderate Royalist and of the Liberal party.

Charles, when he consented reluctantly to the framing of these two bills, insisted that they must go through in their original shape, or be withdrawn. He was, without doubt, honestly opposed to the principles which they embodied. But he was also keenly alive to the fact that, should they fail to pass, he would be furnished with the best of excuses for dismissing his Ministers. In March, 1829, a by-election at Rethel resulted in the return to the Chamber of the Comte Clauzel. He was that general officer who, during the Hundred Days, had occupied Bordeaux in the name of the Emperor, and had compelled the Duchesse d'Angoulême to leave the town. Charles spoke of his election as "a bombshell fired at the Tuileries," and was convinced that the Liberalism of his Ministers was responsible for it.³ There are no

¹ Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VIII. pp. 19-21.

² Pasquier, VI. pp. 159-162.

E. Daudet, *Ministère Martignac*, pp. 253-254.

Nettement, *Histoire*, VIII. pp. 230-233.

Thureau Dangin, *Le parti libéral*, pp. 441-443.

³ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XIX. pp. 45-48.

Mdme. de Boigne, *Mémoires*, III. p. 239.

direct proofs, but the presumptions are strong that from this time forward he set himself deliberately to bring about the defeat of the Government. Already his insistence that the communal and the departmental bill should be brought forward simultaneously had aroused the mistrust of Portalis. It is highly suspicious that La Bourdonnaye should have been forgiven during this winter for his hostility to Villèle, and should suddenly have been admitted into the King's circle. The activity displayed at this period by Ravez and the Jesuitical Franchet, both members of the *camarilla*, in organizing all sections of Royalists into a great opposition party, furnishes another link in the chain of circumstantial evidence.¹ The words of Louis XVIII would seem to have come true. Charles was conspiring against himself.

On March 30th, when the general discussion of the two bills began, Martignac was faced by a discontented and censorious Liberal party, and by both wings of the Royalists banded together against him under Ravez and La Bourdonnaye. He was a finished debater, but never had he been seen to greater advantage than upon this occasion. The case for the Government was presented with all the art of which he was a master. His arguments were delivered with an elegance of diction which charmed the House. But neither reasoned statements nor persuasive rhetoric availed. He had been powerless to prevent the insertion into the report of the committee of a proposal for the suppression of the *conseils d'arrondissements*, which the Ministerial Municipal bill was to establish. On April 8th, at the close of the debate, Royer-Collard, the President, put the question of this amendment to the Chamber. Alone the Ministerialists, the Centre party, rose to their feet to signify their dissent, whilst the Right and the Left remained seated. Martignac cast an imploring glance towards the Royalist benches, but the President, after a pause of more than usual length, declared the amendment carried. Portalis and Martignac hurried off to the Tuileries with the news. Charles, with difficulty concealing his satisfaction, shook them by the hand and bade them observe that "there was no contenting such people; the time had come to call a halt." After an absence of little more than a quarter of an hour Ministers were back in the Chamber, where Martignac announced the withdrawal of both bills by Royal command.²

¹ Pasquier, VI. pp. 162-163, 185.

E. Daudet, *Ministère Martignac*, pp. 219, 254-255.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XVIII. pp. 441; XIX. pp. 39, 43-46.

² Pasquier, VI. pp. 163-170.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VIII. pp. 23-36.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XIX. pp. 1-144.

E. Daudet, *Ministère Martignac*, pp. 256-275.

The Liberals made the decision not to proceed with these measures the pretext for withdrawing all support from the Government which, during the remainder of the Session, dragged out its existence powerless to contend against the systematic opposition of the whole of the Left and of the extreme Right. Bills to reform the military code, to modify the law of arrest for debt, and other minor measures had either to be adjourned or altogether withdrawn. In the debates upon the Budget the Liberals and the followers of La Bourdonnaye, reviewing from their respective standpoints the past policy of the Government, subjected it to severe criticisms. Events had developed in accordance with Charles' wishes. He had allowed his Ministers to introduce laws of which he disapproved personally. But they were now without a majority in the Chamber, and were reduced to impotence. In deciding to dismiss them he would be following a strictly constitutional course. He was fully resolved to part with them, but, before carrying out his intention, he deemed it advisable that supply for the next twelve months should be voted.¹

Ministers appear to have been serenely unconscious of the fate which was in store for them. Never had their relations with the King been upon a more pleasant footing. Charles, now that he saw his way to ridding himself of them, treated them with a charming affability. In the case of Martignac the Royalist always far outweighed the Constitutional Minister. His eyes were more intently fixed upon the Tuileries than upon the Chamber. In these last weeks of his administration, Charles' evident contentment consoled him for his Parliamentary disappointments. Yet in addition to the warnings which reached him from several quarters, the King's attitude was suspicious when the question arose of permanently replacing La Ferronnays. At the expiration of the three months' leave accorded him in the winter, he was still pronounced unfit for work, and Portalis insisted upon being relieved of his twofold responsibility. Hyde de Neuville and the friends of Chateaubriand again bestirred themselves actively upon his behalf. His name, along with those of Pasquier and Rayneval, was submitted to the King. But Charles had no intention of allowing a new element to infuse fresh life into the moribund Cabinet. After considerable delay he decided that Portalis should be appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs, and he succeeded as Keeper of the Seals by Bourdeau, a painstaking but comparatively obscure official. Portalis would appear to have had a shrewder appreciation of the situation than his colleagues.

¹ Pasquier, VI. pp. 175, 178.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XIX. pp. 560-562.

E. Daudet, *Ministère Martignac*, pp. 282-298.

Thureau Dangin, *Le parti libéral*, pp. 446-542.

Before accepting the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, he stipulated that the comfortable post of President of the *Cour de Cassation* should be kept open for him.¹

On July 27th, three days before the prorogation of the Chambers, Polignac was back in Paris and hard at work constructing a Cabinet. He is said to have been disagreeably surprised at the influence which, during his absence, La Bourdonnaye had succeeded in establishing over the King. In any Ministerial combination which might be arranged, Charles was determined to confide the Home Department to the leader of the extreme Right. If Polignac had ever entertained the idea of introducing into his Cabinet a moderate or Liberal element, the necessity, under which he found himself, of accepting La Bourdonnaye as a colleague, must have compelled him to forego it. All his negotiations, however, were enveloped in great secrecy, and the accounts of them which exist are very conflicting. It would appear to have been only on August 5th that he was able to present a list of names which met with Charles' approval. That same day Martignac and his colleagues seem to have realized their position at last. After a consultation at the house of Portalis they decided to go to Saint-Cloud to ascertain the true state of affairs. Charles no longer made any concealment of his determination to dismiss them. "Their intentions," he told them, the next day, when they formally handed in their portfolios, "had been excellent, but they had lost all influence in the Chamber." He listened patiently to their protestations that a government of a pronounced Royalist type could never command a Parliamentary majority. But he remained unconvinced, and assured them that they were mistaken.²

On August 9th a Royal ordinance, dated the previous day, appeared in the *Moniteur*, containing the names of the members of the new Government. The Prince Jules de Polignac was Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Comte de La Bourdonnaye, Minister of the Interior, the Comte de Bourmont, Minister of War, the Comte de Chabrol, Minister of Finance, M. Courvoisier, Keeper of the Seals, Admiral de Rigny, Minister of Marine, and M. de Montbel, Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs. "Decidedly," said M. Royer-Collard, when he read the news, "Charles X is still the Comte d'Artois."³ Young M. Thiers was about to start

¹ Pasquier, VI. pp. 171-175.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VIII. pp. 37-41.

² Pasquier, VI. pp. 179-183.

E. Daudet, *Ministère Martignac*, pp. 299-306.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XIX. pp. 577-590.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VIII. pp. 46-47.

³ E. Daudet, *Ministère Martignac*, p. 307.

upon a voyage round the world. But he at once abandoned his intention upon seeing the Gazette. In that list of Ministers he perceived the germs of great political events at home.¹

The Liberals have been held responsible by certain writers for the catastrophe resulting from the fall of the Martignac government. It has been adduced as a proof of their bad faith that they themselves, under another *régime*, introduced a bill to establish those very *conseils d'arrondissement* for the suppression of which they voted in 1829.² But inconsistencies of this kind are inseparable from party government. In systematically opposing M. de Martignac, the Liberals were simply adopting constitutional methods for compelling the King, eventually, to select his Ministers from their party. Infinitely more illogical and blameworthy would appear to have been the conduct of those Royalists who, though they neither desired to see the extreme Right nor the Liberals in power, nevertheless allied themselves with La Bourdonnaye, in order to encompass the overthrow of the Government. It may be true that even with their support Martignac might have been unable to withstand a coalition of the extreme Right and both sections of the Left. But under these conditions his defeat might not have entailed the same disastrous consequences. Had the moderate Royalists stood aloof from La Bourdonnaye, even Charles might have hesitated to embark upon that ghastly experiment—a Government of the extreme Right.

¹ Thureau Dangin, *Le parti libéral*, p. 457.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 441–447.

E. Daudet, *Ministère Martignac*, pp. 250–251.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VIII. p. 31.

CHAPTER XVII

SOWING THE WIND

THE name of Polignac occurs at ominous periods in the history of the later Bourbons. The Minister of Charles X was forty-nine years of age, and "carried proudly the burden of his family's immense unpopularity."¹ He was the second son of the Duchess, the too notorious friend of Marie Antoinette. After emigrating with his mother in the early days of the Revolution, he entered the Russian service and, towards the close of 1803, returned clandestinely to France to take part in the great plot against the First Consul. The arrest of the conspirators was followed by a celebrated trial, at which were to be seen side by side upon the bench of the accused such strange companions as Moreau, the General of the Republic and the victor of Hohenlinden, the heretofore nobles Rivière and the two Polignacs, Georges Cadoudal and his cut-throat gang of Chouans, and Caron, the Royalist hairdresser of the Rue du Four. The elder Polignac was condemned to death, and Jules to two years' imprisonment. More fortunate, however, than some of the less aristocratic conspirators, Armand's sentence was commuted. But both brothers were detained as prisoners of State until the fall of the Empire. At the Restoration, Jules was taken into high favour and appointed an aide-de-camp of Monsieur. From 1823, during six by no means uneventful years, he performed creditably the duties of Ambassador in London. The conspiracies in which he had been engaged, and a long imprisonment, had developed his powers of secretiveness to an unusual extent. He was a zealous member of the Congregation and an intensely devout man. His religion, however, was strongly imbued with mysticism, and he was a firm believer in the direct intervention of Providence in human affairs. In the fatalism engendered by a blind unquestioning faith lies the only possible explanation of some of his actions.

General de Bourmont, the Minister of War, had been with Ney

¹ E. Daudet, *Ministère Martignac*, pp. 236-237.

at Lons-le-Saulnier in 1815. He had accepted the command of an infantry division in the Imperial army, but had deserted to the enemy on the opening day of the Waterloo campaign. La Bourdonnaye, the Minister of the Interior, for party or personal reasons, had sometimes espoused the popular cause in the Chamber. His name, however, was indelibly associated with the *Bourbon terror* and with bloodthirsty speeches in the *Chambre introuvable*. "Coblentz, Waterloo, 1815," wrote Saint-Marc-Girardin in a famous article in the *Journal des Débats*, "squeeze, press the Ministry as you like, you will wring from it nothing but national dangers and humiliations."¹

Courvoisier, the Keeper of the Seals, was a former supporter of the Duc Décazes. Since those days, however, he had grown very religious, and had considerably modified his Liberal views. But he assured Pasquier, upon his arrival in Paris, that he should resign sooner than be a party to any violation of the Charter. Chabrol, the Minister of Finance, had sat in Villèle's Cabinet. Like Courvoisier, he was resolved never to give his sanction to unconstitutional practices.² Admiral de Rigny, the Minister of Marine, had commanded the French squadron at Navarino. He was the one person in the list of Ministers who might have introduced a certain element of popularity into the Cabinet. But Polignac had not gone through the form of consulting him before publishing his name in the *Moniteur*. Contrary to his expectations, the Admiral firmly declined the honour it was proposed to confer upon him.³ The King sent for him and did his best to overcome his reluctance. Rigny confessed that he felt an insurmountable repugnance to M. de Bourmont. "I understand," said Charles as he dismissed him in great wrath; "it is a crime in your eyes that his arms should have dropped from his hands, when he found himself face to face with his King. It is, however, a claim to my affection and my respect." The Baron d'Haussez, Prefect of Bordeaux, was appointed Minister of Marine on August 23rd.⁴ The remaining member of the Cabinet, the Baron de Montbel, the Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs, was a friend and supporter of M. de Villèle.

The newspapers opened the campaign with a violence which had never been exceeded at any previous period. The Royalist press exulted that the days of concessions were over, and hinted at *coups d'état* and modifications of the Charter. The Liberal

¹ Pasquier, VI. p. 187.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XIX. pp. 603-604.

² Pasquier, VI. pp. 189-192.

³ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XIX. pp. 612-613.

⁴ Pasquier, VI. pp. 191-192.

E. Daudet, *Ministère Martignac*, pp. 316-318.

organs, the *Constitutionnel* and the *Courrier*, described the new Government as a grotesque attempt to revive a dead system, and as an outrage to every national sentiment. The *Globe* declared that the idea, more foolish than wicked, of forming such a Cabinet could have originated only at a Court dominated, now as in times past, by caprice, prejudice, obstinacy, and inconsequence. The language of the *Journal des Débats*, of which the article of Saint-Marc-Girardin is an example, was even more bitter against Ministers, whom it accused of alienating the affections of the people from their King. Debelleye, the prefect of police, and other high officials and councillors of State sent in their resignations.¹ Many of the Bishops, on the other hand, issued pastoral letters in which the advent to power of Polignac and his colleagues was held up as a victory for religion and the monarchy.² Chateaubriand was on leave from Rome taking the waters at Cauterêts, in the Pyrenees. Upon reading the names of the members of the new Government, he returned at once to Paris. In a letter announcing his intention of resigning his Embassy, he asked Polignac to procure for him an audience with the King, that he might explain to him his reasons for retiring. The interview was not accorded him, but Polignac himself spent an hour in vainly trying to flatter and cajole him into foregoing his purpose. Chateaubriand was, as usual, in debt and in difficulties. He realized that Charles would deeply resent his conduct, and that never again could he expect employment of any kind. Nevertheless, he adhered to his resolution.³

At the time of the advent to power of Polignac and his fellow-Ministers, affairs in the East were approaching a crisis. An important step had been taken towards the recognition of Greek independence when, on November 16th, 1828, the Plenipotentiaries in London signed a Protocol placing the Morea and the islands of the Cyclades under the guarantee of the Powers. In the meantime, the course of events in the Russo-Turkish war gave rise to a very serious situation. The unexpected difficulties of the campaign induced the Russians to proclaim a blockade of the Dardanelles. This violation of the neutrality of the Mediterranean, which they had undertaken to observe, evoked an outburst of indignation in England. Canning's policy of coercing the Turk had cooled the warmth of the relations existing between the Cabinets of London and Vienna. But the accession of the Duke of Wellington to the Premiership, in January, 1828,

¹ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XIX. pp. 595-603.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 608-609.

Pasquier, VI. pp. 192-193.

³ Chateaubriand, *Mémoires*, nouvelle édition, V. pp. 238-248.
Pasquier, VI. pp. 192-194.

and, in the following autumn, the dispute about the Dardanelles, brought Metternich once more into the field.¹ France had now to consider her plans in view of a possible Anglo-Austrian intervention in favour of the Turks. Under these circumstances La Ferronnays invited Chateaubriand to transmit from Rome his opinion upon the situation which might arise, when the Russians should resume hostilities in the spring.

Chateaubriand set forth his views in a lengthy memorandum. A hostile move by Great Britain and Austria against Russia should be, he contended, France's opportunity for readjusting the Treaties of 1815. Would the Cabinets of London and of Vienna give her the left bank of the Rhine in return for her support? He had no hesitation in saying that the idea would not be entertained for a moment. But, whereas it was the avowed policy of these two Governments to keep France weak, Russia was interested in seeing her strong, in order that she should counterbalance, effectually, the German Powers. The Tsarina was the daughter of Frederick William III. In a great European conflict Prussia would be found upon the side of Russia. Civilization in general, and France in particular, had nothing to fear from the substitution of the Cross for the Crescent at Constantinople. Should such a consummation some day open the road for a Russian advance against India, France might regard the event with complacency. Were France, therefore, to draw the sword in the threatened conflict she must do so as the ally of Russia.²

But the intervention of the Western Powers in the Russo-Turkish conflict was confined to diplomatic action. In the spring of 1829 hostilities were begun afresh, and in this second campaign the brilliant strategy of General Diebitsch achieved a series of successes for the Russian arms. On August 19th, Adrianople surrendered, and Constantinople itself lay at the mercy of the invaders. Polignac, upon assuming the direction of French diplomacy, had to consider the situation which would be created by the expulsion of the Turk from Europe and the complete break up of the Ottoman Empire. Some vague words of the Tsar to the French Ambassador were taken to imply that the territorial changes resulting from the overthrow of Turkey might render possible certain modifications in the Treaties of 1815. Upon this assumption Polignac caused a memorandum to be drawn up which was discussed at a Cabinet Council in the presence of the King and the Dauphin.³

In this curious document, said to have been the work of M. de

¹ *Cambridge Modern History*, X. pp. 201-202.

² Chateaubriand, *Mémoires*, nouvelle édition, V. pp. 68-99.

³ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XX. pp. 2-10.

Boislecomte, of the French Foreign Office, the views of Chateaubriand were adopted, and an understanding with Russia was advocated, as more calculated to advance French interests than a general conference or an agreement with any other Power. Once matters had been settled with Russia, Prussia and Bavaria were to be drawn into the alliance by the favourable conditions which would be held out to them. Austria must next be approached, and, isolated as she would then find herself upon the Continent, would probably accept the settlement proposed to her. Great Britain, under these circumstances, would be compelled to bow to accomplished facts. Wallachia, Moldavia, Armenia, and Trebizond were to be the spoils of Russia. But should she desire further territory in Asia Minor, her wishes in that respect might be complied with safely. Any expansion in those regions must bring her sooner or later into collision with England. France was to take Belgium, besides Sarrebrück, Sarrelouis, and Landau, of which she had been deprived by the Treaties of 1815. Holland and Saxony were to be transferred to Prussia, who, in exchange, would be required to cede her provinces upon the left bank of the Rhine to the King of Saxony, whom it was proposed to set up in a new Kingdom with Aix-la-Chapelle for its capital. The remainder of the Rhenish territory, relinquished by Prussia, was to be given to Bavaria, and Salzburg might, in addition, be handed over to her should Austrian resistance to these arrangements have entailed a war. The King of Holland was to be moved to Constantinople to rule over a Christian Kingdom consisting of Greece, Crete, Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Albania. The Dutch colonies were to be the share of Great Britain, and Austria might be allowed to acquire Bosnia, Herzegovina, Servia, Turkish Dalmatia, and Croatia. In this direction she could act as a useful check upon Russia, whilst an extension of her Mediterranean seaboard would bring her into rivalry with England.¹

The points to which Polignac attached the highest importance were the maintenance of secondary German States, under French influence, and the new direction it was proposed to impart to Prussian activity. By giving her Holland she would be converted into a maritime Power, and consequently into a potential enemy of Great Britain. The creation of a weak State, under the King of Saxony, out of the Prussian provinces upon the left bank of the Rhine, was a solution of the question to be preferred to their annexation by France. In her hands they would be regarded always as a standing menace to the German States, whereas her occupation of Belgium would inspire no distrust

¹ *Nettement, Histoire*, VIII. pp. 310-315.
Viél Castel, *Histoire*, XX. pp. 10-13.

among her neighbours. But she would gain thereby an outlet upon the North Sea which might enable her, some day, to head a European league for the overthrow of England's maritime supremacy. Thus by turning her eyes resolutely to the north she might rise again to the position of the predominant Power in Europe.¹

It is not conceivable that, under any circumstances, Russia would have lent her support to a scheme so extravagant. But in the meantime the strain of war had told upon her more than was probably suspected, and, on September 15th, she had signed a treaty of peace with the Turks at Adrianople. Polignac's memorandum, which it was intended to send to St. Petersburg, was relegated, in consequence, to the archives of the Foreign Office. The hostility to Great Britain which it breathes at every line proves how little justified was the belief, widely entertained at this time both in England and in France, that a secret understanding existed between him and the Duke of Wellington.² The transference of Holland to Prussia, and the other combinations which he suggests, show as utter a disregard for the feelings and predilections of the people concerned as was displayed at Vienna in 1814.³ Yet Polignac himself was influenced unconsciously by that sentiment of nationality which he was proposing to ignore in others. When he talked of taking from Prussia the left bank of the Rhine, or of wresting from England the dominion of the seas, he spoke not as an *émigré*, but as a French patriot. In their burning desire to see their country acquire her "natural frontiers,"⁴ Royalists, Liberals, and Bonapartists could meet upon common ground. Lord Palmerston, during a visit to Paris about this time, notes the recrudescence of a very warlike feeling. As a result of his conversations with leading men of their party, he records his conviction "that the Ultra-Liberals would support any Government which would give them back the left bank of the Rhine."⁵ Without doubt, Charles and Polignac realized that they could achieve popularity only by a great military or diplomatic success. The memorandum shows that, had chance put the opportunity in their way, they were prepared to embark upon a most adventurous policy. But they were hardly the men to create for themselves the conditions under which so tremendous an undertaking could be attempted.

¹ Nettement, *Histoire*, VII. (note), "à consulter sur la Belgique et les provinces rhénanes" (appendix).

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XX. pp. 14-24.

² Walpole, *History of England*, III. pp. 174-175.

³ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XX. pp. 21-40.

⁴ The Pyrenees, the Alps, the Rhine, and the sea—the *prè carré* as it was called.

⁵ H. Bulwer, *Life of Palmerston*, I. pp. 315-316, 331.

Charles had contemplated making a tour through Normandy in the autumn. But the explosion of indignation with which the formation of the new Government had been greeted, induced him to abandon his intention. His decision was doubtless a wise one. The Dauphin paid a visit to Cherbourg, but, outside official circles, he was accorded the coolest of welcomes. La Fayette, on the other hand, was at Puy when the news was received that Polignac and his colleagues had been called to office. From this moment his journey, which was connected solely with his private affairs, assumed a political character. At Vizille and at Grenoble he was acclaimed as the great citizen, and presented with a silver crown of oak leaves. At Lyons the youth of the town rode out to meet him, and a banquet was given in his honour.¹ More significant still were the associations which sprang into existence for the refusal to pay taxes, should it be attempted to levy them illegally. The formation of the first of these, the Breton league, was announced in the *Journal de Commerce*, on September 11th. The example was quickly followed in other parts of the country. The Ministerial press asserted, with truth probably, that the vaunted number of members enrolled was greatly exaggerated. Nevertheless, proceedings were instituted against those papers which had announced the formation of these leagues, or which had invited their readers to subscribe to them. But in the existing state of public opinion it was not easy to obtain convictions, and the authorities soon decided that it would be wiser to leave the matter alone. The Government was hardly more successful in the other press prosecutions upon which it embarked. The trial and acquittal of the elder Bertin, for publishing in the *Journal des Débats* Saint-Marc-Girardin's article against Ministers, was the great event of the winter. Enthusiastic Liberals compared it to the case of the seven Bishops.²

The general distrust of Polignac's intentions was not unfounded. It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that he was scheming to re-establish the old *régime*. But had he entertained such an idea it would not have been more impracticable than the one he is supposed to have been actually proposing to carry out. Whilst he had been Ambassador in London he had conceived a great admiration for English methods. He was attracted by the liberty of action enjoyed by local authorities, and by the decentralized system of government. Superficial as

¹ Nettement, *Histoire*, VIII. pp. 340-343.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XX. pp. 51-57.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VIII. pp. 52-56.

Pasquier, VI. pp. 195-196.

Thureau Dangin, *Le parti libéral*, pp. 456-457.

² *Ibid.*, p. 463 (note).

was his knowledge of English institutions, his comprehension was still more imperfect of the social conditions, laws, ideas, and habits which the Revolution had created in his own country. He believed it possible to form in democratic France a governing class, in imitation of the landed aristocracy which he had seen managing successfully local affairs in England. At the same time he intended to encourage industry, open up new markets for trade abroad, and create greater opportunities for the employment of capital. By these means he hoped that the attention of the educated classes would be diverted from politics, either to the administration of local affairs or to the conduct of great business undertakings.¹ Though such a system was unsuited, in most particulars, to the traditional habits and educational training of his countrymen, the mere attempt to introduce it constituted no violation of the Charter. Moreover, the changes which it was to effect could only be brought about gradually. But the principle which was to be the crowning element of his scheme was of a different and more dangerous character. He was in thorough agreement with his Royal master that in the future the King must be the real head of the State. Charles was content to admit that he ought to consult the opinion of the Chambers, but, with the understanding that when he differed from it, his will was to prevail. The defence of the Royal Prerogative against the insolent pretensions of the elective assembly was to be the watchword² of M. de Polignac and his fellow-Ministers.

It has been contended sometimes that Polignac, when he assumed office, harboured no unconstitutional designs. It has been said that, misled by Ravez and Ba Bourdonnaye, he believed that the Government would be able to command a majority in the Chamber. Public expressions of his confidence upon this point may be quoted.³ Nevertheless, the best evidence points to his having from the first contemplated a recourse to extraordinary measures. As early as September d'Haussez, the Minister of the Marine, drew up a memorandum in which he advocated the dissolution of the Chamber, the suppression of the liberty of the

¹ Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VIII. pp. 80-85.

Nettement, *Histoire*, VIII. p. 330.

Pasquier, VI. pp. 7-8.

Letters of Polignac to Villèle during the years 1823, 1824, 1825, 1826, contained in Vols. IV. and V. of Villèle's *Mémoires*.

Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. p. 349.

² Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XVIII. p. 455.

Villèle, *Mémoires*, V. p. 385.

Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, III. p. 337.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VII. pp. 72-73.

Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, III. p. 338.

³ Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VIII. pp. 72-73.

Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, III. p. 338.

press, and the levying of taxes by Royal ordinance.¹ Even before this Montbel, the Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs, in a confidential letter to Villèle foreshadowed the possibility of "a resort to such means as the King might see fit to employ for the safety of the State."² Polignac himself is reported to have said in the secrecy of the Council Chamber that "he cared nothing for a majority, that he should not know what to do with it if he had it."³ According to some authorities he and La Bourdonnaye were fully agreed as to the necessity for a *coup d'état*, but differed as to the means to be employed and the time when it should take place. Polignac was for delay and for trusting to the influence of the clergy. La Bourdonnaye, on the other hand, advocated prompt action, and placed his faith in bayonets, or, as Lord Palmerston says, "held that three *gendarmes* were worth a dozen Jesuits."⁴

Besides these differences of opinion, which are imputed to them, they had other subjects of disagreement. Polignac was a notorious supporter of the Congregation, La Bourdonnaye was as anti-clerical as an extreme Royalist could venture to be. Moreover, La Bourdonnaye was an overbearing, quarrelsome person, who was soon upon bad terms with Courvoisier and other of his colleagues. "*Mauvais coucheur*, if ever a man was so," is Chateaubriand's description of him.⁵ This lack of harmony among the members of the Cabinet induced Charles to appoint a President of the Council. After some hesitation, he decided to prefer Polignac to La Bourdonnaye who, thereupon, tendered his resignation. Charles is said to have tried to dissuade him from retiring, and to have offered to place either Talaru or the Duc de Bellune at the head of the Council.⁶ But it is very possible that the King may have begun to suspect that he had overestimated the courage and determination of this man from whom he had expected so much. For fourteen years La Bourdonnaye had denounced with merciless severity the insufficiency of the measures, which successive Governments had adopted, for the defence of the Monarchy. But as Minister of the Interior he appears to have had no policy to propose. The only trace of his three months' direction of the Home Department is alleged to have consisted in a regulation affecting the butchery trade in Paris, and in a circu-

¹ Nettement, *Histoire*, VIII. pp. 347-348.

² Villèle, *Mémoires*, V. p. 379.

³ E. Daudet, *Révolution de 1830*, p. 11.

⁴ H. Bulwer, *Life of Lord Palmerston*, I. p. 348.

E. Daudet, *Révolution de 1830*, p. 15.

⁵ Chateaubriand, *Mémoires*, V. p. 255 (nouvelle édition).

Pasquier, VI. pp. 202-203.

⁶ Villèle, *Mémoires*, V. pp. 388-389.

lar to the police authorities prescribing the repression of a growing tendency on the part of exhibitors of marionettes to introduce into their shows the figure of Bonaparte or of other objectionable political characters.¹ A Royal ordinance, dated November 17th, announced his resignation and the appointment of M. de Montbel to succeed him. In the same gazette appeared the nomination of M. de Guernon-Ranville, Procurator-General at Lyons, but a member of neither Chamber,² to the post of Minister of Education and Ecclesiastical Affairs which Montbel had vacated. There can be little doubt that La Bourdonnaye availed himself with alacrity of the first opportunity of escaping from office. He seems to have been a man of words rather than of action. But it is possible, also, that he may have seen the futility of embarking upon anything in the nature of a *coup d'état* with a colleague such as Polignac. "When my head is at stake I like to play the cards myself," were the words by which he explained his reasons for retiring to his friends. His saying was widely repeated, and strengthened the general impression that highly unconstitutional questions were the subject of Ministerial deliberations.³

The winter of 1829-30 was one of exceptional severity. In the autumn the harvest had been spoilt by rain, and in the manufacturing districts the over-production of the past few years had been followed by a period of stagnation. Distress and unemployment were rife all over the country. But in Paris this last winter of the Restoration was the gayest which had been experienced. Balls, many of them in aid of charities, were particularly numerous. The rival attractions of the romantic and the classical schools drew enormous crowds to the theatres. The hotels were full, the number of English visitors of good position being especially remarkable.⁴ "The surface of society," says Guizot, "was undisturbed by the political situation. Beneath this seeming quietude, however, there was much anxiety. Nobody conspired, but men waited and were prepared."⁵ "Constitutional principles," wrote Lord Palmerston from Paris, "are making progress." It was clearly his opinion that any infraction of the Charter upon the part of the Government would be fiercely resisted.⁶ Charles Greville's enquiries, three months later, pointed to the same con-

¹ Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VIII. pp. 60-65.

² This was unusual, but perfectly constitutional.

³ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XX. pp. 77-81.

Nettement, *Histoire*, VIII. pp. 351-354.

⁴ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XX. pp. 154-158.

H. Bulwer, *Life of Palmerston*, I. p. 352.

⁵ Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. p. 348.

⁶ H. Bulwer, *Life of Palmerston*, I. p. 314.

clusions.¹ Palmerston found the impression general that Charles would give way and dismiss his Ministers. But, if he should not, he foresaw that "the Duc d'Orléans might be invited to step over the way from the Palais-Royal. . . . As to any other change, it is out of the question." Again, after a dinner with Polignac on December 9th, at which he thought his host "looking singularly beaten and cast down," he appears to have been greatly impressed with the probability that he would counsel a resort to violence. "A man who has passed ten years in prison becomes either broken or hardened; he is the latter."²

An astute opponent of the Bourbons, who had been watching keenly the development of events, had now matured his plans.³ The first number of the *National* appeared on January 1st, 1830. It was the new paper which Thiers had started, in conjunction with Mignet and Armand Carrel, with the pecuniary assistance of some of his friends. He was also in close relations with Charles de Remusat and *Le Globe*, which was to be converted into a political organ, and was to enter upon the campaign as the ally of the *National*. Thiers divined rightly that neither Charles nor Polignac would give way, and that, were they to be faced by a refusal of support from the Chambers, they would resort to unconstitutional measures. It was certain that the middle classes would resent deeply any violation of the Charter. It was possible, however, that their fears of a revolution might prove stronger than their affection for the Constitution. They must be convinced, therefore, that not only were the Bourbons a menace to the maintenance of existing institutions, but that their expulsion and replacement need entail no social convulsions. Thiers held, moreover, that the chief reason of the failure of the many attempts which had been made since 1815 to upset the reigning dynasty, lay in the fact that the conspirators had never clearly put before the people a successor to the Bourbons. He had no intention of compromising himself in any plots. His plans were to be worked out in the columns of a daily newspaper. But he was resolved not to be guilty of this particular omission.⁴

Guizot and the Doctrinaires had set the fashion of comparing the French with the English Revolution. Thiers perceived that this was a theme which, properly handled in the *National*, might be made to serve a great anti-dynastic purpose. It was easy to

¹ C. Greville, *Journals, Reigns of George IV and William IV*, new edition, 1888, I. p. 290 (March 8th, 1830).

² H. Bulwer, *Life of Palmerston*, I. pp. 350-351, 356-357.

³ Chateaubriand, *Mémoires*, nouvelle édition, V. p. 256.

⁴ Thureau Dangin, *Le parti libéral*, pp. 465, 466.

Nettement, *Histoire*, VIII. pp. 377-378.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XX. pp. 166-169.

present to persons whose knowledge of history was only superficial extraordinary points of resemblance between the two events. In both countries the King had been beheaded and a Republic had been proclaimed. Upon both sides of the Channel the Republic had been converted into a military despotism by a successful soldier. In England the Stuarts, in France the Bourbons had been restored. Charles II had been succeeded by his brother James II. Louis XVIII by Charles X, also his brother. A second revolution, the complement of the first, had driven James from the throne. Thiers could not pursue his comparison of facts any further, but he could insinuate that the Duc d'Orléans was a kinsman of the reigning Bourbons, more closely related to them than William of Orange to the Stuarts. The Revolution of 1688, he constantly reminded his readers, had entailed no bloodshed, nor had it involved a social upheaval. Institutions had subsisted, the change had been one of rulers only. Thus the policy of the *National* was anti-dynastic, but strictly monarchical at the same time.¹

By calling history to his aid in this fashion, Thiers could carry on a revolutionary propagandism without seriously infringing the letter of the law. As in the days when he had shaped afresh the tactics of the *Constitutionnel* in its campaign against M. de Villèle, so he now impressed upon his followers that the defence of the Constitution must be their war cry always. "We must confine the Bourbons strictly to the Charter," he would tell them. "Lock all the doors, and they will jump out of the windows." The name of Thiers and Mignet assured to the *National* a wide popularity. Before long its large circle of readers came to regard a change of dynasty, by a peaceful revolution, as almost a logical consequence of 1789.²

A Royal ordinance, on January 6th, fixed the opening of Parliament for March 2nd. This announcement, which dispelled the vague fears existing as to the intention of the Government not to convene the Chambers, was received with a general feeling of relief.³ All the members of the Cabinet, wrote Montbel to Villèle, in the first fortnight of January, were agreed that in the event of a hostile address in reply to the King's Speech, the Chamber should be dissolved.⁴ In the meantime, Ministers had decided that they must rest content during the coming Session

¹ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XX. pp. 170-171.

Nettement, *Histoire*, VIII. pp. 378-379.

Thureau Dangin, *Le parti libéral*, pp. 470-472.

² Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. p. 353.

Thureau Dangin, *Le parti libéral*, pp. 473-476.

³ Nettement, *Histoire*, VIII. p. 370.

⁴ Villèle, *Mémoires*, V. p. 409.

with bringing forward the Budget. For the present more ambitious proposals would have to be postponed, and only measures of secondary importance, or of a non-contentious character could be introduced.¹ During the month of February, however, a resolution was arrived at by the Cabinet which was destined to have lasting consequences. The blockade of Algiers, which had subsisted for the past two years, had proved ineffectual to bring the Dey to submission. The terms of settlement, which M. de la Bretonnière had been empowered to offer in the previous August, had been declined, and his ship had been fired upon before she could leave the harbour. The French naval officers were unanimous in describing the disembarkation of a large force upon the coast as a most dangerous undertaking. Polignac, under these circumstances, conceived the idea of subsidizing Mehemet Ali and of thus obtaining the assistance of his troops. But the successful conclusion of this arrangement was prevented by the remonstrances of Great Britain to the Porte, and by the pressure which this Power brought to bear upon the Pasha. At this juncture, Marmont, who had been studying the question for some time past, came forward with a memorandum, in which he proved that the obstacles in the way of an expedition were not so great as had been pretended. The Marshal had been associated in drawing up his plans with Admiral Mackau, who was one of the few naval men who regarded a landing upon the coast of Algeria as a practicable undertaking. Polignac had always wished to see France gain a footing in Northern Africa. Doubtless also, he hoped that a successful war might react favourably upon the situation at home. He was, therefore, easily won over to Marmont's views. At a Cabinet Council early in February the despatch of an expedition against Algiers was resolved upon.²

On March 2nd the ceremony of the opening of Parliament took place as usual in the *Salle des Gardes* at the Louvre. From an early hour all the places reserved for the public were occupied, and eager crowds filled the approaches to the palace. At one o'clock Charles, in the dress of a general officer, took his seat upon his throne and began to read his speech. Believers in omens noted that, as he had ascended the steps, his hat had fallen from his head, and had been picked up and returned to him by the

¹ Villèle, *Mémoires*, V. pp. 386-387.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XX. pp. 224-227.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VII. p. 73.

² Polignac, *Études historiques*, pp. 227-230.

Marmont, *Mémoires*, VIII. pp. 213-225.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XX. pp. 189-194.

Nettement, *Histoire*, VIII. pp. 383-386.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VII. pp. 110-117.

Pasquier, VI. pp. 208-215.

Duc d'Orléans. The news that a military expedition would be sent to chastise the insolence of the Dey provoked little response, so keen was the anxiety to hear the Royal pronouncement upon internal affairs. At last Charles reached that part of his speech for which all present had been waiting eagerly. After expressing his desire to see France happy, and in a position to enjoy in peace those institutions which he was determined to preserve, he uttered these stern words of warning: "Peers and Deputies, I do not doubt that you will support my endeavours to carry out this good work. But should wicked intrigues place obstacles across the path of my Government which I cannot, which I will not contemplate, I shall find the strength to surmount them in my firm resolution to maintain the public peace, and in my just confidence in Frenchmen, and in the love which they have always shown for their King."¹

These words were greeted with loud cheers by the Right, but by the remainder of the House they were listened to in silent consternation. By both parties they were regarded as a declaration of war, and each side prepared for the coming struggle. The Royalist papers exultingly applauded the King's determined attitude, the *Journal des Débats* raised a cry of sorrow and alarm, the *Constitutionnel*, the *Courrier*, the *Globe*, and the *National* took up the Royal challenge defiantly.² The preliminary formalities of the Session, the choice of the President, the Vice-President, and the composition of the *bureaux*, which as usual were treated as party questions, showed that the Government was in a hopeless minority. No Ministerialist figured among the five candidates for the Presidency whose names were submitted to the King. Charles, as in the two previous years, appointed M. Royer-Collard, who had obtained the largest number of votes. Even more ominous proved to be the constitution of the committee to consider the address in reply to the King's speech. The nine members who composed it were either Liberals or dissident Royalists. No candidate of the Right was elected to serve upon it.³

The Peers were content with merely paraphrasing the different paragraphs of the King's speech. Their rather colourless address

¹ Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. pp. 354-355.

Pasquier, VI. pp. 216-217.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VIII. pp. 74-76.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XX. pp. 229-233.

² Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XX. pp. 232-233.

Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. p. 355.

³ Pasquier, VI. p. 217.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VIII. pp. 77-79.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XX. pp. 234-236.

concluded, nevertheless, with a significant reminder that "the sacred rights of the Crown were inseparable from the national liberties." Ministers were only too glad to escape without direct censure, and were careful not to intervene in the discussion. Alone, Chateaubriand opposed the adoption of the committee's report, and demanded that the address should be drawn up in more vigorous language.¹ In the Lower Chamber the general discussion of the reply, proposed by the committee, was opened on March 15th. The night before one of those receptions, known as *jeu du roi*, had taken place at the Tuileries. Charles had made a point of speaking to the Liberal Deputies present, and had paid especial attention to MM. Etienne, Gauthier, and Dupin, who were all three members of the committee. It was rumoured that the address might prove less hostile to the Government than had been expected.² This idea was quickly dispelled. When Royer-Collard, the President of the Chamber, began to read the form of address proposed by the committee, over four hundred Deputies listened anxiously to his words, and every Minister was present in his place, except M. de Courvoisier, who was ill. All interest was centred upon the paragraph, which was to constitute the reply to the King's warning, as to the support which he counted upon from the Chamber. It runs as follows :

"Sir, the Charter has consecrated the people's right to intervene in the deliberations of matters of public interest. That intervention must be, and is, in point of fact, indirect, carefully considered, and circumscribed within certain limits, which must never be outstepped. But it is positive in its results. It requires as an indispensable condition to the proper conduct of public affairs that the policy of your Government should be in harmony with the wishes of your people. Sir, our loyalty and our devotion compel us to declare to you that that harmony does not exist."

The debate began at once. Polignac was wholly without practice in public speaking, and already, in attempting to explain a question which had arisen in connection with an election petition, had shown an almost laughable inexperience. Guizot, who in the previous January had been returned by the electors at Bayeux, and who upon this occasion delivered his maiden speech as a Deputy, caught the eye of the President of the Council when the discussion was at its height, and was struck by his strange, puzzled expression. The position of the Government was defended to the best of their ability by Montbel, Guernon-Ranville, and d'Haussez. But the opposition speakers carried everything before them.

¹ Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VII. pp. 79-81.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XX. pp. 242-251.

² Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VIII. pp. 82-83.

On the second day M. de Lorgénil, a member of the Right Centre, moved an amendment to the paragraph which constituted the Chamber's refusal of support. This new proposal had been drawn up by M. de Martignac. It tended to the same result as the original paragraph, but it was couched in language which, he hoped, the King would consider less offensive. The Liberals and constitutional Royalists, however, inspired by M. Royer-Collard, believed that only by a respectful but strongly worded message could Charles be brought to realize the gravity of the situation. It was impossible, on the other hand, for Ministers and their adherents to adopt an amendment hostile to the Government. Lorgénil's proposal, in consequence, enlisted the support of no more than thirty Deputies. That same night the address, in its original form, was adopted by a majority of forty. Two hundred and twenty-one votes had been recorded in its favour and one hundred and eighty-one against it.¹

The defeat of the Government was in reality more complete than these figures would make it appear. The thirty members who had supported the Lorgénil amendment were not Ministerialists, but, upon this occasion, they had voted with the Government.² At a Cabinet Council the next day Polignac tendered his resignation and that of his colleagues to the King. It was a solution of the difficulty put forward as a mere matter of form. Charles declared, at once, his unalterable resolution never to submit to the dictates of the Chamber in the question of his choice of Ministers. Beyond accepting this principle as the basis of their future policy the members of the Cabinet, at this sitting, appear to have settled upon no definite plan of campaign. But M. d'Haussez, who seems to have been anxious to emulate certain achievements of Sir Robert Walpole, propounded an ingenious scheme. He assured the King that he could estimate very correctly "the price of consciences," and that he was convinced that the votes of forty Liberal Deputies could be bought for three million francs. This additional support would give the Government an assured majority, and would avert the necessity of a resort to extraordinary measures. Both Charles and the Dauphin however, rejected this proposal, and d'Haussez's plan was not discussed at the Council table.³

On the following day the members of the deputation of the

¹ Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. pp. 354-364.

Pasquier, VI. pp. 217-220.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XX. pp. 253-303.

² Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VII. p. 92.

³ Nettelement, *Histoire*, VIII. pp. 430-434.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XX. pp. 304-312.

Pasquier, VI. pp. 220-221.

Lower Chamber went to the Tuileries to present the address to the King. On ordinary occasions many of the Deputies who had voted the address would take part in the ceremony. But in this instance only twenty-one members, in addition to those who were obliged to be present, visited the palace. Charles was personally popular, and most of the Deputies had pleasing recollections of some little attentions he had paid them. The forty-six representatives of the Lower Chamber, waiting in the *salon de la Paix* whilst the King was at Mass, formed a solemn and almost mournful group amidst the pages and courtiers who stared at them with a scarcely concealed dislike. Presently the Dauphine, with averted gaze, passed through the room on her way to the chapel. When they were ushered into the Royal presence, Royer-Collard read the address with great dignity. Charles' reply was firm and impressive. "Gentlemen, I expressed to you my intentions in my speech at the opening of Parliament. Those resolutions are unalterable, the welfare of my people makes it impossible for me to depart from them. My Ministers shall inform you of my decision." The next day, March 19th, the Chambers were prorogued till September 1st.¹

This announcement, which was proclaimed as a triumph for Royalty by the Ministerial press, was denounced with the utmost violence by the opposition papers. The society *Aide-toi le ciel t'aidera*, which had played so important a part in the elections of 1827, still subsisted, and its members prepared at once for the dissolution which the prorogation appeared to foreshadow. In Paris, on April 1st, at the restaurant *Les vendanges de Bourgogne*, a great banquet was given to the two hundred and twenty-one Deputies who had voted the address. Medals were struck to commemorate the event, and in many country towns the electors subscribed for entertainments in honour of their members.² In the northern departments, at this time, incendiary fires were creating widespread alarm. Normandy, especially, was the scene of these outrages, which were said to have been perpetrated by agents of the Government, in order that Ministers should have an excuse for resorting to arbitrary measures.³ The misdeeds of these still unknown miscreants were put a stop to only by the despatch of two battalions and two squadrons of cavalry to Caen.

Without doubt Charles and Polignac had already decided to dissolve the Chamber. It was advisable, however, to give the

¹ Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. pp. 364-365.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VIII. pp. 95-96.

² Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XX. pp. 314-320.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VIII. pp. 96-102.

³ Polignac, *Études historiques*, p. 274.

Guernon-Ranville, *Journal d'un Ministre*, Mai 2, 5, 9.

prefects time in which to prepare for the elections, and it was hoped that news might be received before long of the fall of Algiers. The mobilization of an expeditionary force of 35,000 men had been proceeding actively. These preparations were viewed with great suspicion by the British Government. The refusal of the Cabinet of the Tuileries to state definitely its ultimate intentions with regard to Algeria was deeply resented. But neither Charles nor Polignac were to be deterred from carrying out their undertaking by the fear of a conflict with England. General de Bourmont, the Minister of War, was given the command of the expedition. The appointment of this officer was extremely galling to Marmont, whose plan the Government had adopted, and who, though he had received no definite promise, understood that he was to be entrusted with the supreme direction of the campaign. Bourmont, besides, whilst he had been intriguing to obtain it, had constantly assured the Marshal that he had no idea of putting himself forward for the command.¹ If Marmont's conduct at Essonnes in 1814 be borne in mind, it may be suggested, without injustice, that the sense of injury under which he laboured, from this time forward, may have sensibly influenced his conduct during the days of July. At this juncture, when he was contemplating a *coup d'état*, Charles' decision to send Bourmont abroad instead of Marmont appears to have been ill-judged. Bourmont had been especially recommended to him as a man who could be trusted to deal ruthlessly with a popular rising.²

As the time drew near for the decisive conflict with the Chamber, the necessity of strengthening the Cabinet became more apparent. Montbel had never ceased to urge the wisdom of bringing M. de Villèle into the Government. For the past year Villèle had remained in the country, though in the early part of the Session of 1829 the charges, brought against him by M. Labbey de Pompières, had been withdrawn. This year, however, he had arrived in Paris a few days after the prorogation of the Chambers. Many Royalists were now convinced that he was the only man who, at this crisis, should be entrusted with the conduct of affairs. The soundness of his previsions with regard to the conversion of the *rente* had helped to rehabilitate him in the public estimation. The smoothness with which the indemnity to the *émigrés* had been paid off had, at last, earned for him the gratitude

¹ Pasquier, VI. pp. 208-216, 222.

Despatches and Correspondence of Duke of Wellington, VII. pp. 20-26.

Marmont, *Mémoires*, VIII. pp. 212-230.

Mdme. de Boigne, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 277-283.

Guernon-Ranville, *Journal d'un Ministre*, Avril 10, 17, 20, 1830.

² C. Rousset, *Le Marquis de Clermont-Tonnerre*, p. 376.

of those who owed so much to him.¹ He was himself, undoubtedly, anxious to re-enter public life provided he were accorded a free hand. But neither Charles nor Polignac had any serious intentions of invoking his assistance. The King, whenever the question arose of sending for M. de Villèle, would say either that "it was not yet time," or that "he was too precious to risk at such a moment." Polignac would appear to have entertained substantially the same views. "M. de Villèle must die in office," he is reported to have said. "When I have extricated the Monarchy from the ruts into which Martignac has allowed it to sink, I shall hand over gladly the Presidency of the Council to him." Thus he believed himself to be the Minister whom Providence had especially designed to replace the throne upon its true foundations.² Charles had a more logical reason for not calling upon the services of M. de Villèle. The unconstitutional measures to which he was proposing to resort would, he knew, never have the approval of Villèle. For his purpose he must find a determined Minister who would be prepared to treat the Charter with scant respect. He had hoped to find such a man in La Bourdonnaye. But his expectations had not been fulfilled, and his thoughts now turned to Peyronnet, who appeared to possess the qualities required of a Minister of the Interior at this particular juncture.³

In the evening of March 31st, Villèle, to his surprise, received a visit from M. Humann, a Left Centre Liberal, and from M. du Marhallac'h, a Right Centre Royalist. They came to assure him that, were the King to commission him to form a new Cabinet, all their colleagues would support him throughout his first Session, in the course of which, however, only the Budget and indispensable measures must be brought forward. Under these conditions he would have a majority, and the time thus gained would enable passions to cool down. They had lost their illusions, they told him, that Parliamentary Government could be satisfactorily established in France. They could see the personal rule of the King restored without regret, and they felt sure that Polignac was planning a *coup d'état* with this end in view. But they had no confidence in his capacity to bring it to a successful issue. Their horror of a revolution, which must be the inevitable consequence of the failure of his attempt, was the motive which had induced them to lay this proposal before him.

Earlier in this same day Villèle had had a long talk with the

¹ Correspondence of Montbel and Génoude with Villele, contained in Villele's *Mémoires*, V. pp. 377-409.

² Villèle, *Mémoires*, V. pp. 389-390, 392-393, 397, 401, 413.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 427-428, 429-430.

Pasquier, VI. p. 225.

King. The interview had not been of his seeking, Charles had suggested it himself. He had found the King as pleasant and as gracious as formerly, but clearly determined not to take him into his confidence. Nevertheless, had the visit of MM. Humann and du Marhallac'h occurred at an earlier date, he should have brought their suggestion to His Majesty's notice. Under the circumstances, however, he conceived that no good purpose could be served by asking for a second audience in order to discuss it. He could only promise, therefore, to keep the matter a secret, and could hold out no hopes that their well-meant endeavours would lead to any practical results.¹ A week later Polignac himself suggested his entry into the Government. But Villèle had no confidence in the sincerity of his offer, and, in any case, he could not accept a seat in a Cabinet with the policy of which he was in complete disaccord. To put an end to the intrigues and rumours which his presence occasioned, he left Paris, on April 12th, carrying away with him the sad conviction that a badly conceived and ill-prepared *coup d'état* was impending. With him departed the last chance of a peaceful termination to the crisis.²

Early in May the Dauphin, by the King's desire, inspected the army and the fleet at Toulon, before the expedition set sail for the African coast. Immediately upon his return to Paris, on May 17th, the Royal ordinance dissolving the Chamber of Deputies was promulgated. At the same time the electoral colleges were convened for June 23rd and July 3rd, and the opening of Parliament was fixed for August 3rd. Two days later, on May 19th, a reconstruction of the Cabinet was made public. Courvoisier, the Keeper of the Seals, and Chabrol, the Minister of Finance, retired, and were replaced in their respective posts by Chantelauze and Montbel. The portfolio of the Interior, surrendered by Montbel, passed to Peyronnet, and a new Ministry, to be known as that of Public Works, was created for the Baron Capelle. The decision to dissolve and to resort to extraordinary measures, should the elections prove unfavourable, had been Courvoisier's and Chabrol's reasons for retiring. Charles made no effort to retain them, and parted from them in the most affectionate manner.³

By these changes Charles had created a more homogeneous Cabinet. But neither he nor Polignac could impart to its members their sublime confidence. Chantelauze was President of the

¹ Villèle, *Mémoires*, V. pp. 418-421.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 423-424, 462.

³ Pasquier, VI. pp. 224-227.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XX. pp. 358-365, 413-415.

Royal Court at Grenoble and, during the Sessions of 1828 and 1829, had been closely associated with Ravez. The Dauphin had a high opinion of him and, as he was passing through Grenoble, had, after much difficulty, persuaded him to enter the Government. "You will read of my appointment in the *Moniteur*," he wrote to his brother on May 18th. "I look upon it as the most disastrous thing which could have befallen me." The King had to entreat and almost to command Montbel to accept the portfolio of Finance. D'Haussez, the Minister of Marine, consented to remain at his post only because the Dauphin warned him that, were he to retire, his successor would gain the whole credit for the Algerian expedition. Guernon-Ranville in vain begged Polignac to induce the King to replace him, and expressed the opinion that the reconstituted Cabinet would not endure three months. In Charles' words, "the name of Peyronnet was to be the flag which he intended to plant upon the battlefield. His appointment was to give the required fillip to public opinion." Yet Peyronnet himself would appear to have entered the Government with the idea of abandoning Polignac, and of forming a Constitutional Cabinet, which the King was to be compelled to accept after the elections. Pasquier alleges that he tried to induce both Martignac and himself to join a combination of this kind. Neither of them, however, had the faintest desire to be associated with him. Peyronnet was probably the most unpopular man in France. His temper was overbearing, and he was always remembered in connection with the worst measures of the Villèle administration. His appointment to the Home Department, at this time, was regarded as the expression of a deliberate intention to flout public opinion. The Baron Capelle was prefect of Versailles, and in former days had done secret political work for the Pavillon de Marsan. His supposed skill in electioneering matters was the reason of his inclusion in the Cabinet. Bourmont was not to be replaced as Minister of War. During his absence Polignac undertook to be responsible for his portfolio, assisted by General de Champagny, Under-Secretary of State for War.¹

The earlier reports of the prefects upon the prospects of the elections had been encouraging. If their calculations could be depended upon, the Government might expect a majority of from thirty-five to forty. But as the time drew near for the

¹ Pasquier, VI. pp. 223-230.

Nettement, *Histoire*, VIII. pp. 482-492.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XX. pp. 415-427.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VIII. pp. 123-128.

Mdme. de Boigne, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 295-297.

E. Daudet, *Révolution de 1830*, pp. 29-35.

D'Haussez, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 199-200.

electoral colleges to assemble, they expressed less confident opinions. Meanwhile, Peyronnet and Capelle directed that the utmost pressure was to be brought to bear upon public officials. Polignac, as Minister of War, enjoined generals of districts to order their officers under pain of the severest penalties to vote for the Government candidates. The Bishops and other high dignitaries of the Church entered keenly into the struggle. In pastoral letters several prelates violently denounced the conduct of the opposition members of the late Chamber, and urged their clergy "to exercise all their influence to obtain good electoral results." Lastly, Charles himself, on June 14th, issued an address in which were to be found such sentences as these :

"Frenchmen, the late Chamber disregarded my wishes. It refused to support the good work which I purposed to do. As the father of my people my heart was troubled, as a King I was offended. I pronounced the dissolution of the Chamber. . . . The preservation of the Charter and of all the institutions founded upon it shall always be the object of my endeavours. But to attain this end I must exercise freely my sacred rights, and they must be respected. . . . Electors, hasten to your colleges. Let no reprehensible laziness detain you. It is a king who asks you, it is a father who calls upon you. Do your duty—I shall know how to do mine."

Mayors were ordered to read aloud this proclamation. Public officials were directed to say everywhere that it was a question of choosing between the King and a revolution. The clergy adjured their parishioners from the pulpit to come forward for the defence of their religion. Upon the other side the opposition papers and the society *Aide-toi, le ciel t'aidera* were no less active. The re-election of the two hundred and twenty-one Deputies who had voted the address was their watchword.¹

Whilst the country was preparing feverishly for the elections, the King and Queen of Naples arrived in France. They were returning from Spain, which they had visited upon the occasion of their daughter's marriage with Ferdinand VII. In Paris they were installed at the Elysée, where they remained for several weeks. Balls and festivities were given in their honour, and, on May 31st, they were entertained magnificently at the Palais Royal. Charles, upon this occasion, consented to depart from his usual rule and to be present in person. The Duc d'Orléans, in his anxiety to gain popularity, issued over 3000 invitations, of which

¹ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XX. pp. 431-445.

Pasquier, VI. pp. 231-232.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VIII. pp. 128-132.

Nettement, *Histoire*, VIII. p. 547-553.

a goodly number were sent to members of the opposition. Moreover, to please the people, he caused the gates of the gardens to be kept open during the whole duration of the ball. It was said that he showed himself too frequently upon the balcony, and displayed a too marked satisfaction at the acclamations with which he was greeted by the crowd. As the evening wore on the spirit of the mob in the gardens grew very turbulent. Amidst savage shouts chairs were collected in a heap round the Statue of Apollo and set on fire. Before order could be restored, the intervention of the police and of the fire brigade had to be invoked. "In truth," said Salvandy to the Duc d'Orléans, "it is a Neapolitan feast; we are dancing upon a volcano."

The presence in Paris of these members of a degenerate branch of Bourbons was not calculated to increase the people's respect for the family. The Royal couple presented a singularly grotesque appearance. The King attired himself habitually so as to resemble closely an old pensioner at the Invalides, whilst his Queen was monstrously fat. Nevertheless, outside Court circles their visit passed almost unnoticed. M. d'Haussez took upon himself to point out to Charles this disquieting indifference of the Parisians to their strange guests. "You are right," answered the King; "if they allow to pass so excellent an opportunity of making fun, they must, indeed, have serious matters over which to ponder."¹

On June 19th it was known in Paris that the expedition had disembarked safely upon the Algerian coast. This good news had no favourable effect upon the elections. Four days later the *colleges d'arrondissement* assembled, and before the end of the month the Government knew the names of most of the successful candidates. In the large majority of cases the opposition had triumphed. With very few exceptions Deputies who had voted the address had been returned a second time. Though the departmental colleges might be expected to give better results, it was possible no longer to hope for a government majority. On June 29th Charles bade his Ministers take counsel and advise him of the measures which their wisdom might suggest for dealing with the situation.

When at a later date Polignac, Peyronnet, Chantelauze, and Guernon-Ranville were placed upon their trial,² they refused persistently to disclose the secrets of the Council chamber. The

¹ Pasquier, VI. pp. 227-228.

Mdme. de Boigne, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 228-304.

Nettement, *Histoire*, VIII. pp. 496-499.

Viel Castet, *Histoire*, XX. pp. 377-380.

D'Haussez, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 225-226.

² Montbel, Capelle, and d'Haussez succeeded in escaping abroad.

proceedings, in consequence, shed little light upon the different stages, by which the decision was arrived at to draw up the famous ordinances. But Polignac, d'Haussez, and Guernon-Ranville have written, more or less detailed, accounts of their share in the events of July. Polignac is responsible for two contributions, both of which are valuable as showing the point of view from which he regarded the situation. The first of these consists of a confidential memorandum, dated April 14th, 1830, in which he sets forth for the King's information his ideas upon the state of affairs. He admits that a certain degree of unrest exists, but contends that it is confined to a small section of society, and is kept alive by the newspapers which persist in falsely ascribing to Ministers unconstitutional designs. The general conditions of the country are prosperous and satisfactory. The people are concerned entirely with their own affairs, and ask only to be allowed to enjoy in peace the benefits which they owe to the Charter. Frenchmen combine a veritable thirst for distinctions with a passion for equality before the law. This twofold sentiment finds a complete satisfaction in existing laws and institutions. Outside the limited circle of a few agitators, no one desires the overthrow of the order of things established by the Restoration. From this devotion of the people to the Charter and to the social conditions founded upon it, M. de Polignac draws the following very dangerous conclusion. "Were circumstances to render necessary a deviation from our institutions it would be submitted to, provided that the public conscience were satisfied that any such temporary infraction would establish the existing system of government upon a permanent foundation in the future."¹

Polignac's second compilation was published in 1845, nine years after his release from prison. In this work, to which he gives the name of *études historiques*, he seeks to justify his conduct in 1830. The only mistake which he is prepared to acknowledge that he committed, lay in underrating the strength of the revolutionary movement.² Ever since 1815 the struggle had been going on continuously between the monarchical principle and that of the sovereignty of the people. When in August, 1829, the King called him to office, his crown was already in danger owing to the policy of concessions to the advancing tide of democracy pursued by previous governments. The Liberal party was an enemy of the principle of legitimate sovereignty, and the country was permeated with revolutionary societies. In 1830 the action of the two hundred and twenty-one Deputies, who voted

¹ Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VIII. pp. 102-105.

² Polignac, *Études historiques*, p. 294.

the address, was a violation of the Charter, inasmuch as it was an attempt to deprive the King of his constitutional right to choose his own Ministers. Under these conditions had the King sent for Villèle, Martignac, or Chateaubriand the situation would not have been improved, seeing that not one of them would have been able to form a Cabinet acceptable to a factious majority. "Moreover," he asks, "could the King have gone hat in hand soliciting support to the Right and to the Left?" Conduct so humiliating would have been regarded merely as a sign of weakness and of fear. At this crisis, Charles, he contends, rightly decided to make use of the powers conferred upon him by Article 14 of the Charter, which declared him to be "the supreme head of the State, and competent to issue regulations and ordinances for the execution of the laws and the safety of the State."

Polignac devotes considerable space to trying to prove that, after the refusal of support and the re-election of a hostile Chamber, a resort to Article 14 was perfectly constitutional. But he weakens his case by citing as precedents for such action the ordinances issued by Louis XVIII against Bonaparte, in March, 1815, and those promulgated, in the following July, immediately after the second Restoration.¹ It is hardly necessary to point out that the conditions of war and of invasion, which caused these edicts to be published, present no analogy to the situation in 1830. Nevertheless, though unprecedented, a recourse to extraordinary measures might be shown to have been justified, were Polignac able to prove that the action of the Parliamentary opposition or of revolutionary societies threatened danger to the throne. It is clearly out of his power, however, to adduce any real evidence in support of his statements. He can assert only that, when the revolution broke out, there lay in his desk at the Foreign Office a list of prominent persons affiliated to secret societies, and refer to some story about the discovery of a large number of daggers at the shop of an armourer, who could not explain satisfactorily why they were there.²

In the *études historiques* occurs the following passage: "A Parliamentary majority, unstable as the public opinion which gave birth to it, is a perilous support for the Monarchy."³ In this sentence are contained, without doubt, the true reasons which moved Charles and his President of the Council to embark upon that "slight deviation from our Constitution," which had been foreshadowed in the report of April 14th. It is clear that Polignac was convinced that the middle classes only would resist

¹ Polignac, *Études historiques*, pp. 284-285.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 270-272, 282.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 319.

an infraction of the Charter. The majority of them, moreover, would be deterred from overt acts of rebellion by the material losses which a revolution would inflict upon them. Perhaps a few hundred turbulent individuals might attempt to create disorder, but two or three volleys from the Guards would suffice to disperse them. Writing fifteen years after the event, he is still at a loss to understand why working men, who could not read the newspapers, should have courted death on behalf of the liberty of the press, or why youths of eighteen should have faced bullets in defence of electoral laws which did not concern them.¹

Pasquier, who as President of the House of Peers under Louis Philippe conducted the trial of the Ministers of Charles X, is of opinion that, when the Government was reconstructed in May, the three new members of it, Capelle, Peyronnet, and Chantelauze, were required to give their assent to a *coup d'état* before they entered the Cabinet.² It is not disputed that at the first deliberations of Ministers to consider the situation created by the wholesale defeat of Government candidates in the *colleges d'arrondissement*, a resort to Article 14 was declared constitutional by a majority of the members of the Cabinet. The proposal to adopt extraordinary measures would appear to have emanated from Chantelauze. It is probable, however, that he had been prompted to take this step by the President of the Council. Both Charles and Polignac were instinctively conspirators, and it is practically certain that before important measures were submitted to the Cabinet they were in the habit of discussing them with their secret advisers. According to d'Haussez, Polignac rarely proposed anything of importance at the Council table, but he contrived always to enforce the King's wishes upon his colleagues.³ Guernon-Ranville, nevertheless, appears to have dissented from his fellow-Ministers, and to have contended that, until the new Chamber should have thrown out the Budget, or taken some other step calculated to bring the machinery of government to a standstill, the King could not legally avail himself of the dictatorial powers conferred upon him by Article 14. Unfortunately for himself, and perhaps for his country, he did not carry his opposition to the length of resigning. Peyronnet also deprecated in a half-hearted manner a premature resort to extraordinary measures, but he seems to have been quickly won over to the views of the majority. In any case, very soon afterwards, he proposed that the King should annul the elections and convene,

¹ Polignac, *Études historiques*, pp. 286, 294.

² Pasquier, VI. pp. 230-231.

Guernon-Ranville, *Journal d'un Ministre*, 29 Juin, 1830, and 13 Septembre, 1831.

³ D'Haussez, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 240, 318-319.

in the place of the elective assembly, a Grand Council, to consist of selected Peers, Deputies, and Magistrates. But this plan was abandoned in face of the opposition of Montbel, Capelle, and Guernon-Ranville, who declared that such a body would carry no weight in the country, and would be merely a feeble imitation of the Assembly of Notables of 1788. The next day the same Minister suggested another scheme. The King, acting under the provisions of Article 14, was to abolish the liberty of the press and the existing electoral law, dissolve the Chamber, and convene afresh the electoral colleges, under conditions to be laid down by Royal ordinance. To these proposed measures all the Ministers gave their assent except M. de Guernon-Ranville.¹

On July 7th a council of Ministers, at which Charles and the Dauphin were present, was held at Saint-Cloud. Polignac laid before the King Peyronnet's last proposals, and declared that they had the unanimous approval of his colleagues. Guernon-Ranville demurred to this statement, and Charles listened attentively whilst he enumerated his reasons for dissenting from his fellow-Ministers. But he declared that both he and his son concurred with the views of the majority, and finally summed up the situation in these words: "Gentlemen, the men of the Left are imbued with the spirit of the Revolution. They pretend to oppose my Ministers, but it is the Crown itself which is the real object of their attacks. I am older than you. I can remember the Revolution. My brother's first concessions cost him his life. Then, as now, men protested their devotion to him, and asked him only to send away his Ministers. He yielded, and, by so doing, sealed his own fate. I shall not dismiss you. I like you, gentlemen, and you have my full confidence. Were I to act otherwise, sooner or later they would treat me as they treated Louis XVI. Never, however, shall they drag me to the scaffold. Gentlemen, if we are to die we must die on horseback, fighting." It was decided, forthwith, that Peyronnet should draw up the ordinance to repeal the electoral law, whilst Chantelauze should frame the edict abolishing the liberty of the press.²

Two days later, on July 9th, the news was received of the capture of Algiers after sharp fighting. The successful termination of the expedition was little noticed by the public. Even upon the *Bourse* the effect was slight and the *rente* remained stationary. On the 14th the King went in state to Notre Dame to hear the *Te Deum* chanted, in celebration of the victory. He was sur-

¹ Guernon-Ranville, *Journal d'un Ministre*, 6 Juillet, 1830.

² *Ibid.*, 7 Juillet, 1830.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XX. pp. 472-488.

D'Haussez, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 239-240.

prised and pained at the stony indifference with which the people saw him pass through the streets. At the door of the Cathedral he was received by Quèlen, Archbishop of Paris, whose address was considered very ominous. "Your constant faith, sir, in the protection of Mary, the Mother of God, shall not be reposed in vain. May Your Majesty soon receive another reward, and be enabled to thank our Lord for other victories, not less sweet, and not less glorious."¹ In the meantime, the departmental colleges had met, and the position, by the end of the second week in July, was clearly defined. Though the returns from the superior colleges were less unfavourable, the Government was, nevertheless, in a hopeless minority, and in a worse position than in the last Parliament. Two hundred and two Deputies out of the two hundred and twenty-one who had voted the address had been returned, whilst out of the one hundred and eighty-one who had supported the Ministry, only ninety-nine had been successful.² D'Haussez, to whom as Minister of Marine some credit was due for the naval preparations in connection with the Algerian expedition, had been defeated in nine electoral colleges.³

During the next ten days the preparation of the ordinances proceeded. The new electoral regulations were the subject of an animated discussion at a meeting of the Cabinet on July 21st. This ordinance, as drawn up by Peyronnet, was to consist of twenty-two articles, which provided for the reduction of the number of Deputies to two hundred and fifty-eight, the abolition of Septennial Parliaments, and for the re-establishment of annual partial elections, and of the system of indirect election. At the same time all the reforms, introduced by Martignac's bill two years before, were to be swept away. "You need have announced merely that in future Deputies will be appointed by the prefects," said Guernon-Ranville bitterly to Peyronnet.⁴ In all these measures traces are discernible of a weak desire on the part of Polignac and the King to give to their *coup d'état* a kind of constitutional appearance. Two hundred and fifty-eight was the number of Deputies originally fixed by the Charter, which had also laid down that the Chamber was to be renewed by annual partial elections. Finally, it was prescribed that both the ordinance repealing the electoral law and the one abolishing the liberty of the press would require to be ratified by the Chambers. D'Haussez approved of the ordinances in principle, but was afraid

¹ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XX. pp. 507-509.
M^{de}. de Boigne, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 309-310.
Pasquier, VI. pp. 238-239.

² Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XX. pp. 519-520.

³ D'Haussez, *Mémoires*, II. p. 225.

⁴ Pasquier, VI. pp. 240-241.

that the troops in the capital would prove insufficient to quell the disorders which their publication would give rise to. Polignac, in his capacity as Minister of War, assured him, without convincing him, however, that all the necessary military precautions had been taken.¹

Charles had insisted that their plans must be wrapped in the most absolute secrecy, that the ordinances might burst upon the public like a bombshell. His instructions were scrupulously carried out. Nevertheless, rumours that startling events were impending in France reached foreign Courts. The Tsar Nicholas bade Mortemart, who was returning home on leave, tell Charles that "were the Coronation oath to be violated, he must expect no assistance from Russia." Metternich had suspicions that an infraction of the Charter was contemplated, and could realize the folly of it, enemy as he was to Constitutionalism. "I know well," he said to Rayneval, the French Ambassador, "that the freedom of the press and your electoral laws are abominations, but any attempts to abolish them by a *coup d'état* will be fatal to the Bourbons." But Charles returned always the answer that he was growing tired of mischievous insinuations, and that there was no truth in any of these reports. Neither to the Duc d'Orléans nor to Baron James de Rothschild, who ventured to question him upon the subject, would he make the slightest admission. He is even said to have assured the Dauphine, who was about to start for Vichy, that he would sanction no important measures during her absence. Meanwhile, Peyronnet was putting the final touches to the electoral ordinance, and at the same time despatching to the Deputies official notification that the Chambers would meet on August 3rd. Anxious visitors, who went to the Home Office hoping to glean some news, saw the letters of convocation, always sent to members on the eve of the opening of Parliament, piled up upon the Minister's table, and departed reassured.²

The ordinances were to be signed at a Council to be held at Saint-Cloud on Sunday, July 25th. The Baron de Vitrolles was among the crowd of privileged individuals who visited the palace to pay their respects to His Majesty upon his return from Mass. His instinct, sharpened by years of intrigues and conspiracies,

¹ D'Haussez, *Mémoires*, II. p. 241.

² Pasquier, VI. pp. 240-245.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XX. pp. 525-553, 542.

Mdme. de Boigne, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 311-312.

Guizot, *Mémoires*, I. p. 366.

Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 352-357.

Lord Stuart de Rothesay, France, 1830, 26 July, 1830, F.O. 411.

warned him that, for some time past, Charles and his Ministers had been engaged upon matters of unusual importance. The *coup d'état* which he believed to be impending would have had his hearty approval, provided he had felt sure that suitable preparations had been made for its accomplishment. Before embarking upon it, the loyal inhabitants of La Vendée should have been armed, and a notification of the King's designs should have been sent to foreign Courts. Charles, in his opinion, should postpone any violation of the Constitution till the armies of the Holy Alliance should be concentrated upon the French frontiers. Vitrolles, it will be remembered, was the author of the *Secret note*. On this Sunday morning his suspicions were confirmed by the ill-concealed anxiety which he discerned in the demeanour of the King and of Ministers. With better reason than Royer-Collard he might have said that "he had read the ordinances upon their faces."¹ He now told Guernon-Ranville that he had no wish to pry into Ministerial secrets, but, if any unusual measures were contemplated, he could assure him that the town was in a very dangerous condition of excitement, and that great precautions should be taken. Though he failed to elicit any information from him, he succeeded in frightening him. Going across the room to Mangin, the prefect of police, Guernon asked him about the state of the capital. This official, who, strange to say, had not been taken into the secret, told him that he could guess the reason of his questions, but that he need be under no apprehension, whatever might happen "he would stake his life that Paris would not stir." To Peyronnet, also, Vitrolles confided his fears, and expressed a wish to be allowed to make a communication to the Council. Charles addressed a few words to him; he did not, however, venture to make his request to him. The King, followed by his Ministers, then entered the Council Chamber, and the doors were locked behind them.

"If only one of them would refuse to sign all might yet be well," whispered Vitrolles to Sémonville, whose political sagacity was proverbial. But, upon this occasion, the habitual acuteness of the Grand Referendary of the Chamber of Peers would appear to have been at fault. He ascribed the anxious looks, which he had observed upon the faces of Ministers, merely to the difficulties of composing a suitable King's speech.² Meanwhile, Charles was listening whilst the five ordinances were read out to him. The first abolished the liberty of the press, and prescribed that no paper could appear without the sanction of the Government. It was preceded by a lengthy enumeration of the reasons which had

¹ Thureau Dangin, *Le parti libéral*, p. 453.

² Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 360-364.

induced the King to resort to this step. The second dissolved the Chamber of Deputies which had not yet met. The third repealed the electoral law, and laid down the new conditions under which elections were to be carried out in future. The fourth convened the electoral colleges, and fixed upon August 28th for the opening of Parliament. The fifth reinstated upon the Council of State those persons, like Franchet and Frénilly, whom Martignac had succeeded in removing from it. When they had been twice read aloud the King turned to the Dauphin and asked for his opinion. "When the danger is imminent," answered he, "one must put one's head down and go for it straight." "You are all agreed, I believe, gentlemen?" said Charles. "We are unanimous," replied d'Haussez, "in thinking that these measures are necessary, but not in considering that the means to enforce them are sufficient." "You refuse to sign?" "No, sir, I shall not desert my colleagues, and am prepared to share their responsibility." Charles hid his face in his hands for several minutes, then, taking up his pen, affixed his signature, saying: "It is the only way." D'Haussez, when it came to his turn to sign, appeared to gaze anxiously round the room. "What is it?" whispered Polignac. "I am looking for the portrait of Lord Strafford," replied his colleague.¹ "These are grave measures, gentlemen," said Charles, as the Council broke up; "it is now a matter of life and death between us." The Dauphin took a less serious view of the situation. "I know somebody," he exclaimed, laughing and rubbing his hands, "who will be astonished to-morrow when he opens his paper—that is Champagny." General de Champagny was, for all practical purposes, Minister of War. The full force of the joke was to be brought home to *M. le Dauphin* before the end of the week.²

That evening, at 11 o'clock, M. Sauvo, the editor of the *Moniteur*, was shown into a dimly lighted room at the Ministry of Justice, where Chantelauze and Montbel handed him a voluminous manuscript, the contents of which were to be inserted into the official paper the next day. He glanced through it and started. "You are surprised?" questioned the two Ministers, who seemed painfully anxious. "It would be astonishing if I were not." "What, then, is your opinion?" "God save the

¹ This story is denied by Polignac. *Études historiques*, p. 315 (note).

² Guernon-Ranville, *Journal d'un ministre*, 25 Juillet, 1830.

D'Haussez, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 241-244.

Polignac, *Études historiques*, pp. 315-316.

Pasquier, VI. pp. 246-249.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XX. pp. 541-542.

King, God save France." "Indeed, we pray it may be so." "Gentlemen, I am fifty-seven," said Sauvo as he took his departure. "I have witnessed the scenes of the Revolution. I take leave of you now, consumed with dread that I may be about to see a repetition of them." ¹

¹ Procès des Ministres, deposition of Sauvo.

CHAPTER XVIII

REAPING THE WHIRLWIND

ON Monday, July 26th, the day of the publication of the ordinances, the general appearance of the town was calm. In the wealthy quarters a keen observer might, perhaps, have detected an increased gravity and seriousness in the demeanour of the passers by. On the *Bourse*, however, the news created the gravest alarm, and a heavy fall of the *rente* was recorded.¹ Forty-four Liberal journalists met during the afternoon at the offices of the *National*, where Thiers drew up a protest which was signed by all present. The ordinances were pronounced illegal, and the Deputies were urged to assemble on August 3rd, the day fixed for the opening of Parliament. The proclamation concluded with these words: "the Government has forfeited its right to expect obedience. We intend to resist, in so far as we are concerned; it is for France to judge to what lengths her resistance should go."² A meeting of some fourteen Deputies was also held at the house of M. Delaborde. No resolutions were passed, however, and the members separated, after agreeing to assemble again the next day at M. Casimir Périer's.³

Throughout the day Ministers carried on as usual the business of their departments, and, in the evening, for the convenience of Chantelauze who was ill, met at the Ministry of Justice. Whilst they were assembled, news was brought to Montbel that his windows had been broken, and that crowds were collected in the Rue de Rivoli and upon the boulevards. Polignac, fearing that the Foreign Office, which was then situated at the corner of the

- ¹ Pasquier, VI. p. 250.
Mdme. de Boigne, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 321-323.
Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 369-371.
Nettement, *Histoire*, VIII. p. 595.
² Pasquier, VI. p. 251.
Nettement, *Histoire*, VIII. pp. 595-598.
Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XX. pp. 561-568.
³ Nettement, *Histoire*, VIII. pp. 599-600.
Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XX. p. 569.

Rue des Capucines and the boulevard, might be attacked, decided to return home. On the way he was recognized, and stones were thrown at him, D'Haussez, who accompanied him, being slightly wounded by the broken glass of the carriage windows. The mob was dispersed, however, and the night passed off without further disturbance.¹

Marmont, whose turn it happened to be to command the Guards, had been in attendance at Saint-Cloud. On this Monday morning he left the palace in complete ignorance of the ordinances, and heard of their promulgation only upon his arrival in Paris. At the Institut he expressed to his friend François Arago, the astronomer, his disapproval of them, and spoke very bitterly of the conduct of the Government. Later on he appears to have called upon Madame de Boigne and to have talked to her in very much the same strain. This astute person, possibly for ulterior motives, was at pains to impress upon him that this new development of events was singularly unfortunate for him personally. Hitherto, whenever his conduct in deserting Napoleon at Essonnes had been aspersed, he had been able to say that by acting as he had he had helped to deliver his country from an odious despotism. But, now that the Bourbons had embarked upon absolutism, that excuse could serve no longer.²

Charles, meanwhile, had been stag-hunting all day in the forest of Rambouillet. Before starting he went to see his grandchildren, and asked Madame de Gontaut whether she had read the *Moniteur*. Upon her saying that it was not a paper which she was in the habit of seeing, he told her that it contained news which might surprise her, and proceeded to enumerate upon his fingers, and to explain for her benefit the different ordinances. Her grief and alarm annoyed him; nevertheless, when she begged to be allowed to put a question to him, he bade her speak. Thereupon she asked whether the ordinances were not a violation of the Charter. "I believe not, upon my word of honour, I believe not," he assured her, taking her kindly by the hand. "I am advised that a resort to Article 14 is constitutional under the circumstances." Shortly afterwards he took his departure, telling her to be under no apprehension.³ It was nearly eleven o'clock before he returned to Saint-Cloud. "What news from Paris?" he asked of Marmont, upon descending from his carriage. "Much alarm, much depression, sir, and a very severe fall of the *rente*." "How much has it fallen?" questioned the Dauphin, who had

¹ D'Haussez, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 249-250.

² Nettement, *Histoire*, VII. p. 594.

Mdme. de Boigne, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 318-320.

Procès des Ministres, *Deposition of Arago*.

³ Duchesse de Gontaut, *Mémoires*, pp. 311-314.

been hunting with the King. "Four francs, your Royal Highness." "It will go up again," said the Dauphin.

It had been decided at the Council at Saint-Cloud on Sunday that, in the event of disturbances, Marmont was to be invested with the command of all the troops within the Paris district. This intelligence, however, had not yet been communicated to him, and it was only about eleven o'clock on the morning of Tuesday, July 28th, that he was sent for. "They appear to be rather anxious in Paris; go to the Foreign Office, obtain from Polignac your letter of service and take up your command," said Charles to him. It was a singularly unwelcome piece of news for Marmont, who could not, however, do otherwise than obey. He was to come back in the evening, the King had told him, if all were quiet. At an earlier hour that morning a certain Doctor Bertin, attached to the Foreign Office, appears to have arrived at Saint-Cloud with a letter, which he gave to Madame de Gontaut, saying that Polignac desired her to hand it to the King with her own hands. The Duchess duly carried out her instructions, and Charles read aloud to her the contents of the note. Polignac begged His Majesty to listen to no alarmist rumours, and to believe only his reports, which he would send to him frequently. The disturbances in Paris were a mere riot, "if he should prove to be wrong he would give his head in expiation of his mistake." "Not much of a present that," blurted out Madame de Gontaut. "I like you very much, but you are sometimes very trying," said Charles.¹

In defiance of the ordinance both the *Temps* and the *National* appeared as usual on Tuesday with the protest of the Journalists, which had been drawn up the day before, figuring conspicuously in their columns. No number of either the *Constitutionnel* or the *Journal des Débats* was issued, but the Royalist papers, having obtained without difficulty the required permission to appear, warmly congratulated the Government upon its determination to deal firmly with the situation.² It was not alone in certain sections of the press that the violation of the Constitution found admirers. Guernon-Ranville's *salon* was invaded by visitors anxious to testify their admiration of the skilful manner in which the *coup d'état* had been carried out. Some of the loudest to applaud its success were persons who had hitherto affected distinctly Liberal opinions.³ Yet from an early hour matters had begun to assume a decidedly threatening aspect. At a meeting

¹ Duchesse de Gontaut, *Mémoires*, pp. 316-318.

² Pasquier, VI. p. 252.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XX. pp. 571-572.

³ Guernon-Ranville, *Journal d'un ministre*, Juillet 27, 1830.

at the Hôtel de Ville, the day before, to elect new members to the Chamber of Commerce, a number of large employers of labour had resolved to close their places of business.¹ Working men deprived of their employment, prominent among them being the printers and compositors whom the ordinance against the press especially affected, joined the crowds of youths and students assembling about the Palais Royal. Men mounted on chairs in the gardens and read out Thiers' proclamation in the *National*. The *gendarmes* charged repeatedly, but failed to drive away the people, who replied to all summonses to disperse by volleys of stones. About two in the afternoon the police and detachments of troops opened a sharp fusillade upon the rioters. A young Englishman, Folkes by name, leaning from a window in the Hotel Royal, in the Rue des Pyramides, is said to have been one of the first victims.

Meanwhile the police had been ordered to render unserviceable the printing presses of the *Temps* and the *National*, the two papers which had appeared without permission. Warrants were also issued for the arrest of all those journalists who had signed Thiers' protest. When the commissary of police presented himself at the office of the *National* to carry out his orders, he was compelled to break open the doors. No resistance was offered to him or to his men, but they were solemnly warned of the illegality of their proceedings. They appear to have performed their work in a very half-hearted manner, seeing that, in the course of the next few hours, printed matter was issuing again from the offices of the paper. The visit of the police to the premises of the *Temps* gave M. Baude, the manager, an opportunity of exercising his theatrical talents with marked effect. Having caused the doors to be locked, and having armed himself with the *code*, he proceeded to read out to the locksmith, whom the commissary had requisitioned, the penalties for housebreaking. To the delight of a sympathetic crowd which had assembled, he succeeded in persuading two or three workmen, who were sent for in turn, to refuse to perform the work demanded of them. To fulfil his instructions, the police officer was obliged to summon, at last, the smith employed to rivet the irons upon convicts.³ The agents of the men, who carried through successfully the *coup d'état* of twenty-one years later, wasted no time in bandying words with journalists.

As had been arranged the day before, about thirty-seven

¹ D'Haussez, *Mémoires*, II. p. 252.

Pasquier, VI. p. 251.

² *Ibid.*, p. 252.

Nettement, *Histoire*, VIII. pp. 607-608.

³ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XX. pp. 571-575.

Nettement, *Histoire*, VIII. pp. 607-608.

Deputies met at the house of M. Casimir Périer, in the Rue Neuve du Luxembourg, early in the afternoon. Crowds of students and rioters of all descriptions filled the street, and asked that some of their number should be allowed to take part in the deliberations. But Casimir Périer had no intention of allowing his house to be used as the headquarters of a revolutionary movement, and he succeeded in excluding everybody except the members of the Chamber. The majority of these persons appeared to be as nervous and as uncomfortable as their host. Indeed, their demeanour drew from Villemain the remark that "he had not expected to find so many cowards." A resolution was moved and carried to the effect that the ordinances were unconstitutional. M. Dupin proposed that they should all go to Saint-Cloud, not as the chosen representatives of the people, but as simple citizens, to implore the King to withdraw his edicts. This suggestion was not generally approved of, and, as the uproar in the neighbouring streets grew in intensity, the feeling of the meeting became increasingly favourable to an early adjournment. The Deputies, accordingly, resolved to close their deliberations and to assemble again, the next day, at the workshops of one of their number, M. Audry-Puyraveau, in the Rue du Faubourg Poissonnière, where they considered that they would be more secure. Their decision to disperse was hastened by the sound of an angry splutter of musketry upon the Place du Palais Royal.¹

Later on in the day another meeting was held at the house of M. Cadet-Gassicourt, at which were present some of the most advanced Liberals and a considerable number of former members of the Carbonari lodges. As might have been expected from such an assembly, the resolutions were of a revolutionary character. Every effort, it was decided, was to be made to incite the working classes to rebellion, and committees were to be chosen to direct the insurrection in the different quarters of the town. Thiers took part in these deliberations, after which he disappeared and was not heard of again for thirty-six hours. Being a prudent man he probably considered that, now that the train was fired, it would be wise to await the result of the explosion from a safe distance.²

Marmont had established himself in the headquarter offices of the Guards at the Tuileries between one and two o'clock in the

¹ Vulabellé, *Deux Restaurations*, VIII. pp. 212-215.

Guizot, *Mémoires*, II. p. 3.

Nettement, *Histoire*, VIII. pp. 608-610.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XX. pp. 575-576.

² Vulabellé, *Deux Restaurations*, VIII. p. 219-221.

Nettement, *Histoire*, VIII. p. 613.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XX. pp. 579-580.

afternoon. Upon taking up his command he at once discovered that Polignac had greatly overestimated the number of troops available for service. At Saint-Cloud, on the previous Sunday, he had declared to the Council that 17,000 men would be at hand, within a few hours, to repress any insurrectionary movement. Marmont, however, realized that even with the troops at Versailles his total force would not exceed 11,500 men. In his intense desire to keep his plans secret, Polignac had not consulted Champagny or any other official at the War Office. It has been said that his error arose from his inability to differentiate between the numbers of men shown upon the strength of a regiment, and those actually present with it in barracks. Polignac, as may be supposed, is not prepared to admit that he was mistaken, and maintains that his calculations were correct. He allows that, for fear of arousing suspicion, he was averse to bringing up reinforcements to Paris, prior to the promulgation of the ordinances, but he considers that the troops in the capital itself, and those within a day's march of it, should have been capable of quelling any disturbance. In proof of the soundness of his contention he cites the opinion of the Duke of Wellington, who looked upon 9000 men as sufficient to maintain order in London, a much larger town than Paris. Seeing the absolutely different conditions prevailing in the two countries, the argument is absurd, whether or not the Duke may have held the views which he ascribes to him.

Polignac seriously asserts that, when he was calculating the forces available for the repression of possible disturbances, the hideous suspicion never crossed his mind that some of the troops were not to be depended upon. This statement, if it be true, proves only that he was singularly badly informed. It was a matter of common knowledge that the regiments of the line were not to be trusted to act against their own countrymen.¹ It is probable that Polignac, when he made so incredible an assertion, was trying to excuse his strange negligence in allowing two battalions of Guards to be sent to Normandy to hunt down incendiaries, a task which a line regiment could safely have been entrusted to carry out. Marmont alleges, moreover, that the Guards themselves were not in the best condition for embarking upon the important duties which they were to be called upon to perform. All the four generals commanding divisions were absent, and a large number of officers, who had been granted leave to re-

¹ Marmont, *Mémoires*, VIII. pp. 341-342.
 Polignac, *Études historiques*, pp. 304-314, 311-313 (note).
 H. Bulwer, *Life of Palmerston*, I. p. 351.
 Duchesse de Gontaut, *Mémoires*, p. 320-321.
 D'Haussez, *Mémoires*, p. 253.
 Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XX. pp. 577-578.

turn to their homes to vote, had not rejoined for duty. In several regiments, on July 27th and the subsequent days, only one officer was present with each company.¹

The increasing turbulence of the crowd, and the report that barricades had been constructed, induced Marmont, soon after his arrival at the Tuileries, to order out the troops. By five o'clock the boulevards, the Place Louis XV, the Place Vendôme, the Carrousel, the Pont Neuf, and the Place de la Bastille had been occupied by horse, foot, and artillery. From these points detachments were sent out to clear the neighbouring streets. At the corner of the Rue de l'Echelle and the Rue Saint-Honoré, where a barricade had been thrown up, a sharp engagement took place. Among the killed was an old man, whose corpse was carried about the streets and shown to the people to the cry of : "Vengeance, to arms, down with the Bourbons !" But as night came on the crowds began to dwindle away, and by half-past ten order had been restored. Upon receipt of reports to this effect Marmont allowed the troops to return to their barracks, and sent word to Saint-Cloud that the town was quiet, but that he deemed it advisable to remain in Paris himself. Ministers had been installed at the Foreign Office throughout the day. A decision, arrived at in the evening, to declare Paris in a state of siege, was the only important result of their deliberations. Polignac was to carry the necessary ordinance to Saint-Cloud, early the next morning, for the King's signature. When they returned home on foot about midnight the streets were quiet, and the town appeared to be in its normal condition.²

When morning broke on Wednesday, July 28th, the disastrous consequences were apparent of the premature withdrawal of the troops the night before. The street lamps had been broken systematically, barricades had been erected, paving-stones had been torn up and conveyed to the roofs and upper floors of houses to serve as missiles, the Royal arms had been removed from shops and public buildings, gunsmiths' shops had been swept bare of their contents, and guards and small military posts had been rushed and disarmed. The central military victualling store and a powder-magazine had been captured, the Government printing office had been taken possession of, a circumstance which was to render very difficult communication between the authorities and the insurgents ; lastly, both at the Hôtel de Ville, where the guard of sixteen men had been overpowered, and at Notre-Dame, the

¹ Marmont, *Mémoires*, VIII. pp. 286-287.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 240-241.

Guernon-Ranville, *Journal*, Juillet 27, 1830.

D'Haussez, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 252-253.

Nettement, *Histoire*, VIII. p. 615.

tricolour had been hoisted and the alarm bell rung to summon the people to arms. In the streets and behind the barricades men were to be seen once more in the uniform of the National Guard. Three years before, when this force had been disbanded, it had not been disarmed. The members of it now either joined the insurgents or, in the large majority of cases, simply handed over to them their muskets. Much more conspicuous, however, was the uniform of the students of the *École polytechnique*. These young men had broken out of their college in a body, and had brought to the insurgents the aid of their technical training. In all directions they were to be seen, directing the construction of barricades and instructing the people, who recognized them instinctively as their leaders. In the rich quarters of the town respectable working men went in groups from house to house, asking civilly for the loan of any firearms which might be in the possession of householders. Their request was generally complied with, and, it is said that in the majority of cases, these weapons were returned faithfully to their owners. At the same time, upon the steps of the *Bourse* and in the courtyards of houses, women were hard at work making cartridges. "The riot of yesterday has been converted into a revolution. It is urgent that your Majesty should take steps to arrive at a peaceful settlement. The honour of the Crown may yet be saved; to-morrow, perhaps, it may be too late," wrote Marshal Marmont to the King at an early hour on Wednesday morning.¹

In his own account of his proceedings, Marmont says very little about the withdrawal of the troops from the streets on Tuesday night, but by implication attempts to throw the blame for it upon Polignac. There was, he says, a total lack of transport and a great deficiency of field cooking-pots, which made it necessary for the men to return to barracks in order to be fed. Without doubt, Polignac was responsible for the inadequacy of the arrangements which had so detrimental an effect upon the later operations. But it is ridiculous to pretend that men, who had left their barracks only about three or four o'clock in the afternoon, could not have remained out during the whole of the night.² It is clear that Marmont, like Polignac and his fellow-Ministers, completely failed to realize the gravity of the situation. On Wednesday morning, however, whilst they retained their illusions he perceived clearly that matters were very serious.

¹ Guernon-Ranville, *Journal*, Juillet 28, 1830.

D'Haussez, *Mémoires*, II. p. 254.

Pasquier, VI. p. 255.

Marmont, *Mémoires*, VIII. pp. 242-243.

Mdme. de Boigne, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 330-332, 338-339, 345.

Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 378-379.

² Marmont, *Mémoires*, VIII. pp. 284-287.

From this time forward there can be little doubt that the wish to avoid adding to the unpopularity, which his desertion of Napoleon had gained for him, was uppermost in his thoughts. He may have hoped that he would be held to have atoned for his conduct at Essonnes, were he to be the means of inducing Charles to withdraw the ordinances and to come to terms with his revolted subjects. Reference has already been made to the frame of mind in which he took up his command. He conceived that Polignac and his colleagues had treated him extremely ill in the matter of the Algerian expedition, and as a Constitutional Liberal he was honestly opposed to the ordinances. It enraged him to think that he must incur fresh unpopularity, and perhaps estrange himself from persons whose friendship he valued, in order to carry out the measures of men whom he detested.

Marmont's despatch to the King, in which he informed him of the serious state of affairs and urged him to come to terms with the rebels, was accidentally lost by the orderly to whom it was entrusted. A second one, drawn up in the same language and sent off about eight o'clock, was duly delivered. In the meantime, however, Polignac had visited Saint-Cloud, in order to obtain the King's signature to the ordinance declaring Paris in a state of siege. It is probable that his account of the state of the capital differed in every respect from the one transmitted by the Marshal. Moreover, after he had departed, Peyronnet and Capelle arrived, under the mistaken idea that a Council was to be held at Saint-Cloud during the course of the morning. It may be that they also warned the King to attach no credence to Marmont's alarming reports. About ten o'clock the Marshal was summoned to the Foreign Office and informed that Paris was now in a state of siege, and that, in consequence, the responsibility would devolve upon him alone of restoring order. Polignac's reason for obtaining the King's sanction to this measure is believed to have been due to his desire to see martial law proclaimed, in order that prompt justice might be meted out to the insurgents. It is not likely that, at this juncture at least, he was anxious to shelter himself behind the Marshal. On the contrary, before noon, he and all his colleagues betook themselves to the military headquarters at the Tuileries. It was no longer safe, they explained, to remain at the Foreign Office. That may have been true, but, at the same time, it is evident that by transferring himself to the palace, Polignac was enabled to keep a watchful eye upon Marmont, and to influence his decisions.¹

¹ Marmont, *Mémoires*, VIII. pp. 242-245.

Pasquier, VI. pp. 254-256.

Guernon-Ranville, *Journal*, 28 Juillet, 1830, and 2me partie à Vincennes, 28 Juillet, 1830,

On being made aware of the events of the night, Marmont had sent orders to the troops to resume their positions of the day before. For several hours he allowed them to remain inactive, in the hope of receiving from the King the required permission to enter into negotiations with the insurgents. About noon, however, having heard nothing from Saint-Cloud, and having been informed that fifty men from one of his line regiments had deserted to the rebels, he decided, reluctantly, to issue his orders for action. In order to regain possession of the Hôtel de Ville and to clear the streets, he proposed to set in motion the major portion of his troops in four columns. The left one, under General Saint-Chamans, was to proceed by the boulevards to the Place de la Bastille, observe the Faubourg-Saint-Antoine, and establish communication with General Talon, who was to march upon the Hôtel de Ville by the quays. General Quinsonas was to clear the Rue Saint-Honoré and occupy the Marché des Innocents. General de Wall, with a fourth column, was to establish himself upon the Place des Victoires.

Marmont neither saw fit to show himself to the troops before they marched off, nor to issue to them any order of an inspiring character. They were to fire only should they meet with severe resistance, which he explained to mean "not a few stray shots, but fifty, at least, directed upon them at a time." The different columns succeeded with great difficulty in reaching their objectives. General Talon, Madame du Cayla's brother, re-occupied the Hôtel de Ville and repulsed all attempt to recapture it. Upon the Place de Grève and upon the quays the fighting was determined, the rebels, with drums beating, returning several times to the attack. It was in the streets and upon the boulevards, however, during their advance that the Royal troops sustained their heaviest losses. The barricades were not defended seriously, but as fast as the soldiers captured and demolished them the people would throw them up afresh, thus cutting off the columns to the rear. Meanwhile, a murderous fire would be poured upon the troops from the windows. Tiles, bricks, paving-stones, and even furniture would be hurled down upon them. The Guards, upon whom fell the brunt of the fighting, behaved throughout with a commendable steadiness. The linesmen, however, who were received always with loud cheers by the insurgents, in some cases either openly fraternized with them or discharged their weapons in the air.¹

¹ Marmont, *Mémoires*, VII. pp. 245-248.

Pasquier, VI. pp. 258-259.

Mdme. de Boigne, *Mémoires*, III. p. 341.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VIII. pp. 234-246.

D'Haussez, *Mémoires*, II. p. 257.

Marmont has been criticized adversely for committing his troops to this fight in the streets.¹ It is difficult to see, however, what other course he could have adopted. He could not retain 10,000 soldiers inactive round the Tuileries and hand over, without resistance, the town to the revolutionaries. His long delay in attacking them would appear to have been a far more blameworthy proceeding. Marmont contends that, on July 28th, his strategy was correct in directing all his efforts to gaining the possession of the *places* and open spaces upon which the main streets debouched. He expected that the barricades would be defended obstinately, and that the troops might find as many as 30,000 rebels opposed to them. He reckoned with confidence, however, that their superior training would give them the advantage. He admits readily that he was not prepared for the tactics employed against him. But their methods were practicable only because the entire population was upon the side of the insurgents. Unarmed men built afresh the barricades which the soldiers had pulled down, women carried cartridges to the combatants in their aprons, children flung stones and broken bottles upon the troops from the windows. Against the whole town in revolution his small army was powerless.²

As had been settled the day before, the meeting of Liberal Deputies was held at Audry-Puyraveau's place of business in the Rue du Faubourg-Poissonnière. On this occasion about thirty members were present, including Caffitte and La Fayette, who had hurried to town from the country, and the two Waterloo generals, Mouton de Lobau and Gérard. Dupin, Villemain, and Guizot had drawn up a manifesto, declaring that the ordinances were unconstitutional, and that they still considered themselves the lawfully elected representatives of the people. This protest was approved of, but, with very few exceptions, the members present declined to sign it. Casimir Périer proposed that a deputation should wait upon Marmont to ask for a suspension of hostilities, in order that the grievances of the people might be laid before the King. Before the meeting broke up it was decided to entrust this mission to MM. Casimir Périer, Caffitte, and Mauguin, and Generals Gérard and Mouton de Lobau.³

The tactics of the people in throwing up fresh barricades behind the Royal troops, cut off the columns from all regular communication with headquarters. Reports were, nevertheless, carried to Marmont by officers in disguise. All of them contained

¹ "Cette honteuse guerre de pots de chambre," as M. de Guernon-Ranville styles it. *Journal d'un ministre*, p. 258.

² Marmont, *Mémoires*, VIII. pp. 268-282.

³ Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VIII. pp. 231-234.

urgent requests for reinforcements, which he was powerless to send. At this juncture, when he began to realize the alarming nature of the situation, François Arago came to see him. He appears to have remained for some hours at the Tuileries, and Marmont seems to have talked matters over with him in the most open manner. The astronomer, who pressed him to throw up his command, was one of his intimate friends, but he was also an ardent Liberal and in close relations with the leading men of the party.¹ In the adjoining room the members of the Government were assembled. The sound of battle in the streets showed no signs of lessening in intensity, and it was clear that the soldiers were making slow progress. Polignac, says d'Haussez, preserved an unruffled exterior, but seemed so lost in thought that it was useless to address a question to him. Chantelauze, who was ill, lay upon a sofa. Peyronnet maintained an attitude of contemptuous indifference. Capelle talked of mowing down the people with grape-shot. Montbel was unable to conceal his anxiety, and Guernon-Ranville indulged in a succession of pleasantries, which tried the strained nerves of his colleagues almost beyond endurance. Glandévé, the Governor of the Tuileries, paid them several visits. He was greatly concerned at the damage done to the newly gravelled walks in the gardens by a cavalry regiment.²

The prefect of police, M. Mangin, had already deemed it wise to leave the town in disguise, and the prefect of the Seine, M. de Chabrol-Volvic, was concealed in a cellar³ at the Hôtel de Ville. The absence of these officials, without doubt, aggravated the difficulties of Marmont's position. He appears to have decided, however, to order the apprehension of six of the leading Liberal Deputies. At the subsequent trial of the Ministers, the officers of his staff were at pains to suggest that Polignac was solely responsible for this measure. Satisfactory evidence is not forthcoming as to whether Marmont acted in this matter upon his own initiative. All that can be said for certain is that, soon after he had handed the warrant to the commandant of *gendarmerie*, he was informed of the arrival of MM. Laffitte, Gérard, Casimir Périer, Mouton de Lobau, and Mauguin. The two first figured in his list of persons to be apprehended. Upon hearing of their presence at his headquarters, he appears to have decided to revoke his order for their arrest, and to have sent to recall the

¹ Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VIII. pp. 247-249.

Guernon-Ranville, *Journal d'un ministre*, p. 259.

Mdme. de Boigne, *Mémoires*, III. p. 350.

² D'Haussez, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 258-260, 265.

³ This gentleman, in his evidence, calls it retiring to a *dependance de l'Hôtel de Ville*. The Hôtel de Ville, it should be stated in fairness, had been captured by the insurgents.

officer charged with carrying it out.¹ When the deputation was shown in to him, Baffitte, who acted as spokesman, implored him to suspend hostilities, and argued that the resistance of the people to unlawful edicts was justifiable. Marmont declared himself in complete agreement with him, and deplored that, as a soldier, he must enforce measures of which he disapproved. At the same time he urged the members of the deputation to exercise all their influence in order to induce the people to lay down their arms, and promised to inform the King at once of his interview with them. Before they departed, he suggested that they should see the President of the Council. Polignac, however, upon hearing that they had come to negotiate upon the basis of the withdrawal of the ordinances, declined to hold any communication with them.

Marmont lost no time in despatching Colonel de Komiérowski to the King with a letter, in which he described the military situation as grave, announced the arrival of the deputation, stated the nature of the conditions proposed, and begged His Majesty to allow him to enter into negotiations without delay. Charles sent back no written reply, and merely instructed Komiérowski to tell the Marshal "to concentrate his troops, stand firm, and act only with large bodies of men." There are the strongest grounds for supposing that this staff officer, who was accompanied by an escort, had been passed upon the road to Saint-Cloud by an emissary of Polignac, probably his nephew, the Duc de Guiche, bearing a message for the King.² A few hours later, Marmont received written instructions to the same effect. He was to concentrate all his troops between the Place des Victoires, the Place Vendôme, and the Tuileries; remain upon the defensive, and await orders which would be sent him on the morrow. Officers in plain clothes were despatched, accordingly, to the four column commanders, enjoining them to fall back upon the Tuileries. It was not till ten o'clock, when fatigue had compelled the people to slacken their attacks, that Generals de Saint-Chamans and Talon were able to comply with their orders. About midnight all Marmont's troops were once more round the palace. A tropical heat had prevailed during the day; most of the men had been without food for eighteen hours, and 2500 casualties³ were reported. A quarter ration of bread and some wine from the cellars

¹ Guernon-Ranville, *Journal d'un ministre*, Juillet 28, 1830 (2me partie à Vincennes).

D'Haussez, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 254-255.

Procès des Ministres, depositions of Chabrol-Volvic.

Komiérowski, Arago père et fils, La Rue, Guise and Foucauld.

² Marmont, *Mémoires*, VIII. pp. 249-254.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VIII. pp. 250-254, 264-265.

Procès des Ministres, deposition of Komiérowski.

³ A large portion of these were, without doubt, deserters and prisoners.

of the Tuileries was all that Marmont had been able to collect for their sustenance.¹

Notwithstanding that the roar of the battle was plainly audible at Saint-Cloud, and that by the aid of a powerful telescope the tricolour could be seen flying from the steeple of Notre-Dame, Charles maintained his serene confidence.² Vitrolles was in relations with General Gérard by means of a Doctor Thibaut, their common friend. This person had urged him to induce the King to consent to some compromise. Vitrolles, realizing the strength of the popular movement, drove out to Saint-Cloud and was accorded a long interview by Charles. He would not, however, entertain for a moment the idea of negotiations until his revolted subjects should have laid down their arms. Taking up a paper from the table, and dropping his voice to a whisper, he confided to him that Caffitte and La Fayette had been arrested, and that a Court Martial was sitting at the Tuileries. He expressed a wish, however, to know his opinion as to whether he should go to Paris in person. Under the circumstances, Vitrolles considered that such a course was not to be recommended. If military executions were to take place at the Tuileries, people would be certain to say that Charles X had been seen upon the balcony of Charles IX. But this objection would not apply to the Dauphin, though the possibility should not be overlooked that his presence in Paris might prove embarrassing to Marshal Marmont.³

After two hours spent in a fruitless conversation, Vitrolles returned to town. *M. le Dauphin*, it would appear, was as little concerned at the course of events as his father. During the afternoon he had sent one of his officers into Paris, but it was to ascertain only the *maximum* temperature recorded at noon at the Observatory. After dinner the King played his usual rubber of whist and the Dauphin his game of chess. Through the open windows the hot night air carried to their ears the rumble of the battle, and the clanging of the great bell calling the people to arms. Yet their conversation was confined always to the games upon which they engaged. Sometimes, when the firing seemed to be more furious than usual, Charles would give the table a fillip with his finger, as though to remove a speck of dust.

¹ Marmont, *Mémoires*, VIII. pp. 255-256.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VIII. p. 266.

Guernon-Ranville, *Journal d'un ministre*, 28 Juillet, 1830.

D'Haussez, *Mémoires*, II. p. 261.

² Duchesse de Gontaut, *Mémoires*, pp. 322-323.

³ Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 375-384.

Pasquier, VI. pp. 259-260.

⁴ M^{me}. de Boigne, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 351-369.

Pasquier, VI. pp. 260-262.

Duchesse de Gontaut, *Mémoires*, p. 325.

At dawn, on Thursday, July 29th, Marmont, in accordance with his instructions, proceeded to occupy the Louvre, the Place Vendôme, the Carrousel, the Place Louis XV, and the Tuileries gardens. Strict orders were given to the troops to fire only should they be attacked. The King, in his communication to him of the night before, had told him to arrange for the safe passage of Ministers to Saint-Cloud between the hours of ten and eleven. Marmont now urged them to start at once, and to impress upon His Majesty that he regarded the withdrawal of the ordinances as a concession which the situation rendered imperative. In his present position, however, he felt secure, and had no fears of being driven from it by the people. At this juncture d'Argout and Sémonville, the Grand Referendary of the Chamber of Peers, presented themselves at his headquarters. Fighting had begun again; nevertheless, at considerable personal risk, they had come to implore him to put an end to the bloodshed. An altercation ensued with Polignac, and Sémonville, according to his own account, took Marmont aside and advised him to place the Ministers in arrest, and to announce to the people that he had done so. The Marshal was not prepared to assume so great a responsibility, and, finally, the members of the Government and MM. d'Argout and de Sémonville drove away to Saint-Cloud.¹

Meanwhile, the insurrection had spread to the left bank of the river, and the people were preparing to attack the Royal troops from three different directions. Up to this point their remarkable success had been achieved under the sole direction of the students of the *École polytechnique* and of other improvised leaders. Despite the progress made by the insurgents, no Liberal general was yet prepared to place himself at their head. But, on this morning, an obscure adventurer, named Dubourg, a former officer of subordinate rank, appears to have been dressed up in a second-hand general's uniform, and to have been presented to the people as their leader. This individual installed himself at the Hôtel de Ville, where he caused a black flag to be hoisted, which act seems to be the only measure for which he can be held responsible. Whilst the courage of the people was rising, the discipline of the soldiers was breaking down, and their spirit was giving away.² At the Tuileries d'Haussez had led a friend to the window and had pointed out to him the Guards as "our one hope, and they have been without food for twenty-four hours."³ Around them the

¹ Procès des Ministres, deposition of Sémonville.

Marmont, *Mémoires*, VIII. pp. 258-259.

Guernon-Ranville, *Journal d'un ministre*, Juillet 29, 1830 (2me partie à Vincennes).

² Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VIII. pp. 272-275, 304-305.

³ Procès des Ministres, deposition of Bayeux.

troops saw only a bitterly hostile population. No sympathizers came forward to cheer them, no Royalist volunteers to help them. The King remained invisible, and appeared to be indifferent to their sufferings.

The night before all the troops near Paris, and those encamped at Bunéville and Saint-Omer, had been sent for. On this morning of Thursday, July 26th, however, the army in Paris had been increased only by the arrival of some 1500 men from Versailles and Creil. Marmont made every endeavour to bring about a suspension of hostilities. He had no means of printing proclamations, but he directed that all prisoners were to be released and furnished with handbills, to distribute to their friends, announcing an armistice. The mayors of the thirteen *arrondissements* of Paris had been convened to his headquarters; only three, however, obeyed his summons. He now urged them to do all in their power to pacify the people, and to declare to them that a truce had been proclaimed. In some places the fire slackened, but in other directions the insurgents redoubled their efforts. Upon the Place Vendôme, which was occupied by 5th and 53rd regiments of the line, a cessation of hostilities appears to have taken place. The troops were surrounded by a crowd of people, urging them to join the popular side and giving them food and drink. Their constancy was already shaken, when Casimir Périer appeared and made them a stirring speech. Headed by their officers, both regiments went over to the people.¹

Their defection compelled Marmont to make certain changes in his dispositions. For fear they should follow the example of their comrades, two line regiments, in the Tuileries gardens, were retired to the Champs Elysées, and one of the two battalions of Swiss Guards holding the Louvre was sent to take their place. It was about midday. Marmont, who was in the Rue de Rohan, had just ordered an aide-de-camp to announce to a body of insurgents advancing along the Rue de Richelieu that hostilities had ceased, when a violent fusillade broke out behind him. It ceased almost as suddenly as it had begun, but it was followed by a confused murmur, which to his experienced ears sounded ominous. Turning his horse's head, he galloped towards the Tuileries. His troops were flying in wild disorder across the Carrousel. It would appear that, after the withdrawal of part of the garrison of the Louvre, some confusion had taken place. Availing themselves of this circumstance, a few insurgents penetrated into the galleries and opened fire upon the Swiss in the courtyard. Thinking he was about to be cut off, the Colonel gave the order to

¹ Procès des Ministres, deposition of Champagny.
Marmont, *Mémoires*, VIII. pp. 258-259.

evacuate the building. The retreat of the Swiss, who, doubtless, recollected the fate which had overtaken their compatriots on August 10th, 1792, degenerated into a rout, and the panic spread to the troops upon the Carrousel. Marmont performed prodigies of valour, and succeeded in restoring some degree of order. Nevertheless, he conceived it hopeless to attempt to retake the Tuileries, into which the people had swarmed, and gave the order to retreat upon the Barrière de l'Etoile by way of the Champs Elysées.¹

Marmont intended to hold the high ground about the Barrière de l'Etoile, but, when he arrived there about two o'clock, he was handed a letter which acquainted him that the Dauphin had taken over the command of the troops and directed him to evacuate Paris and retire upon Saint-Cloud. Accordingly, after ordering the retreat to continue, he rode on himself to see the King. Upon the road he passed the Dauphin, who exchanged with him a cold greeting. Marmont's decision to abandon the Tuileries has been severely criticized by certain Royalist writers. The matter is, however, of purely academic interest, seeing that the order, prescribing the evacuation of Paris, had been written before the capture of the palace was known at Saint-Cloud. The late hour at which he received it was due to the extraordinary carelessness which had caused this important despatch to be confided, not to a special messenger, but to an officer who was proceeding to the Tuileries in charge of a convoy of bread for the troops. Marmont had, therefore, only anticipated the order to retreat, which would have reached him probably about three o'clock, had he retained his positions. Upon arriving at Saint-Cloud he was admitted to see the King at once. Charles listened kindly to the story of his misfortunes and addressed no word of blame to him.²

The night before, the Duc de Mortemart had arrived at Saint-Cloud. He had had to pass through Versailles, and had found the town in a state of revolution. He was not permitted to see Charles, who had retired to bed. The next morning, however, at seven o'clock, ignoring all rules of etiquette, he insisted upon being admitted to the King's presence. Charles was not to be convinced that the position was serious, and angrily scouted the notion of dismissing his Ministers and of withdrawing the ordinances. When the Duke pressed him he fell back upon his favourite expression that "he knew where concessions led to, and

¹ Marmont, *Mémoires*, VIII. pp. 260-263.

Pasquier, VI. pp. 267-268.

Mdme. de Boigne, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 349, 367-368.

Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, III. p. 403 and note.

² Marmont, *Mémoires*, VIII. pp. 264-267, 455-456.

Pasquier, VI. pp. 269-270.

that he would sooner mount his horse than be put into the executioner's cart." Scarcely had Mortemart departed than Sémonville and d'Argout arrived, closely followed by the seven members of the Cabinet. Polignac and Peyronnet at once proceeded to confer with the King. The details of their interview have never transpired. Very soon, however, both Ministers returned, and Sémonville was ushered alone into the Royal presence. According to his account, it was not until he had drawn an alarming picture of the dangers which must beset the Dauphine, who was on the way back from Vichy, that he began to make any impression upon the King. Charles promised him to assemble the Council without delay. Nevertheless, the usual time for Mass was not advanced, and it can hardly have been before eleven o'clock that the formal deliberations of the Council began. It is clear, however, that the decision to supersede Marmont by the Dauphin and to evacuate Paris must have been taken at an earlier hour. It may be presumed that Polignac had expressed great dissatisfaction at the way the Marshal had performed his duties.¹

Early on this Thursday morning, Vitrolles had seen the doctor who served as intermediary between him and General Gérard. He had come to tell him that the monarchy might still be saved. The Liberals would be satisfied were Charles to consent to dismiss his Ministers, to withdraw the ordinances, and to entrust to the Duc de Mortemart the formation of a new Cabinet, in which seats would have to be given to Casimir Périer and General Gérard. It was suggested that this concession might be supposed to have been wrung from the King by the prayers of the magistrates of the Royal Courts, who might proceed in a body to Saint-Cloud. Vitrolles was agreeably surprised at the moderation of these demands, and started off at once to communicate them to His Majesty. When he arrived he was informed that Charles was at the Council. With great difficulty he succeeded in inducing an usher to scratch the door. When the King was at the Council, nobody might, under any circumstances, knock at the door. On rare occasions the usher would scratch gently with his fingers to intimate that some important communication awaited His Majesty. It was unlocked by Polignac, who came out to speak to him. Vitrolles gave him a paper upon which were written the terms which the Liberals would be prepared to accept.²

No trustworthy account exists of the deliberations of the

¹ Procès des Ministres, deposition of Sémonville.

Pasquier, VI. pp. 263-264, 271-273.

Guernon-Ranville, *Journal d'un ministre*, Juillet 29, 1830.

² Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 388-394.

Council. There can be no doubt, however, that the Dauphin was opposed to any concessions. Guernon-Ranville states that he was the only Minister who considered that it was now too late to give way. The plan of retiring to Blois or Tours appears to have been mooted, and to have been discussed. The first news of Marmont's disaster was brought to Saint-Cloud by General de Coëtlosquet, who had escaped from Paris in plain clothes. According to d'Haussez, the King ordered him to be admitted to the Council, and he describes how he staggered into the room, covered with dust, without a neckcloth, and stood panting against a bookcase. After he had told his story, it seems to have been decided to postpone further deliberations until the Dauphin should have judged for himself of the condition of the troops. He mounted his horse, accordingly, and rode out into the Bois de Boulogne. A few gracious words from His Royal Highness would have been much appreciated by the dispirited men. But, after scanning critically the appearance of the regiments, he merely asked a Colonel, whose command had suffered severely, how many men he still had in the ranks. Upon receiving the required information, he remarked simply, "That is a fair number," and rode on.¹

When the Dauphin returned to Saint-Cloud about five o'clock, it was decided to accept the terms submitted by Vitrolles. "Gentlemen," said Charles, "though you have my complete confidence I am obliged to dismiss you, and to replace you by Ministers imposed upon me by my enemies. There is no help for it, and I shall send for the Duc de Mortemart. I am sorry, for his sake, that he should have earned the good opinion of my antagonists. If he has done wrong he must feel now that he is being cruelly punished for it."² Mortemart was watching the troops in the park when, greatly to his surprise, he heard that the King wished to see him. He was still more astonished when he learnt that Charles proposed that he should construct a new Cabinet. It was a terrible responsibility to assume at such a moment, and he knew, moreover, that the King would never heartily support him. He refused to listen to his protests, however, and at last thrust the ordinance appointing him President of the Council into his belt, asking whether he would be so heartless as to return it to him. The Duke's resistance was thus overcome, but many important points had yet to be settled. In the meantime, however, Vitrolles, Sémonville, and d'Argout, who had been waiting

¹ Guernon-Ranville, *Journal d'un ministre*, Juillet 29, 1830.
Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 395-405 (note).

D'Haussez, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 273-274.

² *Ibid.*, p. 275.

anxiously throughout the day in the passages and ante-chambers, were to take to Paris the news of the withdrawal of the ordinances and the formation of a new Cabinet, under the presidency of the Duc de Mortemart, who was to have for colleagues, Casimir Périer and General Gérard. "In all this," said Charles, as he parted from them, "I see neither good for France nor safety for the Crown."¹

After the expulsion of the Royal troops from Paris, the prompt occupation of Montmartre was the course which should have been pursued. Forty-two guns from Vincennes, which had been unable to join Marmont, reached Saint-Cloud in the afternoon. Once the Guards and a formidable line of batteries had been established upon the heights to the north of Paris, from which the town could have been bombarded effectually, negotiations might have been begun with the insurgents. This measure, however, must have entailed the removal of the Royal Family from Saint-Cloud to Saint-Denis in rear of the army. Marmont² mentions this plan as the one which presented the best chance of success, but neither he, nor anybody else, would appear to have counselled Charles to adopt it. It is clear that the King at this time had not yet realized fully the extent of his misfortunes. It is by no means certain, moreover, that, when he dismissed his Ministers and announced the formation of a new Government, he was acting in good faith. Even he must have been aware that surrender to attain its object must be made promptly and in such a way as to inspire confidence. Yet he eluded all discussion with Mortemart and detained him at Saint-Cloud. It is possible that he may still have cherished a hope that he might be spared the humiliation of having to make very serious concessions. His conduct, unquestionably, points to an intention not to allow the Duke to proceed to Paris, until he should have received a report upon the situation from either Vitrolles or Girardin.³ That evening both Mortemart and Polignac played whist at the King's table.⁴

The people had displayed a surprising moderation in their hour of victory. The damage and the robberies committed at the Tuileries were not very serious, and are said to have been almost entirely the work of criminals, who broke loose from the Conciergerie. The Archbishop's palace, however, was plundered systematically, sacred vessels, vestments, and furniture being either cast into the Seine or burnt in the courtyard. Bands of men also sacked the establishment of the Jesuits at Montrouge

¹ Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 406-410.

Pasquier, VI. pp. 273-276.

² Marmont, *Mémoires*, VIII. pp. 264-265, 275-276.

³ Pasquier, VI. pp. 281-283.

⁴ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XX. p. 625.

and the headquarters of the missionaries upon the Mont-Valerien. The Deputies were assembled at Laffitte's house when the news was brought them of the triumph of the people and the retreat of the troops. The necessity was seen at once of establishing some central authority, other than that assumed by the so-called General Dubourg, at the Hôtel de Ville. It was decided to give to La Fayette the command of the National Guards, and to appoint a municipal commission. But all present were still in a painfully nervous condition. A discharge of musketry and the appearance of some soldiers in the street caused a panic. With the cry "They have come to shoot us!" some rushed to the doors and windows, whilst others fled to conceal themselves in the cellars and in the most private chambers of the house. In a moment Laffitte, who had sprained his ankle and could not move, found himself alone. The noise which had so alarmed them proceeded from the troops, who had deserted to the people upon the Place Vendôme, and who were now discharging their muskets in the air. So soon as they had satisfied themselves upon this point the Deputies returned and resumed their deliberations. Laffitte, Casimir Périer, Schonen, Mouton de Robau, and Mauguin were elected to serve upon the municipal commission which was to hold its sittings at the Hôtel de Ville. La Fayette was to have command of the National Guards, and General Gérard of the regular troops who had come over to the people.¹

Sémonville, d'Argout, and Vitrolles, preceded by General de Girardin on horseback, experienced no difficulty in entering Paris. Once inside the town they learnt that General Gérard would probably be found at the Hôtel de Ville, where the Provisional Government was sitting. Vitrolles, especially, was disagreeably surprised to find that the situation had developed so quickly. Under the circumstances, however, they all agreed that they must push on to the Hôtel de Ville. The Champs Elysées and the Place Louis XV were deserted, but the quays, as far as the eye could see, were black with people. Along the waterside their progress was very slow. Every forty or fifty yards groups of armed men with threatening gestures stopped their carriage. As night came on, and as they approached their destination, the crowd grew denser. With difficulty they made their way across the Place de Grève, through peasants from the neighbouring villages armed with scythes and pitchforks, students of the Polytechnic, workmen in their shirt-sleeves, and club orators. Sinister figures in filthy rags clutched knives or rusty muskets and scowled at them defiantly. Clearly this night the mob ruled Paris, and M. de Sémonville, the Grand Referendary of the House

¹ Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VIII. pp. 299-304.

of Peers, was as prompt as ever to pay his court to power. In joyful accents, right and left, he announced that the Ministry had fallen, and, to convey the news, employed a metaphor habitually made use of by the sovereign people.¹

The three envoys entered at last the Hôtel de Ville, and, after a brief delay, were shown into the room where the commission was sitting, with Casimir Périer in the chair. Sémonville shook La Fayette by the hand effusively, and reminded him that forty years before they had met at the same spot under very similar circumstances. According to Vitrolles, Casimir Périer was much attracted by the prospect of entering the Government. Nobody present, not even La Fayette, appeared to regard an arrangement with the King as out of the question. The situation, however, was complicated by the arrival of Girardin, who had parted from his companions when they entered Paris, and who now asked to be admitted, stating that he was the bearer of a confidential communication from Saint-Cloud. This development caused the authority to be questioned of Sémonville and his fellow-envoys to speak in the King's name. Vitrolles loudly declared his readiness to remain as a hostage, but soon afterwards all three took their departure, having been provided with safe-conducts. They were to seek out General Gérard, for whom Vitrolles said that he had a message. He would be found, they were informed, either at the *Bourse*, where he had established his headquarters, or at Laffitte's house.²

After leaving the Hôtel de Ville, Sémonville, who was an elderly man, declared that he was too exhausted to accompany them, and returned to his lodgings at the Luxembourg. Vitrolles and d'Argout, however, continued their way through streets intersected with barricades, the guardians of which generally fired without waiting to deliver the usual challenge. But neither at the *Bourse* nor at Laffitte's could they gain any news of Gérard. D'Argout entered the banker's house alone, Vitrolles having agreed to return home in deference to his companion's disinclination to face the Deputies and journalists assembled in company with so notorious an Ultra-Royalist. In about two hours' time he was rejoined by d'Argout, who gave a very encouraging account of the discussions in which he had taken part. The news of the concessions to which the King had agreed appeared to have satisfied the Deputies. Surprise had been expressed, however, that the Duc de Mortemart should not have come to Paris in person. Nothing, it was evident, could be settled before his arrival. D'Argout and Vitrolles, accordingly,

¹ Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 410-415.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 416-424.

started off for Saint-Cloud, accompanied by Laffitte's nephew, who was to pass them out of the town.¹

When, after several exciting experiences, they reached Saint-Cloud, about three in the morning of Friday, July 30th, everybody appeared to be in bed and asleep. Mortemart was in his room, but had not undressed. He could not, he explained, start for Paris until the King should have signed the authority for the withdrawal of the ordinances. Moreover, seeing that the re-establishment of the National Guard could not be prevented, it was desirable that he should give it his official sanction. Mortemart agreed that no time must be lost, and they there and then drew up the ordinances to which he was to obtain Charles' signature. At seven o'clock the Duke gained admission to the King, and, soon afterwards, Vitrolles was sent for. Charles showed the utmost repugnance to yielding upon the question of the National Guard. Vitrolles described the state of Paris, and did all in his power to convince him that the situation would admit of no delay. Before making up his mind, Charles appears to have invited Mortemart to leave the room. This strange request must have brought home to him the small amount of confidence which Charles was prepared to extend to him, had his suspicions upon the point required any additional confirmation. When they were alone, Vitrolles took his stand at the foot of the bed, and, shaking his finger at him almost menacingly, warned him of the extreme gravity of the situation. His troops, he begged him to remember, had been driven from his capital, and he must beware "lest the thread should snap at any moment which held the crown suspended over the head of a child." Charles up to this hour would seem to have been still the victim of his own and of Polignac's illusions. He had dismissed his late Ministers, but they remained at Saint-Cloud, and his intercourse with Polignac continued uninterrupted. At the same time he delayed to invest Mortemart, his successor, with the powers without which his office could have no real existence. Stories are told of a strange confidence which, during the fighting in Paris on the previous Wednesday, he had made to the Comte de Broglie. He had sought to allay his fears by telling him that "Jules, the night before, had been visited again by the Holy Virgin, who had bade him persevere with his policy which had the divine approval." Religious mysticism may have been the link which attached him to his favourite Minister.² Their imperturbable confidence, and their disregard of the most

¹ Pasquier, VI. pp. 278-280.

Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 425-427.

² Pasquier, VI. pp. 262-263.

Mdme. de Boigne, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 370-371.

ordinary precautions to repress the resistance, which the ordinances might have been expected to give rise to, should, perhaps, be ascribed to some influence of this kind. But, as Charles listened to Vitrolles, about whose attachment to his person and his cause he felt no doubt, he realized the full misery of his position. At last he perceived that his throne was in the direst peril, and that no subterfuges could avail to save him from the humiliating consequences of defeat. When, a few minutes later, Mortemart was brought back to his bedside, he signed the papers which he laid before him with scarcely a glance at them.¹

Mortemart, accompanied by d'Argout, started at once for Paris. But the officer commanding the Royal outposts in the Bois de Boulogne had received special orders that morning to allow no communication with the town. In Pasquier's opinion Polignac should be held responsible for this obstacle placed across Mortemart's path. When, after a long and circuitous journey on foot, the Duke arrived in the neighbourhood of Laffitte's house, he met, coming away from it, Bérard, a Liberal Deputy. This person informed him that his colleagues had separated for the present, but were to meet later at the Palais-Bourbon, which was once more at their disposal. At the same time he assured him that the idea was no longer considered practicable of an arrangement with Charles X, and that another plan had been proposed which had been received favourably. Finally, he summed up the situation with the famous words: "You are too late." Mortemart was dumbfounded, and appears to have accepted without question the statement that it was useless for him to go to Laffitte's house. Changing his plans, he made for Sémonville's lodgings at the Luxembourg, where he arrived so footsore and so exhausted by the heat that d'Argout was compelled to support him.²

Thiers, who had emerged from his hiding-place upon receipt of the news of the popular victory, had been present at the meeting at the banker's house, the night before. He had perceived quickly that, now that their fears of retribution from Saint-Cloud had subsided, the Deputies were dominated by their terror of the people. To this apprehension he was disposed to ascribe the readiness with which they had listened to proposals for an arrangement with the King. He was convinced, however, that they would accept with alacrity any other solution, provided it were of a nature to preserve them from mob rule. Laffitte entertained the same views as himself, and the result was seen of their delibera-

¹ Vitrolles, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 430-437.

Pasquier, VI. pp. 282-284.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 285-287.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VIII. pp. 334-335.

tions during the night and in the early morning, when about ten o'clock the following proclamation was placarded upon every wall and distributed in the streets :

" Charles X cannot re-enter Paris, he has shed the blood of the people.

" A Republic would expose us to internal dissensions, and would bring down all Europe upon us.

" The Duc d'Orléans is a Prince devoted to the cause of the Revolution.

" The Duc d'Orléans has never fought against us.

" The Duc d'Orléans was at Jemmappes.

" The Duc d'Orléans has worn the tricolour in the face of the enemy. The Duc d'Orléans alone can still wear it ; we will have no one but him.

" The Duc d'Orléans has declared himself ; he accepts the Charter in the sense in which we have always understood it.

" He will owe his crown to the French people."

Thus was that change of dynasty announced, which Thiers, for the past six months, had been educating the readers of the *National* to regard as necessary in order to safeguard popular liberties and institutions. The assertion, however, was untrue that " the Duc d'Orléans had declared himself." In point of fact neither Thiers nor Eaffitte knew for certain where he was. But the effect of their proclamation was magical. Before midday the name of the Duc d'Orléans was upon every tongue.¹

Early in the afternoon some sixty Deputies assembled at the Palais-Bourbon, where Eaffitte assumed the presidential chair, and where Hyde de Neuville was the only representative of the Royalist party. Bérard related his meeting with Mortemart, and some surprise was expressed that he had neither come in person nor sent a message to the Chamber. The Duke was genuinely ill and utterly prostrated by his fatigues of the morning. He had undertaken his difficult task with reluctance, and had every reason to doubt the King's good faith. He now appears to have failed entirely to grasp the importance of entering quickly into relations with the Deputies. Instead of betaking himself at once to the Chamber, he remained at the Luxembourg, surrounded by about twenty Peers who had replied to Sémonville's letter of convocation. The Duc de Broglie, who had visited the popular quarters of the town, informed his colleagues that the people were in a dangerous state of excitement, and that at any mention of Charles X they would certainly destroy the Luxembourg as they had the Bastille. Chateaubriand, on the other hand, was greatly elated by the enthusiastic acclamations of a number of students,

¹ Vulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VIII. pp. 325-328.

who had recognized him near the Palais Royal, and who had insisted upon carrying him in triumph to the Luxembourg as a defender of the liberty of the press. He assured his fellow-Peers that were the Monarchy to be overthrown he would undertake to restore it within three months, provided he were not deprived of the use of his pen.¹

The Peers at the Luxembourg were disposed to regard Mortemart's presence among them in the light of a protection, and were reluctant that he should go to the Lower Chamber. Without much difficulty they induced him to entrust to one of their number, M. de Sussy, the communication of the ordinances to the Deputies. Eaffitte and the Orléanists had taken advantage of the Duke's delay to enter into relations with the Lower Chamber, and had carried on a vigorous canvass in favour of their candidate. When Sussy at last appeared and announced from the tribune the withdrawal of the ordinances of July 25th, the re-establishment of the National Guard, and the opening of Parliament on August 3rd, he was listened to coldly. Eaffitte refused to receive the documents which he proposed to hand over to him, on the plea that he was only presiding at an informal meeting of Deputies, not at a sitting of the Chamber, and suggested that he should take them to the municipal commission at the Hôtel de Ville. Shortly after Sussy's departure Thiers arrived from Neuilly. He had not contrived to see the Duc d'Orléans in person, but had had an interview with the Duchess and with Mademoiselle, his sister, and had been empowered to declare that His Royal Highness was in complete sympathy with the popular cause. On the strength of this news, a resolution was carried to offer to the Duc d'Orléans the post of Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom. Later on in the evening, the Peers, with the approval of Mortemart, endorsed the action of the Deputies, and delegates were chosen to lay the proposal before His Royal Highness.

Sussy, in the meantime, had met with no better fortune at the Hôtel de Ville than at the Palais-Bourbon. He was informed curtly that Charles' ordinances could not be inserted in the *Moniteur*, and it was only with difficulty that he succeeded in persuading La Fayette to allow him to leave them with him. The Hôtel de Ville had become the headquarters of the former Carbonari, and of the young men who had borne the largest share in the fighting—the so-called Republican party. These persons acclaimed La Fayette as their chief, and loudly declared that neither Charles nor any member of his family should ever again reign over France. The Duc d'Orléans was a Bourbon, not a

¹ Pasquier, V. p. 291.

Chateaubriand, *Mémoires*, XV. pp. 98-103 (edition Bruxelles, 1850).

Valois, as his partisans asserted, and as such could not be regarded as a candidate for the throne. Moreover, they contended that sixty or seventy Deputies, chosen under the electoral laws of a fallen monarchy, had no right to speak for France, and that until the people should have been consulted as to the form of government under which they should elect to live, the municipal commission must not be dissolved.¹

At Saint-Cloud Charles now placed all his hopes in Mortemart. But the day wore on and no message was received from him, whilst the news was confirmed that the revolution was spreading rapidly. Versailles had hoisted the tricolour, and the men of Rouen were marching to the assistance of Paris. Marmont, who was now in command only of the Guards, urged him to retire to Blois, where he could convene the Chambers and summon to his side the *corps diplomatique*. The Marshal was growing very uneasy about the spirit of the troops. Food was still scarce and, owing to Polignac's lack of foresight, there was not sufficient money to enable them to receive the extra pay which the King had promised them. Even in regiments of the Guards numerous cases of desertion were reported, and, it was feared, that many more men would abandon the colours so soon as it was dark. Under these circumstances, Marmont decided to issue a general order acquainting the troops of the dismissal of Ministers and the withdrawal of the ordinances, measures which must bring their hardships to an end. Before taking this step, he says that he made futile attempts to find the Dauphin, and only acted upon his own responsibility because he conceived that delay would be dangerous. Charles, when he heard about it, blamed him for introducing political questions into an address to soldiers, and bade him inform his son, at once, of what he had done. The Dauphin had intended to promulgate an order, according to which, far from representing the struggle as terminated, he promised to share all the dangers of the troops, and urged them to preserve the constancy and courage of true French soldiers. He was greatly enraged at Marmont's extraordinary assumption of the supreme command of which he had been deprived, and, probably also, had grave suspicions of his good faith. When the Marshal was alone in his room with him, he tried to seize him by the throat, and asked him furiously whether he contemplated the perpetration of a second act of treachery. The one-armed Marmont placed his hand upon the hilt of his sword which the Dauphin attempted to wrench from him, and, in so doing, cut his hand with the blade. Both men appear to have rolled strug-

¹ Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VIII. pp. 336-357.
Pasquier, VI. pp. 292-293.

gling upon a sofa, His Royal Highness calling loudly for the Guard. Marmont, when the gardes-du-corps burst into the room, was made a prisoner, and marched under escort to his quarters across the great courtyard.

Upon hearing of this deplorable scene, Charles at once ordered the Duc de Luxembourg to take back to the Marshal his sword, and to bring him to see him. When the indignant Marmont was in his presence, he begged him to go to his son, who was prepared to apologize, provided the Marshal would admit that he had done wrong in publishing an order without his permission. But Marmont, whilst protesting his devotion to the King, declared that never again could he speak to the Dauphin. Charles, however, placed his arm round him, and, adjuring him not to add to his trouble by refusing his request, led him to the door, and, before the assembled courtiers, charged the Duc de Guiche to take him to His Royal Highness. Marmont, when confronted with the Dauphin, acknowledged his error, and he, in return, confessed that he had acted hastily. They then shook hands coldly and separated.¹ Before midnight General de Girardin, who had been despatched from Paris by Mortemart, arrived to warn the King that the populace was preparing to attack Saint-Cloud. Charles yielding, it is said, to the entreaties of the Duchesse de Berri, who was in an agony of apprehension on account of her children, gave orders for the departure of the Court to Trianon. The mournful procession started about three o'clock in the morning of Saturday, July 31st, and reached Trianon about eight, where nothing had been prepared. The escort of four companies of gardes-du-corps was commanded by Marmont, the Dauphin, with the main body of the troops, remaining for the present at Saint-Cloud.²

When Charles was resolving to fly during the night from Saint-Cloud, the Duc d'Orléans was quietly returning to Paris. The publication of the ordinances of July 25th had found him with his family at his summer residence at Neuilly. Very little appears to be known of his movements during the next few days. Nevertheless, it is practically certain that he held no communication either with the King or with the Liberal Deputies. Caffitte, however, when he arrived in Paris on July 28th, sent to warn him that "a trap might be laid for him at Saint-Cloud." In consequence possibly of this message he secretly quitted Neuilly,

¹ Marmont, *Mémoires*, VIII. pp. 288-297.

Pasquier, VI. pp. 294-298.

D'Haussez, *Mémoires* II. pp. 287-288.

Guernon-Ranville, *Journal d'un ministre*, 30 Juillet, 1830, p. 260.

² Pasquier, VI. p. 293.

Marmont, *Mémoires*, VIII. p. 297.

either on this Wednesday or on the following day, and took up his abode at De Raincy, another of his houses a few miles away. Thus it happened that when Thiers arrived at Neuilly, on Friday morning, the Duc d'Orléans was absent, and he was only able to see the Duchess and the Princess Adelaïde, Mademoiselle d'Orléans, as she was generally called. The Duke was sorely puzzled to know what to do when the news was transmitted to him at De Raincy that the Liberals regarded the throne as vacant, and urgently desired his return to Paris. Without doubt, in the first instance, his wife counselled him to abstain from all intervention, but Mademoiselle had greater influence over him, and it is certain that she held more ambitious views. In his perplexity he invoked the advice of Lord Stuart de Rothesay, the British Ambassador, who urged him to remain at Neuilly and to do all in his power to restore order. About five o'clock, however, he appears to have ordered his carriage and to have started for Neuilly. But he had not proceeded far, when Montesquiou, his aide-de-camp, who accompanied him on horseback, looked round and saw that he had turned back. Soon afterwards, however, he departed a second time, and, upon this occasion, adhered to his resolution and drove to Neuilly.¹

The deputation from the Chamber which was to offer the Lieutenant-Generalship of the Kingdom to the Duc d'Orléans enquired for him in vain at the Palais-Royal. General Sébastiani, who was upon terms of intimacy with His Royal Highness, wrote to him, in consequence, to explain the situation, and a young man of his household undertook to deliver the letter. The Duke received this communication upon his arrival at Neuilly, and, in reply, sent back word that he would return to Paris the next day. His partizans, however, would hear of no delay, and Laffitte forthwith despatched to him a second and more urgent summons. The Duke, thereupon, set out at once on foot, accompanied by two of his aides-de-camp. Barricades rendered the streets impassable for all but pedestrians. In many places the paving-stones had been taken up, and everywhere the lamps had been broken, the principal thoroughfares alone being lighted by the candles and lanterns which the inhabitants were obliged to place in their windows. The Place du Palais-Royal was thronged with people and ablaze with bivouac fires, round which crowded armed men of all descriptions. As the Duke made his way through the different groups, no one recognized in the inoffensive citizen the man whose name appeared on countless proclamations about the town.

¹ Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VIII. pp. 366-367.

F. O. France, No. 411. Lord Stuart de Rothesay, July, 1830. Paris, 30th July, 1830.

After entering about midnight the Palais-Royal by a side-door, the Duc d'Orléans sent to announce his arrival to Bassette and La Fayette, and to request the Duc de Mortemart to come to him at once. During the evening, Mortemart had attempted to return home, but the mob, hearing of his presence, assembled round his house and compelled him to fly in disguise to the Luxembourg, where Sémonville lodged him in a garret.¹ Upon arriving at the Palais-Royal he was taken to a room, where he found the Duc d'Orléans lying upon a sofa. His Royal Highness, with a real or simulated emotion, sought to impress upon him that he had been dragged to Paris against his will, because the Deputies insisted upon making him Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom. He enquired anxiously whether Mortemart had been invested with the power to recognize his appointment. Mortemart had no such authority, and suggested that he should explain his position in a letter, which he would transmit to the King at the first opportunity. The Duke agreed, and forthwith wrote out the assurance that "were a title to be imposed upon him to which he had never aspired, His Majesty might feel certain that he should regard it as a merely provisional arrangement." Mortemart concealed this document in his neck-cloth and departed. A few hours later, however, he gave it back in compliance with an urgent request from the Duke for its return. Without doubt, Charles' precipitate flight from Saint-Cloud had convinced his kinsman that he was no longer a factor in the situation which he need take into account.²

About eight o'clock the delegates from the Chamber arrived at the Palais-Royal. After listening to their address, the Duc d'Orléans informed them that he would acquaint them, in the course of a few hours, with his decision with regard to the Lieutenant-Generalship which they proposed he should assume. They adjured him, however, not to delay for a moment. Bérard pointed out that Saint-Cloud could be ignored, but that grave peril threatened from the Hôtel de Ville, where at any moment the extreme party might persuade La Fayette to proclaim a Republic. After several other Deputies had spoken in the same strain, the Duke left the room with Dupin and Sébastiani. Presently he returned with the draft of a proclamation in which he announced his acceptance of the Lieutenant-Generalship, and promised that in future "the Charter should be a reality." The Deputies expressed their warmest approval, and departed to communicate the Duke's address to their colleagues at the

¹ Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XX. p. 651.

² Pasquier, VI. pp. 299-301.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VIII. pp. 367-369.

Palais Bourbon. But, from an early hour, an armed mob had been gathering round the Hôtel de Ville. Rumours were current that the Deputies were negotiating with Saint-Cloud, and were proposing to rob the people of the fruits of their victory. The proclamation of the Duc d'Orléans, which was read with feelings of relief by the inhabitants of the wealthier quarters of the town, roused the fury of the more turbulent sections of the population. The Duke was denounced as a Bourbon, and round the Hôtel de Ville the cry was general that no member of that family should rule over France. To calm the agitation which was growing serious, the municipal commission decided to announce that Charles X had ceased to reign, in a proclamation which was replete with flattering allusions to the courage and virtues of the people, "to whom whatever Government that might be set up would owe its origin."¹

Under these circumstances it was plain that the assumption by the Duc d'Orléans of the office of Lieutenant-General could not be regarded as the termination of the crisis. Before that end could be attained La Fayette, the hero of the mob, must be induced to set the seal of his approval upon the Duke's nomination. Great efforts were made by the Orléanists in this direction, and, among other means employed, the good offices of Mr. Rives, the American Minister, were invoked. Once assured that, were he to assist in founding a Liberal Monarchy, he would not forfeit his popularity in the United States, La Fayette's resistance was, in a great measure, overcome.² At last La Fayette carried the news to the Chamber that he had promised to reserve the Lieutenant-General at the Hôtel de Ville. The Deputies, thereupon, declared their intention of accompanying His Royal Highness to the municipal headquarters. When they arrived at the Palais-Royal, the Duke showed himself upon the balcony to the crowd, and publicly embraced La Fayette. He then mounted a white horse and started off, attended by his aides-de-camp and closely followed by La Fayette, whose sprained ankle compelled him to be carried in a chair. The Deputies, flanked by four ushers of the Chamber, pushed their way through the crowd as best they could. A tipsy drummer beating the *pas de charge* headed the procession.

At first this Royal progress was acclaimed with some enthusiasm by the people. The Duke, nodding to General Gérard, or turning round to speak to La Fayette, would shake effusively the

¹ Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VIII. p. 372-378.
Pasquier, VI. pp. 301-303.

² Thureau Dangin, *La Monarchie de Juillet*, I. pp. 14-15.
Viel Castel, *Histoire*. XX. pp. 668-670, 673-675.

numerous hands held out to him. Without doubt, it was not affection for him, but a desire to drag down Royalty to their own level, which prompted so many citizens to grasp the Lieutenant-General by the hand. As the procession approached the Hôtel de Ville the attitude of the crowd underwent a change. Cries of "Down with the Bourbons!" and "Long live liberty!" resounded upon all sides. Still smiling, but deadly pale, the Duke rode through the armed mob upon the Place de Grève, and dismounted in safety at the entrance to the Hôtel de Ville. "You see an old National Guard come to pay his respects to his General,"¹ he said to those around him, as he was conducted into the great reception-room. The declaration of the principles to which he undertook to adhere, drawn up by the Deputies that morning, was read aloud, and, in reply, His Royal Highness placed his hand upon his heart and expressed the hope that he might be enabled to contribute to the happiness of the people. At this juncture, the so-called General Dubourg forced his way to the front, and, pointing insolently to the mob outside, remarked that he must keep his word. "Evidently, sir, you do not know me," said the Duke, with great dignity. This answer evoked applause, in the midst of which La Fayette came forward, and, placing the tricolour in his hands, led him to the window. The Duke waved his flag, and, clasping La Fayette in his arms, embraced him. At this spectacle the people upon the Place set up a tremendous cheer and discharged their firearms in the air. Legitimate Monarchy was at an end in France. The accolade upon the Place de Grève had consecrated the sovereignty of the people. The Duc d'Orléans was accepted by the Revolution, and could ride back in triumph to the Palais-Royal.²

The reign of the Duc d'Orléans may be said to have begun on this Saturday afternoon. Ten days were to elapse, however, during which the Charter was to be modified, before he was to be formally enthroned as *Louis Philippe, King of the French*. His conduct has been the subject of much controversy. His friends contend that by coming forward he saved the country from the civil war which the proclamation of a Republic must have entailed. His detractors hold that he was guilty of treason and of the blackest ingratitude towards Charles X, from whom he had experienced nothing but kindness. It must be admitted that during the whole of the Restoration period the Duc d'Orléans

¹ Thureau Dangin, *La Monarchie de Juillet*, I. p. 27.

² Pasquier, VI. pp. 304-307.

Chateaubriand, *Mémoires* (Bruxelles, 1849), XV. pp. 117-120.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VIII. pp. 378-387.

Thureau Dangin, *La Monarchie de Juillet*, I. pp. 17-20.

Viel Castet, *Histoire*, XX. pp. 678-682.

had made a point of ingratiating himself with the Liberals. The leading men of their party were his constant guests at the Palais-Royal, his sons were educated at a public *lycée*, and by all means in his power he sought to show that his ideas had nothing in common with those entertained at the Tuileries. Yet it does not follow that he wished to see the elder branch overthrown, or that he contemplated a usurpation. Without doubt, he realized that Charles was following a course which might lead to a revolution. But were such an event to take place, he may have hoped, merely, that any decree of banishment passed upon the Bourbons would not be extended to him. He was a very rich man, passionately fond of money, and in past years had tasted the bitterness of poverty and exile. His conduct, from the moment that affairs became serious in Paris, points to a strong desire to avoid compromising himself with either party. The Duc d'Orléans was neither responsible for, nor could he have averted Charles' ruin, which was consummated when the troops evacuated the capital. Once the victory of the people was assured, however, he was not slow to avail himself of the advantages which circumstances had placed within his grasp.¹ Though he may not have been actuated by disinterested motives, his acceptance of the Lieutenant-Generalship undoubtedly preserved his country from further bloodshed and disorder. The despatches of Lord Stuart de Rothesay, the British Ambassador, who had had a long experience of French affairs, are instructive upon this point. As has been related already, on July 30th he advised the Duke to remain at Neuilly, and warned him that his elevation to the throne would not be sanctioned by the Powers. Nevertheless, the very next day, he reports that "his nomination to the Lieutenant-Generalship was the only solution of the question, otherwise the Hôtel de Ville party would have gained the upper hand."²

Charles made but a brief stay at Trianon. At one time during the day bolder counsels appear to have prevailed. The Duchesse de Berri, according to d'Haussez, put on male attire and stuck a pair of pistols in her belt, whilst the dismissed Ministers, with the exception of Polignac, were assembled and directed to draw up plans for combating the revolution. Early in the afternoon, however, the Dauphin arrived from Saint-Cloud with the main body of the Royal army. A skirmish that morning at the Pont de Sèvres, in which an infantry regiment of the Guards had refused to do its duty, showed that even the picked corps were no longer to be depended upon. In consequence, possibly of his son's

¹ E. Daudet, *Révolution de 1830*, pp. 87-94.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VIII. pp. 159-160.

² F. O. France, Nos. 411, 412. Lord Stuart de Rothesay, Paris, 1830.

report, Charles forthwith decided to continue his flight to Rambouillet. Ministers hastily destroyed the proclamation and circulars which they had drawn up, and prepared to follow the Court. They were informed, however, that they would do well to look to their own safety, and Montbel and Capelle, who had seen the King, gave them blank passports and money to enable them to escape. Charles conveyed his thanks to them for their past services, and expressed his regret for the dangers which they must encounter.¹ He appears, however, to have been more genuinely solicitous on Polignac's behalf, and to have charged M. de Semallé, who had property in Normandy, to do all in his power to convey him in safety to the coast. Charles arrived at Rambouillet about ten o'clock at night, the Dauphin and the troops bivouacking at Trappes. Desertions had been numerous during the day, and the roads were strewn with arms and accoutrements.²

The next day, August 1st, Charles heard that the Duc d'Orléans had taken up the office of Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom. Under these circumstances he deemed it well to appoint him to the post himself by a letter, in which he expressed his desire to see order restored, assured "his cousin" that he counted upon his devotion to his person, and announced his resolution of defending himself to the death were he to be attacked. The gloom on this Sunday at Rambouillet was dispelled for a moment by the arrival of the Dauphine. The news of the outbreak of the revolution had reached her at Dijon upon her return journey from Vichy, and, by travelling across country in disguise, she had contrived to rejoin her family in safety. In the course of the day the Dauphin withdrew from Trappes and posted his troops in the forest and in the park of the *château*. His command still numbered about 12,000 men and 42 guns, but it had no longer any value as a fighting force. After conferring together, the colonels of the different infantry regiments of the Guards decided to enter into negotiations with the Provisional Government, whilst Bourdesoulle's heavy cavalry brigade left the position assigned to it and marched back to Paris. Either during the night or early on the morning of August 2nd, Charles received a reply from the Duc d'Orléans. By whom it was brought and precisely what it contained does not appear to be known. It is probable, however, that the Duke gave him to understand that

- ¹ D'Haussez, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 289-291.
Guernon-Ranville, *Journal d'un ministre*, 31 Juillet, 1830.
Marmont, *Mémoires*, VIII. pp. 298-299.
Pasquier, VI. pp. 309-311.
- ² E. Daudet, *Révolution de 1830*, pp. 78-79.
Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VIII. pp. 394-398.

nothing short of his abdication could restore that tranquillity which he had declared he was so anxious to see re-established.¹

Either on Sunday, August 1st, or early the following day, Charles sent General de Girardin to Lord Stuart de Rothesay to ask for his advice. It was the first communication which either he or Polignac had had with the *corps diplomatique* since the publication of the ordinances of July 25th. A conference of the Ambassadors of the four Powers now took place, which resulted in a reply being handed to Girardin to the effect that "being in ignorance of the conditions of the country they could offer no counsel, and could only advise His Majesty to provide for his own safety." Pozzo di Borgo, the Russian Ambassador, was an ardent supporter of the Duc d'Orléans, and had already had a secret interview with Mademoiselle, his sister, at the house of Madame de Boigne.²

In consequence, presumably, of the Duc d'Orléans' letter and of the news brought to him from Paris by General de Girardin, the King and the Dauphin, on Monday, August 2nd, decided to abdicate in favour of the Duc de Bordeaux. In forwarding their act of abdication to the Duke, Charles enjoined him to take steps to have his grandson proclaimed King at once. Without doubt, in the enthronement of the Duc de Bordeaux, with the Duc d'Orléans as Regent, lay the only hope of preserving the legitimist principle. Pasquier, on Sunday morning, discussed the matter with Girardin, and urged that the child should be brought to Paris, and confided to the Duchesse d'Orléans. At Rambouillet, the Duchesse de Berri is said to have offered to take her son into the capital, and to have abandoned the idea only in consequence of Charles' opposition to it. There can be no doubt that had she carried out her intention the Lieutenant-General would have been placed in a very embarrassing position. Pasquier,³ though he himself recommended this plan at the time, is fain to confess that he no longer considers that it would have proved successful. The suspicion could never have been eradicated that the secret advisers of Charles X were exercising their baneful influence over his grandson. Without doubt the *National*, in commenting upon the King's abdication, expressed the sentiments of the vast

¹ Pasquier, VI. pp. 311-316, 318-320.

Marmont, *Mémoires*, VIII. pp. 299-302.

² F. O. France, 411. Lord Stuart de Rothesay, Paris, August 2nd, 1830.

Pasquier, VI. pp. 309, 315-317.

Mdme. de Boigne, *Mémoires*, III. pp. 423-428.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XX. pp. 689-691.

³ Pasquier, VI. pp. 307-308, 315.

Marmont, *Mémoires*, VIII. pp. 303-305.

Nettement, *Histoire*, VIII. pp. 700-703.

majority of the people when it declared that the pupil of the Baron de Damas and of M. Tharin could not rule over France.¹ Moreover, it is clear that the Duc d'Orléans had no intention of co-operating in such a scheme. It is certain that he ignored altogether the stipulation, which Charles had inserted into his act of abdication, that his grandson should be proclaimed King. A curious story is related, however, by Colonel Caradoc, afterwards Lord Howden, in his unpublished memoirs.² In 1830, he was attached to the British Embassy in Paris, and was entrusted by the Duke with an unofficial mission to Rambouillet, with the object of inducing Charles and the Duchesse de Berri to hand over the Duc de Bordeaux into the keeping of the Duchesse d'Orléans. This apparent anxiety to protect the rights of his little kinsman accords ill with all the Lieutenant-General's public acts. At this time he was desirous above all things to persuade Charles to leave the country. To attain this end he had despatched five commissioners to him, who may have passed upon the road the messenger bringing to Paris the act of abdication.³ It is difficult to believe that the proposal which Lord Howden carried to Rambouillet can have been made in good faith. Rather would it appear to have been a trick whereby Charles' objection to quitting France was to be overcome.

The news brought back, during the night of August 2nd-3rd, by the commissioners, that Charles refused to leave Rambouillet greatly disconcerted the Duc d'Orléans. Ever since the previous Saturday he had been exercising sovereign power. He had appointed Ministers, convened the Chambers for August 3rd, and proclaimed the tricolour the national flag. It was impossible, however, to restore complete tranquillity so long as the fallen King remained within a short distance of Paris, surrounded by a military force which had not yet formally acknowledged the new Government. The Duke, therefore, directed that an armed demonstration should be made against Rambouillet. In the official account of this affair, published in the *Moniteur* of August 6th, it is stated that La Fayette was ordered to employ 6000 National Guards for the purpose. The beating of drums at

¹ *Vide*, p. 385.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XX. p. 768.

² These memoirs would appear to have been written in French. I do not know what has become of the MS. A brief account of Lord Howden's mission is given by an "Occasional Correspondent" in *The Times* of October 14th, 1873, p. 8. It is referred to by M. E. Daudet in *La Révolution de 1830*, p. 88. Both Pasquier (VI. pp. 330-331) and Marmont (*Mémoires*, VIII. p. 325) mention an interview between Colonel Caradoc and Charles X. They differ as to its object, but both agree in describing it as having taken place on the road between Rambouillet and Cherbourg.

³ Pasquier, VI. pp. 320-321.

the Hôtel de Ville, however, caused a vast crowd to assemble, the cry "*à Rambouillet!*" was set up, and in a moment forty or fifty thousand armed citizens started off for the Royal residence "with that dash which has ever been characteristic of Frenchmen in all their enterprises." Pasquier relates that he was walking through the Champs Elysées, when he found himself suddenly in the midst of a hideous rabble. He estimates that about fifteen or sixteen thousand armed men passed him, some on foot, some in cabs and vehicles of every kind, which had been requisitioned during the morning. The sinister faces around him reminded him of a similar expedition on October 6th, 1789, and he is prepared to affirm that he did not see a single person in the uniform of the National Guard.¹ Without doubt, the Duc d'Orléans and his advisers were confident that the Royal troops would offer no serious resistance, and, of a surety, they were well pleased that the scum of the population should be away from Paris on the day of the meeting of the Chambers.

Meanwhile, three commissioners, Marshal Maison, M. de Schonen, and M. Odillon Barrot were proceeding to Rambouillet in advance of the mob. They insisted upon being taken at once into Charles' presence, and assured him, when they were admitted, that the whole of Paris was advancing to the attack. Maison warned him roughly that, should he persist in remaining where he was, he would be responsible for the bloodshed which his decision would entail. Odillon Barrot suggested diplomatically that his peaceful departure would improve greatly the prospects of the Duc de Bordeaux. He was visibly impressed by this view of the situation. After retiring to deliberate in private for a short time he sent for Maison. Two years before he had conferred upon this person the *bâton* of a Marshal of France, and he now adjured him to tell him truthfully whether 80,000 men were on the march from Paris. "I have not counted them," said he, "but I should guess that they amount to about that number." This statement, from an officer whom he believed he could trust, overcame Charles' resistance. He announced his readiness to depart at once with all the members of his family.²

Upon the abdication of the King and the Dauphin, Marmont had resumed the command of the troops at Rambouillet. It has been said that by acquiescing in Charles' departure, he allowed a splendid opportunity to escape of inflicting a salutary lesson upon the mob. He, however, alleges that the troops had

¹ Pasquier, VI. pp. 322-323, 328-329.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VIII. pp. 416-418.

Viel Castel, *Histoire*, XX. pp. 701-703.

² Pasquier, VI. pp. 324-326.

Marmont, *Mémoires*, VIII. pp. 312-313.

lost all spirit, and that the position at Rambouillet was difficult to defend. On the other hand, it has been contended that, had the soldiers been attacked, they would have shown themselves eager to avenge their defeat in the streets of Paris. In such case as this the tactical considerations entered into by the Marshal may be ignored. It cannot be doubted that, provided it were disposed to fight for the Royal cause, the army under his command was amply sufficient to have made short work of the mob. It is difficult to believe, however, that the dynasty would have profited by such a victory. The whole country had declared for the revolution, and at this stage resistance could have resulted only in the massacre of the Royal family. The Duc de Luxembourg, in a conversation with one of the commissioners in the evening, doubtless summed up the situation correctly: "I believe you have imposed upon us," said he; "nevertheless, had we swept that rabble off the face of the earth, we should have been rendering merely a great service to the Duc d'Orléans."¹

Charles quitted Rambouillet in the evening of August 3rd, and, escorted by his gardes-du-corps only, proceeded by easy stages to Cherbourg. Despite the efforts of the commissioners who accompanied him to accelerate his march, his progress was of the slowest. Perhaps he still expected that a movement in his favour would break out in La Vendée, or possibly he may have been induced to linger by the hope that some promise made to him at Rambouillet would be fulfilled. Yet, as the Royal family moved slowly towards the coast, the aspect of the people must have dispelled their illusions. Everywhere the inhabitants saw their King pass into exile with cold indifference, and scarcely a hat was raised in his honour. From church steeples and public buildings the tricolour was flying, and even the country-houses of the nobility were prudently closed against him. On August 16th, Charles arrived at Cherbourg, and, accompanied by his family and by Marshal Marmont, sailed for England on board the *Great Britain*, an American vessel which had been chartered for his conveyance. A week earlier, on August 9th, Louis Philippe, Duc d'Orléans, had sworn fidelity to the revised Charter at the Palais-Bourbon, and had been proclaimed *King of the French*.²

¹ Viel Castet, *Histoire*, XX. pp. 703-706.

Marmont, *Mémoires*, VIII. pp. 313-320.

Chateaubriand, *Mémoires* (Bruxelles, 1850), XVI. pp. 5-10.

Nettement, *Histoire*, VIII. pp. 708-712.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VIII. pp. 425-427.

Pasquier, VI. pp. 327-328.

² Marmont, *Mémoires*, VIII. pp. 321-333.

Pasquier, VI. pp. 344-347.

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VIII. pp. 428-431, 441-447.

Nettement, *Histoire*, VIII. pp. 728-731.

Of the seven Ministers who composed Charles X's last Cabinet only MM. de Montbel, Capelle, and d'Haussez succeeded in escaping abroad. Peyronnet, after walking from Rambouillet to Chartres in his dress-shoes, was recognized by an official whom he had dismissed from his post, and was cast into prison at Tours. In the same neighbourhood, a few days later, Guernon-Ranville and Chantelauze were apprehended. When arrested at Granville in Normandy, on August 15th, Polignac was attempting to pass for the servant of the Marquise de Saint-Fargeau. His practice of drawing on a pair of gloves, in order to protect his hands whilst cleaning his mistress' boots, appears to have excited the suspicions of his fellow-domestics. All four prisoners were in due course conveyed to Paris, and incarcerated at Vincennes.¹ The feeling against them was very strong among the people of Paris. Louis Philippe, however, was resolved at all hazards to save their lives. At their trial before the Peers, in December, they were found guilty of high treason, but, in deference to the King's wishes, were condemned only to perpetual imprisonment. They were indebted, however, to the firmness and skilful provisions of Montalivet, the Minister of the Interior, that they were not torn to pieces by the mob and the National Guards when they were removed from the Luxembourg.² After undergoing a detention of six years' duration in the fortress of Ham they were set at liberty.³

From 1814 to 1830 the Monarchy had been struggling with difficulties inherent to the conditions under which the Restoration had been effected. The Constitutional Charter, which was to be a guarantee that existing institutions were to be maintained, had established a parliamentary system modelled upon that of England. At the bidding of the Tsar, Louis XVIII had been compelled to adopt a form of government, which accorded ill with national traditions, and which had to be carried on in conjunction with the highly centralized administrative system instituted by Bonaparte. An acute observer of French affairs has pointed out that parliamentary government is incompatible with a centralized bureaucracy, and that the difficulty of reconciling the two systems has not been overcome to this day.⁴ The sudden removal of a strong hand from the central government produced

¹ E. Daudet, *Révolution de 1830*, pp. 78-79, 102-110, 114-130. Pasquier, VI. p. 330 (note).

² E. Daudet, *Révolution de 1830*, Procès des Ministres de Charles X, pp. 159-274.

Pasquier, VI. pp. 368-478.

³ Guernon-Ranville, in his *Journal d'un ministre*, Caen, 1873, gives an account of their imprisonment.

⁴ J. E. C. Bodley, *France*, new edition, 1899, pp. 407, 408, 415, 596.

anarchy under the First Restoration. The task of engrafting the parliamentary system upon national institutions which were unsuited to receive it was not, however, the only problem which confronted the Monarchy. It was foreign invasion, not the action of the people themselves, which had made the return of the Bourbons possible. But the enthronement of a brother of Louis XVI, which put an end to the war, aroused apprehensions, and was the signal for animosities to break out, which the Imperial rule had held in check. The fear that the revolutionary land settlement was to be disturbed, the general contempt into which the Government had fallen, and the lack of consideration shown to the army enabled Bonaparte to march to Paris without firing a shot.

Under the Second Restoration the main causes which had produced the overthrow of the Monarchy in 1815, continued to operate with varying degrees of intensity. As it was put further to the test the unsuitability of representative government to the national temperament was made manifest. The establishment of the party system, the essential complement of parliamentary government, was rendered impossible by the unwillingness of Deputies to submit to the necessary discipline. The tendency of Royalists and Liberals to break up into groups produced that Ministerial instability which has been the feature of French political life under all parliamentary *régimes*.¹ Though Villèle succeeded in forming a party and in remaining in office for six years, his action, for a long time before his final downfall, had been paralysed by the disunion of his followers. Décazes, Richelieu, and Martignac were all in turn beset by the same difficulties.

The people, generally, took small interest in parliamentary proceedings. They cared little whether the franchise were narrowed, or whether a Deputy were ejected from the Chamber by soldiers. They placed their faith in the Charter, not because it had established parliamentary government, but because it prevented a return to the old *régime*. The infirm old Louis XVIII was not the ruler of their choice, but they began to trust him when they saw that he was determined to defend the Constitution against the Ultra-Royalists. The advantages of peace and of a stable government were reflected in a general prosperity, which turned men's thoughts from revolutionary ideas. Hence the crushing electoral defeat of the Liberal party, in consequence of the countenance which certain prominent members of it had given to the Carbonari and military conspiracies. Charles X upon his accession reaped the full benefit of his brother's wisdom. Moreover, his appearance on horseback and his grace of manner told in his favour. This good impression, however, was of brief dura-

tion. The clergy had suffered too much in the Revolution to be credited with friendly dispositions towards the institutions of modern France. Many of the high dignitaries of the Church were men of ambitious views, who were known to be scheming to regain for it its lost power. Charles' piety and his extreme deference to the clergy aroused misgivings. His coronation at Rheims was contrasted with that of the Emperor at Notre-Dame, and was held to be symbolical of ecclesiastical domination. Whilst educated men talked of the occult influence of the Congregation over the King's counsels and over every department of the State, the working classes, after the processions of the Jubilee, were convinced that their Sovereign was a Jesuit. The laws of sacrilege and of primogeniture evoked the dreaded spectre of the old *régime*. Peyronnet's abortive press bill, *the law of justice and of love*, was believed to have been brought forward in deference to the demands of a reactionary clergy.

The recollections of the Revolution were too fresh in the minds of the men of the Restoration for political controversy to be carried on in any spirit but one of extreme bitterness. To them "party division meant not the constitutional struggle to gain or to guard administrative office under an unchanging sovereign power, but defence and attack of the existing *régime*."¹ Unlike his brother, Charles X was by temperament unsuited to the part of a Constitutional Sovereign. He took the keenest interest in the business of government, and entered passionately into all the contentious questions of the day.² But the idea that he must dismiss his Ministers at the bidding of a factious opposition was as repugnant to him as to a King of the old *régime*. A Constitution admitting of the personal rule of the Sovereign was infinitely better suited to the nation than parliamentary government. It is conceivable that such a system might have been imposed successfully upon the country had a well-considered plan for its adoption been put into execution at a favourable opportunity. But Charles had still that leaning towards "small men and small measures," of which he had given proofs as the Comte d'Artois. At Coblenz he believed in Calonne, and championed the policy of the emigration. At the Tuilleries he placed his faith in Polignac, and issued the ordinances of July.

There were many men, even among the Liberals, who were ready to admit that the parliamentary system could not be established satisfactorily in France. Polignac's incapacity, however was so notorious, that they had no faith in his ability to carry out successfully the attack upon it which they suspected

¹ J. E. C. Bodley, *France*, new edition, 1899, p. 379.

² *Nettement, Histoire*, VIII. pp. 733-734 (note).

him of planning. They were moved to indignation, not at the idea that a violation of the Constitution was contemplated, but at the thought of the chaos which must result from an unsuccessful *coup d'état*. Unquestionably this was the general feeling of the well-to-do *bourgeoisie*. The resistance of the labouring classes and the students to the ordinances proved to be, however, the determining factor in the situation. Their attitude may be ascribed in part to the contempt and hatred which they felt for Polignac as a priest-ridden *émigré*. It is certain that the working men of Paris had no respect for parliamentary government. During the street fighting of July, it was not to their Deputies that they looked for guidance. Twenty-one years later they were to laugh and clap their hands when they saw their chosen representatives packed into prison vans and driven off to Mazas.¹ In 1830 the masses were stirred to action by their anti-clericalism and their hatred of the reigning dynasty. After the Revolution, the prodigious number of silver coins upon which Charles' effigy had been surmounted by the *biretta* shows how widespread was the belief in his subjection to the priests.² Moreover, the sack of the Archbishop's palace and of the Jesuit establishment at Montrouge were the only instances of wanton damage committed in the hour of victory. The legend has been propagated sedulously that the rule of the elder branch was oppressive. Nevertheless, it is certain that under the Restoration the people enjoyed a greater degree of liberty than under any *régime* which preceded it, and fully as much as under the one which followed it.

The extreme unpopularity of the Bourbons was due to the conditions which had attended the re-establishment of the Monarchy. Not only was it galling to the national pride that the Sovereign should owe his crown to foreign intervention, but the unreasonable suspicion was entertained that the loss of territory, to which France had been subjected, was the price which the Bourbons had agreed to pay to the Allies for their assistance. The disasters of 1814 and 1815 had not quelled the warlike spirit of the people. They remembered with satisfaction that a coalition of the nations had alone proved capable of overpowering them. In the last years of the Restoration the rising generation was

¹ Victor Hugo, *Histoire d'un Orfèvre*, 4th edition, 1877, I. p. 118. "Quelques hommes en blouses battirent des mains et crièrent, 'C'est bien fait ! à bas les vingt cinq francs !'" I. p. 173, "Une vieille femme disait. Les vingt cinq francs sont à bas. Tant mieux." Under the Restoration and under the Monarchy of July, Deputies were not paid. It is possible that they may have been regarded with a little more respect in consequence.

² Nettelement, *Histoire*, VIII. p. 735 (note).

Vaulabelle, *Deux Restaurations*, VIII. p. 451 (note).

burning to see the country regain its natural frontiers. "What are your opinions about the treaties of 1815?"¹ was the first question put to the Duc d'Orléans by a deputation of young Republicans. Guizot relates that a paper was placed in his hands, a few days before Louis Philippe's enthronement, in which were set forth the views of the Hôtel de Ville party. "A bold march to the Rhine" occupied the foremost place among the measures which were to fortify and regenerate the nation.² Without doubt, many combatants in the days of July went forth to fight, convinced that the defeat of the Bourbons would mean a victory gained over the Allied Sovereigns.

Charles, by his folly, had alarmed the middle classes, and alienated from his cause the sympathies even of his well-wishers. In the hour of distress the best elements of the nation stood aloof and allowed the Monarchy to fall to the ground. Legitimate Sovereignty was overthrown, but the fate of the *régime* which was set up in its place was to prove that revolutionary forces cannot be let loose with impunity.

¹ Thureau Dangin, *La Monarchie de Juillet*, I. p. 50.

² Guizot, *Mémoires*, II. pp. 31-33.

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